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FOREWORD 
In addition to the various forms of Japanese management, the often uni-
quely regarded Japanese relationships between employers and employees 
(industrial relations) are an area, which is of equal interest, both to the West-
ern academic and economic worlds, and about which a great number of stu-
dies have been conducted. Even in the early 1980s two international Confer-
ences were jointly organized by Japanese and German scholars (in 1982 in 
Sendai, Japan and in 1983 in Darmstadt, Germany), at which industrial soci-
ologists and economists, mainly from Japan and Germany, discussed the 
Systems of industrial relations from a comparative perspective.1 
In the years since the last of these two Conferences many things have 
changed. Nowadays the discussions amongst industrial sociologists are 
about the reprofessionalization of work and the end of the division of labour, 
about industrial districts and also particularly about newproduction Systems. 
Industrial relations in all countries are strongly influenced by the increas-
ing world economic Integration through the emergence of supra-national 
economic zones and by the expansion of world trade, as well as foreign 
direct investment. It was a result of these deliberations that the German 
Institute for Japanese Studies developed the plan to once again bring to-
gether Japanese and German specialists in a Conference on this field of 
study. 
As was the case in the previous Conferences, the aim was not only the 
exchange of results of academic research, but it was of great importance 
to the Organizers that mutual Cooperation beyond the limits of the Con-
ference should come about between the colleagues of various nations. 
Even the first Conferences provided the initiative to work together. Both 
the bibliographies of the various articles and also the biographies of the 
authors are evidence of this. It was hoped that this Cooperation would be 
deepened and extended, and so not only participants from previous Con-
ferences, but also other, particularly younger industrial sociologists, were 
invited. 
Communication between experts of different countries is not without 
difficulties. The lingua franca, English, was not the native language of any 
of the Speakers and of course the level of English among the individual 
Tokunaga, Shigeyoshi and Joachim Bergmann (eds.) (1984): Industrial Relations 
in Transition - The Cases of Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany. Tokyo: 
University of Tokyo Press. 
Bergmann, Joachim and Shigeyoshi Tokunaga (eds.) (1987): Economic and So-
cial Aspects of Industrial Relations - A Comparison of the German and the Ja-
panese Systems. Frankfurt/New York: Campus Verlag. 
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participants varied greatly. However, the Organizers decided against 
translating into the various languages, since, as already mentioned, 
Cooperation was to be encouraged and working together on a daily basis 
through an Interpreter would hardly be possible. 
It also was an aim of the Organizers to present results of current empiri-
cal work, which was still unknown outside the home country. For the 
realization of this fifth International Symposium of the German Institute 
for Japanese Studies, the fruitful Cooperation of the national Töhoku Uni-
versity in Sendai could be ensured. At this point I would particularly like 
to thank Dr. Nishizawa Jun'ichi (Professor Emeritus and President of Tö-
hoku University) as well as Dr. Tokunaga Shigeyoshi (Professor at the 
Faculty of Economics of Töhoku University) and his assistants for all their 
support. The Organization of the Conference was in the capable hands of 
Dr. Nomura Masami (Professor of Economics at Okayama University), 
Hiramoto Atsushi (Professor at the Faculty of Economics of Töhoku Uni-
versity), Dr. Norbert Altmann (Chairman and Research Director of the 
Institute for Social Research, Munich) and Dr. Tokunaga who chaired the 
Organization committee. For their contribution we are also most grateful. 
On the part of the German Institute for Japanese Studies, the research 
fellows Helmut Demes and Bettina Post-Kobayashi were members of this 
committee. 
The Conference took place between 14th and 16th October 1991 and 
brought together 19 Speakers from Japan, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many and other European countries. A further 40 participants from 
economic and political fields took part in the discussions. 
The Organization committee selected three main subject matters, which 
they believed to be particularly worth discussing: 
1. What influence has the rapid internationalization of the national econo-
mies and companies on industrial relations? It was intended that the 
focus should be on Japanese companies, which in the past ten years 
have been investing in many countries of the world and whose 
branches are testing ground for the transferability of production Sys-
tems to other countries. 
2. What influence have the new production Systems which include the 
whole value adding process? Here the discussion should focus on the 
Organization of supply and effects on industrial relations in the sub-
contracting industry, an aspect which up to now has been neglected. 
3. Finally, the questions had to be asked: what new possibilities arise in 
the setting and development of labour Standards; how can precarious 
labour condifions be fought and negative effects on employees be al-
leviated, and what chances and dangers arise for working Standards 
from new political developments? 
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This publication of revised Conference papers is divided into five parts. 
In the first part, two of the Organizers, Dr. Tokunaga and Dr. Altmann, 
have arranged the questions theoretically and link them with the results 
of the first two Conferences. The following three parts deal with the ques-
tions mentioned above. In the fifth and final part, the question wil l be 
raised, with reference to the previous essays, as to what extent the cur-
rency much discussed concept of "lean production" can be a model for 
the next Century. 
I am convinced that this volume represents a valuable contribution to 
a better understanding of the Japanese economy and society in Germany 
and in the world, and hope that it gives rise to further discussion. For this 
reason I am particularly glad that, thanks to the efforts of the editors, these 
proceedings could be published so quickly. 
Josef Kreiner 
Director 
German Institute for Japanese Studies 
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CONVERGENCE OF RATIONALIZATION - DLVERGENCE 
OF INTEREST REPRESENTATION 
Norbert Altmann 
ABSTRACT 
The first part of this introductory essay establishes a link to industrial sociological 
issues of the early eighties. At that time, the debate centered around questions of 
internal Company rationalization (the introduction of microelectronics) and the "Ja-
panization" of the German System of worker representation. Since then rationali-
zation strategies and measures have taken a new direction: They are oriented 
toward productivity increases in the entire value added chain, from procurement 
of materials and parts supply to the manufacturing of the end product all the way 
to distribution; the strategies are based on information technology which effect an 
international and global systemic Integration. Traditional structures of worker rep-
resentation therefore become obsolete. However, new appoaches and opportunities 
arise for union policy and a new politicization of worker representation, resulting 
in a worldwide convergence of rationalization strategies (not forms of rationaliza-
tion) and a continued divergence of industrial relations. Thus, the "Japanization" 
does not take place. 
CONTENTS 
1. Looking back and looking ahead 
2. Systemic rationalization - analytic aspects of a worldwide strategy 
3. Obsolete structures and new opportunities for interest representation - ap-
proaches in union policy in Germany 
4. Spearhead for better work Standards? 
Bibliography 
1. L O O K I N G B A C K A N D L O O K I N G A H E A D 
The Conference that we are launching today has its roots in two previous 
Conferences held in 1982 and 1983. 
The topic of the first Conference, which took place in Sendai (Japan), 
Industrial Relations in Transition1, and that of the second, a year later in 
1 Symposium held at the Faculty of Economics, Töhoku University, Sept./Oct. 
1982. Proceedings cf. Tokunaga and Bergmann 1984. 
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Darmstadt (Germany), Economic and Social Aspects of Industrial Relations2. 
Both issues focused on Japan and West Germany and were treated, to 
some extent, comparatively. In preparing the present Conference, the Or-
ganizers have endeavoured to remain within the tradition of the questions 
raised and dealt with at the Conferences which preceded it. In view of the 
fact that some eight years have passed in the meantime, this requires a 
few words of explanation. 
First of all, both Conferences had the unexpected effect of providing the 
starting point for a number of Japanese and German collaborations, which 
have continued up to today and are seemingly gaining strength. In the 
course of time more Japanese and German colleagues working in corre-
sponding fields have become involved; this is documented by the 
Speakers and guests at this Conference. Thus, there has been de facto no 
interruption in the exchange of ideas over the past eight years - a develop-
ment which provides the basis for continuing this tradition in the form 
of Conferences. 
A further array of reasons for continuing the tradition of Conferences 
lies in the topics with which we have concerned ourselves, reflecting as 
they do the developments and changes in Company rationalization strate-
gies, industrial relations, and the basic economic and social conditions of 
the eighties. Standing at the onset of a new decade, we find ourselves 
raising new questions and seeking new answers. In this respect it seems 
appropriate to look back for a moment to the Conferences held in 1982 
and 1983. 
Both Conferences were strongly marked by the developments following 
the first oil crisis of 1973 and especially by the critical economic Situation 
at the beginning of the eighties. At the first Conference, the German par-
ticipants reported on the surprising stability of the dual System of in-
dustrial relations in West Germany. Instead of the 'crisis in cooperative 
trade union policy' and an increasing orientation towards conflict which 
many had expected, there was a 'flexible adjustment of interest repre-
sentation to the crisis' as Gerhard Brandt (1984), our late colleague, for-
mulated it in his introductory address in 1982. With the 'cooperative reg-
ulation of conflict', the question of the 'Japanization' of interest repre-
sentation also arose (see also Deutschmann 1989a). Tendencies towards 
'syndicalistic loyalty' on the part of employees, and the 'gradual trans-
formation of works Councils into de facto Company unions' (Streeck 1984) 
were predicted. In the following, I refer to these concepts as 'tendencies 
toward company-centered interest representation' (Verbetrieblichung). 
2 Symposium held at Technical University, Sept. 1983. Proceedings cf. Bergmann 
and Tokunaga 1987. 
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This thesis posits a transfer of power and capacity for regulation from the 
industry-wide unions to the works Councils on the plant level. 
At the same time, however, the weak position of the works Councils 
outside the large companies was also pointed out. The tension between 
concepts of union policy which were increasingly directed toward inputs 
into the design of technology and work rather than simply compensation 
for negative effects' and the works Councils' problems in realizing these 
concepts at the plant level was debated (Altmann 1984). The question of 
the 'Japanization' of interest representation remained open. 
One point in which there was agreement was that labour markets were 
becoming increasingly segmented as a result of the rationalization meas-
ures taken at that time, particularly the rapidly spreading utilization of 
microelectronics. In the treatment of this point the "dual production struc-
ture" in Japan moved especially into the forefront, that is, the sub-
contracting system and the associated hierarchical structures of the labour 
market and of employment Status (Tokunaga 1984). With reference to 
'slim-down management' in rationalization (Hiramoto 1984) and the re-
lated measures in personnel policy, the outlines of corresponding develop-
ments in Germany were also suggested, for instance the Integration of 
indirect job tasks and participatory forms of work Organization in the 
broadest sense (Deutschmann 1984). 
A l l in all, the tension between company-centred interest representation 
in Japan and the fate of dual interest representation in Germany played 
a central role in our debates at the second Conference as well (Bergmann 
and Tokunaga 1987). However, rationalization measures were seen on all 
sides - even by our Japanese colleagues despite their references to the 
dual production structure - primarily in a company-related context, 
shaped by our experiences with the implementation of microelectronics 
and computer-aided technologies. The question of reorganizing manufac-
turing in a supra-company context, especially on an international level, 
and thereby raising the question of completely new tasks for interest rep-
resentation, was not a subject for debate. But it was precisely to these 
issues that the perception of problems shifted in the second half of the 
80s. 
The questions raised at that time must be posed anew and related to 
present-day developments. In doing this, there are three general areas 
that will be discussed in depth and from a number of different perspec-
tives in the course of this Conference. Briefly they are: 
1. New strategies of rationalization, which transcend Company bounda-
ries and which have an international focus, 
2. the role of a company-linked interest representation or one which 
reaches out beyond the Company, and 
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3. the labour Standards to be achieved, both to ensure productivity as well 
as to create humane working conditions. 
If you would permit me to interject a comment here: My contribution 
refers mainly to the metal workers' union (IG Metall) and to the works 
Councils of the automotive, metal and electrical industries, namely to mass 
production goods when addressing the above-mentioned topics. It should 
be borne in mind, however, that corresponding developments can be de-
tected in other industrial sectors. It is also relevant that companies from 
other industrial branches have been involved in the rationalization of the 
automobile producers and their major suppliers. Thereby essential 
economic sectors are covered by the developments which are the topics 
for discussion at this Conference. 
In the next section I will deal with strategies of rationalization and then 
approach the question of industrial relations. 
2. SYSTEMIC RATIONALIZATION - A N A L Y T I C ASPECTS OF A WORLDWIDE 
STRATEGY 
Let us turn to rationalization. What have been the main changes in the 
mass production goods industry since the end of the seventies and the 
beginrüng of the eighties? 
It has become accepted worldwide, both in scientific circles as well as 
in business management, that far-reaching changes in manufacturing 
strategies are taking place. It should suffice - in view of the group of 
experts gathered here - just to mention the change in the market structures 
brought about by international competition, the satiation and differentia-
tion of demand, as well as the rigidity of Tayloristic manufacturing 
methods which are no longer capable of meeting the markets' flexibility 
requirements, the cost pressures within companies etc. It is assumed that 
the limits of the Fordistic accumulation regime have been reached, and 
that the balance between forms of production and level of consumption 
or even the Standard of living in a more comprehensive sense is presently 
in crisis - despite the existing regulating mechanisms provided by the 
welfare System. 
The Company rationalization strategies of the seventies - and here I am 
referring primarily to Germany - seeking to achieve production flexibility 
and individual work motivation in mass production with the aid of work 
Organization measures (work structuring is the keyword here) - soon 
reached their limits (Altmann et al. 1982). The introduction of microelec-
tronics and associated computer-based manufacturing Systems generated 
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considerable advances in flexibility. But these remained limited as long 
as rationalization measures were mainly geared to meeting in-house flex-
ibility requirements. 
Since the beginning of the eighties the central problem of rationaliza-
tion strategies has been the linkage of flexibility and cost reduction. On 
the basis of rigid machinery and a Tayloristic work Organization, it was 
not possible to optimize the relationship between these two demands. 
This is also not possible - at least for mass produced goods - within tradi-
tional Company boundaries. 
The basic structure of the new forms of production which seek to re-
solve the contradiction between flexibilization and economization i.e. 
simultaneous cost reduction, can be summed up in the term "systemic 
rationalization". 
At this point a brief semantic Observation is unfortunately necessary. 
The use of the term 'systemic' means a rationalization strategy which 
includes the whole chain of value creation of a product, in other words, 
one which extends beyond the boundaries of the individual Company and 
which affects every part of this chain. The expression as used here has no 
relation to System theory in the restricted sense. 'Strategy' refers to the 
structural features of a process of rationalization, which can only be in-
terpreted in retrospect as an expression of conscious, targeted manage-
ment concepts. I will return to this later. 
I should like to outline this rationalization strategy, to which the new 
concrete forms of production correspond, in six main ideas. 
My intention is to shed some light on the analytic dimensions of the 
worldwide structural convergence of rationalization, which, however, get 
expressed in nationally specific forms due to societal conditions. 
How can we characterize - as ideal types - systemic rationalization 
and its corresponding production forms?3 
1. Essentially, systemic rationalization is no longer solely oriented towards 
increasing Performance at individual workplaces, the productive capacity 
of individual machines and installations, or towards enhancing the eff i-
ciency of delimited machining processes. Instead, its primary objective is 
the optimal coordination of all functions and work processes within the 
Company. The thrust is towards the Integration of manufacturing 
Regarding systemic rationalization, cf. the work of the Institute for Social Re-
search (ISF), Munich: Altmann et al. 1986; Altmann and Sauer 1989; Döhl 1988; 
Bieber and Sauer 1991; Sauer et al. 1992. Regarding discussions in Germany: 
Baethge and Oberbeck 1986; Deutschmann 1989b; Bergstennann and 
Brandherm-Böhmker 1990. 
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processes within the Company and information technology is the essential 
tool in achieving this objective. 
Computer-aided, integrated manufacturing Systems (CIM), as well as the 
rapid introduction of assembly-oriented engineering, for instance in the 
combination of C A D / C A M (Computer aided design/computer aided 
manufacturing), are concrete expressions of this. In this context, the corre-
sponding feedback and control technologies, such as production data ac-
quisition (PDA) and personnel information System (PIS), are also worthy 
of mention. 
2. Systemic rationalization refers, above and beyond work process, plant 
and Company, to the entire manufacturing chain of a product; that is, to 
the coordinated rationalization of supply and processing, which also in-
cludes the downstream distribution processes and service areas. In con-
trast to conventional Fordistic structures, we are not dealing with 
economic and legal Integration within a Company, but primarily with link-
ages or even restructuring within a hierarchical network of manufacturing 
(and distribution). Organizational measures, but above all information 
technology-based Integration, enable direct technical and organizational 
interaction throughout the entire production chain. Relations between 
companies, which until now have been primarily mediated by the market 
- whether contractually or relationally based - are tending to become 
fixed in a real and concrete way. Thus, they result in new forms of both 
dependency as well as autonomy for the affected companies, which are 
not mediated solely on the basis of market mechanisms. 
Once again, I would like to emphasize the Strategie relation to the op-
timization of value creation throughout the entire production chain. 
In externalizing or integrating individual process segments into the com-
pany's own production process, e.g. make or buy decisions (MOB deci-
sions) related to production costs or the company's own know-how are 
no longer the only considerations. Apart from securing processes which 
are company-speeifie and important from the perspective of market 
strategy, the relative importance of externalization or Integration for pro-
duetivity in the chain as a whole is decisive. 
3. There have always been attempts to control the upstream and 
downstream manufacturing stages and thereby skim off profits. In the 
Fordistic tradition this was primarily achieved by vertical Integration 
within a Company or by the Company exploiting its own market power. 
As far as strategy is concerned, however, systemic rationalization does 
not center on such measures. It is not a matter of simply transferring 
profits within a production chain in the sense of a zero-sum game. Rather, 
given ongoing increases in produetivity, the critical point becomes having 
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an influence on the source as well as Controlling the distribution of the 
productivity gains that have been achieved. This implies two different 
things: 
As to the first, companies which are more or less dependent and possess 
limited innovation and investment capacity must be granted sufficient 
autonomy to be able to exploit their specific Performance potential to the 
füllest extent possible. 
As to the second, for Controlling companies it is a matter of being able 
to define the means or instruments which determine the development of 
total productivity and the distribution of productivity gains. I wil l return 
to this aspect shortly. 
The gap between rigid cost pressure and sheer exploitation by powerful 
companies on the one hand, and Cooperation and assistance on the other 
is a large one in reality, and neither the one extreme nor the other char-
acterizes relationships between dependent and Controlling companies. It 
is a matter of balancing control and autonomy, and for the focal companies 
the issue consists of Controlling the autonomy of the dependent companies 
throughout the production chain. 
4. Neither market mechanisms nor relationships of direct economic de-
pendence generate productivity increases and power positions in the pro-
duction chain. Market mechanisms and relationships of dependence come 
into play via manufacturing functions which are determined by the 
markets of focal companies or end producers and their rationalization 
strategies. The decisive functions - or more concretely: Company areas -
are research and development, inter-company logistics and supra-com-
pany quality assurance. Especially in these areas, not only do the material 
linkages within the production chain take concrete form, but also the in-
struments for determining control and autonomy (with regard to this sec-
tion, compare the contribution by Dieter Sauer). 
a) The extent to which a Company is in the position of engaging in research 
and development (R&D) thanks to its capacity for innovation and inven-
tion also determines its degree of autonomy within the production chain. 
The increasing in-house basic research in focal companies and expanding 
in-house development of products and process technologies in upstream 
companies preserve the State of balance. At the same time, due to different 
centers of gravity in research and development, the dominant companies' 
potential and needs for planning, regulation and control continue to grow. 
b) Inter-company logistics is geared to achieving productivity gains on a 
supra-company level and also serves to structure inter-company relations 
between Controlling and dependent companies. Here, too, it is not a matter 
of simply shifting costs, but essentially a rationalization issue, namely that 
of increasing organizational flexibility and lowering the transaction costs 
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in the whole chain. At the same time information and Communications 
technology helps render the logistics process considerably more trans-
parent, and thus increases the potential for regulation and control. This 
makes it possible to redefine the relationship of autonomy and depen-
dence. 
c) Quality assurance is a central mechanism for mediating the rationali-
zation of the production chain as a whole. It is not just a matter of com-
petitiveness in quality in the end product market, or of lowering inspec-
tion costs, but also a matter of achieving the means for realization of com-
plex techniques of automation in the end producer's Company. Quality 
Standards become a means of Controlling the production chain and pro-
ductivity gains. On the whole this also expands the potential for balancing 
autonomy and control. 
5. The central focus of systemic rationalization is to exploit the elastic 
potential of technology, and not that of the labour force, in order to achieve 
flexibility. I am very much aware that what I am postulating is likely to 
meet with considerable Opposition. Most social scientists and managers 
continue to see flexibility in small-scale companies, in company-internal 
decentralized production structures or in altered forms of the assignment 
and use of labour. The key words here are: profit centers as the principle 
of Company Organization, reprofessionalization, group work, U-line Or-
ganization in direct manufacturing, and so on. 
Flexibility and economization of the product chain for mass-production 
goods, however, can only be achieved on the condition and basis of flex-
ible automation and of System technologies which ensure regulation and 
control of the decentralized production sequences over and beyond Single 
processes or companies. In this way the labour force loses some of its 
importance as an immediate subject of systemic rationalization strategies 
for securing flexibility. Determining which groups of employees - or more 
precisely, which functions and skills - will gain more importance at which 
points in the production chain can only be derived by focusing on sys-
temic rationalization through flexible technologies. 
In direct production the few positions of process control become highly 
relevant. At least as far as end users and direct suppliers are concerned, 
these are engineering positions in the further development of flexible tech-
nologies and Software. Furthermore, there are the key groups with vary-
ing qualifications which are to be found at the still problematic interfaces 
of different technologies and inter-company networks. Lastly, there are 
the experts dealing with structurally similar problems in implementing 
computer-aided flexible technologies which are continually arising and 
ensuring their Optimum capacity utilization. The issue of the flexible ex-
ploitation of labour either in the small companies at the Tower' levels of 
the suppliers' pyramid, or in the small companies downstream in the 
service sector go beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Labour does not directly secure production flexibility but rather the 
functioning of flexible technology as the indispensible basis of systemi-
cally integrated production. For this reason, human resource management 
is a variable resulting from the rationalization strategy, which is mainly 
oriented toward technical flexibility, and so remains limited. 
6. Bringing the analytical outline of systemic rationalization to an end, 
there are at least three other questions that should be raised, which I can 
only touch upon briefly: 
a) First of all, I would like to deal with a question which was posed by 
Christoph Deutschmann in an earlier paper (Deutschmann 1989b): Who 
is the moving force of systemic rationalization, and if it is management, 
who does this management consist of? The type of rationalization I have 
outlined demonstrates clear impulses for optimizing the relationship be-
tween achieving flexibility and reducing costs simultaneously under the 
new conditions of competition on the sales markets. This is to say that 
from an analytical Standpoint systemic rationalization is not 'systematic' 
nor is it a managerial planning concept. 
On the empirical level this has been observed - and not just in the auto-
motive industry - in the course systemic rationalization has run, namely 
in small Steps, with insular Solutions and a certain amount of friction. 
Here management fractions, as agents or groups of agents with certain 
interests, play a role which naturally modifies the concrete form of ration-
alization. 
It is absolutely certain, however, as Deutschmann shows, that reflexive 
learning processes tend to develop, which solidify into management con-
cepts, and lead to a most likely increasing and consciously systematic 
planning of systemic rationalization. Systemic rationalization yields suc-
cessive increases in transparency and makes systematic planning possible 
by way of feedback mechanisms. Here too, it is well to remember that the 
production strategies which are spreading worldwide can only be under-
stood in retrospect as managerial 'concepts' - roughly in the sense of Tean 
production' as this is presented by the principle authors of the MIT study 
(Womack et al. 1990). 
b) This brings us to the second question: What does 'internationaliza-
tion' or 'globalization' mean in this context? I can only deal with this very 
briefly here, as our colleague Ulrich Jürgens will be going into this ques-
tion in detail both conceptually and concretely in his paper. 
The Berkeley Round Table on the International Economy (BRIE Discus-
sion Paper 1991) proposes that internationalization be defined as compa-
nies entering the sales market on a worldwide scale; multinationalization 
that companies set up production facilities abroad; and globalization that 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
numerous sources of innovative rationalization concepts exist, which 
develop in the geographical centers of industrial production (such as 
Japan, U.S.A., Europe) and gradually settle into a few different ap-
proaches. This would mean that concepts of lean production, of flexibly 
specialized production, or of industrial districts arise independently of 
one another and in competition with one another. The result would be 
turbulence in the markets and competitive pressure from rival innova-
tions. 
In contrast, the systemic rationalization approach understands global-
ization as being a characteristic of the rationalization strategy itself. This 
involves building up production chains and their networks, mostly sup-
ported by information technology; chains which may be international or 
global, depending on the industry and structural and political conditions 
of the region. The focus remains orienting the production strategy towards 
increasing productivity and profitability within an integrated System, and 
also on creating a balance between autonomy and control in order to be 
able to ensure that profits can be transferred on a worldwide basis. 
c) Finally, there is the question of convergence, which was mentioned 
at the beginning of this paper. Demonstrating that rationalization concepts 
have been 'taken over' by management does not provide the analytic key 
to interpreting strategies of rationalization which are becoming univer-
sally visible, but rather in the attempts at solving the dilemma of flexibility 
versus cost reduction, which are wholly specific to nations, industries, 
and companies. 
The MIT study mentioned above provides effective publicity in placing 
the problem of adopting concepts in the forefront, but all references cited 
are to objective factors of production technology, economics and personnel 
costs. 
If, as just suggested, we assume systemic rationalization to be a basic 
structure, a production form which is currently asserting itself, then the 
various managerial production concepts being discussed today - such 
as flexible specialization, development of industrial districts, lean pro-
duction or flexibly standardized mass production - are all directed 
towards Controlling or incorporating more or less autonomous compa-
nies into the production and distribution chains as an aspect of problem 
solving, as I have outlined. The Solutions tend to remain subordinated 
to the given societal conditions (as demonstrated once again by Berg-
gren in his recent book on the Swedish automotive industry; Berggren 
1991): in other words, structural convergence manifesting itself in differ-
ent forms, or to put it loosely, the convergence of rationalization without 
Japanization. 
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3. OBSOLETE STRUCTURES A N D N E W OPPORTUNITIES FOR INTEREST 
REPRESENTATION - APPROACHES IN U N I O N POLICY I N G E R M A N Y 
I now come to the role which the dual System of interest representation 
existing in Germany plays in this process of rationalization (on the System 
of industrial relations; cf Weiss 1987). The question is whether structurally 
similar strategies of rationalization are associated with convergence in the 
structures of interest representation. 
I return to the thesis mentioned at the beginning of this paper on the 
trend towards 'company-centered interest representation'. 
This thesis, very much simplified, assumes the following: As flexibil-
ization, decentralization and so on increase in mass-production in the 
era of so-called 'post-Fordism', general guidelines can no longer be 
made for the design of work conditions or the implementation and 
enforcement of labour Standards at the union level which is responsible 
for an industry or for large regions. The concrete shaping of general, 
and even abstract, collective agreements is now increasingly and princi-
pally undertaken by the works Councils. At the same time, there is the 
assumption that this results in an increase in their power. This develop-
ment is supported by offers of participation from employers. It is as-
sumed that this would also lie in the employee's interest. The result 
could be that the works Councils would become more tightly bound in 
with Company specific interests in order to secure legitimation and 
clientele. Growing Company syndicalism would be the logical result. To 
an increasing degree, the unions would only perform Service functions 
and the like for the works Councils or direct Services for its members 
(for a summary see Müller-Jentsch 1986: 273). 
To put it briefly and somewhat bluntly: This thesis posits a shift of 
power to the works Councils, "company egoism" and participatory man-
agement and as such a tendency towards the 'Japanization' of interest 
representation. 
In the following I intend to show that this idea of the tendency towards 
company-centered interest representation is not only incorrect, but also 
that the question of Japanization has been wrongly posed. It diverts away 
from the central demands on the System of interest representation in Ger-
many under the conditions of systemic rationalization. 
By the way, here we are not dealing with the question of "adopting" con-
cepts of participation or interest representation - such as the well-known 
examples of Japanese transplants in the U.S. A . - but rather with the ques-
tion of their almost 'inevitable' implementation within the context of new 
strategies of rationalization. 
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I would like to very briefly outline two developments in interest repre-
sentation in Germany which are linked to systemic rationalization. Here 
we are dealing with: 
1. the crisis in the normative System of negotiations and 
2. the obsolescence of institutional structures of interest representation. 
1. Unlike the period of economic crisis at the beginning of the eighties 
and the insular introduction of microelectronics-based 'new technologies' 
up until the middle of the eighties, the adaptation of interest repre-
sentation to changed conditions by means of 'cooperative conflict man-
agement' is no longer a subject for debate. It is now a question of the 
System of negotiating itself, which is founded on the "juridicalization" of 
industrial relations, entering into a crisis (Erd 1978). 
Düring the long period of Tayloristically oriented rationalization, two 
areas of bargaining held center stage in the conflict of interests: one was 
the relationship between wage and Performance, and the other was job 
security. Both areas were extensively regulated and Consolidated by col-
lective agreements and thus also firmly established the works Councils' 
ränge of negotiation tools. This has been called the "juridicalization" (Ver-
rechtlichung) of industrial relations. With the advance of systemic ration-
alization both areas of bargaining became precarious. 
a) The mechanisms for the control and monitoring of labour in Tayloristi-
cally organized work processes were primarily determined by the econom-
ics of time, that is, aimed at securing a measurable quantified job Perform-
ance. The construction of the so-called 'normal Performance'4 was the 'his-
toric compromise' between employers and unions by which the wage-per-
formance relationship could be bargained (Linhart et al. 1989). Conditions 
surrounding Performance - predominantly physical work burdens - were 
quantified and compensated for by means of additional allowances. 
With the advance of systemic rationalization, however, this principle 
of control through the wage-performance relationship lost its foundation. 
This, however, is due only to a limited extent to new forms of labour 
utilization, discussed by many authors, including myself, which cannot 
be negotiated using the traditional, quantitatively-oriented wage and Per-
formance criteria (Altmann and Düll 1990). Indeed planning at the work-
4 In the 60s and 70s, employers and unions agreed in principle upon a definition 
- with various special provisions, - whereby "normal Performance" consists of 
Performance which can be reasonably expected and achieved on a long-term 
basis by every worker having sufficient aptitude and enough practice after ade-
quate training, and which do not entail any health risks. It is obvious that this 
formulation permits considerable scope for interpretation. 
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place level, flexible deployment of labour, teamwork and so on still only 
comprise a restricted quantitative importance in direct production. 
In systemic rationalization the problem of Performance now presents 
itself differently: First of all, as far as the works Councils' bargaining power 
is concerned, it is important whether the unions succeed in generally 
pushing through criteria for work assessment and wage setting which are 
appropriate to the new demands made on some of the labour force (flex-
ible deployment, Cooperation, planning etc). So far, they have not been 
very successful in this respect. Secondly, however, it wil l be of decisive 
importance for the works Councils which position their Company, or a 
particular section of manufacturing within their Company, occupies in the 
dependency pyramid of the total production chain. Opportunities of in-
fluencing relocation of production facilities, MOB decisions, utilization of 
external Services, for example those of a logistical nature, wil l be central 
for them; and thus the question as to what forms of employee Performance 
will be demanded within the Company. 
The once central, Consolidated, normatively secured area of Perform-
ance bargaining not only becomes precarious because conventional cri-
teria of Performance - e.g. work assessment and wage setting - can no 
longer be applied, but also because it finds itself completely outside the 
ränge of a relevant means of influencing working conditions. In the 
process of systemic rationalization, it is precisely those areas which so far 
have not been regulated which have become relevant for interest repre-
sentation. These areas include information on and the opportunity of ex-
erting influence on the internal and external shaping of networks with 
regard to their technical Organization; the supra-regional and inter-
national transparency of costs, which is available to management but not 
to the works Council; the plant-external decisions made by the principal 
companies of multinational groups, and so on. 
b) The same holds for employment. Previously, the consequences of 
rationalization measures which had a direct effect on employment were 
identifiable within the Company and negotiable within the framework of 
Consolidated Settlements. This was, however, linked to proof of a direct 
connection between rationalization measures and their consequences for 
employment or employee Status. With systemic rationalization, integrated 
forms of production cause qualitative and quantitative effects both within 
the Company and across companies at those points which are not directly 
linked to rationalization measures (for example, at the suppliers and not 
at the manufacturers where an actual rationalization measure has been 
undertaken). And so employment becomes difficult to negotiate within 
the framework of existing normative procedures (Deiß 1988; Deiß 1989). 
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Since these areas escape standardized bargaining within individual 
companies, there is more pressure on the works Councils to utilize "weak 
forms" of representation, such as information and counselling, informal 
influence and similar measures, as opposed to "strong" forms of interest 
representation such as co-determination and control. Naturally, bargain-
ing results achieved with the aid of weak forms of negotiation decrease 
the likelihood that they are enforceable by regulations. Likewise, the 
possibility of generalizing these results and setting Standards which reach 
beyond the Company also diminishes. 
This concludes a brief treatment of Company interest representation. 
Should normatively Consolidated areas of bargaining with strong repre-
sentational rights such as co-determination and control become pre-
carious, and bargaining should shift to weak forms of interest repre-
sentation such as counselling and information Services, then one could 
say a 'Japanization' - in the sense of consultation procedures and purely 
intra-company Solutions - was emerging. 
2. This development does not, however, mean the 'tendency towards com-
pany-centered interest representation' in the sense of a growth in power 
of the works Councils and a loss of function for the unions. Obviously -
and this is my line of argument - the Situation is rather the other way 
around: Systemic rationalization leads to weakness in bargaining and loss 
of works Council power. And here new functions appear for the unions 
within the dual System. These may mean new bases for power and in-
fluence in comparison to the intra-company interest representations - pro-
vided the unions succeed in carrying out these functions. 
The following argument is not concerned with demonstrating an in-
crease in unions' power, but rather with outlining the conditions under 
which a stabilization of the dual System of interest representation is con-
ceivable and possible under systemic rationalization. 
I should like to formulate two closely connected assumptions here: 
a) The first deals with the increasing obsolescence of the prevailing insti-
tutional structure in light of inter-company Integration and internation-
alization: 
While relations between central company-headquarters and their divi-
sions and between different enterprises are solidifying and strengthening, 
there have been as yet no institutionalized connections between the work 
Councils of different companies or between companies within a produc-
tion or logistics chain. In light of unions organized on the basis of one 
industrial branch, this applies particularly to companies within a chain 
which encompasses a number of branches. (In automotive manufacturing, 
for example, we would encounter the metal workers' union IG Metall as 
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well as the unions concerned with the textile or plastics branches and so 
on). There is in general neither mutual exchange of information nor 
Cooperation on the part of the respective works-councils; for example, 
concerning impending changes in the volume of work, the possible relo-
cation of Company facilities or MOB decisions in user companies, or com-
munication of experiences relating to new work requirements due to new 
logistics Systems, or common strategies, for example, regulating working 
hours within a just-in-time (JIT) context, and so on. 5 
At the same time works Councils of smaller companies, for example 
suppliers of the second or third tier, actually lose their bargaining partner, 
namely management, as the latter is strongly dependent on external cus-
tomer decisions. Examples include working time arrangements for which 
co-determination should be compulsory, for example within a JIT context, 
or the volume of orders, which determines staff cuts or overtime, and so 
on. Our colleague Reinhard Doleschal wil l report on this issue. 
It is important to understand that the Separation of production Integra-
tion and the structure of interest representation is itself an element of 
systemic rationalization: drawing new boundaries between enterprises 
and companies is an integral part of this rationalization strategy. 
Examples are: The new structuring or restructuring of enterprises roughly 
by reductions in Company size in order to evade co-determination regu-
lations; the choice of location and relocation (which means that new struc-
tures of interest representation will then have to be built up); the exter-
nalization of certain processes into independent commercial units (this 
may be done, for example, in order to enter organizational areas with 
more favourable collective Settlements - the so-called 'flight from wage 
agreements' - or in order to pull certain employee groups and work 
processes - such as data processing or central logistics control - away 
from the influence and awareness of the works Councils). 
This development is gaining momentum in connection with international 
logistics and even more so within the context of multinationals; it wil l be 
further boosted by the creation of the European Market. This topic will 
be dealt with by Gerhard Bosch. 
The interim conclusion is: The Organization of production and interest 
representation are drifting apart. 
The problems of interest representation which thereby arise - and 
5 At this point I will not go into the first attempts to set up intercompany contacts 
between works Councils in the automotive industry; they follow initiatives by 
IG Metall or individual works Councils but are not formally institutionalized. 
Nor will questions of the different bargaining traditions or of different union 
policies be treated. 
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which are only outlined here - canrtot be solved at the Company level. 
With this in mind, which points of departure present themselves to the 
unions? 
In order to overcome the obsolescence of institutional structures, first 
attempts are being made to develop and put into effect legal regulations. 
This approach accords with conventional union policies. What is en-
visaged is that corporate works Councils or works Councils within pro-
duction chains or within de facto or quasi-corporations also become inte-
grated, and thus can be secured on a legal basis or by collective agreement. 
This is also intended to produce a coordinated representation of em-
ployees from different companies on a European level. 
These concepts have different directions of thrust. One example is the call 
for higher ranking participation rights following a pattern of corporate-
level works Councils along a logistical chain in the case that an information 
technology link and a relationship of domination by the final producer 
exists, or if the close interaction generated by information technology and 
work Organization produces quasi a Single Company - i.e. a closed pro-
duction chain. In our context, such Settlements, however, would only af-
fect the relationship of manufacturers and System suppliers or first tier 
suppliers and would not affect the many small-scale suppliers (for a sum-
mary see Wendeling-Schröder 1991). 
So far, successful implementation of such Settlements have been singularly 
lacking and as far as the European context is concerned, can hardly be 
expected at present. 
One Suggestion of the EC commission envisages the legally binding in-
stallment of "European Works Councils" within companies and groups 
of companies. Compared with Settlements made in Germany their func-
tions would be extremely restricted. The, as of now, foreseen minimum 
regulations do not contain any participation rights, but only weak infor-
mation and counselling rights. 
Such models of regulation, which are based on a parallelism of production 
and interest representation structures, will certainly continue to be put 
forward by the unions. But these models seem, should they be realized 
at all, to be based on weak forms of representation, as already evidenced 
for Single Company works Councils. The very few supra-company and 
international forms of participation that can be found at present fulfill 
little more than very general information functions. 
Examples are the "Information Committees" at Thomson Consumer Elec-
tronics or at BSN (foodstuffs industry); the "European Corporate Works 
Council" in the Volkswagen group and the "Union Information Circle" 
at Gillette which is not accepted by that Company (for a summary, see 
Buda 1991: 241ff.). 
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b) Against this background - and this is my second assumption - a role 
is played by developments which, although they do not represent any 
new form of industrial relations in an inter-company and international 
context, could well still provide impulses towards a stabilization of the 
unions within the dual structure. These developments are founded pre-
cisely on the obsolescence of prevailing institutional structures and nor-
mative Settlements. I would like to cite five aspects closely related to sys-
temic rationalization although they also extend far beyond it. 
Firstly: Due to the very nature and intensity of Integration in market 
strategy, use of information technology and new forms of work Organi-
zation, international and inter-company Cooperation between corpora-
tions - particularly in the automotive industry - the problems go far be-
yond what works Councils are capable of comprehending conceptually, 
grasping as information, or influencing either by means of strong or weak 
forms of participation. Their traditional tools for Controlling consequences 
for the labour force have, as demonstrated, become fragile. Without the 
massive support of the unions in the form of planning and training on 
the one side, and by the development of new tools and forms of regulation 
on the other, the works Councils will lose influence. This is particularly 
true for the works Councils of dependent companies. In the automotive 
industry this applies especially for suppliers' works Councils or 
downstream Service and distribution companies. Without the conceptual 
and informational assistance of the unions, the basis for company-
centered bargaining will be lost. This could be secured, however, if the 
unions took the initiative. 
Secondly: A central factor in systemic rationalization consists of exploit-
ing advantages of production costs with the aid of inter-company division 
of labour and networking, and particularly by internationalization. This 
presumes the existence of differing labour Standards. The possibilities of 
generalizing the results of bargaining which were achieved at one location 
by works Councils or across a whole industry by unions are thereby un-
dermined. Up to now, standardization of income, employment Status and 
working conditions have not only been the precondition for the dual Sys-
tem of interest representation and the foundation of social stability. Se-
curing these conditions has also lain - at least on the national level - in 
the interest of management: within the Company, to avoid conflicts 
amongst the workforce, and within individual industries, to eliminate 
differing conditions of competition on the market. These conditions are 
fading away through the orientation towards international competition. 
The creation of the European Market has provided companies with even 
greater opportunities for exploiting discrepancies in labour Standards. A n 
area of conflict is arising on a national and international level which can-
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not be handled by works Councils, only by unions. This means that in 
future the unions will have to fulfill new functions. 
Thirdly: The regional, national and global linkages of production 
processes are associated with new forms of inter-company divisions of 
labour, new configurations for Company locations, new demands on pub-
lic sector infrastructure measures. Here the works Councils, as in the case 
of workforce reduction, are definitely overtaxed. Union initiatives in the 
form of Cooperation with municipalities, labour admirtistrations, and State 
governments, have already led to regional and structural development 
measures. Here the unions have presented Solutions fraught with conflict 
but which still received the support of the industry to some extent (ex-
amples are employment plans in cases of mass layoffs; for a survey see 
Bosch 1990). Activities of this type are still the exception rather than the 
rule, and more oriented to defensive measures and crisis situations. But 
they do represent a growing component of union work which goes be-
yond the capacity of the works Council or Single union. They also contain 
a stabilizing tendency for the dual System, for example by securing the 
rather weak position of works Councils in crisis situations, and thus cannot 
be considered in any sense as merely stand-ins for syndicalistic policies 
(similar ideas can be found in Kern and Säbel 1990). 
Fourthly: The integration of the production chain has often been re-
garded as providing a potential new power base in labour struggles. The 
keyword here is spot-strikes within the logistics chain. This weapon has 
been considerably restricted by the high integration of information tech-
nology and logistics, contributing to centralized control of production 
processes on an international level, by the potential threat of relocation, 
labour transfer, removal of poorly-organized white-collar areas from the 
Company, and so on. We may add to these the deregulation measures in 
Germany, which make corresponding countermeasures on the part of 
management possible, in particular the so-called 'indirect' lock-out (kalte 
Aussperrung). 
Nevertheless, labour disputes are not out of the question because inte-
grated production is highly susceptible to disturbances. In any case, in 
the dual System only the unions, and not the work Councils, can initiate 
a labour dispute. Thus, a strong Instrument of interest representation in 
Germany remains in the hands of the unions. 
Fifthly: Who is - or remains - the clientele and thus the power base of 
interest representation in the process of systemic rationalization? Can in-
terest representation secure its legitimacy when the form and content of 
labour and the rewards for Performance are increasingly determined by 
rationalization measures which are oriented to supra-company and inter-
national criteria? Or if differing labour Standards can be exploited, and if 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
enforcing employees' interests becomes increasingly impossible within 
individual companies? 
The problem presents itself in two ways. Firstly, the Organization and 
activation of indirect, especially white-collar, employees (key groups in 
production, personnel in research and development, and so on) within 
the union cannot be presently achieved with work Council representation 
as it now exists. These so-called 'modern employees' believe that they 
have a stronger capacity of asserting their interests as individuals. For 
workers in direct production the old risks still exist, and these can be 
handled primarily by the works Councils. But with systemic rationaliza-
tion new dangers arise through decisions made by the head offices of 
multinationals - such as the threat of integration or externalization of 
work processes, Company relocation, and so on - and the works Councils 
have no way of influencing such threats. 
Therefore, for the unions, long-term societal-level activities have to be 
given considerable importance in order to solve the Organization problem 
for the 'modern employee' and also the representation problem for the 
'traditional worker' and to secure the unions' legitimacy for both groups 
of employees. 
There are a number of starting points which suggest themselves. One ex-
ample, to remain within the context of the automotive industry and to avoid 
beginning a new paper, is IG Metall's programme on "Car Production, En-
vironmental Problems and the Future of Traffic". This proposal calls for a 
close linking of measures relating to ecology, infrastructure, product design, 
and other areas, but does not question production itself, and as such, em-
ployment in that industry. Such programmes make it possible to address 
workforce groups which are otherwise hard to reach on the Company level; 
they are, for example, acceptable to the 'modern employees' as they address 
professional and general life interests without bringing this group of em-
ployees into explicit contradiction with their duties in the Company. 
On the other hand, it still remains decisive that the unions also perform 
Services for the mass of 'traditional workers.' Systemic rationalization 
makes new demands on wage policies, on job protection policies, and so 
on, which we cannot go into here (Deiss 1990; Sauer 1989). The interests 
of these employees can only be represented within the Company and by 
the works Councils when general labour Standards, which go beyond the 
individual Company, can still be put into effect in a society. The necessity 
of being able to generalize bargaining results is solely the responsibility 
of the unions in the dual interest representation structure. It is, however, 
an open question whether this shift onto societal-level activities wil l pro-
duce a new basis for the cooperative Solution of conflicts as in the 80's, 
or whether it will lead to a corporatist form of union policy. 
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The obsolescence of the traditional bases of interest representation 
points to the potential of the unions rather than that of the works Councils. 
A l l in all, approaches are presenting themselves for stabilizing the dual 
structure of representation through a politicization of interest repre-
sentation on a societal level. 
4 . SPEARHEAD FOR BETTER W O R K STANDARDS? 
I would like to summarize my paper by making three points in conclusion: 
1. The central message I would like to emphasize in my contribution is a 
twofold one: 
a) There are good reasons to suppose that a worldwide convergence 
of a rationalization strategy is emerging which, spreading out from focal 
enterprises, is directed at increasing productivity in entire production and 
Service chains. The struggle over the distribution of profits in the value 
added chain leads, however, to new forms of autonomy and control within 
these chains. 
In this context, strategy cannot be seen as a managerial concept which 
had been ex ante formulated and can now simply be 'adopted'. Systemic 
rationalization means simultaneously increasing flexibility and reducing 
costs - a Solution which is only possible on a supra-company level. But 
systemic rationalization induces a reflexive learning process and thereby 
becomes a systematically pursued management goal. In this process, the 
forms that systemic rationalization take on national and regional levels 
remain different: What we have is convergence in structure and diver-
gence in form. 
b) This development does not entail an automatic or naturally evolving 
convergence of the structures of interest representation - this is something 
I dealt with under the question of the Japanization of German interest 
representation. In the process of inter-company and internationally linked 
rationalization a major shift of power towards company-level interest rep-
resentation is unlikely to take place within the framework of the dual 
System in Germany with the possible exception of very large companies. 
On the other hand, however, systemic rationalization does at least offer 
points of departure for the stabilization of unions and the dual System: 
in this context we find convergence of rationalization strategies and diver-
gence of the structures of interest representation. 
2. Indisputably, my argument on the stabilization of the dual System of 
interest representation and union politics requires a certain amount of 
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qualification. I could not have shaped my contribution in such a lean' 
form if I had not been certain that the contributions of my German col-
leagues to this Conference would deal with the potential problems Stand-
ing in the way of the realization of the various approaches I have put 
forward. In the following I would like to point out examples of a structural 
and a historical barrier for union policy in the process of systemic ration-
alization. 
Structurally, systemic rationalization, with its thrust towards the utili-
zation of the elastic potential of technology and towards supra-company 
integration, implies only a very selective human resource management: 
the abilities of workers are not comprehensively developed and used, at 
least not for the vast majority of the labour force. Decisive is that systemic 
rationalization seeks to strategically exploit existing worldwide differ-
ences in the potential of manpower and in work Standards in order to 
increase the productivity of the entire production chain (see the contribu-
tion of Werner Sengenberger). This results in impediments for all forms 
of interest representation: for the German ones especially in the context 
of the European Market. 
Historically, the reunification of the two German states has probably 
thrown the German unions back years, namely to the pursuit of traditional 
policy goals: quantitative wage policies, compensation for negative work-
ing conditions, job security and increase in employment at any price. A l -
though the Situation is still to a great extent unforeseeable, the incorpora-
tion of East German industry seems to point to a special version of inter-
company division of labour as well as the utilization of different Standards 
of work through systemic rationalization, while interest representation 
may well be for the most part paralyzed by the classic problems of the 
employee and the task of building up its own Organization. (See Volkmar 
Kreißig's contribution). It is an open question whether the unions wil l be 
able to exploit the existing opportunities for playing a prominent role in 
social and societal policies. 
3. Finally, the central political problem of interest representation in dealing 
with processes of rationalization is the generalization of established 
labour Standards and their maintenance. This generalization requires at 
least three preconditions in the unions and in the Company work Councils: 
- Firstly, a power base for bargaining - this would seem rather obvious, 
but systemic rationalization does raise new questions, especially in 
view of production chains organized on a global basis. 
- Secondly, the possibility of standardizing negotiated outcomes and 
Controlling the adherence to them - this is a growing task within an 
international context; 
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- Lastly, concepts and even visions of societal-level policy are a prere-
quisite not only for reaching the important group of 'modern em-
ployees' as clientele, but also the mass of 'non-modern workers' - this 
is an old task which was often neglected in the phase of Tayloristic 
work Organization. 
Given that the strategies of systemic rationalization are aimed at exploit-
ing different labour Standards, that the normative System of bargaining 
in Germany is in a crisis and the company-centred institutional structures 
of representation are obsolete, we cannot rule out a decisive move towards 
the politicizing - instead of "juridicalization" - of union work in order to 
push through a generalization of established Standards. Will German un-
ions act as the spearhead of interest representation in Europe? That is the 
one question that presently arises. 
The other question: Inasmuch as a mobilization of the employees 
within the context of integration and internationalization of production 
only succeeds to a limited extent, a new corporatist change is also con-
ceivable as an expression of this politicization - and thus the question of 
Japanization is raised on a new level: will we witness the emergence of 
"Germany Incorporated" in the European Home Market?6 
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INTERNATIONALIZATION OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES 
AND INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
W I T H S P E C I A L R E F E R E N C E T O T H E R E C E N T S T R A T E G I E S 
O F L A R G E J A P A N E S E C O R P O R A T I O N S 
Tokunaga Shigeyoshi 
ABSTRACT 
The fact that the economic activities of corporations have extended far beyond 
national borders is one of the remarkable recent changes in global society. 
In this paper I first maintain that the discipline of industrial relations should 
also take into account the interrelations among nations and should deveiop an 
international viewpoint for analysis. 
Second, I deal with the problems of new technology in Japan: what kind of im-
pact new technology has had on labour; how these problems have been discussed 
and why they have been dealt with in a different way from that in other countries. 
Third, I examine the strategy of Japanese large corporations in terms of three 
main points: the style of management, the nature or type of technology adopted, 
the structure of the labour market and the industrial relations System. In order to 
give a balanced understanding, in this paper emphasis is mainly placed on the 
negative sides of the problems, rather than the positive ones, which many re-
searchers have already discussed in greater detail, sometimes in a self-complacent 
way. 
Finally, I point out some Symptoms of recent changes which owe to both domes-
tic and overseas factors, suggesting the necessity of some social reform of the con-
ventional structure of Japanese society. 
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1. A CONSTELLATION OF PROBLEMS 
In the nearly ten years since the first Conference in Sendai, many events 
have occurred. The following list will outline the pertinent issues. 
First, as the words "borderless economy" so aptly show, in the world 
economy, transnational activities of large corporations have expanded 
and economic relationships among nations have become closer. 
The influence and size of multinational corporations (MNC) has grown 
so that the amount of their annual sales now equals, or even exceeds, any 
Single nation's annual gross national product (GNP) (Miyazaki 1986). Ja-
panese companies in particular have become increasingly multinational, 
following the example of their Western counterparts. 
Owing to both the rise of the so-called NIEs (newly industrializing 
economies) and the development of the Japanese economy into an 
economic giant, the centre of 'relative effectiveness' has been shifting from 
Western countries to the Pacific countries (Gilpin 1987). However, the 
economic Situation of the Third World has not conspicuously improved. 
Instead, the gap between developing countries and industrialized nations 
has widened. The region's existing problems have never been resolved 
and have, in fact, worsened. One explanation for this is that the primary-
products economy has become 'uncoupled' from the industrial economy. 
In other words, the prices of raw materials, one of the main products 
supplied by developing countries, have stagnated "at their lowest levels 
in recorded history in relation to the prices of manufactured goods and 
Services" (Drucker 1986). 
The world population today is roughly 5 billion, of which 3.6 billion 
reside in poor developing areas. These people, who comprise three quar-
ters of the total world population, account for only one quarter of total 
world consumption. Moreover, 73 million people are living at starvation 
level, an increase of about 20 per cent over the 60 million figure of ten 
years ago (Motoyama 1990). Environmental conditions have worsened as 
a result of rapid growth, uncircumscribed development, and un-
scrupulous aid policies, for which the industrialized countries are mainly 
responsible. 
If we take a global point of view, we can see that the contemporary 
capitalist System has fatal defects and therefore, at present we cannot be 
deemed capable of solving these problems. 
From an analytical viewpoint, the previous two Conferences lacked the 
ability to grasp the problems in an international context. It is no longer 
adequate to analyze global issues from the viewpoint of single-state capi-
talism but necessary to consider them from a more global perspective. 
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Also lacking was an analysis of economic activities from a service-oriented 
point of view, or the viewpoint of - dare we say it - an 'information 
society'. 
At the last two Conferences we discussed the problems of new tech-
nology. Since then the 'microelectronics revolution' has proceeded still 
further, greatly increasing the productivity of our society. Based on this, 
the service sectors of the industrialized countries have flourished. How-
ever, in every industrialized country total employment in the industrial 
sector has stagnated or decreased. This tendency is most conspicuous in 
the U.S., where 'de-industrialization' has become a problem. It is also 
related to the behaviour of the multinational Corporation. The tendency 
to transfer a part or all of the manufacturing process abroad, i.e. 'off-shore' 
production, has also intensified. 
Blue-collar workers are no lönger the most crucial part of total employ-
ment in the industrialized countries, either quantitatively or qualitatively. 
Thus, we must reconsider the traditional concept of 'production'. 
Nowadays it is difficult for us to group the workers into a homogeneous 
class. Also, we must acknowledge the importance of female workers. We 
should stress analysis of the roles of female workers and their significance 
to the society. 
As I cannot go into detail with regard to all these problems in this paper, 
I wil l focus on the following major points: 
- First, how do we understand the internationalization of the economy? 
I wil l explore this in connection with Japanese corporations. 
- Second, I wil l investigate how new technology has been dealt with, 
and thereby Japanese companies' policy of rationalizing production 
through its use. 
- Last, I wil l point out some of the implications of alternative polices, 
referring to the development of industrial relations since the last two 
symposia were held. 
2. T H E M E A N I N G OF INTERNATIONALIZATION 
There are differing views as to whether capitalism and the labour market 
have been world Systems from their beginning. As is generally known, 
the concept of 'a new division of labour' was founded and advocated by 
Fröbel and others (1980) in the 1970s. The term M N C was first put forward 
in 1960 by David Lilienthal. Depending upon its definition, the existence 
of the M N C itself can be traced back to the mid-19th Century (Fieldhouse 
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1986:24). Potts (1990) Starts her analysis of the world labour market with 
the 15th Century. 
However, for our discussion here, it is important to remember the rev-
olutionary developments in transportation and Communications in recent 
years. Above all, the spread of MNCs motivates us to investigate the prob-
lems of industrial relations from the international point of view. We must 
clearly understand the existence of the following differences between the 
similar conditions of the prewar and postwar periods, especially since the 
1970s. 
First, I shall outline the quantitative differences: MNCs in recent years 
have become enormous. The scale of the M N C is equivalent to or greater 
than that of one country. For example, the revenues of Exxon Corporation 
in 1981 (U.S. $ 11.3 billion) were equivalent to the gross national products 
of Switzerland (11.3) or Czechoslovakia (8.9). The revenues of Royal Dutch 
Shell (8.2) and General Motors Corp.(6.3) exceeded the GNPs of Greece 
(4.3), Thailand (3.7) and Portugal (2.5) (Miyazaki 1986). Moreover, the 
international migration of labour has taken place on a large scale for a 
number of reasons. Because the continuous economic growth of the world 
economy from the mid-1950s to the first half of the 1970s had created a 
Situation of füll employment, there was much international migration -
around 20 million migrant workers worldwide in 1980 (World Labour 
Report 1984, cited in Potts 1990). That is without doubt a low estimate: 
The International Labour Office (ILO) estimated that there are in fact some 
25 to 35 million people who have left their home countries and now live 
abroad. In six Western European countries the number of foreign workers 
increased by more than two times during the 14 years from 1960 to 1974. 
In the peak year, the share of foreign workers in total employment reached 
about ten percent. In 1986, there were still more than 5 million foreign 
workers living in Western Europe (Okumura et al. 1990). 
There are also qualitative differences: Foreign direct Investment in the 
prewar period was directed mainly from the industrialized countries to 
the developing ones. Nowadays, there is also foreign direct investment 
among the industrialized countries. The aims of overseas direct invest-
ment are no longer just to secure natural resources and use cheap labour 
in the former colonial countries. Based upon the relative advantages due 
to technology and management 'know-how', the industrialized countries 
have invested in one another. Thus, a mutually permeating network of 
trade and capital has been formed all over the world. Needless to say, it 
was promoted and supported by the recent revolutionary developments 
in transportation and Communications (e.g. jumbo-jets, facsimiles, etc.) 
The economic activities of each country today are globalized and syn-
chronized. As a result, the conditions of the 'borderless economy' have 
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been realized. Big corporations plan their own 'global strategy' and adopt 
measures to implement it. They decide whether they should produce in 
a country, what kinds of products, how, and how much, so as to produce 
at the optimal conditions from a global viewpoint. It is not necessary for 
big corporations to plot to maximize profit within each domestic sphere. 
If they suffer a loss within one nation's market, they need only balance it 
from a global view. In other words, the M N C has a wider ränge of choice 
when it comes to investment opportunities, and therefore an advantage. 
For example, one product is developed and designed in the United States, 
some of its mechanical parts are manufactured in Japan, and some com-
ponents are purchased from Asian NIEs; the final assembly process takes 
place in the countries where the products are consumed; and the producer 
is able to build its research institute in Europe. This is the new inter-
national division of labour. 
Although production activities are transnational and allotted to various 
countries, the most important decisions are made in the respective nation 
in which the headquarters are located. In other words, diverse activities 
are coordinated under one definite policy decided on at the head office. 
In this sense the power of decision-making is centralized, in spite of the 
highly divergent form in which it is implemented. This process, however, 
does not prevent subsidiary plants from contributing to the economic 
growth of the host countries. In fact, some developing countries have 
made use of this opportunity and have succeeded in contributing to the 
rapid industrialization of their economies. The rise of the Asian NIEs is a 
good example. Instead of an import Substitution policy at an early stage, 
these countries adopted an export-oriented policy and have been making 
great strides toward developing into industrialized nations. Their emer-
gence as new industrialized economies shows the one-sidedness of the 
so-called 'dependence theory', and has contributed to an increase in the 
Asian area's share of the world economy (cf. Table 1 and Figure 1). Now 
sharing nearly one third of the total global gross domestic product (GDP), 
Southeast Asia forms one of the three major economic poles of the world 
(the other two being North America and Western Europe). 
In short, the internationalization of the global economy is in progress. 
Therefore, a world-wide network of goods, money, manpower and infor-
mation has been established, with each country's economic activities 
being integrated into it. This fact urges industrial relations researchers to 
reflect upon the necessity of incorporating a global viewpoint into our 
analytical mode because - although it is still true, as Adam Smith once 
pointed out, that 'labour' is the most difficult commodity to move -
nowadays transnational migration of labour is appearing on a larger scale. 
Again, this is because more than just a few native workers, especially 
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Table 1: Growth of the principal countries' G D P (in billion U.S. Dollar; in brackets: 
share of each region in %) 
1962 1970 1980 1988 
N. America 613.6 ( 45.4) 1,093.6 ( 41.9) 2,951.7 ( 29.0) 5,302.4 ( 31.2) 
U.S.A. 572.4 ( 42.4) 1,009.2 ( 38.7) 2,688.5 ( 26.4) 4,817.8 ( 28.3) 
Canada 41.2 ( 3.1) 84.4 ( 3.2) 263.2 ( 2.6) 484.6 ( 2.8) 
West Europe 406.5 ( 30.1) 795.6 ( 30.5) 3,594.9 ( 35.3) 5,528.1 ( 32.5) 
W. Germany 90.2 ( 6.7) 184.5 ( 7.1) 813.7 ( 8.0) 1,201.8 ( 7.1) 
France 74.2 ( 5.5) 142.9 ( 5.5) 664.6 ( 6.5) 949.9 ( 5.6) 
Britain 80.7 ( 6.0) 123.9 ( 4.7) 536.2 ( 5.3) 822.8 ( 4.8) 
Italy 49.6 ( 3.7) 107.5 ( 4.1) 452.7 ( 4.5) 829.9 ( 4.9) 
Southeast and East Asia 165.4 ( 12.2) 406.4 ( 15.6) 1,800.6 ( 17.7) 3,975.7 ( 23.4) 
Japan 61.0 ( 4.5) 203.7 ( 7.8) 1,059.3 ( 10.4) 2,843.4 ( 16.7) 
Asia NIEs 6.8 ( 0.5) 18.3 ( 0.7) 142.4 ( 1.4) 349.6 ( 2.1) 
ASEAN 9.9 ( 0.7) 17.7 ( 0.7) 165.2 ( 1.6) 208.3 ( 1.2) 
China 37.5 ( 2.8) 78.2 ( 3.0) 246.1 ( 2.4) 376.5 ( 2.2) 
Other countries 164.8 ( 12.2) 315.0 ( 12.1) 1,825.0 ( 17.9) 2,212.2 ( 13.0) 
Total (world) 1,350.3 (100.0) 2,610.6 (100.0) 10,172.2 (100.0) 17,018.4 (100.0) 
Source: Nihon Kaihatsu Ginkö (1991: 7). 
female workers working on the assembly line of an export-oriented elec-
tronic plant - let's say in Malaysia - form one of the ingredients of the 
international division of labour as a whole (Pearson 1986: 342-345). 
This transnational migration of labour does not mean that the process 
of internationalization will make the world uniform, still less that it 
wil l bring the 'extinction of the State'. In spite of the internationalization 
of economic activities, the State does not disappear, but continues to 
exist. As Gilpin says (1987), there is a logic of politics or power in 
parallel with that of economy. The State can still check and control 
economic activities to a certain extent, using its sovereignty to pursue 
the 'national interest'. Of course, the State has not always been almighty; 
yet it is true that the State exerts its power to influence varies matters. 
Regulations such as import surcharges or quota Systems, local content 
regulations and so on are only some of its concrete measures. States are 
able to adopt policies which encourage foreign direct investment by 
exemption from taxation, EPZ (economic processing zones), FTZ (free 
trade zones), etc. In the mid-1970s more than a few countries, including 
China, changed their earlier restrictive policies and adopted open poli-
cies for attracting foreign capital. 
We cannot talk about the 'extinction of the State' in the foreseeable 
future. It is nothing more than an illusion. Nevertheless, we must take 
particular notice of new tendencies toward regional unification such as 
those seen in the European Community. We might regard this as the model 
for what new states should be. States will exist, but 19th-century-type 
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Figure 1: The growth of nominal G D P in the three big economic areas of the 
world (in billion U.S. Dollar; in brackets: share of each area) 
In 1950 In 1970 
424.9 1,968.6 
(100.0%) (100.0%) 
The areas are defined as follows: 
North America: U.S.A., Canada; 
Western Europe: F.R.G., France, Italy, U.K.; 
Southeast Asia: Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hongkong, Malaysia, Thai-
land, Indonesia, the Philippines, China. The data for 1950 include only Japan, Thai-
land and the Philippines. 
Source: Nihon Kaihatsu Ginkö (1991:11). 
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national states will gradually be transformed. Despite internationaliza-
tion, 'uneven development' will not disappear. Capitalist development 
has created cores or metropolises on the one hand and peripheries on the 
other (Wallerstein 1983). Those geographically hierarchical structures of 
the world economy are so solidly structured that they will not easily be 
altered. Examining this problem in detail is beyond the scope of our sub-
ject here; therefore, I will not discuss it any further, only point out that 
this problem exists. 
3 . CORPORATIONS' N E W PRODUCTION STRATEGIES 
3.1. The Problems ofNew Technology 
Before examining the problems at Company level, I wil l discuss in general 
terms the problems of new technology in Japan. 
What kind of problems does the so-called new technology cause for 
labour? These problems, called "microelectronization (ME) problems" in 
Japan, attracted attention in the early 1980s and had become one of the 
most conspicuous topics by the mid-1980s. However, just after the Plaza 
Agreement (September 1985), which brought a rapid rise in the value of 
the Yen and therefore a decrease in exports, the economy bottomed out 
at the end of 1986. The succeeding long prosperity lasted until 1991, when 
the economy again feil into a recession. Düring the long boom period, ME 
problems began to recede and instead the main issues were how to re-
structure the Japanese economy during the recession caused by the 
strengthening of the Yen; how to establish the so-called tripolar world 
System - i.e., with American, European and Asian Centers; and how to 
cope with the shortage of workers. Yet have ME problems really been 
solved? 
3.1.1. The Quantitative Effects on Employment 
We will examine the quantitative effects on employment first at a macro and 
then at a micro level. In Japan serious unemployment has not been caused 
by the introduction of new technology. This is because a nation's level of em-
ployment depends upon its total demand, not upon technology. Even if new 
technology is introduced to a significant degree, this does not lead to a re-
duction in the volume of employment, provided total demand does not 
decrease. Furthermore, employment may even increase if the rate of 
decrease in demand caused by the the introduction of new technology is less 
than the rate of overall increase. This case is applicable to Japan. 
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Owing to exports and the opening up of new markets, Japan's employ-
ment demand increased. At the same time Japan's concentrated exports 
- cameras, automobiles, television sets and so on - led to a decrease in 
employment abroad. If we take a global view, rationalizing use of the new 
technology has decreased the total volume of employment. Despite this, 
much Japanese research, especially research carried out by the 
governmental institutions, has not fully taken into account this negative 
effect. The export market has a Strategie and significant meaning for the 
Japanese economy. The tendency of Japan's export market to excessively 
export industrial goods and import only primary goods has caused trade 
frictions and been critieized as "neomerchantilism". Due to the inter-
national trade balance being a 'zero-sum' relation, there are countries with 
credit and countries with a deficit. Therefore it is logically impossible for 
all countries of the world to ächieve a balance in trade by following the 
"Japanese model". 
One way to increase domestic employment without decreasing em-
ployment abroad is by opening up new markets. New products such as 
video cassette recorders (VCR), facsimiles, word processors, and personal 
Computers have found new markets and resulted in increased employ-
ment. In fact, is has happened in Japan. Except for several entirely new 
industries, such as the production of Software for Computers, there is usu-
ally more or less an effect of Substitution among industries.1 Therefore, 
an increase in total employment does not mean that the workers' Status 
is stable. In fact, their Status has changed tremendously. 
At the micro level, I wil l briefly discuss two points: some aspects of the 
competition among enterprises, and the characteristics of the Japanese 
labour market and industrial relations. Generally speaking, the speed of 
the new technology's progress is faster than that of earlier technology: if 
the latter is an arithmetic series progression, the former is, as it were, a 
geometric series. Therefore, the life-cycle of today's products, which in-
clude a number of M E parts such as integrated cireuits (ICs), is shorter-
lived. Products are especially short-lived when R&D (research and 
development) is of crucial importance to their development and when 
competition for R&D is fierce. This causes the competition for markets to 
become more keen. The new technology blurs the traditional borders 
among industries, allowing them to easily enter other fields of business. 
This is a truly borderless economy! 
Defeat or delay in the competition for R&D and markets, even for a 
large Company, wil l cause it to retreat or close down. New technology 
For example, traditional records and cassette tapes have been substituted by 
compact disks (CD). 
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provides enterprises with new business chances, by which they can grow 
rapidly and/or successfully enter a new field. In fact, the winners grow 
and the iosers decline. 
The Japanese labour market is different from that of Europe and North 
America: it is more segmented than Western ones. The structure of the 
Japanese labour market is "dual" or, more precisely, multiplex. Roughly 
speaking, there is a core group of employees, who work in large compa-
nies, whose employment is more stable and who are better treated than 
those in a peripheral group. The word "peripheral" does not mean less 
important. On the contrary, they are the essential and indispensable 
labour force of the Japanese economy. The core group consists primarily 
of male workers, with some female workers, and accounts for approxi-
mately one quarter of the total labour force. The peripheral group consists 
of the majority of regulär female workers, part-timers, elderly workers 
and shagaikö (lit, labourers from outside the firm: the workers in small 
and medium-sized subcontracting companies) (Tokunaga and Bergmann 
1984). The peripheral labour force saves labour costs for large corporations 
by serving a "buffer" function, providing the required number of workers, 
which changes with fluctuation in demand. When the introduction of the 
new technology (for example, industrial robots) results in superfluous 
labour, a large corporation wil l carry out the following measures: reduc-
tion of overtime hours, curtailment of recruiting, a natural decrease in 
employment, especially of female workers, and reduction in the number 
of part-time workers and in Orders for subcontracting companies - i.e., in 
the dismissal of shagaikö. Thus, the hardship is transferred from the parent 
Company to the first subcontracting tier, from the first to the second, from 
the second to the third, and so on. The subcontracting companies at the 
bottom are very tiny Workshops, usually located in agricultural villages, 
employing a small number of married women as part-time workers (Chüö 
Daigaku Keizai Kenkyüsho 1985). These workers move from the labour 
market to domestic work during a recession and therefore are not counted 
as unemployed. Thus, the rate of unemployment in Japan does not appear 
to increase. 
As is well known, the Japanese trade unions are enterprise unions 
which generally organize only the core group, leaving the peripheral 
group mostly unorganized. Therefore the unions do not strongly resist 
management's measures to adjust employment; in fact, they "under-
stand" and often even support them. 
Although the working conditions of the core group are relatively 
favourable, these workers do suffer some hardships. Although their em-
ployment is secure, they must endure many discomforts: one common 
one is arbitrary transfer or loan to other companies, which may involve 
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being parted from their families. In addition, they must often work long 
overtime hours. Excessive overtime is one of the reasons why working 
hours in Japan are far longer than those of Western countries and why it 
is not so easy for Japanese management to shorten them (Deutschmann 
1987). 
3.1.2. The Qualitative Effects on Labour 
The qualitative effects of new technology on employees has sparked keen 
discussion among researchers both at home and abroad. One can classify 
the opinions into three types. 
1) Degrading thesis (Braverman's thesis cf. Braverman 1974): 
The new technology wil l degrade workers'skill. 
2) Upgrading thesis (Hirschhorn 1984, Kern and Schumann 1984): 
The new technology will Upgrade workers' qualifications. 
3) Polarization thesis (Düll 1985, Altmann et al. 1986, Brandt 1990): 
The new technology wil l polarize workers into two groups: one group 
with jobs that will require higher skills but which will be fewer in num-
bers; the other with jobs that will require less skill and provide the 
majority of jobs. 
Although the polarization thesis prevails in Western countries, the up-
grading thesis is held by an overwhelming majority in Japan. Even Ja-
panese trade unions' questionnaires and activities have not proved 
successful in clearly upholding the polarization thesis (Denki Rören 1983). 
In contrast to Western countries, the " M E Revolution" in Japan has not 
brought as much damage to labour as expected. In the mid-1980s, an 
optimistic view prevailed (Nihon Rödö Kyökai 1986); why is the upgrad-
ing thesis and its optimistic view so prevalent in Japan? 
Our case study on M E problems in a large electronics Corporation 
clarified the following points (cf. Tokunaga and Sugimoto 1990). For male 
core workers, we could not distinctly validate the polarization thesis. 
However, this does not invalidate the upgrading hypothesis, because the 
simplified jobs are performed mostly by female workers and also by some 
elderly workers. Also, the big Corporation optimally automated only the 
most efficient parts of the entire production process. Those processes not 
suitable for automation were, as before, left to subcontracting companies, 
and were still being done by manual labour. Due to these divisions of 
labour, the polarization thesis cannot fully explain the labour Situation in 
Japan. Furthermore, in Japanese society these divisions of labour seem to 
be natural, and therefore optimism on ME problems has been prevailing. 
Yet, many people do not see the other side of the coin: that the core workers 
are not a majority, but a minority, of total employment. 
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To dismiss male core workers is difficult, unless the Company is faced 
with certain critical situations. Because so-called lifetime employment is 
still practiced by large companies, and the wages of these core workers 
are higher and their potential abilities are of better quality than those of 
the peripheral workers, management invests a great deal of money in 
their career development in order to maximize their potential talents, and 
justify their higher wages. However, management will not do this for 
female workers, who for the most part do not belong to the core group 
(Tokunaga and Sugimoto 1990). 
3.2.3. How New Technology has Changed Industrial Relations 
As one can easily guess after analyzing these matters, in Japan the new 
technology itself has not, in principle, changed the relationship between 
labour and management. Rather, the previous industrial relations System 
has freely accepted the introduction of the new technology. 
Because wages are paid according to personal attributes, the rational-
ization of production processes by ME has not caused serious wage-
decrease problems in Japan, unlike in Western countries, where wages 
are paid according to the skills involved in the job. As long as the core 
workers' employment is maintained - and this is also the large companies' 
main personnel policy - the core workers are apt to accept other ration-
alization measures, such as intra- and inter-plants transposition, the adop-
tion of night shifts, etc. As a result, trade unions as a whole actively 
cooperate in the drive toward technological innovation initiated by man-
agement and so do the employees, due to their ever-present fear that the 
Company might fall behind its competitors, which would worsen their 
working conditions. 
3.2. The Characteristics of Management Strategies 
Generally speaking, Japan has been more active in the introduction of ME 
technology than other industrialized countries. For example, Japan uses 
more industrial robots. However, the comparative advantage of Japanese 
industry in the world market does not consist in its level of technology 
but in the complexity of its production management strategies, which 
have been developed and deployed by the Japanese corporations but are 
attributable mainly to the Japanese social conditions. 
The Japanese style of management is to pursue economic effectiveness, 
as symbolized by Toyotism, the production System of Toyota. It empha-
sizes eliminating waste (muda), excess (muri) and unevenness (mura) in 
the production processes, not in the machinery itself. 
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For example, the kanban System (or just-in-time (JIT) System) is a System 
that minimizes inverttory and the need for Space and thereby contributes 
to faster market response, better forecasting and less administration. To 
find defects early in production is a way to minimize unnecessary repairs 
(Schönberger 1982). These techniques do not depend on machinery but 
are Systems that management uses to produce higher quality goods, as 
quickly (with shorter lead-time) and cheaply as they can. In short, it is a 
style of production management that is loyal to the principle of capitalism. 
Of course, such a management System works more effectively when 
adopted along with the use of new technology. 
We must examine the character of the technology adopted. Though it 
has actively introduced technological innovation, the strategy of Japanese 
industry has been to pursue the merits of mass production as far as 
possible. In connection with this I should point out that the Japanese 
economy's growth has been mainly based upon excessive exports. The 
export market is the Strategie lever by which the Japanese economy ex-
pands its market so as to maintain the mass production system and to 
reduce production costs. The technology Japan has adopted in the 
branches where it holds a comparative advantage in the world market -
e.g., iron and steel, automobiles, electro-engineering and electronics is the 
kind of technology by which one can secure the economy of scale. In other 
words, in non-mass production sectors such as aeroplanes and chemical 
goods - Japanese technologies are still weak. 
According to a world-wide field survey on productivity in the auto-
mobile industry (Womack et al. 1990:94-95), the most effective auto plant 
in the world is the least automated Japanese domestic one. Although there 
is generally a strong negative correlation between higher levels of auto-
mation (technology) and higher levels of effort (productivity), the most 
automated plant is not always the most efficient. The survey concluded 
that "high-tech plants that are improperly organized end up adding about 
as many indirect technical and Service workers as they remove unskilled 
direct workers from manual assembly tasks". 
Düring the recession after the first oil crisis, large Japanese corporations 
had to severely reduce their labour force, aiming to achieve a "slimmed-
down" management. As a result, the method of Tean production' has been 
intensified and elaborated. 
To aecommodate the increase of demand after the recovery of busi-
ness, the corporations have microelectronized in order to save labour. 
According to our case study of one large electro-engineering Company 
on the introduction of new technology since the beginning of the 1980s 
(Tokunaga and Sugimoto 1990), the following features can be pointed 
out: 
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a) In making the decision to invest in automation, the large Corporation 
carefully selects those production processes which can be automated 
to best achieve the effects of mass production and automates them to 
the extent necessary to obtain the optimal effects. 
b) Most of the processes of less effective mass production are apt to be 
left to the peripheral labour force; i.e., to female workers, non-regular 
workers and/or subcontractors. 
c) Concerning the nature of the technology selected, the main emphasis 
is placed upon efficiency and improvement of the quality of products, 
as suggested by such mottoes as "Simple is best!" and "Keep hands 
from handling products!" In fact, the industrial robots used on an as-
sembly line for electronic durable consumer goods are, as a whole, 
comparatively simple and cheap ones.2 The technology adopted is 
small and medium-scale and unsophisticated. Again, the humanization 
of work is secondary in importance. 
Concerning the characteristics of the use of labour, it should be remem-
bered again that the Japanese labour market has a multiplex or hierarchic 
structure. This was discussed above in detail. Here, it is enough to restate 
some special characteristic of the labour market that give several advan-
tages to the large corporations: 
- The peripheral labour force works as a "buffer" against the fluctuations 
of the market. By using a force of peripheral workers, large corporations 
are able to easily adjust their total volume of labour corresponding to 
the fluctuations in business trends. 
- As wages are lower and other working conditions are worse for the 
peripheral labour force than for the core labour force, the utilization of 
the former helps the large corporations to save on labour costs. 
- In the long run, the existence of an immense peripheral labour force 
has negative effects on the core labour force's own wages and working 
conditions. It intensifies the competition among workers for the scarce 
jobs with relatively favourable Status; consequently, core workers are 
apt to stick with their jobs and tamely submit to excessive work. 
For the core labour force job security is of highest importance. Therefore, 
if they are given that security, they are inclined to accede to all of man-
agement's rationalization proposals, such as transfer in and out, shift 
work, overtime, etc. 
Summing up, Japanese corporations enjoy certain advantages fostered 
by the character of the Japanese labour market and industrial relations. 
2 A similar Situation can be found in the automobile industry (Chüö Daigaku 
Keizai Kenkyüsho 1990: 159-160). 
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3.3. Some Symptoms of Changes? 
New developments in the Japanese economy since the latter half of the 
1980s, especially further internationalization of economic activities, has 
brought new features and problems, some of which pressure the economy 
to change its structure. 
The so-called diversification strategy of management has been accel-
erated. Many companies have adopted this strategy and still work to in-
crease the variety of their products, in order to adapt to changes. The 
necessary workers for the new fields of business are normally recruited 
by such conventional techniques as transfers and loans of regulär em-
ployees. At the same time, the use of mid-career recruits and temporary 
workers from employment Services (haken rödösha) has increased as well 
(Rödöshö 1989b). 
Companies are not only diversifying their products, they are diversi-
fying their labour forces, too. Because the enterprise unions consist mainly 
of core labour force workers, this causes difficulties for the trade unions. 
To unionize non-regular workers is extremely difficult. This is a reason 
for the recent decrease in the unionization rate. 
In this regard, the security of regulär workers' employment within one 
firm becomes difficult: the scope of job security is now expanding from 
within one Company to within the company's group. 
Trade friction with the U.S. and other nations and upward appreciation 
of the value of the Yen has motivated Japanese companies to deploy over-
seas activities such as off-shore production and international procurement 
etc. At first, the companies' attitude toward international production was 
reluctance. Nowadays, however, they plan their own global strategy and 
develop it rather aggressively. For example, such rationalization methods 
as stopping domestic production of low-priced products and switching 
to production overseas where wages are lower have been used by the 
large electronic corporations, which domestically concentrate on produc-
ing high value-added products. Therefore, the international division of 
labour - i.e., low value-added products produced abroad, higher value-
added products produced at home - wil l continue. Although at the initial 
stage this transfer of production does not decrease domestic employment, 
because it increases the export of parts, it cannot be denied that in the 
long run it causes "de-industrialization of the economy" ceteris paribus. 
To avoid de-industrialization, the companies will have to continue to 
develop new higher value-added products and to concentrate on produc-
ing them. Recruitment of qualified staff and retraining of the employees 
for this type of production wil l be one of the most urgent tasks for Japanese 
companies. 
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Third, international criticism of Japanese industrial practices has re-
cently become more and more bitter. A n example is the long and com-
prehensive list of demands raised by the U.S. side at the bilateral Struc-
tural Impediments Initiative talks. Shortening of longer working hours 
is one of the issues to receive early attention. Owing to these circum-
stances, the Government recommended that annual working hours be 
reduced to 1,800 within fiscal 1992 and launched a campaign with that 
aim. However, it is clear that the tempo of the improvement is too slow 
for the aim to be realized by that deadline. Several reasons can be 
advanced for this, but here the author wil l point out only that the 
just-in-time System is an obstacle to the shortening of working hours. 
JIT demands that the suppliers deliver punctually certain quantities of 
the products to their customer (parent Company) at certain times, which 
frequently can be as often as three or four times per day. To meet such 
severe conditions the workers at the suppliers are obliged to do over-
time work, even weekend work, if the parent Company asks them to 
deliver at that time. Because of the longer working hours, suppliers are 
confronted with difficulty in recruiting workers. This difficulty has been 
intensified by the most recent business expansion. Nowadays a number 
of small businesses, including some suppliers at the bottom of the au-
tomobile industry cannot operate without employing foreign workers, 
although the government does not permit the immigration of unskilled 
labourers officially. The problem of foreign workers is another pressing 
issue at present, but I cannot deal with it here. 
JIT has caused another problem: its frequent delivery of the products 
has given rise to traffic jams on highways. The problem became so serious 
that even Toyota Corporation, which had hitherto located its net of pro-
duction facilities only in Toyota city and its surrounding areas, recently 
decided to set up a new plant not in this base area but in Kyüshü. 
Growing interest in environmental problems, a series of scandals in the 
business world, the crash of the "bubble economy", and serious recession 
thereafter created an atmosphere critical of business. Reflecting on this 
Situation, even the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MTTI) 
has criticized the time (usually about four years) between model changes 
in the automobile industry being too short and recommended it to be 
longer (about seven years, similar to that of their Western counterparts). 
Thus, not only pressure from abroad but also domestic factors indicate 
the necessity of some reform of existing Japanese production strategy and 
economic structure. Of course, we should not overestimate the influence 
or power of public opinion. Therefore, to expect such a drastic reform to 
be executed in the near future is too optimistic. However, the above-men-
tioned problems seem to be symptomatic of forthcoming changes. 
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The crucial defect of contemporary capitalism as a social System is that it 
makes accumulation an aim in itself and consequently accumulation for 
accumulation's sake is going on. While it is true that this System has 
formed the most efficient society it has been done through the use of 
capital, a motion-form of value, with the motive being to make a profit. 
Capitalist society originally had its own self-controlling mechanism, cy-
clical economic crises; however, it has lost the quality of self-restraint since 
the advent of the "Weifare State" (exploring this problem is beyond the 
scope of this paper, cf. Ouchi 1991). Therefore it is apt to continue exceed-
ing the limits of its resources unless there is a control mechanism. 
This tendency has been intensified with the emergence of multinational 
corporations. Contemporary capitalism has been expanding beyond its 
proper boundary, polluting the air and destroying the environment, thus 
jeopardizing the existence of human life itself, producing severe labour 
conditions (for example, karöshi (sudden death due to extreme overwork)), 
and upsetting the proper and well-balanced conditions of the world; in 
consequence, the rieh countries become richer and the poor countries 
poorer. 
This especially applies to Japan, because in Japan the 'producer's ide-
ology' has been the top priority to all and been supported almost unani-
mously, even by trade unions, since the beginning of industrialization, 
when the aim was to catch up with the advanced countries. The aims of 
Japanese trade unions have been apt to merge with those of the employing 
companies within the narrow sphere of a Single Company; unions have 
seldom exerted power beyond their own companies. This Situation wil l 
not change fundamentally unless Rengö (Japanese Trade Union Confed-
eration), a united national centre formed in 1987, with which 55 principal 
unions and 5.4 million members are affiliated3, breaks away from 'pro-
ducer's ideology'. 
The fact that Japan has longer working hours than other industrialized 
countries shows that the 'producer's ideology' is still prevalent. 
The necessity of establishing an international labour Standard is clear 
(Sengenberger 1990). International labour Standards would help Japan 
solve the problems we are facing both at home and abroad. 
Nowadays, doubts and reflections on produetion-oriented thinking 
have begun to appear. Reconsideration and amendment of JIT is one ex-
3 In 1987 Rengö was founded as united centre of private-enterprise unions. In 
1989, after many unions from the public sector had joined, Rengö emerged in 
its present form. 
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ample. Total fertility rate, i.e., the average numbers of children borne by 
women during their lifetimes, dropped to 1.53 in 1990, the lowest rate 
recorded in the dynamic statistics of population. This represents a critical 
response from women. Because 'producer's ideology' causes women the 
most suffering, it is no wonder that its severest critics are women. The 
younger generation has begun to show a quite different consciousness of 
labour; for example, they dislike taking the so-called '3-k' jobs (kitsui 
(hard), kitanai (dirty) and kiken (dangerous)). Such a propensity among 
the young is generally conceived of as to be only negative. Yet it seems 
to denote a rejection of the conventional ideology. 
Although there are voices in Japan advocating a quality life, they are 
still too weak to effectively exert more influence and social power. Inter-
national labour Standards wil l doubtlessly provide a common and uni-
versal aim for these groups, including the trade unions. 
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INTERNATIONALIZATION STRATEGIES OF JAPANESE 
AND GERMAN AUTOMOBILE COMPANIES 
Ulrich Jürgens 
ABSTRACT 
The questions in this article are directed at the relationship between international-
ization and industrial relations. There was a shift in the constellation of actors in 
the world automobile industry in the 1980s. The internationalization strategy of 
the Japanese companies became the dominant phenomenon. Public perception also 
shifted: instead of talking about the power and domination of the "multinationals", 
the new topic of discussion was the management and production concept of the 
"transplants". 
The term "transplant" has up to now primarly been used to refer to the inter-
nationalization of the production structures of Japanese manufacturers. This article 
deals with the more recent trends towards internationalization in the German au-
tomobile industry with a look at the same process in Japan. This reference does 
not only come from an interest in comparison. The development in the German 
automobile industry since the mid-1980s has been influenced and shaped to a large 
degree by the internationalization of the Japanese automobile industry. 
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1. INTERNATIONALIZATION AS A PRODUCTION STRATEGY 
In the past decades, the automobile industry has been one of the main 
actors in internationalization. The majority of the automobile companies 
has an international presence with its products; a minority, on the other 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
hand, has also internationalized production. We are primarily interested 
in these structures of international production and their Strategie utiliza-
tion in regard to questions concerning the industrial relations of the home 
Company as well as those of the foreign subsidiaries. 
In comparison with the international mobility of goods and Invest-
ment capital, industrial relations are largely nationally determined. 
Much has been written about the tense relation between the inter-
national character of Company activity and the national character of 
industrial relations (Flanagan and Weber 1974; Banks and Stieber 1977; 
Kujawa 1975; Kujawa 1980). Most studies on the automobile industry 
have focused on the two largest U.S. multinational car companies, 
General Motors and Ford. For a long time they were also the only 
companies which had firrnly established themselves both in North 
America and in Western Europe. In the 1970s both companies 
developed a world car strategy. This strategy promised to compensate 
for the enormous costs of developing the new product generations by 
using the economies of scale which would correspond to their world-
wide sales volumes. In this manner, they believed that they could take 
advantage of their strengths as multinational companies. 
The world car concept did not live up to these high expectations. The 
aim of standardizing the product was in contradiction to the diverging 
market trends in the different regions of the world. There was no system-
atic attempt to standardize process technology and management Systems 
in the world-wide network of plants established in the course of the world 
car strategy. 
There was a shif t in the constellation of actors in the world automobile 
industry in the 1980s. The internationalization strategy of the Japanese 
companies became the dominant phenomenon. Public pereeption seemed 
to shift: instead of talking about the power and domination of the "mul-
tinationals", the new topic of discussion was the management and pro-
duction concept of the "transplants". 
The term "transplant" has up to now been primarily used to refer 
to the internationalization of the production structures of Japanese man-
ufacturers. In the following, I wil l be dealing with more recent trends 
toward internationalization in the German automobile industry with a 
look at the same process in Japan. This reference does not only come 
from an interest in comparison. The developments in the German au-
tomobile industry since approximately the mid-1980s have been in-
fluenced and shaped to a large degree by the internationalization of the 
Japanese automobile industry. M y questions are directed at the relation-
ship between internationalization and industrial relations under these 
conditions. 
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In industrial relations, our concern is primarily the level of work reg-
ulation in the plant.1 There are close connections between industrial rela-
tions, production concepts and thus the form of work regulation in the 
plant. This has been shown for the automobile industry in a number of 
internationally comparative studies in recent years (Jürgens et al. 1989; 
Tokunaga et al. 1991; Sorge and Streeck 1987). A keynote of these studies 
has been the question of alternative paths for production Organization 
and thus of possible options within the framework of strategies for pro-
duction modernization and industrial policy. Nationally specific paths, in 
the sense of a "Japanese model" or a "German model", are discussed in 
this context (cf. Jürgens et al. 1989: 354ff.; Berggren 1988). With respect to 
their foreign sites, companies are faced with the following concrete ques-
tion: to what extent do they consider the production concepts of their core 
plants to be transferable, or to what extent do they want to transfer them? 
The answer to this question is clearly relevant in determining which pro-
duction concepts will prevail. 
In the following, I would like to first of all compare the internation-
alization profiles of the German and Japanese automobile industries 
(section 2); following this, I will discuss the question of the extent to 
which internationalization is carried out through transplanting national 
production concepts from the German or the Japanese automobile in-
dustry. For the automobile industry I wi l l be concentrating on 
Volkswagen as the most important German multinational Company.2 
There was a clear change in VW's internationalization strategy at the 
end of the 1980s which was primarily influenced by Japanese concepts 
from Japan and from the "transplants" (section 3). The closing reflec-
tions deal with the establishment of international Systems of industrial 
relations in view of the internationalization strategies of the companies 
(section 4). 
1 In this article I am focussing on plant level industrial relations. I am not looking 
into the interrelations with the System of industrial relations made up by the 
triangle of State, unions, and companies which is the classical arena of industrial 
relations in the sense of J. Dunlop (1958). 
2 For this purpose I interviewed representatives of management and works Coun-
cil of Volkswagen A G and the International Metal Workers Federation in Sum-
mer 1991. The following draws also from the Autoproject at the Wissenschafts-
zentrum Berlin (WZB). This project on "Challenges and Opportunities of the 
Current Restructuring in the World Automobile Industry for its Employees" 
was carried out in the context of MIT's research program on "The Future of the 
Automobile" by K. Dohse, T. Malsch and the author. The project's findings are 
published in Jürgens et al. (1989); the English Version is forthcoming from Cam-
bridge University Press. 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
2. COMPARING THE INTERNATIONALIZATION PROFILES OF THE G E R M A N 
A N D THE JAPANESE C A R INDUSTRY 
In this comparison I wil l be limiting myself largely to the automotive area 
and to well-known car producers in both countries. Both dominant mul-
tinational companies General Motors and Ford already owned production 
sites in Germany (referring in the following to the Federal Republic of 
Germany, thus up until 1990 West Germany) which they were able to 
operate again after World War II (WW II). Their share of the entire car 
production in Germany was 42% in 1990. To this extent, a part of the 
German automobile industry was subject to the internationalization 
strategies of these American manufacturers from the Start. 























F.R.G. in % of 
total supplies 
(1987) 
VW 31 (-1) 59 (+2) 64 (+12) 857 
Mercedes Benz 30 (0) 90 (-D 78 (-3) 90 
BMW 38 (-8) 98 (0)3 85 (-1)3 84 
GM (Opel) 61 (-13)2 14 (-10)4 65 (+20)6 78 
Ford 51 (-17)2 17 (+30)4 II 5 (+13)6 70 
Porsche 28 (-19) 100 (0) 100 (0) 95 
1 sales in 1988. 
2 change 1988 vs. 1982. 
3 without motorcycles. 
4 change 1990 vs. 1982. 
5 labour force 1990 vs. 1982. 
6 change 1988 vs. 1980. 
7 only V W - A G ; at Audi: 94 %. 
Sources: M V M A (various years); Sauer (1991: 32). 
It becomes clear from Table 1 that the German site plays a very differing 
role for the automobile companies with production in Germany: 
- The two American companies General Motors and Ford both produce 
approximately one seventh of their world production at their German 
sites; this has a considerable but not decisive importance in the com-
panies as a whole. However, both companies have important manage-
ment functions located in Germany: in the case of Opel, these are the 
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development and central planning departments for General Motors 
Europe; in the case of Ford, these are fundamental parts of research 
and development (R&D) and production planning. 
- The Volkswagen corporation produces around 60% of its cars in Ger-
many and two thirds of its workers in the corporation's two companies, 
V W A G and Audi , are employed here. With VW-Sachsen, a third Com-
pany is emerging in the former GDR - however, in contrast to Audi 
and V W A G , without its own central functions like R&D and produc-
tion planning. 
- Mercedes Benz is still exclusively a German Company in the area of car 
production; it only has international production sites in the area of 
trucks and commercial vehicles. 
- BMW and Porsche, finally, are the firms which are most closely limited 
to Germany in their production and work force. 
The German automobile industry is also largely rooted in Germany in 
terms of relations with suppliers. In 1987, V W A G still received 85% of 
its purchasing volume from domestic sources, while Ford and Opel even 
received 70% and 78%, respectively (Sauer 1991: 32). 
If we exlude sales, the rootedness of the lapanese automobile manu-
facturers in Japan is still very great, but it has been sharply reduced in 
the course of the 1980s, as table 2 shows. Honda and Nissan have the 
most strongly internationalized production structures. Of the Japanese 
companies selected, Toyota is still most firmly rooted in Japan. 
Table 2: Strength of Japanese roots of the Japanese automobile manufacturers 















Toyota 55 (+14) 87 (-13) 69 (-31) 
Nissan 44 H) 80 (-10) 903 (-10) 
Honda 36 (+13) 70 (-30) 852 (-8) 
Mazda 35 (0) 84 (-16) na. n.a. 
1 not including the group companies. 
2 only for passenger car. 
3 in 1988. 
Sources: JAMA (various years); The Economist Intelligence Unit (1991). 
If we compare the internationalization strategies of the German and Ja-
panese manufacturers in the area of car production it becomes clear that: 
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- Volkswagen was the only German automobile Company that pursued 
an internationalization strategy with regard to its production system 
up to now. Originally it aimed primarily at Third World countries in 
which potential market growth was seen (Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, 
South Africa, China). A n exception to this strategy of "opening up the 
periphery" was its Westmoreland site in the U.S.A. which started pro-
duction in 1978. Giving up the U.S. production site in the middle of 
the 1980s went hand in hand with the development of Volkswagen 
towards a European oriented Corporation (the shares of Europe on the 
corporation's sales, production and work force in 1990 were 74%, 84% 
and 76% respectively). At the beginning of the 90s, the Company is 
setting up new production sites in Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, 
and the eastern part of Germany. 
- Up until the beginning of the 1980s, direct Investments of the Japanese 
companies also went to production sites on the periphery. With the 
establishment of "transplants" in North America and then in Western 
Europe we see a decisive change in strategy at the beginning of the 
1980s; starting then, internationalization meant a triad strategy build-
ing up their presence as manufacturers in North America and Western 
Europe. 
Connected with the change in strategy in both cases is a difference in the 
relationship between domestic and foreign sites. Up until then there was 
a hierarchy in which the domestic core plants were outfitted with the 
respective company's latest technology and delivered their products in 
the core countries of the triad, whereby the peripheral plants applied 
"used technology" to supply the peripheral countries. The change in 
strategy now undermines the central position of the core plants. They are 
now confronted with parallel plants in foreign countries which are 
equipped with modern technology and operate under modern manage-
ment concepts. The latter are now also "world market" factories able to 
meet the demands of the triad markets and even to export to the home 
market of the Company. This holds true for the "transplants" of the Ja-
panese companies and for some of the new production sites of the VW-
Group. As a consequence parallel plants are now competing on the basis 
of comparable technology and with the same products in this inter-
national production system. 
Parallel production of the same model at different sites was practiced 
early by General Motors (GM) in North America and became the basis 
for a system of control and systematic competition there. There are ob-
vious advantages for central management control: better transparency for 
evaluating plant Performance and exerting pressure on the laggards to 
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match the level of Performance of the best factories. Thus parallel pro-
duction also became an important control instrument for management at 
Ford and G M when they integrated their European organizations in the 
1970s (cf. Jürgens et al. 1989:196ff.).3 
The installation of structures of parallel production obviously has 
far-reaching consequences for industrial relations. We wil l be returning 
to this below. In the past, parallel production in European companies, 
to the extent that it took place at all, had a totally different purpose. A 
System of main and satellite plants emerged with the rapid growth of 
these companies. If these were " Single purpose plants" for the produc-
tion of one model, then the factory works Councils of the main plants 
attempted to preserve production structures with which one product 
could be produced exclusively and one product parallel with one of the 
company's other plants. In view of fluctuations in demand between the 
products, this would help safeguard employment in the core plant. With 
reduced demand for one product, the production of the second model 
could be increased to preserve jobs. Thus both basic models "Golf" and 
"Polo" were produced in Volkswagen's core plant in Wolfsburg during 
the 1980s, in the satellite plants in Emden and Pamplona (Spain), on 
the other hand, only the Passat and Polo were produced respectively. 
In the framework of the new international production structures at VW 
we see a reversal of this Situation - the core plant with its main pro-
duction line only has a limited conversion flexibility, and the new plants 
in the corporate group are so designed that several basic models can 
be produced with their equipment. (The Japanese transplants generally 
have a very high degree of process flexibility which is assured through 
two or three basic models that can be produced on the same production 
lines.) 
3 Whether in Great Britain or in the U.S.A., the tenor of leading industrial en-
gineers we interviewed in our WZB project dealing with the restructuring of 
the automobile industry was the same: "We endeavor to achieve a production 
lay-out and installation which is as compatible as possible. When we now plan 
new equipment, then the plants will be made exactly the same, even the colors, 
so that the people in England don't have any more excuses (an industrial en-
gineer of a major European car Company). "The division specified the tooling 
for work models and provided factories with the same equipment" (an in-
dustrial engineer of an American Company quoted in: Jürgens et al. 1989:197). 
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Table 3: Production sites of car assembly and planned additional capacity of the 
V W group 1990-1995 (in 1000 vehicles) 
Concern Company (assembly plants) Production 1990 Additional 
capacity -1995 
(New plants) 
VW AG/F.R.G. (Wolfsburg, Emden, Hannover) 1,644 
VW Sachsen/F.RG. (Mosel I) 2 250 (Mosel D) 
Audi AG/F.RG. (Ingolstadt, Neckarsulm) 430 
VW/Belgien (Brüssels) 206 
SEAT/Spain (Barcelona, Prat, Pamplona) 533 400 (Martorell) 
TAS/Jugoslavia (Sarajewo) 37 
SKODA/CS.F.R. 400 (Mlada Boleslav) 
BAZ/CS.F.R 100 (Bratislava) 
MPV/Portugal 80 (Setubal) 
VW/Mexico 214 150 
Autolatina / Brasilia 265 
Autolatina/Argentina 8 
VW/South Africa 60 
VW/China (Shanghai) 19 300 (Changchung) 
Total 3,418 1,680 
Source: Volkswagen: Annual Company Report 1990 
Table 3 shows the current sites structure of VW's assembly plants and 
their production Output for 1990 and compares this to the currently pro-
jected expansion and the additional capacities this wi l l create. With respect 
to the newly created international production structure the following can 
be stated: 
- Despite the possibility of surplus capacity, VW is planning additional 
capacity which exceeds the production volume of 1990 by almost 50% 
worldwide. A projected market share of almost 20% is projected for 
Europe (1990 around 20%). Volkswagen is thereby contributing to the 
heating up of competition in the 90s which can be expected in any case 
following the agreement between the European Community (EC) and 
Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) to gradu-
ally lift the market entry barriers towards Japanese cars into West 
Europe. 
- The competition for the core plant Wolfsburg becomes tougher: the 
production of the A-model (Golf) was the privilege of the core plant in 
Wolfsburg, in the future it can be produced at six sites: in Wolfsburg 
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and Mosel (the new site in the former G.D.R.), in Brüssels (Belgium), 
in Puebla (Mexico), im Pamplona (Spain) and in the future also in 
Changchung (China). 
- With the new sites, the Volkswagen Company is growing on the pe-
riphery of Europe, in countries with low wages (the wages at Skoda 
are presently around one tenth of those at the VW AG) and weak union 
structures. The same pattern is also discernable in its expansion strate-
gies outside Europe, where growth is on the fringe or outside the areas 
of the other two triad powers. 
This pattern of growth for the future contrasts with that of the Japanese 
companies. Here the core countries of the triad powers are the focal points 
of expansion. On the basis of the most recent announcements (Oct. 1991), 
a capacity of 1.2 million vehicles could emerge in Europe by 1995 (after 
205,000 in 1990), and more than double the 1990 production figure of 
1,320,000 vehicles could then be produced in the U.S.A. (around 
2,700,000). In the United States alone the Japanese cars assemblers estab-
lished eight new plants (not including the Joint venture between General 
Motors and Toyota N U M M I (New United Motor Manufacturing Inc.)), 
and three in Canada; in Western Europe the new production sites are all 
in the U.K. (two existing production sites have been taken over in Spain, 
a Dutch plant of Volvo will be restructured as a Joint venture, probably 
under Japanese management. With this focus of growth the Japanese man-
ufacturers are obviously not counting on the advantage of lower wages. 
They are, in principle, facing strong union organizations who are observ-
ing this development with Argus eyes, although partly from the outside. 
This is also true for the political organizations and the public in these 
countries. The Japanese producers are going into the "lions den" to contest 
for market shares with the established companies! If they are neither 
counting on low wages nor on the established actors showing a particular 
readiness to make concessions, then what advantages could they bring to 
bear for themselves? 
3 . INTERNATIONALIZATION AS THE TRANSPLANTATION OF N A T I O N A L 
PRODUCTION CONCEPTS 
3.1. The Concept of Transplants 
"Transplants" is a well-established term for the new plants of the Japanese 
companies in North America and Western Europe. The term is even used 
for the Joint ventures of Japanese and American car companies - NUMMI, 
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Diamond Star and CAMI (Canadian Automobile Manufacturing Inc.). The 
term is obviously being used analogous to the transplantation of organs 
from one body to another. This has two implications: on the one hand it 
means transplanting a part of the organ donor to a foreign carrier and it 
is not clear whether the transplanted organ will be accepted or rejected; 
on the other hand, it means that it is not only a minor Operation for the 
recipient, but requires that the entire "body" adapt and adjust itself to the 
new "organ". It fits into the analogy of an organ transplant that with 
North America and Great Britain the Japanese manufacturers have chosen 
two production sites which are considered "sick" by many observers, 
whose automobile industries showed especially serious crisis features at 
the beginning of the 1980s (cf. Dertouzos 1989; Dunnett 1980). 
However, the analogy of an organ transplant is misleading. It is prob-
ably unclear to everybody what the necessary and sufficient conditions are 
which make Japanese production Systems function in the way they do. 
Thus, for the Japanese companies going abroad, it is also a question of 
trial and error, what they should take with them. In any case, it is not 
technology and not certain special skills or work rules which would have 
to be transferred. The "transplanf'-discussion rather concentrates on three 
elements: 
1. The production control system oriented to the "no buffer/no error" 
ideal together with a work Organization based on teamwork, a multi-
skilled work force and permanent improvement activities; 
2. a system of industrial relations with the "three pillars" of lifetime em-
ployment (for core employees), seniority-based wages and Company 
unions; 
3. a supplier/ subcontractor system in the well-known pyramid structure 
and long-term relationships within the Company group. 
Obviously, the process control/work Organization improvement Sys-
tem lies at the heart of the matter; its elements and implications are cur-
rently discussed widely in the West under terms like "Toyotism", 
"Ohnoism", "lean production system" (cf. Dohse et al. 1985; Wood (un-
publ. paper); Womack et al. 1990). 
What is it what the German management might consider to take with 
them when going abroad with production? The following two elements 
could be regarded as typical for the "German way" to run production 
and to organize work: 
1. The central role of qualified skilled workers and the system of vo-
cational trairiing by apprenticeship; 
2. the system of plant level industrial relations which gives the works 
Councils a strong degree of influence and in some areas co-determina-
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tion rights concerning decisions on personnel policy, training and - to 
a lesser degree - on production Organization. The basis of this system 
is the German labour law. It exerts strong pressure to find consensus 
Solutions and forces "jointness" in developing plant level Solutions. 
In the following I will mainly deal with the first element. The most striking 
contrast when we compare the "Japanese" and the "German" way to run 
production is in the area of skills formation and labour deployment. The 
German system is traditionally oriented towards technical Solutions (Jür-
gens et al. 1989:354ff.), and the qualified skilled workers (Facharbeiter) are 
regarded as the most valuable asset to run the automated equipment. 
These skilled workers have gone through a solid apprenticeship at the 
beginning of their career (cf. about the "dual system" of apprenticeship 
training: Streeck et al. 1987); they are the specialized problem-solvers who 
also receive most of the additional training. Ordinary production workers 
are traditionally of secondary importance; often they are foreign workers 
(Gastarbeiter) working under what is still regarded in Germany as the 
"American concepts" of Fordism-Taylorism. As a consequence, produc-
tion work in the "German way" is largely polarized between the poorly-
trained unskilled workers in direct production and the qualified skilled 
workers in the off-line and indirect areas. Both direct and indirect workers 
have the same qualifications in the Japanese plants and there is no differ-
entiation of Status between them. Initial (apprenticeship) training and con-
tinuous training in the German system is still oriented to creating an elite 
of core workers with special technical competence; in the Japanese plants, 
training is a matter concerning all workers. 
At the center of the "German model" is the qualified skilled worker 
(Facharbeiter) and a specific acknowledgement of skilled work as a "profes-
sion". This understanding also includes an interest in one's work, a willing-
ness to accept comprehensive responsibility (also crossing over the borders 
of their own task area), and a large degree of self-regulation in carrying out 
work. Almost all of the first-line Supervisors, the Meister, in German plants 
have a skilled trades qualification and have passed an external examination 
at the local Chambers of Industry and Commerce after having gone through 
an extensive additional training course with a focus again on technical 
training. These Meister would alsobe the Supervisors in non-skilled produc-
tion areas and thus represent a high technical problem-solving potential 
also in these areas. The Meister form the link between the direct workers on 
the shop floor and the skilled workers of maintainance as well as the techni-
cians and engineers from the technical staff functions. It is the line Fachar-
beiter-Meister, technicians, and engineers which form the crucial axis, tradi-
tionally, in the German plants. The Facharbeiter tradition and the strong posi-
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tion of the works Councils based on the Works Constitution Act (Betriebsver-
fassungsgesetz) did not support a "job control" attitude like that in Anglo-
Saxon countries to emerge on the shop floor. The relationship between the 
works Councils and management developed on the basis of negotiating in-
terests against thebackground of the Situation in the individual factory. This 
system takes the different interests into account and serves to balance them 
out. This, in turn, ensures the work force's acceptance of the conditions of 
employment. 
Taylorism established itself increasingly in the German automobile 
plants after WW II, and the Facharbeiter tradition was pushed aside. As it 
was generally recognized at the beginning of the 1980s that Fordist and 
Taylorist principles for production Organization were no longer appro-
priate for a flexible, highly mechanized production, a model for produc-
tion Organization emerged against the background of the skilled worker 
tradition and the cc^deterrnination rights of the works Councils which 
aimed at the increased deployment of skilled workers, including now 
direct production tasks as well. This went along with production concepts 
inspired by the vision of "Computer integrated manufacturing" aiming at 
high degrees of automation even in areas like final assembly and low 
batch production, where until then human labour had prevailed. This 
meant increased demands for technology-related qualifications and inde-
pendence in completing tasks. The qualified skilled worker received an 
even more pivotal role in the modernized plants of the German automo-
bile industry. 
3.2. Segmentation According to Core and Periphery Sites 
To what extent can we speak of a "transplanf'-strategy of the German car 
manufacturers? In the following I will concentrate on Volkswagen's for-
eign production sites. In view of the central role of the skilled workers for 
German production management, I specifically want to look at the system 
of skill formation and the training of skilled workers in VW's foreign 
production sites. I wil l briefly touch the aspect of industrial relations in 
the first point. The following observations can be made: 
1. No attempt has been made to transplant the institutions of jointness 
and co-determination to the plants abroad. Obviously, this system is ac-
cepted in Germany as it is stipulated by law, but plant management seems 
not to see benefits in establishing similar institutions on a voluntary basis 
in its foreign plants. At the same time, the experience of having to deal 
with the strong unions-based works Council has not instigated German 
management to actively pursuing a union-free environment for its plant. 
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The existence of a union and its rights of representing worker's interests 
was never questioned anywhere. 
The Company adopted existing organizations and the peculiarities of 
the country's system of industrial relations. VW South Africa played a 
pioneering role in the recognition of the black union COSATU. The V W 
works Council supported the struggle against apartheid.4 The recognition 
of unions at foreign production sites, however, does not mean that the 
social partnership between management and the works Councils which 
exists in Germany (cf. Brumlop and Jürgens 1986) is also practiced there. 
There were intense labour conflicts between the workers and manage-
ment in Brazil and Mexico (cf. Dombois 1987; Doleschal 1986). Brazilian 
union circles attribute the transfer of management to Ford in the frame-
work of the Joint venture Auto Latina to the fact that, in view of imminent 
restructuring, VW preferred to avoid direct confrontation. At many sites, 
Ford had acquired the reputation of being a hardliner in questions of 
industrial relations. 
2. In contrast to the co-determination system, German management 
put high emphasis on introducing a German-type apprenticeship training 
of Facharbeiter in its foreign plants. Apprenticeship training was given 
considerable importance when compared to the conditions in the host 
country and other multinationals there. This holds true particularly for 
the Third World plants. Thus, before starting production at the new as-
sembly plant in Pueblo, Mexico, VW set up its own training school for 
skilled workers; the training curriculum was almost identical to the Ger-
man Facharbeiter-traimng, and in the early phase even the trainers were 
Germans. We can observe a similar pattern in most of the other new lo-
cations. Also, the VW plants generally take in more apprentices than other 
multinationals do in these countries. Thus, in 1991 VW South Africa with 
around 8000 employees trained about 300 apprentices, whereas the South 
African Joint venture of Ford and Mazda with 5000 employees had only 
around 70 apprentices in the system. 
At the new site in Shanghai, China, which was set up in 1985, they 
immediately set up a facility for vocational training to train skilled work-
ers. As in the German dual system and in contrast to Chinese practice, 
this facility is not directly a part of the Company and with a largely Ger-
man curriculum; it trains around 200 apprentices. 
In Germany since the 1970s, the intake of apprentices for training as 
skilled workers became more and more disconnected from the projected 
needs of the skilled workers' departments. At the beginning this was 
4 Thus, for instance, John Gomono, President of the National Union of Metal 
Workers of South Africa spoke at Company meetings at V W in Wolfsburg. 
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due to general labour market and youth policy considerations and a 
corresponding pressure by works Councils and politicians to take in 
more apprentices. But in the 1980s, management saw the advantage of 
having "surplus" skilled workers who could be deployed directly in 
the production on unskilled jobs. Because of mass unemployment, these 
young skilled workers {Jungfacharbeiter) could hardly quit and look for 
another job. Thus, they had to accept direct production jobs which they 
and their colleagues in the skilled trades departments regarded as 
having "low value". But management could now use their competence 
to install more "intelligent" work structures (Jürgens 1989: 132f.). This 
strategy could not be implemented in most foreign plants. The 
graduates of the training schools regard themselves as an elite, and 
because of the labour market conditions, they can easily change em-
ployers. In addition, in most of these countries they have even less 
prestige than in Western Europe. The young skilled workers at the 
Brazilian VW Plant San Bernado, for example, went on strike in protest 
against their deployment in production jobs recently. 
3. It is remarkable that in the case of the American plant Westmoreland, 
which was the only case where Volkswagen tried to get a foothold in the 
other two triad locations, VW followed even more a course of "adaption" 
instead of "application" of German concepts. 
The division of labour (job classifications, job demarcations), the role 
of seniority in personnel measures and the principle of hire and fire, and 
the forms of worker representation and conflict that could be seen at the 
production sites in the U.S.A. were exactly like those of the Big 3 (cf. Dom-
bois 1982: 249). This is also true for the role of the skilled worker and 
skilled worker training, which is a particular weakness of the American 
system (cf. Dertouzos et al. 1989: 81). VW did not make any particular 
efforts of its own to cover the scarcity of skilled workers, which was a 
particular problem at the Westmoreland site. Whereas V W has been set-
ting up its own apprenticeship training system in all of its other foreign 
affiliates it did not do so in the U.S.A. Thus Dombois reports that in the 
Situation of a particular skilled worker scarcity, the Westmoreland man-
agement tried to attract skilled workers from Detroit and hired almost 
one hundred British skilled workers. Dombois (1982: 249) summarized 
his observations of the Westmoreland plant in 1986: 
The workers in the U.S. plants produce the same or at least similar 
products (the Golf/Rabbit) on the same equipment as their col-
leagues in Wolfsburg, but the conditions under which they work, 
are compensated and are employed differ considerably from those 
in German plants. Also the manner in which plant conflicts and 
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work and employment conditions are settled is different in German 
and American plants. 
The Westmoreland site closed in 1988. A lot of reasons have been given to 
explain this decision which is still discussed controversially among VW's 
management. The intention to use the low cost production basis in Mexico 
and Brasil did play a role in that decision. Another reason was the rather 
poor Performance of the plant in terms of quality and productivity. Either 
the plant had no warning time or it had already itself given up by the time 
of the decision to close Westmoreland down as it did not seem to make any 
efforts to turn itself around. The plant did not take part in the process of the 
establishment of "new industrial relations" in the U.S.A. (see Katz 1985), 
with the abolition of seniority-based practices for worker deployment, in-
creased flexibility and participation in the framework of team-oriented 
work reforms. There were no attempts at using new concepts to achieve an 
increased efficiency and quality in production. We can speculate that man-
agement instead considered large investments in new technology as neces-
sary - just as it saw the increased use of technology and the mastery of ad-
vanced computer-assisted technology Systems as the best security for the 
future in Germany. At the end ofthe 1980s, machinery and equipment of the 
Westmoreland plant were shipped to China, where it serves as the hard-
ware of VW's second plant at Changchung. 
The picture is not yet complete, as we have not dealt with the new 
plants of Volkswagen in the south and east of Europe. For the international 
production struture up to the 1980s, we have seen the attempt to transfer 
some of the German skilled workers' tradition. But this was done without 
building on it and developing skilled worker based high-tech production 
structures there. 
3.3. Internationalization Via "Transplants" 
The history of how the Japanese "transplants" in North America and 
Western Europe were established will not be reported in detail here. For 
North America this has been, in contrast to VW's experience, a "success 
story" up to now. The following factors help explain why: 
1. Products: the shorter model change cycles and the wide spectrum of 
products on the basis of a higher product flexibility as well as the price 
and product quality. 
2. Site selection and start-up preparation: a high selectivity in the choice 
of personnel, careful training of the core workers, who in part went 
through an extended training in Japan; heavy emphasis on training 
also for direct production workers. 
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The start-up curve was flat and extended over a long period of time. 
In this phase, possible sources of defects in the process lay-out, in qual-
ification and diligence of the work force as well as in the quality of 
supply parts were carefully eliminated before the plant switched over 
to füll Operation. This was especially true for the early plant openings, 
like Honda's Ohio plant and Nissan's Tennessee plant, which had a 
first run with motorcycle and pick-up production respectively. 
3. Political support: this concerns less the subsidies from the State or Com-
munity, which Volkswagen also received in Westmoreland. Worthy of 
note is, in my opinion, rather that the American government did not 
undertake anything to compensate for the unequal cost burdens be-
tween old sites of the Big Three and the new transplant sites. As 
governmental Systems for health insurance, old age pensions and un-
employment compensation in the U.S. A . are very inadequate, the com-
panies have established Company internal Systems on the basis of con-
tractual agreements with the UAW (United Automobile Workers). 
These Systems place a heavy bürden on plants which have been at the 
same site for decades, have a high average age of the work force and 
a large number of retirees (cf. Mosley and Schmid 1991).5 Management 
thus gave the industrial policy goal of modernization a clear preference 
over socio-political objectives. 
4. The fact that a majority in the union and leading union representatives 
accepted that fundamental changes in the work practices of plants were 
necessary and that local resistance to such changes should be overcome. 
This meant a fierce fight against union Opposition to the changes, which 
later formed the "New Directions Movement" (cf. Parker and Slaughter 
1988; Mann 1987). 
5. Last but not least was the new plant management practiced by the 
Japanese in their "transplants". Here they were obviously able to con-
nect cost efficiency and quality Performance with working conditions 
acceptable for the American employees. 
It is well known that of the Japanese transplants only the Joint ventures 
N U M M I (Toyota - General Motors), Diamond Star (Mitsubishi - Chrys-
ler), and C A M I (Suzuki - General Motors), the Mazda Fiat Rock site, 
which is partially a subcontractor of Ford are organized by the UAW. A n 
attempt at organizing at Nissan in Smyrna failed spectacularly. First stu-
5 Iacocca put the average U.S. health care costs at around $ 700 per vehide (Fi-
nancial Times, Sept. 1,1989); the takeover negotiations between Ford and Chrys-
ler have apparently foundered on the unfunded $ 3.6 billion in pension obliga-
tions that Chrysler has from the 1987 takeover of American Motors (Handels-
blatt, July 11,1991:19). 
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dies have shown, however, that the existence of union Organization did 
not lead to fundamental changes in the plant management practices. The 
research done by Abo et al. has shown no significant differences between 
the eight automobile and parts "transplants" they investigated in North 
America (The Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, 1990).6 A n 
explanation for this could be that the Japanese management surveyed 
acted as if a Japanese type of union were present. 
I do not have any further information over the forms of interest repre-
sentation and conflict regulation in the non-unionized transplants in the 
U.S. A. It appears to me that "institutions" like presidential meetings, com-
mon cafeterias, open offices, involvement circles and teamwork have up 
until now functioned successfully as a Substitute for an institutionalized 
system of interest representation with shop Stewards and shop com-
mittees. 
The "transplant" approach, i.e. the attempt to replicate a Japanese man-
agement and production concepts, holds true for all new plants of the 
Japanese car manufacturers in the U.S.A. and Canada (as well as in the 
U.K.). The differences between the "transplants" are small in this respect 
(The Institute of Social Science 1990: 95; Abo 1990). Possibly the most im-
portant success of the "transplants" was their demonstration effect - it 
works under foreign conditions, and it is accepted by American (and 
British) workers. 
In surveys of and Statements from employees of the Japanese trans-
plants, two important positive points for Japan-oriented plant manage-
ment from the point of view of their employees became apparent time 
and again: 
1. "Management cares" - grievances are taken seriously, a Solution to the 
problem is attempted promptly, those affected are included in problem 
solving and taken seriously as experts with their practical knowledge. 
2. "Management shares the bürden" - the attitude prevalent in Western 
plants, in which all problems are passed on down the hierarchy, does 
not exist here, privilege structures and Status differences are clearly 
reduced. There is a high degree of sensitivity and recognition of this 
among the American workers (and British workers), precisely against 
6 "...the existence of a labor union does not necessarily restrict the application of 
Japanese management on the shop floor." (The Institute of Social Science, Uni-
versity of Tokyo, 1990, p. 49). Abo's study had a surprise result here. In the 
indicator "adjustment to an American style" or "transfer of the Japanese style" 
which ranged from 1 - 5 the factor "union" scored 4.4, although only one of the 
eight companies surveyed was unionized. 
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the background of thinking in class categories or in terms of "top" and 
"bottom". 
The overall success of the "transplants", their efficiency, quality record and 
social stabiüty have already led to the conclusion that Japanese production 
concepts are universally employable (Womack et al. 1990; Murata and Har-
rison 1991). There are, though, a number of points which speak in favour of 
still considering the question of the successful transplantation as open: 
1. The new plants were largely built as clones of Japanese plants, the 
products had already been run in Japanese plants, production methods 
had been debugged. Each problem at the "transplant" projects, which 
were very much in the limelight, definitely got a lot of attention from 
management. This might change in the future when the American 
plants have to stand on their own feet and might be regarded as com-
petitors by their Japanese sister plants. 
2. The development chances of the "transplants" and of each employee 
currently appear to be unlimited. There are many possibilities for pro-
motion and improvement in these rapidly growing organizations, and 
this could help console an employee in the face of currently depressing 
and stressful working conditions. 
3. Fundamental elements of the Japanese system, above all those which 
promote the mixture of individual incentive and competition within 
the work force (through personal appraisal, promotion policies) on the 
one hand, and the social integration on the other hand (the multitude 
of clubs, organized leisure activities, etc.) are missing in the "trans-
plants". The wage system generally corresponds to that of the tradi-
tional U.S. plants (cf. Abo 1990). 
In regard to their taking over the American wage system Abo said: 
This is an example of an unfavorable 'hybrid' between Japanese and 
American-style practices, so we believe this wage system is of a 
somewhat transitional character, during which time the Japanese 
carmakers are trying, first of all, to destroy the traditional inflexible 
Systems in the US. (Abo 1990:11) 
In my opinion there are many indications that the further development 
will lead to further "hybrid forms" between Japanese and American manage-
ment styles. The development in the union-organized transplants is con-
spicuous for this. The New Directions Movement, which is critical of the 
Japanese style of management, could gain more influence here as of late. 
This school of thought, which has long been a strong faction in the 
N U M M I plant, recently won the majority in a local union; some modifi-
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cations in the previously practiced team system in Fiat Rock were carried 
out under pressure from this movement.7 
The growing body of literature critical of the Japanese management 
practices in the "transplants" refers time and again to the issues of health 
and safety, speed-up, favouritism (in the appointment of the team 
leaders), equal opportunities, recruiting and promotion of minorities 
(Berggren et al. 1991; Fucini and Fucini 1990). These correspond to the 
traditional conflict points in American industrial relations (seniority is 
another). The Canadian Autoworkers' Union (CAW) put together an ex-
plicit catalogue listing the elements of Japanese production methods that 
the union is not Willing to accept.8 
Instead of the appointment of the team leader, he or she is now elected by the 
team. 
"1. We reject the use of Japanese Production Methods which rigidly establish 
work Standards and Standard Operations thereby limiting worker autonomy 
and discretion on the job. 
2. We reject the use of techniques such as Kaizening (pressure for continuous 
"improvement") where the result is speed-up, work intensification and more 
stressful jobs. 
3. We oppose workplace changes which limit mobility, weaken transfer rights 
and erode seniority provisions. 
4. We reject the introduction of alternative workplace structures and employee-
based programs which purport to represent workers' interests while cir-
cumventing the union. 
5. We reject efforts to shift compensation from wages to incentives and to in-
dividualize the rewards of productivity improvements. 
6. We oppose the process of union nomination or Joint appointees to new jobs 
created to perform Company functions. 
7. We oppose initiatives which undermine worker solidarity-structures which 
require conformity of company-determined objectives and which divide work-
ers into competing groups internally, nationally and internationally. 
8. We oppose the use of peer pressure in Company campaigns to discipline and 
regulate the behavior of workers. 
9. We reject workplace reorganizations which threaten job security by sub-con-
tracting or transferring work outside the bargaining unit. 
10. We oppose efforts to render work places so lean that there is no place for 
workers with work-related, age-related or other disabilities. 
11. We oppose efforts to involve and reward workers in the systematic elimina-
tion of jobs or the disciplining of other workers. 
We support efforts to involve and empower workers, to increase worker dignity, 
to produce quality products with pride, to make jobs more rewarding and work 
places more democratic. These objectives will be achieved through our own 
agendafor change, our own demands around: training, guaranteeing health and 
safety, technology, strengthening mobility rights, improving jobs, strengthening 
affirmative action, improving the work environment, strengthening the union." 
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The picture of a dualization of the Japanese system of industrial rela-
tions with a traditionally America-oriented area and a Japan-oriented area 
is already almost outdated today. On the contrary, an immensely diffe-
rentiated structure has emerged since the 1980s which also shows a num-
ber of concepts at the Big Three which were taken over from Japan. These 
follow with traditional organizational patterns. At the same time, with 
the new G M Company Saturn we see the emergence of extensive union 
co-determination which has some points in common with the German 
system. 
In Great Britain, on the other hand, we have up to now found a 
picture of a more heavily dualized structure of British and Japanese 
industrial relations. This is true despite the fact that the plants here are 
union organized. Thus the Amalgamated Union of Electrical Engineer-
ing Workers (AUEW), which organizes Nissan Sunderland, is also rep-
resented in the traditional British sites of G M , Ford and Austin Rover. 
The British union structure is too fragmented, however, for this to bring 
about a unified policy and a balancing and coordination of demands 
within the union. 
The influence of the union in questions of plant Organization and labour 
deployment is minimal anyway. There is no shop Steward Organization 
and no shop committee of elected union representatives at Nissan Sunder-
land as in the traditional British car plants. Instead, there is a "company 
Council" with an equal number of representatives elected by the work 
force and representatives of management. Management gives information 
through this Council, and bargaining and conflict settlement takes place 
here. It is reported by Nissan workers that there is no union activity in 
the plant. It is rather seen as embarrassing to be a union member (Willi-
amsen 1991: 7). 
Summarizing we can State that the basic principles of plant manage-
ment have been successfully transferred into the new triad plants by 
the Japanese companies. However, this is not true - and the attempt 
has not been made - with respect to the system of industrial relations 
as we know it from Japan. Except for some guarantees of long-term 
employment security, neither the system of seniority-based wages 
(linked to personal appraisal Systems) nor the system of Company uni-
ons has been transferred. In the host country, the arrival of the trans-
plant has triggered off a process of change in the system of industrial 
relations industry-wide. It cannot be expected that the "transplants" 
wil l not be affected by the feedback of the process which they have 
initiated. (The same might be true in the case of changes in the supplier 
relationships which I am not discussing here). 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
3.4. The Japanese Threat and the Internationalization Strategies of German 
Companies 
Let us return to the German companies, and here above all to Volkswagen. 
In view of the perspective of a common EC and intensified competition 
with Japan, either as importers or as producers in Europe, and in view of 
the perceived differences of Performance among the various concepts of 
production concepts (in the spirit of Womack et al. 1990), we can see clear 
changes in the internationalization strategies of the German manufac-
turers. Two directions of thrust can be observed: 
1. The attempt to take advantage of the internationalized production Or-
ganization through concession bargaining, in which concessions at one 
site are held up to another site as an example, with the threat of shifting 
production (this practice is called "whipsawing" by the union Organi-
zation in the U.S.A.). A driving factor behind this are the high, and 
publicly widely discussed, cost burdens of the German site. This per-
tains to wage costs,9 working hours and taxes. A second driving force 
arises from the recognition of the productivity gap between German 
manufacturers and their international competitors and the attempt to 
become lean producers. The MIT study (Womack et al. 1990) has had 
a great impact in this respect. 
Wage Costs in the Car Industry - an International Comparison (D-Mark/Hour 
1990) 
Country Wage costs earning Gross hourly 
F.R.G. 41,87 24,30 
France 26,01 13,76 
Italy 31,67 14,59 
The Netherlands 31,20 16,86 
Belgium 31,83 16,93 
Great Britain 25,58 18,27 
Sweden 23,72 24,56 
U.S.A. 32,07 23,76 
Japan 28,64 22,03 
Spain 29,43 17,13 
Source: V D A Pressedienst (VDA = Association of German Auto Industry), No. 
2 (Jan. 30,1991). 
According to a recent study of McKinsey Consultants the German companies 
lead the cost hierarchy and exceed the cost level of Japanese companies by 40-
50%. With Japanese companies taken as hundred, Mercedes Benz 140-150, BMW 
140-150, V W 140, Ford 130-135, G M (Opel, Vauxhall) 130-135, Volvo 125-130, 
FIAT 120-125, PSA (Peugeot, Citroen) 120, Renault 120, Nissan U.K. 110-115 
(Der Spiegel No. 27/1991, p. 87). 
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2. The attempt to use the internationalized production structure for the 
introduction of new plant management practices in the sense of an 
explicit adoption of Japanese concepts for production and work Organi-
zation. The newly established production sites appear more suitable 
for this endeavor than the core plants in Germany itself, where the 
traditional forms are deeply rooted in the structures and ways of think-
ing of management, the unions and the works Councils. 
The two new directions of thrust in internationalization wil l be dealt with 
in more detail in the following account. Regarding "concession bargain-
ing", the Situation in Western Europe in the 1980s was different from the 
Situation in North America, where the American manufacturers were al-
ready losing market shares and plants had to be closed due to overcapac-
ity. In Western Europe many companies experienced a lack of capacity 
due to a booming market. The union pressure to shorten the work week 
and the high investment in fixed capital contributed in advancing the 
issue of plant utilization as the central "whipsawing" theme in Western 
Europe by the end of the 1980s. 
The chord had already been Struck when the German Metal Workers 
Union, which organizes the employees in the car industry, pushed 
through its demand for shortening the working week. With a long annual 
vacation (30 days), high absenteeism due to sickness (around 10%), and 
long paid breaks during working hours (at Volkswagen 64 minutes per 
shift), the reduction of working time meant that the actual "utilization 
time" of the individual had shrunk to below 1400 hours per year in 1990 
at companies like Volkswagen. This comes close to half of the figure for 
their Japanese colleagues. 
The employer's response to the prospect of the shortening of the work-
ing week was the demand for a lengthening of plant utilization hours per 
week via shift work. 1 0 This could be achieved by disconnecting the in-
dividual working hours from plant utilization hours. The first model for 
such a disconnection was introduced at BMW's new Regensburg plant in 
1 0 Yearly working hours for two shift workers on the basis of collective agreements 
in the metal industry (1989) 
Country working hours public vacation working hours 
per week holidays per year 
F.R.G. 37 11 30 1.528 
U.K. 37,3 8 27 1.686 
Belgium 38,36 10 25 1.734 
Spain 40 13 25 1.784 
Source: Bosch 1989: 69. 
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1986. A nine-hour shift was introduced with four individual working days 
and thus a working week of 36 hours (35,30 hours).11 At the same time, 
the plant utilization time is 99 hours per week and includes one shift on 
Saturdays. This utilization time is achieved by a rather complicated three 
shift rotation system. 
The strategy of increasing plant utilization times thus became one of 
the most important topics in industrial relations in Europe at the end of 
the 1980s. The actual driving force behind this were the capacity bottle-
necks which appeared at some companies, although the European auto-
mobile industry as a whole tended rather toward excess capacity.12 These 
bottlenecks appeared primarily at General Motors Europe, the fastest 
growing European automobile producer in 1990. This was behind G M 
Europe's interest in increasing Output in existing facilities. Their pushing 
through of this interest is often quoted as an example of "whipsawing" 
within an international corporate group (cf. Steinkühler 1989). Thus the 
unions in GM's plant in Saragossa Spain were the first to agree to a third 
shift; in view of the improved Performance of this plant, the Belgian un-
ions in Antwerp saw themselves under pressure as well to agree to a third 
shift. Against this background, the works Councils of the German branches 
saw themselves forced to give in, despite strong pressure from the IG 
Metall headquarters.13 The record for plant utilization times achieved in 
this manner belongs to Opel's Kaiserslautern engine plant, where an 
agreement was reached in spring 1988 that in the planning of future In-
vestments management could assume a utilization time of 139.5 hours. 
This agreement includes round-the-clock production from Monday to 
Friday without stopping the line for breaks, two possible six-hour over-
time shifts and a sixth night shift on Sunday night. 
The fact that the Kaiserslautern works Council was so Willing to make 
concessions can be explained by the fact that it did not do well in com-
parison with its parallel plant Aspern, near Vienna. The Aspern plant is 
In 1986 the contractual working week was 37.5 hours; the difference of 1.5 hours 
at Regensburg was fully paid by the Company. With the further reduction of the 
weekly working hours to 37 hours, this 1.5 hours advantage was kept. 
For the middle of the 1990s, the Consulting Company Ludvigsen Ass. Ltd. is 
reckoning with a market caused surplus capacity of 10-14% in Europe. (cf. 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Aug. 21,1990) 
After that, the central works Council representing the works Councils of the Ger-
man plant wrote a letter to the worker representations at the other European 
G M sites: "We now fear that the measures G M has planned will lead to a com-
petition over lengthened plant utilization times. The winner of this competition 
will be G M , the losers will be the workers in the affected plants and worldwide." 
(express, no. 5/1988: 7). 
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General Motors' first team plant in Europe, where lessons learned from 
N U M M I could be realized at a new site and a high flexibility in labour 
deployment could be achieved on the basis of the team principle 
(Scheinecker 1988). 
Table 4: The disconnection of individual working hours and plant utilization 
hours in European car plants in 1990 
Working hours by collective agreement Regulär (resp. potential1) utilization hours 
G M Antwerpen 1570 G M Zaragoza 5336 
V W Brüssels 1625 Opel Bochum2 5220 
Opel Bochum 1628 V W Brüssels 3 5198 
- Night shifts 1576 G M Antwerpen 5160 
V W Wolfsburg 1628 V W Wolfsburg 3712 
Opel Rüsselsheim 1628 Ford Dagenham 3650 
Ford Cologne 1628 Ford Haiewood 3650 
Ford Saarlois 1628 SEAT Zona Franca 3632 
Vauxhall Luton 1695 Vauxhall E. Port 3588 
Ford Genk 1710 Ford Genk 3541 
Ford Valencia 1720 Ford Cologne 3450 
G M Zaragoza 1725 Vauxhall Luton 3442 
Vauxhall E. Port 1763 Ford Valencia 3441 
SEAT Zona Franca 1768 Ford Saarlois 3345 
Ford Dagenham 1786 Opel Rüsselsheim 3333 
Ford Haiewood 1786 
The figures do not take into acount the lower intensity of equipment utilization 
during night shifts at Bochum, Brüssels and Zaragoza. 
2 The figures for Bochum and Brüssels are extrapolated to cover the whole year 
1990. 
Source: Lehndorff (1990: 31). 
Table 4 shows that by 1990 the plant utilization rate in terms of operating 
hours for the equipment in some European plants has reached spectacular 
heights. The G M plant in Saragossa thus has an operating time of over 
5300 hours a year, an operating time which even the Korean plants can 
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hardly match. In comparison, the Opel (GM) plant in Rüsselsheim runs 
around 3300 hours. This plant produces an upscale product, which does 
not compete with Saragossa, otherwise the plant could not have withstood 
the pressure to come into line. 
We now come to the second direction of thrust of the "new internation-
alization" - the achievement of Japan-oriented production and work 
methods. As the first Western Company to do so, Ford had begun early 
in its American and European organizations to modify its own traditional 
forms of plant management and pursue an "after Japan" strategy. Focal 
points of its measures were integrating direct and indirect task areas, 
above all returning quality responsibility to production, decentralizing 
production responsibility and a number of measures and forms for in-
cluding the work force in solving factory problems, activating potentials 
for improvement found in the experience of each member of the work 
force, supporting the identification of the workers with their factory, and 
improving Communications beyond the previous horizontal and vertical 
interfaces. 
Ford also played a leading role among car assemblers in restructuring 
its supplier relationship and reducing its degree of vertical integration. 
Ford had not made the attempt to introduce teamwork in its plants during 
the 1980s. General Motors has taken the lead here in propagating team-
work after the model of N U M M I as a central productivity concept. Esti-
mates on the order of up to 30 per cent productivity increases by intro-
ducing teamwork are currently making the round among German auto-
mobile managers. Teamwork also plays a central role in MIT's paradigm 
of the lean production system (Womack et al. 1990). 
During the 1980s General Motors accumulated experience with the 
whole ränge of experiments with new forms of work. But the N U M M I 
concept had largely asserted itself by the end of the decade. G M also 
pursued a strategy in Europe of introducing new concepts in peripheral 
plants, first of all in the engine plant in Aspern (production Starts 1982) 
and at the beginning of the 1990s at a new site in Eisenach, in the former 
GDR. "The intention from the Start was to create a transplant in Germany" 
stated Opel's chairman. "We would've wanted that in any green field side 
in Europe, but Eisenach is particularly advantageous. The East-German 
workers are enormously ready to try new methods. They don't know how 
it's done in West Germany. They only know that what they've done in 
the past (building Wartburgs) was the wrong way to do it. So they're very 
open to learning." (Opel chairman Hughes in: Ward's Automotive Inter-
national 1991: l l f . ) . At its "transplant" of N U M M I in Eisenach, Opel tries 
to procede the way the Japanese did in the U.S.: plant management wil l 
be recruited from the transplant plants N U M M I and C A M I who have 
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experience with Japanese management methods. Personnel selection for 
the new plant was just as scrupulous as that of the Japanese in North 
America, and key workers for the plant will be trained at N U M M I and 
CAMI. 
Volkswagen also regards its production system as too "fat" at the begin-
ning of the 1990s and is starting various initiatives to introduce a "lean 
production system" according to the Japanese model. Different ap-
proaches are being followed: 
- In a Joint venture with Toyota, it is producing vans in its Hanover plant; 
this Joint venture is limited to a small area of the plant, which is under 
German management and work methods. Nevertheless, Volkswagen 
admits to have learned a lot from the way the model start-up was 
organized by the Toyota staff in the plant. 
- The change toward a just-in-time process with team production and 
kaizen activities has begun in its engine plant Salzgitter, i.e. in one of 
the core plants of the old Volkswagen system. 
- New work practices explicitly oriented toward the Japanese model are 
being planned for the new locations which are currently being built at 
Martorell and at its new East-German plant in Mosel. Volkswagen hired 
a former manager of Nissan's U.K. plant in Sunderland, C. Griffith, as 
manager of the Martorell plant in Spain. Teamwork and flexibility be-
tween direct and indirect tasks within teams, quality responsibility by 
teams, Kaizen activities, Visual management, just-in-time processes and 
a low degree of vertical integration shall be introduced at Martorell. 1 4 
Almost the same measures are planned for the Mosel plant (Jürgens et 
al. 1991) which is already called by its employees "NUMMI in Sachsen". 
Nevertheless there seem to be differences: At Mosel a policy of recru-
iting only qualified skilled workers for production jobs is in line with 
the paradigm of the skilled worker-based high-tech production of the 
parent Organization. In contrast, at Martorell the broad further training 
effort for unskilled workers has started, and on-the-job training 
schemes are being planned which is more in line with the paradigm of 
Japanese plants. 
- The next plants in the framework of VW's internationalization strategy 
are in Czechoslovakia; we can assume that a further step toward Japan-
oriented production management is planned here. 
At Martorell it was even suggested recently to introduce an individualized pay-
ment System on the basis of personnel assessment by the Supervisors (cf. 
European Industrial Relations Review, July 1991:9). Such a payment system has 
also been installed at Nissan Sunderland in Britain. As we have seen above it 
has not been introduced in the American "transplants". 
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- Last but not least we have the Joint venture VW/Ford in Portugal for 
the production of a minivan. 
The bulk of the Japan-oriented strategy for work reform is still in the 
planning stage. But it shows the clear endeavour of the companies to get 
away from forms of traditional practices and regulations. 
The new Volkswagen plants no longer belong to the Organization of 
the actual V W core group. They are part of new, independent subsidiaries, 
Seat, VW-Sachsen and Skoda, which, together with Audi and the VW A G , 
now make up VW-EUROPE. Wage agreements and accords made by the 
works Council with VW A G management are thus not valid at the new 
sites. Agreements on breaks, shift work, etc. have to be negotiated anew. 
This also includes, for example, the introduction of a regulär third shift 
and Saturday work, as we have already discussed above. 
It is obvious that in the course of this development, the possibilities for 
locally or nationally limited interest representations to exert influence on 
decisions have decreased, and the possibilities for central management to 
play off sites against each other and thus to break the resistance to meas-
ures it wants to introduce have increased. In regard to the new sites at 
the end of the 1980s, management sees here the opportunity to try out 
new concepts in the sense of a clean sheet approach, which no longer only 
attempt to achieve individual elements, but rather "integral" Japan-
oriented concepts. The experiences with the "transplants" and the MIT 
authors' universalizing Interpretation of these concepts as "lean produc-
tion" have played an important initiating role. However, the transfer of 
Japan-oriented concepts to the new plants - with all of the differences that 
have to be made here - does not go so far as to make cuts in the central 
role of skilled workers (Facharbeiter) and vocational training in the German 
tradition. The causes for this can be found less in industrial relations than 
in the still prevailing interest of German management in technological 
Solutions of problems, for which the skilled worker track appears neces-
sary. 
4 . INTERNATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS? 
CONCLUSIONS A N D PERSPECTIVES 
Our starting question was to what extent the Japanese or German com-
panies are attempting to transfer their indigenous production strategies 
within the framework of their internationalization strategies. The study 
has shown that the Japanese companies in their triad sites attempt to 
transfer their own management and production strategies as far as 
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possible and tend to see deviations from the point of view of necessary 
compromises with the social and political surroundings. We cannot dis-
cern a purposeful modification of the concepts in the "transplant" with 
the aim of providing feedback in the core plants at home and thus acting 
as a catalyst for restructuring. This does not mean, of course, that the 
Japanese companies did not learn from their transplants. For instance, 
after Toyota had found out that it could Stretch its kanban system even to 
include the N U M M I and Kentucky plants in the U.S., it gained the con-
fidence of breaking off from its tightly knit network in Toyota City with 
its newest assembly plant which is now being built on the southern main 
island of Japan, Kyüshü. 
The desired feedback from its foreign affiliate is a fundamental element 
of the new internationalization strategy of Volkswagen, which we studied 
as an example for the German companies. In this sense, Volkswagen does 
not pursue a "transplant" strategy, but a modernization and restructuring 
strategy, which aims at the centre from the periphery. At the same time, how-
ever, such new concepts are already being tried out at the centre with the 
Cooperation of worker interest representations. 
The Company modernization strategy which is strongly oriented to 
Japan is, in principle, being supported by the Company works Council. 
Japanese production and managment methods are, in principle, also not 
being rejected by the German unions.1 5 However, the determination of 
position and, previous to that, the reception of Japan are still in their 
beginning stages. Nevertheless, there is a great degree of uncertainty in 
regard to these methods and management's increased possibilities to re-
alize them in the framework of international production structures. The 
idea of meeting the companies' internationalization strategy with an in-
ternational strategy for interest representation arose above all from the 
above-described concession whipsawing in the question of plant utiliza-
tion times. Against the background of changed corporate structures, it 
was also a reason for the formation of a European Corporation works 
Council for the VW Corporation (EVW-KBR). 
In the past, the unions and the plant or Company works Councils had 
little to counter the emergence of international production structures. 
There were periodic Corporation Conferences in which representatives of 
differing sites of the same Corporation came together to exchange infor-
mation and consider strategies in the framework of the International Met-
There has been no discussion in the German trade unions like the one which 
currently takes place in the British Trades Union Congress which has just con-
demned the "alien approach" of some Japanese investors (Financial Times, Sept. 
7-8,1991: 6). 
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al Workers Federation. These bodies could not pass binding resolutions; 
at the most they could increase the understanding of their respective sit-
uations. Here they were dealing primarily with questions of international 
solidarity in comparison to sites in the Third World. There were few in-
terest conflicts and interdependencies which were important for the in-
terest representations from the core country. 
This Situation is changing in view of the emergence of European cor-
porate structures for Ford, General Motors and now also VW. The inter-
dependencies were clear here, and they touched on the primary interests 
of the parent plants. Beyond this, the establishment of a common 
European market also poses the question of the establishment of European 
political and social institutions. The demand for co-determination in the 
decision-making bodies of transnational companies or corporations has 
also been discussed in the political bodies of the EC since the 1970s. 
Numerous drafts thus foundered primarily on the attitude of the British 
government as well the position of the employers' associations, who re-
jected the creation of Europe-wide forms of interest representation (cf. 
Industriegewerkschaft Metall 1990).16 
The European Volkswagen corporate group works Council was formed 
in 1990 and includes representatives from Seat, VW Brüssel, VW A G und 
Audi . In the future, it wil l also include members from the Cze-
choslovakian plants and, possibly, VW Sachsen. The EVW-KBR meets at 
least once a year - its elected executive body meets more frequently - in 
order to reach common positions on topics which effect several national 
sites: securing employment and sites, the international production struc-
tures, corporate structures, issues of working time, working condititons, 
rationalization through new technologies, new forms of work Organiza-
tion, compensation, health and safety and environmental protection, so-
cial benefits, political developments and decisions. The preamble of the 
This corresponds to the fact that they are trying to recruit managers with trans-
plant and Japan experience for the top positions. This has hardly been successful 
in regard to Japanese managers up to now. 
Shimada labels this "foreign aid" of the Japanese companies for Western in-
dustry as an opportunity and responsibility for the Japanese companies: "This 
trend, in fact, has extremely positive implications for the future of Japanese bus-
inesses which are in the process of globalizing. For it suggests that Japanese 
firms and industries could be deeply involved in the future development of the 
world's industry. This, however, holds true in that Japan can actively participate 
and contribute to the building of a new corporate model as international public 
assets, so to speak, which can be shared by people of the world, instead of forc-
ing them to use Japanese experience and engineering." (Shimada 1991: 6). 
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rules of order for the European Volkswagen corporate group works Coun-
cil reads as follows: 
Our common union activity is required so that the work forces of 
the VOLKSWAGEN corporate group are not played out against each 
other. We want to cooperate more intensely in international solidar-
ity so that secure jobs and sites, humane working conditions, food 
wages and social benefits can be achieved or secured in the future 
for all work forces in the VOLKSWAGEN corporate group. For this 
reason we are for a solidarity in the equalization of employment and 
development possibilities for all sites of the VOLKSWAGEN cor-
porate group in order to achieve this goal. 
The establishment of European corporate group works Councils is also 
being prepared at Ford (Aigner and Kuckelkorn 1991:140). Beyond this, 
Aigner and Kuckelkorn, prominent works Council representatives of Ford 
in Germany, see it as necessary for the future to also establish such insti-
tutionalized forms of comprehensive Cooperation with suppliers. 1 7 
It goes along with the social partnership tradition of the V W corporate 
group that the EVW-KBR is recognized by the Company. There is no formal 
agreement, though, in view of the rejection of Euro-corporation works 
Councils by the employers' associations. The costs for the EVW-KBR's 
travel, Interpreters lodging and board, are paid by the companies. VW's 
board member of Labour Affairs (Arbeitsdirektor) states: "We need a social 
dialogue which does not end at the national borders" (Gesterkamp 1991). 
The general secretary of the corporate group works Council fears, though, 
that if the other companies do not keep up with the internationalization 
of their worker interest representation, then this institution could lead to 
a competitive disadvantage for the VW corporate group. We have to con-
clude that the internationalization of interest representation still has a 
much longer path to go than internationalization of the management and 
production concepts. 
"This integration would also require different forms of work Organization and 
task allocation which, besides other places of deployment, would also deal with 
classifications and questions of Subordination. The Cooperation of management 
with a supplier must also include the Cooperation with the corresponding 
worker representations at this point at the latest... A systematic and coordinated 
Cooperation is necessary in order to prevent the worker representations of the 
supplier firms from being played off against the Ford-works Councils." (Aigner 
and Kuckelkorn 1991:140). 
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INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND MANAGEMENT IN 
JAPANESE COMPANIES IN EUROPE 
Kumazawa Makoto 
ABSTRACT 
Japanese-style management is characterized by such strategies as flexible Organi-
zation of work, intensification of workload, close surveillance over the individual 
employee, introduction of 'performance' appraisal, and formation of collaborative 
industrial relations. In this paper, we examine how German workers working for 
Japanese transplants respond to such 'alien' employment practices and to what 
extent Japanese managers are obliged to adapt their strategies to German socio-
cultural conditions. After a brief comparison with the British Situation - the vol-
untarist nature of the industrial relations System in Britain seems to be fully 
exploited to 'Japanize' its manufacturing industries - we offer some critical com-
ments on what Japanese management really intends to bring about in workers' 
daily lives on the shopfloor. Does it mean progress or regress on the road to 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
'Japanese management' Stands out for the characteristic features of its 
employment practices, work Organization, remuneration, and industrial 
relations. When launching their Operations overseas, Japanese 
managers, being convinced of the general superiority of their o w n prac-
tices back in the homeland, usually try to apply the same practices also 
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to the local labour force in the new plants. With all their efforts, how-
ever, in the actual process of implementation, they are often forced to 
adapt to various degrees in the face of foreign socio-economic or socio-
cultural environments. In fact, there are very few cases, at least so far, 
where the "three precious treasures" of Japanese management, i.e., 
lifelong employment, seniority-based remuneration, and enterprise-
wide unionism, have been successfully put into practice in their füll 
forms. Nonetheless, Japanese companies are persistent in introducing 
various elements of the system, if not the entirety, in order to achieve 
enhanced worker motivation, flexible work Organization, stable in-
dustrial relations, and so forth. Some of the measures may be accepted 
by the local employees, but others may not. When and where worker 
resistance is strong enough, further adaptation is inevitable for the man-
agement. What concerns us in this paper is such an application-adaptation 
process seen in Japanese companies operating abroad, mainly in Ger-
many. 
In the first section, we review a series of constraints which the Ger-
man environment puts on the application of Japanese-style manage-
ment. The account will be no more than a rough sketch, for detailed 
case studies of Japanese transplants in Germany, especially those fo-
cused on shopfloor matters, have yet to reach the level of research 
results available for the U.K. or the U.S. Thus, in the next section, what 
appear to be specifically German features of the adaptation process are 
briefly compared with features observable mainly in the U.K., with 
occasional reference also to cases in the U.S. A n attempt is made to 
identify common features and differences between Germany and the 
U.K. as far as the above-mentioned application-adaptation process is 
concerned. The final section wil l be devoted to an analysis of the nature 
and the meanings of Western workers' response to Japanese manage-
ment in the light of such concepts as 'humanization of work', 'quality 
of working life', 'participation of shopfloor workers in decision making' 
and so on, as they have long been propagated in the Western industrial-
ized countries. Of particular importance here is to penetrate into what 
Japanese management really intends to bring about in spite of the beau-
tiful slogans with which Japanese firms often launch their Operations 
abroad. 
Although a great deal can be said about the distinctive conditions of 
white-collar employees under a Japanese management regime (for ex-
ample, a still more intense competitive atmosphere in Offices than in fac-
tories), our focus in this paper is on manual workers at the point of pro-
duction, which, after all, has attracted much of the attention of many 
commentators. 
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2. JAPANESE M A N A G E M E N T IN G E R M A N SITUATIONS 
With our Space limited, we will not reiterate here the fairly well-estab-
lished description of what constitutes Japanese management. In spite of 
a wide variety of interpretations, no one would hesitate in locating the 
very essence of Japanese management in the flexible adaptability required 
of the work force to facilitate management's goals, both immediate and 
over longer terms. Here we will discuss in turn five Strategie policies 
which arise from that principal concept of flexibility, and see how each of 
them works in a German setting. 
2.1. Qualitative Flexibility of Work Task 
At the very beginning, Japanese firms invariably conduet a careful selec-
tion procedure to skim off their future employees from among numerous 
applicants; the foremost emphasis is put on general ability and willing-
ness to perform unspeeified tasks, not on specific skills or formal qualifi-
cations acquired by would-be employees. Closely related to this recruiting 
practice is the fact that job definitions are extremely generalized in Ja-
panese firms. It is not unusual for all the semi-skilled workers employed 
to be categorized under a Single broad job title. Thus, a worker, once 
selected as regulär employee, is expected to undergo incessant changes 
in the content of his/her assigned task in response to management needs. 
Japanese managers tend to take it as a matter of course that work assign-
ment or worker deployment should be a prerogative of management. 
From the workers' point of view, they are not allowed to circumscribe 
their relation to the Company by means of clearly defined jobs they per-
form. In a word, a typical shopfloor under Japanese management finds 
itself at the exaet opposite to one where restrictive practices such as 'de-
marcation' prevail. 
In Germany, however, there are several obstacles which prevent Ja-
panese managers from achieving this kind of flexibility to the füll extent. 
First of all, in most industries there are industry-wide labour agreements 
which provide a graded Classification of distinetive job Clusters industry 
by industry, prescribing wage rates for each defined job Cluster as well. 
Generally speaking, employers, including Japanese ones, are under Ob-
ligation to comply with the provision. Besides, skilled workers known as 
Facharbeiter in Germany are those who have acquired official recognition 
as such after completing a certain formal apprenticeship (Nomura and 
Altmann 1987: 20-23). Their Status is, so to say, a societal one, being in-
dependent of the particular employer for whom they happen to work. 
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Furthermore, German workers, skilled or not, tend to take it for granted 
that their labour contract will be negotiated with an employer before they 
enter into employment, so that they may feel assured about what kind of 
job they are supposed to do under the contract. 
These established practices often hinder Japanese transplants from 
pursuing flexible utilization of the work force. A Japanese zipper man-
ufacturer, for example, experienced considerable trouble when he tried 
to transfer a group of female employees to machine-minding jobs, 
simply because the labour contract for the women described their task 
as 'final assembly by hand'. The employees concerned were naturally 
reluctant to be transferred to more demanding machine jobs, which 
were, after all, not required of them in their contract. In an effort to 
eliminate this sort of rigidity in worker redeployment, some Japanese 
firms are aiming at a more flexible labour contract that includes such 
phrases as 'to be transferable to a similar type of job' (Kumazawa 1989: 
89). 
Indeed, German workers are likely to accept transfer between jobs in-
sofar as the newly allotted work falls within the same job Classification as 
the present one. However, the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz provides the works 
Council with the power of 'co-determination' also in the field of personnel 
management. Under the law, therefore, the management side is not so 
free in determining the conditions of transfer and who will be transferred 
as Japanese managers often desire to be. 
On the other hand, there is a factor which might work favourably 
for Japanese transplants. It is a common practice for a Japanese firm to 
develop a system of 'on-the-job training' coupled with regulär job ro-
tation so that every employee becomes 'multi-skilled', at least to the 
extent that every member of a work team can do all the jobs assigned 
to the team as a whole. In the last analysis, a certain degree of such 
'multi-skiH' on the part of the work force is an inevitable technical 
precondition of the desired flexibility in worker deployment. And this 
aspect of management policy may have some appeal to those German 
trade unions which, for the past decades, have been making out their 
own case for 'humanization-of-work' measures such as job enlargement 
or enrichment in order to redress over-simplified, repetitive work pat-
terns. It requires critical thinking, as will be elaborated later, to know 
whether or not the 'multi-skill' pursued by Japanese management 
means a step forward in the humanization of work that is desired by 
German trade unionists. For the moment, however, there seems to be 
some possibility of a Japanese transplant inducing the work force to 
willingly accept its skill formation arrangements. 
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2.2. Intensification of Workload 
A flexible work Organization of the sort described above does not neces-
sarily allow workers, whether as individuals or as a work team, to retain 
some (if limited) control over their day-to-day workload. The case is often 
to the contrary: 'Standard work' is always clarified for each piece of Opera-
tion as an absolute norm to be achieved by every employee. In many cases 
the 'Standard' is set through Industrial Engineering (IE) methods origi-
nating in, and improving upon, the Taylor-Ford tradition. Furthermore, 
the workload tends to increase as a result of constant elimination of waste, 
human or material, under Japanese management. Typically, many kaizen 
(reorganization) campaigns go like this: the members of a work team 
themselves learn to apply a set of IE methods to the production process 
for which the team is responsible; when they find out exactly at which 
stage or at whose Station on the production line 'idle time' continuously 
arises, work is re-assigned among the team members to eliminate the slack 
Operation; repeated success in such attempts, ironically enough, invaria-
bly leads to reduction in the size of the work team itself - that is, one of 
the workers wil l be made redundant. Where the 'just-in-time' production 
system is pursued, labour intensity tends to be still more heightened. For 
example, the waiting time prescribed for a one-minute job is only three 
seconds at a lapanese-owned automobile assembly plant in the U.S. , 
while the average corresponding time allowance at an ordinary Big Three 
plant is usually fifteen seconds or so (Fucini and Fucini 1990:148). In fact, 
the workplaces where time studies are carried out using a stopwatch 
openly without any reservation are often Japanese, rather than those of 
the Big Three car manufacturers which are supposed to be the birthplace 
of the Ford-type assembly-line production management. 
It seems highly probable that German workers in general wil l dislike 
this kind of intensifying control over their own workload. It should be 
remembered here, for instance, that about 20 years ago in Nordbaden, the 
Industriegewerkschaft Metall (IG Metall) union even organized a strike 
action demanding an upper limit to the speed of moving assembly lines 
as well as an adequate amount of rest during a working day (Kurata 1985: 
39-41). At a video manufacturing plant I myself visited recently, one of 
the agenda items for its works Council was nothing but a critical objection 
to the management prerogative of setting productivity targets unilaterally. 
The discussion was said to have arisen from the workers' protest against 
the usage of stopwatches for time studies (Kumazawa 1989:116). 
The German statutory regulation of working hours, overtime work, 
and holidays poses another major obstacle to Japanese-style efficient util-
ization of the work force. First, weekly scheduled working hours in Ger-
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many are for the most part 37 (to be reduced to 35 by 1995 in the metal 
and engineering industries), whereas in Japan 44 hours or more is still 
normal. Second, although overtime work is permitted for up to 10 hours 
per week in Germany, it must be strictly an emergency measure and 
should be approved as such by the works Council. Also, in Japan, the 
Labour Standard Law stipulates some procedures to be observed by the 
employer, but at the same time the provision can be and is used to render 
overtime work a regulär practice. Actually, overtime of two hours or so 
per day can be arranged any time at the discretion of the employer. Third, 
German employees are entitled to annual paid holidays of 30 days or so, 
and, as a rule, they enjoy all of their earned leave, while Japanese em-
ployees are often persuaded to give up almost half of the paid holidays 
to which they are entitled, 18 days on average. Considering these harsh 
contrasts between the two countries, it is only natural that expatriate Ja-
panese executives in Germany should be quite displeased with statutory 
working hour regulations which seem to them too generous for the em-
ployees. German manufacturing employers themselves, who feel 
threatened by their Japanese rivals' superior competitiveness, sometimes 
refer to the same contrasts as a major reason for their refusal to yield to 
workers' demands for even shorter working hours. After all, the annual 
average number of working hours here is now shorter by 500 hours than 
in Japan. A l l the same, however, Japanese managers of the transplants in 
Germany cannot but be patient, for the present at least, with the in-
digenous conditions, as dissatisfied they are with them. 
2.3. Close Surveillance over the Individual Employee 
In principle, all grades of regulär employees hired by a Japanese Company 
are treated as equals, under what is often called 'single-status' personnel 
management. The other side of what appears to be an egalitarian policy 
is, however, a strong, incessant pressure exerted upon each individual to 
conform to the company's notion of a good employee. The company's 
work rules, therefore, almost always State explicitly, and often meticu-
lously, what is and is not expected of an employee, not only in the technical 
matters related to his/her immediate job but also in ethical or motivational 
matters, with disciplinary measures specified as well in case he/she de-
viates from the norm. One of the most important functions played by 
middle and lower management is, thus, keeping a close watch over, and 
guiding if necessary, the day-to-day behaviour or attitude of the in-
dividual subordinate, extended sometimes even to his/her pattern of pri-
vate life. And, needless to say, it is this aspect of the Japanese management 
that most probably confronts the traditional, individualistic value System 
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of Western workers in general. German employees of a Japanese trans-
plant will also resist, overtly or covertly, its excessive interference with 
their private lives. Some Japanese firms in Germany, for example, have 
failed to make it mandatory for every employee to wear the Company 
uniform, and German employees sometimes even object to their 'working 
jacket' being called a 'uniform'. 
Nevertheless, Japanese employers will be persistent in pressurizing local 
employees to conform to the company's needs. Above all, regulär and stable 
attendance at work is invariably stressed. And attempts are often made to 
restrict the employees' freedom to take their paid leave whenever they like, 
even if the füll use of entitled holidays itself is permitted reluctantly. Thus, 
the employees are required to concentrate a large part of their annual paid 
holidays during sumrner or Christmas vacations, when the plant itself is 
closed anyway. The higher absence rate of German workers compared with 
that of Japanese ones is another major source of complaint for the trans-
plants' managers. The German statutory provision for sick leave, on top of 
the longer annual paid holidays, seems to them too generous. Suspecting 
that some of the many cases of sick leave are nothing but disguised simple 
absenteeism, Japanese managers sometimes go so far as to assign a foreman 
to call at the absentee's house to check up (Kumazawa 1989:102f.). The fact 
that attendance control is much stricter at a Japanese transplant than else-
where is an inevitable result of tight manning levels on the shop floor, where 
there are scarcely any workers reserved to Substitute for a team member 
who happens to be absent for whatever reason. 
2.4. Differentiated Payment by Merit Appraisal 
Concerning wage payment, the most common practice of Japanese firms 
making inroads into Europe or North America is to rearrange and reduce 
the number of wage grades given by the industry-wide labour agreement 
into as few categories as possible on an enterprise-wide basis, and then 
to re-introduce a different kind of wage differential based on a close ap-
praisal of individual employees' merit - more exactly, their general ability, 
realized or potential. Needless to say, this wage policy is closely linked 
with the Japanese-style flexible work Organization. It should be remem-
bered that in the Western industrialized countries similar merit rating has 
been applied, on the whole, only to senior white-collar staff, who are often 
unorganized. Therefore, the introduction of wage differential by merit into 
every grade of the work force, including production workers, is a real 
breakthrough. So it is only natural that those organized manual workers 
who believe in the principle of 'equal pay for equal work' should fear that 
such a payment system will eventually erode the traditional sense of fair-
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ness and solidarity among them. In the U.K., particularly, a variety of 
conflicts have occurred in the wake of the application of the new appraisal 
procedure to production workers. 
In Germany, however, some collective agreements allow a certain por-
tion of the earned payment to be a merit-appraisal-based Supplement 
(within a limited percentage of the basic wage rate), making clear at the 
same time both the factors to be assessed in the appraisal and the per-
mitted ränge of pay-differential resulting from the merit rating. Therefore, 
Japanese employers are at a greater advantage here than elsewhere in 
introducing a merit rating remuneration system in their transplants, if 
under the conditions given in the labour agreement. Yet, in reality, they 
are not as free as they hope to be in doing so. For example, in the zipper 
manufacturing firm mentioned earlier, there has been a prolonged debate 
between the management and the union, or in the works Council, over 
such issues as whether the merit rating should be reflected only in an 
individual's 'bonus' earning, or should also be applied to the suppiemen-
tary part of his/her regulär wages; whether his/her attendance record 
should be included in the appraisal factors or not; and so forth. The Ja-
panese factory manager there pointed to the workers' collective Interven-
tion even in the practice of the personnel appraisal, which he thought 
should be the management's prerogative, as one of the reasons why local 
workers' morale was not as high as desired. 
2.5. Collaborative Industrial Relations 
Successful application of all four Strategie policies listed above depends 
more or less on stable, collaborative industrial relations in the transplants. 
In this sense, the type of Japanese enterprise-wide unionism, which tends 
to identify its fortunes with the company's economic prosperity, is quite 
harmonious with every aspect of Japanese-style management. In this re-
gard, the German industrial relations system poses a considerable incon-
venience for the Japanese direct Investments in Germany. Recognition of 
the established union Organization on an industry-wide basis is a 
statutory Obligation for almost all employers in the industry, including 
Japanese ones. In fact, some Japanese firms which attempted to exclude 
any union influence have been ordered by the Labour Court to recognize 
established unions' legal right of bargaining. The basic working condi-
tions agreed on in collective bargaining are also legally binding across the 
industry, irrespective of the union membership rate of a particular firm. 
In other words, it is virtually impossible for a Japanese employer to opt 
for establishing a non-union plant or to select a Single cooperative union 
from among a number of relevant unions as the sole representative agent 
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of the employees, as is often done in the U.K. and the U.S., where the 
industrial relations system is based on the voluntarist principle. Thus, in 
Germany, many Japanese manufacturers have to have bargaining rela-
tions, say, with the IG Metall union, whose stance Japanese managers 
think is sometimes too demanding. 
However, even if such basic labour conditions as wage rates and work-
ing hours are forced on an individual firm from the outside, Japanese 
managers still try to retain their own competitive edge, which lies, in the 
last analysis, in their firm grip on the in-house Organization of production. 
To be more concrete, Japanese firms' superior productivity derives largely 
from the management's tight control over such matters as work assign-
ment, worker re-deployment, Output quota, manning level, and so on. 
And here arises in Germany another serious problem for transplant man-
agement: the existence of the works Council, which is granted by the 
Betriebsverfassungsgesetz the right of participation or codetermination in 
production and personnel management (Nihon Rödö Kyökai 1989: 60-
65). As a matter of fact, the relative degree of workers' say in the shop 
floor issues mentioned above is possibly much greater under the German 
codetermination system than in the case of the majority of Japanese enter-
prise unions, which have long ceased to exert any independent influence 
over those issues. 
A l l the same, there remains some possibility that the apparently higher 
productivity achieved in a Japanese-owned factory through its flexible 
production management will persuade the works Council to consent to 
the management's more or less unilateral initiative in the day-to-day Or-
ganization of production. After all, the works Council has no right to resort 
to any industrial action if the discussion there has finally failed to reach 
a compromise. And, unlike in the U.K., any unofficial strikes attempted 
by shop floor workers are deemed illegal in Germany, and the official 
industrial union there is not in a position to direct a strike action at a 
particular workplace in order to threat a specific employer. 
A l l in all, therefore, the most probable strategy of Japanese firms in 
Germany in the industrial relations field can be summarized, for the pre-
sent at least, as follows: to keep the industrial union as far as possible 
from intervening in the internal affairs of the transplant on the one hand, 
and on the other to talk the works Council into a close collaboration with 
the management in making the transplant as flexible a work Organization 
as has already been realized in Japan. 
Indeed, there are other German specificities which tend to hinder the full-
scale application of Japanese-style management. For example, the more 
elaborate protective legislation for occupational safety and health are entail-
ing much higher overhead expenses for Japanese transplants than was ex-
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pected. A n d utilization of part-time workers or subcontracting suppliers as 
a means of Controlling the otherwise growing payroll, as is commonly prac-
ticed in Japan, is also rigidly restricted in Germany owing to the industrial 
union's policy of extending Standard labour conditions to as many workers 
as possible. For the purpose of the present paper, however, the five Strategie 
policies pointed out above can be said to form the critical points of conflicts 
between Japanese management and German workers in general. 
3 . JAPANESE M A N A G E M E N T IN BRITAIN - A BRIEF COMPARISON 
At first sight the United Kingdom, long notorious as a 'strike-prone' 
country, appears to offer a more, if not less, problematic setting for the 
Japanese-style management than Germany. Then why, paradoxically 
enough, is the recent heavy concentration of Japanese direct investment 
in Britain rather than in Germany? This section attempts to give some 
answers to this question from the viewpoint of the industrial relations 
Systems of the two countries. 
Before we point out some specifically British features, let us remember 
here the common European socio-cultural background shared by the two 
countries: first, the proportions of organized workers in both countries 
are much greater than in Japan, reflecting Western workers' traditional 
belief in the union Organization as a means of protecting their own inter-
ests as employed workers. In general, second, Western individualistic 
values do not encourage a sense of total belonging to the Company among 
its employees. And third, the highly developed social security Systems 
enable people to live without too much dependence on a particular em-
ployer. Needless to say, all of these European conditions make some sort 
of adaptation unavoidable when the Japanese management practices are 
applied there. 
On top of that, specifically in the U.K., the deep-seated tradition of 
'restrictive practices', especially 'demarcation' among other things, still 
prevails fairly widely at the point of production. With this practice of trade 
unions' (or the rank and file's cautious conservation of their own territo-
ries of job or craft, a series of management initiatives to restrueture the 
production process and Organization - change in job definition, transfer-
ence of workers between different jobs, and technological innovation it-
self, for instance - would necessarily be hampered to a great extent. Oc-
casionally there is even a case where a newly introduced computer-con-
trolled machine tool has been left unused for six months because of a 
demarcation dispute between a machine Operators' union and a Computer 
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workers' union. As was mentioned to earlier, this sort of 'restrictive prac-
tice' on the shopfloor makes the most implacable enemies for Japanese-
style flexible management of production. Such a climate in the workplace 
is also quite unsuitable for the introduction of a Quality Control (QC) 
movement, or a kaizen campaign, the well-known devices used by Ja-
panese management to exploit workers' creativity in continuous reorgani-
zation of production for the purpose of ever increased productivity. 
Closely related to this British State of affairs are the key role played by 
shop Stewards and the conventional practice of shop floor bargaining led 
by Stewards. These union representatives of the shop floor membership 
are usually on their guard and apt to intervene in any management at-
tempts to bring about change in such matters as Standard work, pace of 
Operation, piece rate in the case of payment-by-result, break time, man-
ning level, and so on. Even if these changes are small in themselves sep-
arately, their cumulative effect is critical for the economic Performance of 
a factory as a whole. In general, however, British workers, particularly 
manual workers, have striven mightily to resist the management's uni-
lateral control over their own jobs, especially when it was attempted in 
the name of 'scientific management'; and at least until the beginning of 
the 1980s, so-called 'mutual' decision-making in those shop floor issues 
had been the normal practice in many workplaces. In spite of recent 
changes in British labour-management relations, it may be said that British 
employers on the whole have not yet succeeded in regaüüng their 
complete prerogative in the important area of job-related matters. 
Also to be noted here is the fact that British organized workers are more 
persistent than their German counterparts in upholding the principle of 
'equal pay for equal work'. Any wage differentials resulting from in-
dividual employees' merit-rating by their superior, when they are doing 
the same category of job, would most probably evoke fierce resentment 
among them. In fact, there had never been serious managerial attempts 
to apply any sort of employee-appraisal system to the manual work force 
in Britain, at least until the recent rapid increase in Japanese direct Invest-
ment (Ishida 1990:121-123). 
As the collective bargaining system is largely decentralized, fragmented, 
or autonomous in the U.K., so is the nature of industrial action in many 
cases. In other words, when the shop floor bargaining mentioned above 
fails to result in a compromise, it is often the case that a group of workers 
directly concerned with the dispute will promptly go on strike without any 
official recognition from the union. The union, for its part, if it does not ac-
tively support, rarely suppresses this kind of spontaneous action. Since de-
marcation practices inhibit any workers from assuming the jobs of those 
workers who have walked out, even a sectional strike action within a plant 
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tends to cause serious damage to the whole production process, and thus 
can be extremely effective from the workers' point of view. 
Although there have been many changes during the last decade, it can 
still be said, as a summary of what we have seen so far, that the traditional 
image of British organized labour is the farthest from the 'company-per-
son' ideal of Japanese-style management. Of all other industrialized coun-
tries, thus, the U.K. should have been the least desirable for Japanese 
direct investment if other conditions had been equal. 
In actuality, however, it is the U.K. rather than Germany that many Ja-
panese manufacturers have preferred for the location of their new subsid-
iaries since around 1980. Although the difference in 1987between the num-
bers of Japanese firms in Britain and in Germany was slight, 403 and 368 
respectively, out of the 368 Japanese firms only 39 had opened manufactur-
ing plants in Germany in the same year (Nihon Rödö Kyökai 1989: 245). 
The trend has continued. Apart from the U.S., the main target country for 
Japanese major manufacturers' expansion is not Germany but the U.K. 
One of the most obvious reasons for the choice is the relative low wage 
level in the U.K. today. To take, for example, one of the industries attracting 
most foreign investment, the automobile and auto parts-supply industry, 
the average all-inclusive hourly earnings in the U.K. was U.S. $ 10.54 in 
1987; the corresponding figures were $ 21.38 in Germany, $ 20.53 in the U.S. 
, and $ 14.33 in Japan (Motor Vehicle Facts and Figures 1988; cited in Gron-
ning 1990:160). In short, as far as the car industry is concerned, the level of 
labour costs in Britain was just 49% of that in Germany and 74% of that in 
Japan. It meant, others being equal, that a Japanese car manufacturer could 
expect to be twice as profitable in the U.K. as in Germany. 
There is probably a more stagnant economic Situation in Britain than 
elsewhere, as is also seen in the level of unemployment. According to 
OECD Labour Force Statistics, the average unemployment rates in the U.K., 
the U.S. and Germany during the years from 1983 to 1989 were 10.2,6.8 
and 7.7% respectively (Rödöshö 1991:215). Driven by this hard fact, many 
local governments in the most depressed districts with heavy unemploy-
ment, not to speak of the British government itself, have eagerly invited 
prospective Japanese manufacturers to invest by offering generous con-
ditions. From the Standpoint of Japanese employers, the high unemploy-
ment rate in the U.K. is in itself an inviting factor, for it means they can 
select from among numerous job-seekers only those who have proved 
themselves to be most adaptable to Japanese management. 
From our viewpoint in this paper, much more important is the fact that 
prolonged economic hardship has also forced the British labour move-
ment to make a series of substantial concessions, so that the power of 
organized labour is no longer so strong as it was in the 1970s. We wil l not 
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review the process in detail here, but it should be said that all of those 
characteristic features of the British unionism which we have depicted as 
the very ones most in conflict with Japanese-style management have been 
largely eroded. A n enormous Consolidated pressure - both from heavy 
unemployment on the one hand, and from the concerted, persistent efforts 
by government and employers to rebuild the productive competitiveness 
of British industry on the other hand - has gradually and steadily de-
prived shop floor workers of those traditional 'customs and practices' 
which have long helped them maintain their own way of day-to-day life 
in the workplace. There has appeared a 'realistic' leadership in the union 
movement which is prepared to collaborate with management in pursu-
ing higher productivity, if only to protect its membership from unemploy-
ment and to ensure its own survival. 
Of great significance in this changed labour relations climate is 'volun-
tarism', or the characteristic 'abstention of the law' of the British system. 
Unlike in Germany, where an employer has no choice in union recogni-
tion, and also unlike in Japan where an employer is legally obliged to 
negotiate with any unions representing the workforce irrespective of their 
size and their policy stance, in the U.K. there are virtually no statutory 
duties or liabilities for an employer concerning a wide ränge of industrial 
relations issues including union recognition. A n employer can simply re-
fuse to recognize a particular union, or can pick a desirable union as the 
sole negotiator. To put it another way, whether a particular union is rec-
ognized or not depends largely on its own strength in the workplace. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that Japanese employers in Britain have made 
the best use of this voluntarist tradition there to create a special type of 
in-house management-labour relations. 
In fact, many of the Japanese firms declared well in advance of opening 
factories that they would recognize just a Single union which would be 
best prepared to cooperate with management. Explicitly demanded of the 
union was the acceptance of 'no demarcation', flexible worker deploy-
ment, team-work, technological innovation and so on. Such major unions 
as the Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbing Union 
(EETPU) and the Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) finally ac-
cepted the demand willy-nilly. Some of the Japanese firms decided to 
locate their new plants in heavily depressed districts where people 
desperately expected employment opportunities to be created thereby, 
only after having made sure that a labour agreement could be concluded 
along the above lines. It is not unusual, furthermore, that what is called 
'no strike' clause is included in the agreement (Kumazawa 1989:119-122). 
Thus, in the U.K., once well known as the country of strong, inde-
pendent trade unionism, quite a number of Japanese transplants are now 
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operating, mainly in mass-production fields such as automobile, machine 
tool, and electrical-electronic appliance manufacturing. And it seems that 
even a wholesale application of the Japanese-style management has, at 
least so far, gone largely unchallenged, with the possible exception of the 
introduction of the 'merit'-rating system to the manual workforce. A sim-
ilar development can be seen also in the U.S. Thus it is in Germany rather 
than in the other two countries that Japanese managers are being com-
pelled to adapt their strategies to the local setting to a considerable degree. 
Although the German union movement might be more moderate than its 
British counterpart used to be, a wide ränge of industrial relations matters 
as well as Standard labour conditions are statutorily regulated and, so to 
say, fairly well rooted in the German socio-politico-cultural structure in 
general. 
4 . PROGRESS OR REGRESS? - S O M E CONCLUSIONS A N D C O M M E N T S 
What concerns us here in the concluding section is the nature of the adap-
tation which the Japanese managers of transplants in Europe are being 
forced to make, if in different degrees in different countries, when they 
apply Japanese-style management to the local working people. And what 
should we think of the adaptation itself? 
For those who celebrate the Japanese-style management for the sake 
of its proven superiority in productive competitivity or in economic Per-
formance in general, any adaptation is nothing but a regrettable retreat. 
Indeed, many people on the managing side of industry all over the world 
(including socialist countries) seem to think this way. But if we take into 
account the cost to be paid by the managed side of industry, our view of 
Japanese management can never be one of unqualified celebration. The 
cost sometimes amounts even to karöshi (death from overwork) in the 
motherland of Japanese management. This is why it is important to pay 
special attention to how and how much the adaptation is responding to 
the attitudes or behavior of European workers. 
I am not saying that Japanese management is like a despotic regime. 
Its superior economic Performance is simply undeniable, and some part 
of the success, also undeniably, derives from its own egalitarianism and 
employee-participation principles. And this egalitarian, participation-in-
ducing aspect of the Japanese management may have a certain appeal to 
those Western workers who have long been dissatisfied with the manage-
ment-labour class division. Therefore, in the remaining part of this paper 
we try to discern the truth of what is really happening in the Japanese 
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transplants in Europe, especially keeping in mind the European tradition 
of industrial democracy and recent efforts to 'humanize' work. We discuss 
five points at issue one by one. 
First, does the Japanese-style on-the-job training programme for 'multi-
skill' represent a step forward in the expected 'humanization of work', in 
the sense of 'job enrichment' in particular? 'No' may be the more accurate 
answer to the question, according to many detailed case studies made in 
Japan. In fact, the so-called 'multi-skilled' versatility required of an em-
ployee is frequently no more than an adaptive capability to perform a 
number of simplified Operations as swiftly as possible in a limited amount 
of time - for example, feeding one machine and then removing work from 
another machine, the machinery itself being equipped with a 'fool-proof' 
mechanism in many cases (Suzuki 1990:200,206). Far from an individual 
job's being 'enlarged' or 'enriched', the actual content of a 'multi-skilled' 
worker's job in a Japanese factory will generally remain 'semi-skilled' in 
the conventional sense. The image of a skilled worker who can decide 
autonomously the most appropriate plan, method and pace for his/her 
own work would be rather disharmonious with Japanese-style produc-
tion management, in which an ever-higher Output target is always given 
as an absolute norm. So, it can be said, the more genuine the European 
workers' demand for the 'humanization of work', the greater the adap-
tation that would be required of Japanese management. 
Closely linked with this first point, it should be noted that each in-
dividual job is still designed precisely on the Taylor-Ford principle even 
when it appears to be redesigned by the work team members themselves. 
As a matter of fact, it is at a Japanese-owned car manufacturing plant in 
the U.S., not at a Big Three plant that what is called a 'Programmed Work 
Sheet' is handed out to every assembly worker. The 'Sheet' prescribes 
rninutely the Standard motion and time for every piece of the task to be 
performed by the worker, so that, for example, a typical job consisting of 
ten sequential Operations should be done within one ininute (Fucini and 
Fucini 1990: 78-79, 150). The 'team-work' system, another name of the 
Japanese-style production management, therefore, should be strictly dis-
tinguished from the ambitious goal of 'work humanization' based on the 
concept of an 'autonomous work group', as we saw in a Swedish car 
manufacturer's experiments, where the traditional moving assembly line 
was abolished as the sole, compelling time-setter (Wilkinson 1991:8). In 
this regard, a very suggestive remark was made by Peter Wickens (1987: 
76, 92), Director of Nissan Motor Manufacturing U.K., who said: "Team 
working means having all employees committed to the aims and objec-
tives of the Company, i.e., recognizing that each individual has a valued 
contribution to make but that we should aim for everyone working in the 
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same direction...(In other words,) team working and commitment have 
little to do with the actual method of organizing work." 
In a Japanized production process, third, any 'waste', whether it is 
material or human, is eliminated to an extreme extent. After all, that is 
the main aim of the just-in-time (JIT) production system. Usually no sub-
stantial 'idle time' is allowed to any worker, and no sufficient number of 
relief workers are allocated for any work team (Jürgens 1989: 208f.). As a 
result, every attendant worker often has to work literally without rest 
from bell to bell, moving swiftly to and fro among machines, or up and 
down the assembly line, performing flexibly (or 'multi-skilledly', so to 
speak) several different but simplified Operations, in order to meet the 
day's production quota. Indeed, it is often pointed out that a worker is 
permitted to stop the machine whenever he or she thinks it necessary to 
do so. But it is also true that the worker's decision to stop production is 
subsequently closely examined by a superior, whose decision about 
whether the stop was really inevitable or not has an effect on the merit-
rating of the worker in question in one way or another. 
Thus, fourth, it is necessary to examine the truth of the alleged em-
ployee participation in decision-making concerning the daily Organiza-
tion of work. How much voice is allowed to ordinary members of a work 
team or a 'QC circle', in what kinds of shopfloor matters? 
It cannot be denied that Japanese managers eagerly encourage each 
production worker to make best use of his/her accumulated knowledge 
and creativity to improve on the present production process. Actually, 
however, the workers' knowledge and initiative are carefully harnessed 
to lead almost always to higher quality of work or improved labour pro-
ductivity - in short, to further elimination of 'defect' and 'waste'. It is 
almost impossible and most unlikely for a worker to put forward a pro-
posal at a shopfloor meeting concerning, say, alleviation of the intensified 
workload, more and longer tea breaks, or a higher manning level to make 
it easy for the work team to achieve the set production targets. Even if a 
worker dared to make such a Suggestion, the shopfloor meeting has no 
power to make a decision on it, let alone to put the decision into practice. 
The leading role in a shopfloor meeting is invariably taken by the first-
line Supervisor, who sees to it that every participant understands the com-
pany's goals as well as the shop's targets for the day, and that unanimous 
consent is given to the maximum effort to meet these targets. There is no 
voting at the meeting, and although questions and opinions are sometimes 
encouraged, the final decision always rests with the Supervisor. After all, 
the essential function of these fairly frequent meetings lies in transforming 
the mandate of the management concerning production into a sort of 
voluntary mandate of the shopfloor workers themselves. 
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When this 'mandatory-voluntary' unanimity of the workplace is chal-
lenged by a few 'un-cooperative' workers, the Japanese managers will be 
determined to alienate them from their fellow workers by all means and 
persistently until these dissenters have no other choice but to repent of their 
past behavior or to quit the firm, as is often seen (and in some extreme cases 
brought into court) in Japan. In general, the first-line Supervisors in Ja-
panese factories have greater power and responsibility than their counter-
parts in conventional Western ones, especially in the sense that they are re-
sponsible not only for the daily Organization of production itself but also for 
the personnel management of their immediate subordinates. For example, 
they keep an eye on the attendance record of each individual, grant or 
withhold permission to take paid leave, and make first-hand employee 
evaluations to be submitted to upper management; and of course they have 
final say in the assignment of jobs or.overtime work among the workforce. 
It should be remembered, thus, that what appears to be autonomy of work 
groups under lapanese management is in reality under the strong influence 
and leadership of the lowest level of management (Jürgens 1989:209f.). 
The fifth and final point of our argument is concerned with industrial 
relations policies of Japanese firms in Europe. 
As has been implied now and again in the discussion so far, the most 
disagreeable to the Japanese-style management would be an independent 
trade union movement which tends to intervene in those shopfloor mat-
ters from whose flexible administration Japanese manufacturers derive 
the greatest part of their productive competitivity, such as job definition, 
workload, manning level, transfer of workers, and so on (Jürgens 1989: 
214; Wilkinson 1991: 12f.). Also incompatible with the flexible manage-
ment of production are trade union regulations covering wage payment 
that are based on the traditional principle of ,equal pay for equal work'. 
Such union rules predetermine a fairly rigid system of job definition, on 
the one hand, and by their very nature, on the other hand, contradict any 
wage differentials as a result of Performance evaluations of individuals 
doing essentially the same class of jobs. 
In Japan, enterprise unionism, as one of the 'three pillars' of Japanese 
management, has almost completely fallen in line with management pre-
rogatives concerning both production Organization and employee evalua-
tion. Japanese firms expanding in Asian countries will be able to avoid any 
negotiation with independent union representation of their employees' in-
terests, as is often the case there and sometimes in the U.S., where they also 
have some chance of establishing non-union plants. Japanese firms' success 
in Europe, where there is scarcely any Option of simply avoiding union rec-
ognition, therefore, will depend on whether they can manage to eliminate 
more or less independent unionism from within the Company or to domes-
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ticate the local Organization of the official union structure as an in-house 
partner in collaborative labour-management relations. In fact, the Organiza-
tion of frequent shopfloor meetings has always been emphasized as an effi-
cient way of avoiding unionists' Intervention in direct communication be-
tween the management and each individual employee. 
Once, at a Conference which was held to discuss the implications of JIT 
production, a participant from IG Metall said: "JIT only works properly 
when job enlargement, job enrichment, and other parts of the humaniza-
tion-of-work programme have been achieved". This comment was sup-
ported by H . Widemann in his concluding remarks at the Conference (Holl 
and Trevor 1987: 89,98). From our point of view, however, it would have 
been more proper to say that JIT will never work when Organization of 
work has been really humanized and demoeratized. Japanese managers 
like to stress the importance of 'human resources' in management of pro-
duction, and often exaggerate the egalitarian, partieipation-oriented na-
ture of the Japanese-style management when they launch their Operations 
in Europe, if not in Asian developing countries. Indeed, every employee 
will be encouraged to partieipate in ever-increasing improvement of pro-
ductivity. But rank and file workers will be powerless all the same in 
deciding for themselves how and how much to work without their own 
representation of interests through union Organization, more or less inde-
pendent of management. This is why we focus our attention on the adap-
tation process which is being, and will be, forced upon Japanese-style 
management by European workers and their organizations. We know 
only too well that the superior productivity of Japanese manufacturing 
industries is being maintained at the cost of workers' control over their 
immediate jobs and even their working lives in general. 
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JAPANESE PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT TRANSFERRED 
T R A N S P L A N T S O F T H E E L E C T R O N I C I N D U S T R Y I N A S I A A N D 
E U R O P E 
Nomura Masami 
ABSTRACT 
With overseas direct investment by Japanese companies rapidly increasing since 
1985 when the dollar/yen exchange rate drasticaÜy changed, "globalization" or 
"internationalization" has become a very populär concept in the business and aca-
demic worlds in Japan. One of the hot issues in discussion of "internationalization" 
is the question of whether "Japanese management" is transferable to other coun-
tries. 
The electric and electronics industry has been the most active in overseas pro-
duction among Japanese manufacturing industries. Because TV set manufacturers 
have the longest experience with overseas production, I take TV transplants as an 
example. 
In this article I compare the system and practice of labour management in trans-
plants with that of their parent companies in Japan. In some aspects they are sim-
ilar, and in others not. The degree of similarity is high in the fields of internal 
promotion, employment of peripheral workers, and utilization of overtime. It is 
not high, but not low either, in the field of in-house union Organization, "qualifi-
cation" Systems, and personnel evaluation. The degree of similarity is low in such 
areas as a closed internal labour market, a complicated wage system, utilization of 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With overseas direct investment by Japanese companies rapidly increas-
ing since 1985, when the dollar/yen exchange rate drastically changed, 
"globalization" or "internationalization" has become a very populär con-
cept in the business and academic worlds in Japan. One of the hot issues 
in the discussion of "internationalization" is the question of whether "Ja-
panese management" is transferable to other countries. 
The most important assumption in this discussion is that "Japanese 
management" is unique as a whole. Researchers create an "ideal type" 
(Idealtypus) of "Japanese management" and examine how similar 
(different) is the management of a transplant is compared with this 
ideal type. 
In order to examine the transfer problem exactly, however, two 
methods should be adopted. One method is to compare Japanese trans-
plants with purely local companies, the other is to compare them with 
their parent factories in Japan. Though it is desirable that both methods 
be adopted, this is often made difficult by lack of funds and time. In this 
paper I wil l compare personnel management of transplants to that of their 
parent factories. 
Two big electronics companies are taken as examples. I have given them 
the ficticious names of Metropolitan Electronic Company (MEC), and the 
other Homebred Electronic Company (HEC). Both companies produce 
many products and have many transplants. I limit the scope of my re-
search to TV manufacturing transplants, covering all the transplants of 
MEC and HEC that produce TV sets in Asia and Europe. (Because of the 
project's schedule and cost, it was not possible for me to visit TV manu-
facturing transplants in North America. The electric and electronics in-
dustry has been the most active in overseas production among the Ja-
panese manufacturing industries, and TV set factories have the longest 
history of overseas production in the industry. 
The items examined are: (1) production volume, (2) seasonal fluctuation 
of production volume and adaptation of number of workers to the fluc-
tuation, (3) labour turnover, (4) promotion system, (5) wage system, (6) 
labour representative system, and (7) production system of printed circuit 
boards. These items seem to cover all important aspects of personnel man-
agement. 
The research was conducted in 1989/90 in collaboration with Prof. 
Tokunaga Shigeyoshi and Prof. Hiramoto Atsushi (both of Töhoku Uni-
versity). 
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2. PERSONNEL M A N A G E M E N T IN TRANSPLANTS 
2.1. Outline of Transplants 
The transplants of MEC and HEC manufacturing TV sets in Asia and 
Europe are as follows: 
1) MEC Taiwan Electric Company: 
Established in 1962 (second oldest transplant of MEC). 56% of capital is held 
by MEC, which has exclusive management. Products include air condi-
tioners, audio products, refrigerators, TV sets, washing machines, VCRs and 
others. TV sets account for 7% of total sales and are produced for the domes-
tic market. The number of employees is 6,300 (of whom 50% are males). 
2) MEC Malaysia Electric Company: 
Established in 1965.43.1% of capital is held by MEC, which has exclusive 
management rights. Products include TV sets, refrigerators, washing ma-
chines, electric fans, vacuum cleaners, irons and batteries. TV sets account 
for 20% of total sales and are produced for the domestic market. The 
number of employees is 1,600 (of whom 66% are males). 
3) MEC Malaysia TV Company: 
Established in 1988.100% owned by MEC. TV sets are mass-produced for 
export exclusively. The number of employees is 600 (of whom 50% are 
males). 
4) MEC U.K. TV Company: 
Established in 1974.100% of capital is held by MEC. Products are mainly 
TV sets and microwave ovens. TV sets are produced for the EC market. 
The number of employees is 1,200 (of whom 40% are males). 
5) HEC Taiwan TV Company: 
Established in 1969.100% of capital is held by HEC. Products include TV 
sets, TV chassis, displays, and audio products. The factory is located in 
the free trade zone and its products are exclusively for export. The number 
of employees is 1,000. 
6) HEC China Joint TV Company: 
Established in 1981. The Company is a Joint venture between HEC Group 
(50%) and the local government of China (50%). HEC is responsible for 
product and production technology and product quality. Personnel man-
agement is controlled by the China side. TV sets are the only products. 
Until 1986 almost all TV sets produced were sold in China. In 1989 the 
export ratio was 42% (to Western and Eastern Europe, North America, 
U.S.S.R.). The number of employees is 1,300. 
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7) HEC Singapore TV Company: 
Established in 1973. 92.5% of capital is held by HEC. Products include 
audio products, TV sets, and vacuum cleaners. TV sets account for 40% 
of total sales. TV sets are produced both for the domestic market and for 
export. The number of employees is 1,100 (of whom 31% are males). 
8) HEC U.K. TV Company: 
The Company was established in 1978 as a Joint venture between HEC 
(50%) and a U.K. electric Company (50%). The U.K. Company withdrew 
in 1984 when the failure of the Joint venture became apparent, and HEC 
took 100% of the capital. Products are mainly TV sets and microwave 
ovens. TV sets are sold mainly in the domestic market. The number of 
employees is 800. 
9) HEC Germany VCR Company: 
Established in 1982. Wholly owned by HEC. Products are mainly VCRs 
and TV sets. For TV set production the Company does final assembly only. 
Chassis are supplied by HEC U.K. TV Company. In 1991 it was announced 
that assembly of TV sets by the Company would cease, production in 
Europe would be concentrated in HEC U.K. TV Company. The number 
of employees is 500 (of whom 33% are males). 
2.2. Production Volume 
Production volume of the parent companies and their transplants in 
1989/90 is approximately as follows: 
MEC 
Japan IK TV Factory: 1,000,000 sets. Domestic market and export. 
Taiwan Electric Company: 130,000 sets. Mainly domestic market. 
Malaysia Electric Company: 120,000 sets. Domestic market. 
Malaysia TV Company: 600,000 sets. Export. 
U.K. TV Company: 500,000 sets. Domestic market and export. 
HEC 
Japan Y M TV Company: 1,300,000 sets. Domestic market and export. 
Taiwan TV Company: 80,000 sets and 230,000 chassis. Export. 
China Joint TV Company: 400,000 sets. Domestic market and export. 
Singapore TV Company: 350,000 sets. Domestic market and export. 
U.K. TV Company: 260,000 sets. Mainly domestic market. 
Germany VCR Company: 24,000 sets (final assembly only). Domestic 
market and export. 
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The production volume of the parent factories of M E C and HEC exceeds 
one million sets per year. Though the volume of the HEC parent factory 
is larger than that of the MEC parent factory, the total TV production 
volume of HEC is smaller than that of MEC. HEC concentrates TV pro-
duction in one factory (YM TV Factory), while MEC has two TV factories. 
Generally speaking, transplants are at a disadvantage from the view-
point of production technology. Production volume of transplants is 
smaller than that of their parent factories. Furthermore, transplants pro-
duce many models in response to local needs. Thus, the production lot of 
one model is much smaller than that of the parent companies. It is difficult 
for transplants to enjoy economies of scale. 
In this respect, however, MEC Malaysia TV Company is exceptional. 
Under the production strategy of MEC TV Division, this transplant is to 
produce several mass production models. 
2.3. Recruüment, Labor Turnover, Employment Adjustment 
The yearly labour turnover rate, method of adjusting employment to sea-
sonal fluctuation in demand, and forms of peripheral work force are as fol-
lows: 
MEC 
Japan IK TV Factory: Male 0.8%, female 5.5%. Small seasonal fluctuation 
of demand. Overtime. Temporary workers, part-timers. 
Taiwan Electric Company: Indirect 16%, direct 88%. Small seasonal fluc-
tuation of demand. Overtime. Temporary workers. 
Malaysia Electric Company: Total 5%. Overtime. 
Malaysia TV Company: Total 72%. Just began Operation. Major invest-
ment for more production. 
U.K. TV Company: Total 18%. Big seasonal fluctuation of demand. Over-
time. Temporary workers. 
HEC 
Japan Y M TV Company: Male 1%, female 4.2%. Small seasonal fluctuation 
of demand. Overtime. Temporary workers, part-timers. 
Taiwan TV Company: Total 35%. Big seasonal fluctuation of demand. 
Overtime. Part-timers, temporary work by students. 
China Joint TV Company: Very small labour turnover. Investment for 
more production. Overtime. Temporary workers. 
Singapore TV Company: Total 40-74%. Big seasonal fluctuation of 
demand. No peripheral work force (use of high labour turnover). 
U.K. TV Company: Total 7%. Big seasonal fluctuation of demand. Over-
time. Temporary work. 
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Germany VCR Company: Indirect 10%, direct 19%. Big seasonal fluctua-
tion of demand. Overtime. Temporary workers, part-timers, dis-
patched workers. 
As is usual in Japan, the parent factories both recruit new school leavers as 
regulär employees. The Japanese school year ends at the end of March, and 
companies employ new school graduates at the beginning of April. These 
are called "regulär entrants". Students have semi-official employment con-
tracts with companies in their last year of school education. Male employees 
are expected to stay in the Company until the compulsory retirement age (60 
years). Female employees are expected to retire when they marry or have 
babies. As employees have no experience in other companies, it is easy for 
Japanese companies to train them and to claim their loyalty. 
Usually transplants use newspaper advertisements, labour offices, or 
in-house advertisements for recruitment. Only the Taiwan transplants 
(MEC and HEC) recruit new school graduates as in Japan. However, the 
labour turnover rate in the Taiwan transplants is much higher than that 
of parent factories. They have to fill vacancies by recruiting workers who 
have experience in other companies. Even the Taiwan transplants cannot 
close out the internal labour market. 
It is interesting to notice that there is a big difference in labour turnover 
rate between MEC Malaysia Electric Company (5%) and MEC Malaysia 
TV Company (72%). As the transplants are both located near the city of 
Kuala Lumpur, regional characteristics do not explain the big difference. 
One reason for it is that Electric Company has operated for 25 years and 
has its own corporate culture. TV Company just started operating in 1989 
and is now seeking a corporate identity. Another reason is that Electric 
Company produces many electric and electronic products mainly for the 
domestic market. TV Company produces only TV sets and exclusively for 
export to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Australia. The motto of the 
Company is "World N o . l Quality from MEC Malaysia TV Company". To 
attain this goal, the Company has introduced the most advanced machines 
from Japan and educates employees strictly on manners, work ethics, and 
quality consciousness. This strict management seems to contribute to the 
high turnover rate. 
The difference in turnover rate between MEC U.K. TV Company (18%) 
and HEC U.K. TV Company (7%) can be explained by regional conditions. 
MEC TV Company is near a big city, and HEC TV Company is located in 
a coal mining district with high rates of unemployment. 
In Europe seasonal fluctuation of production volume is bigger than in 
Asia. European bottom production volume in the first half of the year is 
half of peak volume in December, which reflects Christmas sales. 
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The main methods of coping with seasonal fluctuations of production 
volume are common in parent factories and transplants: overtime and 
employment of peripheral workers (temporary workers and part-timers). 
The parent factories and the majority of the transplants feel no serious 
obstacles to ordering overtime. But HEC Taiwan TV Company and HEC 
Germany VCR Company think that they have difficulties with flexible 
overtime. In the case of HEC Taiwan TV Company, flexible overtime is 
difficult, because the Company is located in the free trade zone, to which 
access is not easy. If the Company Orders long overtime shifts, special buses 
have to be ordered to take women workers home. In the case of Germany 
VCR Company, the Japanese managerial staff regard German labour cus-
toms and practices as less flexible than they would prefer. Japanese 
managerial staff members often complain that labour turnover rate in 
transplants is too high for cultivation of employees. In some cases, how-
ever, heavy labour turnover is a favourable factor in employment adjust-
ment. For example, HEC Singapore TV Company does not need to employ 
peripheral workers: the Company can adjust employment simply by util-
izing high labour turnover. 
2.4. Promotion System 
Employee promotion Systems of the parent factories and the transplants 
are as follows: 
MEC 
Japan IK TV Factory: Internal promotion. 
Taiwan Electric Company: Internal promotion. 
Malaysia Electric Company: Internal promotion. 
Malaysia TV Company: External recruitment. 
U.K. TV Company: Internal promotion and external recruitment. 
HEC 
Japan Y M TV Company: Internal promotion. 
Taiwan TV Company: Internal promotion. 
China Joint TV Company: Internal promotion. 
Singapore TV Company: Internal promotion. 
U.K. TV Company: Internal promotion and external recruitment. 
Germany VCR Company. Internal promotion and external recruitment. 
The managerial hierarchy of the transplants is almost the same as that of 
the parent companies. For example, the "executive manager" of HEC U.K. 
TV Company is the equivalent of buchö of HEC in Japan. In HEC, the 
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managerial hierarchy of the parent factory and HEC U.K. TV Company 
are as follows: 
köjöchö - Managing Director 
buchö - Executive 
kachö - Senior Manager 
shunin - Middle Manager 
kumichö - Team Leader 
In practice, however, when a shunin (middle manager) of the parent Com-
pany is dispatched to U.K. TV Company, his nominal hierarchy is two 
ranks higher than that of shunin. 
In the parent factories there is a so-called "qualification system". Taking 
MEC as an example, employees are promoted from the rank and file to 
tannin, shunin, shuji, fuku-sanji, and sanji. The "qualification" roughly 
corresponds to the managerial hierarchy. For employees of MEC and 
HEC, promotion in line with "qualification" is decisively important. 
Among the transplants surveyed, MEC Taiwan Electric Company, 
HEC Taiwan TV Company, and HEC China Joint TV Company have 
qualification Systems. In the other transplants there is no qualification 
system, which suggests that such a system is possible only in East Asian 
countries. 
A l l transplants practice internal promotion. It is noteworthy that the 
transplants in Asia, including the parent factories, practice internal pro-
motion only. MEC Malaysia TV Company recruits managerial staff and 
Supervisors on the external market, simply because the Company has just 
started Operations and has no internal human resources. The transplants 
in Europe combine internal promotion and external recruitment for 
managerial staff. This suggests that transplants in Asia use the internal 
labour market for managerial staff to a considerable degree. The trans-
plants in Europe experience frequent labour turnover of managerial staff, 
and it is difficult to fill vacancies through internal promotion alone. 
Who is to be promoted is normally decided by personnel evaluation. 
But HEC Singapore TV Company is an exception. In this Company pro-
motion is based on length of Service within the Company. As the turnover 
rate of both workers and managerial staff is very high, the Company is 
compelled to regard length of service as the most important criteria for 
internal promotion. 
A l l managing directors (köjöchö) of the transplants are Japanese. Ja-
panese are assigned to different sections in each transplant. However, all 
transplants employ a local person as the top manager for personnel man-
agement. It is almost impossible for Japanese managerial staff to have a 
thorough knowledge of local labour law and information on local customs 
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and practice, and also to be able to take into account the feelings of local 
employees. 
In order to control the personnel management of the transplant, the 
managing director consults with Japanese staff members. MEC and HEC 
both dispatch the managers of their accounting departments to trans-
plants as de facto assistants to the managing directors. The dispatched 
accounting manager has general knowledge of personnel management. 
In cases where industrial relations are tense, HEC's parent factory dis-
patches the personnel manager; at present, this is the case at the U.K. TV 
Company. The personnel manager dispatched to the U.K. transplant is 
called an "advisor", with the same hierarchical Status as "executive". The 
function and authority of this "advisor" are not clearly specified, but in 
practice, the local "executive" personnel manager consults with the advi-
sor before important decisions are made. 
2.5. Wage System 
The wage system of the parent companies and their transplants are sum-
marized as follows: 
MEC 
Japan IK TV Factory: "Qualification", Age, personnel evaluation. 
Taiwan Electric Company: "Qualification", personnel evaluation. 
Malaysia Electric Company: Job grade, personnel evaluation. 
Malaysia TV Company: Job, personnel evaluation. 
U.K. TV Company: Job grade. 
HEC 
Japan Y M TV Company: Job grade, "qualification", personnel evaluation. 
Taiwan TV Company: "qualification", personnel evaluation. 
China Joint TV Company: Age, attendance, "qualification", personnel 
evaluation. 
Singapore TV Company: Job grade. 
U.K. TV Company: Job grade, personnel evaluation. 
Germany VCR Company: Job grade, personnel evaluation (not on all em-
ployees, but Vacharbeiter (skilled employees) and upwards). 
Each Japanese Company has its own complicated and unique wage Sys-
tem. The wage Systems of MEC and HEC are so complicated that it is not 
possible to explain it here. (On the wage system of HEC, see Tokunaga et 
al., 1991:185ff., and on MEC, see Enterprise Union of MEC 1988.) 
Very roughly speaking, the wage Systems of MEC and HEC are similar 
in principle, based mainly on "qualification" and personnel evaluation. 
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In addition, some other wage categories are added: age-related wages in 
MEC and job-related wages in HEC. 
As has been pointed out already, a "qualification" system exits in MEC 
Taiwan Electric Company, HEC Taiwan TV Company, and HEC China 
Joint TV Company. The wages in these transplants are mainly determined 
by "qualification", as in the parent factories. These three companies con-
duct personnel evaluation of all employees, and the result is reflected in 
the wage amount. In this sense, the wage Systems of these companies are 
similar to those of the parent factories. 
In the other companies, the wage is mainly determined by job grade. 
However, there are two Subtypes. In one subtype the job grade determines 
the amount of wage (MEC U.K. TV Company, HEC Singapore TV Com-
pany). In the other subtype the result of personnel evaluation affects the 
wage amount (MEC Malaysia Electric Company, MEC Malaysia TV Com-
pany, HEC U.K. TV Company). 
Three Japan-specific and unique features of the Japanese wage system 
seem to be commonly understood among researchers: 
1) Longer length of Service and older age bring higher wages. 
2) Wages are not directly related to the job, but rather to the "qualification" 
of each employee. 
3) Personnel evaluation is conducted on all employees and affects wage 
amount. 
In HEC Singapore TV Company, annual wage increase rate is higher than 
initial wage increase rate wage, and thus longer length of Service brings 
higher wage. In MEC Taiwan Electric Company and HEC TV Company, 
there is a "qualification system" which affects wages decisively. Personnel 
evaluation for wages is conducted in the majority of the transplants of 
MEC and HEC. 
A l l in all, the features that are supposed to be "Japan-specific" are prac-
ticed in overseas transplants. They do not depend on the Japanese society, 
culture, or mentality. Are there no elements in the wage system in Japan 
that are not practicable in foreign countries? In my opinion, there is one 
feature that is not applicable to overseas transplants: the complicated na-
ture of the wage system. 
The wage system of a Japanese Company is so complicated that re-
searchers have to visit several times in order to understand it. Further-
more, the wage system is very often kept secret. As stated above, the 
principles of the wage Systems in MEC Taiwan Electric Company and 
HEC Taiwan TV Company are similar to those of their parent factories. 
But the actual wage system of the Taiwan transplants is simple. This sug-
gests that wage system with "qualification system" and personnel eval-
uation is not always complicated. 
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2.6. Industrial Relations 
Labour representative organizations of the parent factories and the trans-
plants are as follows: 
MEC 
Japan IK TV Factory: In-house union. 
Taiwan Electric Company: In-house union. 
Malaysia Electric Company: Industrial union. 
Malaysia TV Company: No labour representative (in future, recognition 
of an industrial union). 
U.K. TV Company: Industrial union and employees' representative. 
HEC 
Japan Y M TV Company: In-höuse union. 
Taiwan TV Company: In-house union. 
China Joint TV Company: "Labor union" under leadership of the Com-
munist Party. 
Singapore TV Company: In-house union. 
U.K. TV Company: Industrial union and employees' representative. 
Germany VCR Company: Works Council (Betriebsrat). 
In Asia, MEC and HEC transplants recognize in-house unions. The only 
exception is Malaysia. MEC Malaysia Electric Company recognizes the 
industrial union of electricians, but MEC Malaysia TV Company recog-
nizes neither an industrial nor an in-house union. The Company has begun 
Operations only in 1989, and it asked the union to wait for recognition. 
There is an oral agreement between MEC Malaysia TV Company and the 
industrial union of electricians that the Company will recognize the union 
when its Operation is stable. 
In the U.K., MEC TV Company recognizes the General, Municipal, 
Boilermakers and Allied Trade Union (GMBU), and HEC TV Company, 
the Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunication and Plumbing Union 
(EETPU). Both companies have "single union agreements". The reason 
MEC U.K. TV Company recognizes G M B U can be explained by the his-
torical background. When MEC established the transplant at the end of 
the 1970s, EETPU was not yet prepared for Cooperation with companies. 
The other MEC transplants in the U.K., which were established later rec-
ognize the EETPU. 
In HEC U.K. TV Company there is a Joint committee for consultation, 
which is composed of representatives from the management, from EETPU 
and from the employees. This committee is named the Company Members 
Board (CMB), but the Japanese managerial staff of the Company often call 
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it a "union". This suggests that Japanese managers are so accustomed to 
in-house unions that they regard the CMB a kind of union. 
In Germany, HEC VCR Company does not recognize IG Metall. The Com-
pany negotiates with the works Council (Betriebsrat) as labour's repre-
sentative. It is estimated that only about 10 among 500 employees are organ-
ized by IG Metall. However, of the 9 members of the works Council 4 are 
members of IG Metall. This suggests that the employees support the policies 
of IG Metall, though they are not active enough to be union members. 
Thus, Japanese transplants tend to organize in-house unions and are 
reluctant to recognize industrial unions. In countries where industrial un-
ions have dominant influence, however, Japanese transplants do negotiate 
with them. 
2.7. Printed Circuit Board Assembly Line 
Features of printed circuit board assembly lines (PCB) of the parent fac-
tories and the transplants are summarized as follows: 
MEC 
Japan IK TV Factory: Auto insertion 92-99%. 2-shift for the automated 
line. Loose work Organization. Use of subcontractors. 
Taiwan Electric Company: Auto insertion 80%. 2-shift for the automated 
line. Almost no subcontractors. 
Malaysia Electric Company: Auto insertion 65%. Almost no subcontrac-
tors. 
Malaysia TV Company: Auto insertion 85%. 3-shift for the automated 
line. Strict work Organization. No subcontractors. 
U.K. TV Company: Auto insertion 85%. 3-shift for the automated line. 
Strict work Organization. No subcontractors. 
HEC 
Japan Y M TV Company: Auto insertion 85-98%. 3-shift for the automated 
line. Loose work Organization. Use of subcontractors. 
Taiwan TV Company: Auto insertion 83%. 3-shift for the automated line. 
Strict work Organization. No subcontractors. 
China Joint TV Company: Auto insertion 0%. Automated line in planning. 
3-shift and strict work Organization. Almost no subcontractors. 
Singapore TV Company: Auto insertion 75-79%. 3-shift for the auto-
mated line. Strict work Organization. No subcontractors. 
U.K. TV Company: Auto insertion 80-93%. 3-shift for the automated line. 
Strict work Organization. No subcontractors. 
Germany VCR Company: No PCB assembly (TV chassis are supplied by 
U.K. TV Company). 
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Usually TV companies have a PCB assembly line and a final assembly 
line. I compare the PCB assembly line of the parent factories and the trans-
plants, because it is highly automated. Final assembly is much less auto-
mated than PCB assembly. 
In the parent factory of MEC, the degree of automation (automatically 
inserted parts/all inserted parts) is 92-99%; in HEC, 85-98%. The auto-
mation degree of HEC is lower than that of MEC, mainly because the 
calculation method is different. 
Both parent factories use subcontractors for assembling PC Bs. In both 
parent factories, PCBs which are standardized and designed for mass pro-
duction are assembled in-house. PCBs for which production lot is small 
are assembled by subcontractors. As a result of this division of labour, 
automation in-house is easier than in subcontractors. In MEC the in-house 
automation degree is 92-99%, but the automation degree in subcontrac-
tors is 85-90%. (HEC calculates automation degree as a total that includes 
the subcontractors.) 
Of course, there are differences in the PCB assembly line concept be-
tween MEC and HEC. The most important difference is that MEC uses 
mount surface devices (MSD), and HEC does not. But as a whole, the 
assembly line of both factories has common features. 
First, as stated above, both factories utilize subcontractors to a consid-
erable degree. 
Second, though automation is highly developed in both factories, there 
remain stations for manual assembly, and there is a gender-based division 
of labour. On the manual assembly line female workers are assigned to 
parts insertion and simple inspection, while male workers are responsible 
for setup or PCB repair. 
Third, work Organization of the automated line is flexible and unclear. 
In both factories it is the aim of the management that all workers on the 
automated line can do all jobs within each group of machines (parts 
supply, setup, simple maintenance of machines, etc.). The important pre-
condition of this work Organization is that all the direct workers are male. 
According to Japanese labour laws, night shifts for female workers are 
prohibited, and the automated PCB assembly line is operated in 2-shift 
(MEC) or 3-shift (HEC) arrangements. 
Comparing PCB assembly lines in overseas transplants with those of 
the parent factories, the features of transplants are as follows: 
First, auto insertion degree in the transplants is lower than in the parent 
companies. Automation in transplants is not easy because of the small 
production lots. However, it cannot be said that the automation degree 
in transplants is much lower than that in the parent factories. The differ-
ence in automation degree is that the transplants have not introduced 
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insertion robots for odd-shaped parts. (Automation in China HEC Joint 
TV Company is 0%. Up until 1990 the company's first goal has been to 
keep up the rate of employment; this is a political request from the Chinese 
government. Investment has not been made in labour-saving production 
lines as a result.) 
Second, transplants utilize no subcontractors, or use them only to a 
limited degree. Managers of transplants point out that utilizing subcon-
tractors is not profitable, because in foreign countries the wage difference 
between the transplants and subcontractors is not large enough. This 
means that transplants have to assemble non-mass-produced PCBs in-
house, too, which makes assembly automation difficult. 
Third, work Organization in transplants is clear and fixed. For example, 
in Singapore HEC TV Company, there is a clear division of labour between 
maintenance staff and direct Operators. Direct Operators are responsible 
for parts Charge and other very simple jobs. If machines stop, the main-
tenance staff repairs them. However, the skill level of the maintenance 
staff is limited, and the management has to ask the maker of the machines 
to repair them when the trouble is beyond the maintenance staff's level. 
The Company replaces machines rather than repairing them, because it 
does not trust the maintenance staff. 
3. C O N C L U D I N G REMARKS 
The research results are summarized in Table 1. Four characteristics are 
difficult to practice in overseas transplants: 
1) closed internal labour market, 
2) complicated wage system, 
3) subcontract system, 
4) flexible work Organization. 
These four elements can be called "Japanese-specific". 
Why are they difficult to transfer to overseas transplants? It seems that 
they depend on the economic and social conditions in Japan. 
1) Subcontractors: The most important precondition of the subcontract 
system is that wages of subcontractors be significantly lower than those 
of parent companies. In foreign countries the wage difference is not so 
large as in Japan. Japanese transplants are not so influential in foreign 
countries that they can make the wage difference larger. 
2) Closed internal labour market, complicated wage system, flexible 
work Organization: A closed internal labour market is basic to a compli-
cated wage system and flexible work Organization. When the labour 
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market is closed, the Company can manage employees individually and 
thoroughly. The complicated wage system is both a precondition for and 
a result of individual management of employees. The wage is a kind of 
secret between the Company and the individual employee. Employees do 
not talk about their wage amounts among themselves, and they do not 
know the wages of their colleagues. As the personnel management is so 
thoroughly individualized, in-house unions are not very active. Flexible 
work Organization is required to motivate workers who are expected to 
stay in the Company for many years. Female workers are excluded from 
the system of "human resource development": they are expected to retire 
from the Company when they marry or have babies. The simple jobs which 
remain in spite of high automation are given to female workers. Division 
of labour by gender is the precondition of flexible work Organization 
among male workers on the automated line. 
Can "Japanese management" influence management philosophy and 
style in foreign countries? This question is beyond the parameters of my 
research. However, "Japan-specific" measures are difficult to practice in 
foreign countries, because they are not transferred even to transplants of 
Japanese companies. Other characteristics can be transferred to local com-
panies. How much the local companies will be influenced depends on 
their competitiveness in the world market. If they are weak competitors, 
they may be more likely to feel that "Japanese management" is an alter-
native to their traditional management. 
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WORKS COUNCILSAND ENTERPRISE-LEVEL 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN GERMAN TRANSPLANTS 
OF JAPANESE FIRMS 
Christoph Deutschmann 
ABSTRACT 
This paper summarizes and comments on some recent studies of management and 
industrial relations in German transplants of Japanese companies. So far, Japanese 
direct investment in Germany has been rather limited and confined largely to small 
subsidiaries in the trade, real estate and banking sectors and to the consumer elec-
tronics industry. The studies show that, due to the big institutional and cultural 
differences and to their still relatively ethnocentrical personnel policies, Japanese 
firms have difficulties in becoming familiär with the legal and institutional context 
of German industrial relations. These difficulties result in problems in complying 
with labour law, disputes with works Councils and communication problems with 
employees. Consistent attempts of firms to transfer Japanese management concepts 
to their German subsidiaries could not be observed. At the sectoral level, the inte-
gration of Japanese companies into employer organizations and the collective bar-
gaining system seems to be proceeding gradually. 
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Japanese management techniques 
2. The institutional context 
3. The relations between management and works Councils in German transplants 
of Japanese firms 
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1. JAPANESE DIRECT INVESTMENT I N G E R M A N Y A N D THE QUESTION OF 
TRANSFERABILITY OF JAPANESE M A N A G E M E N T TECHNIQUES 
Since the mid-1980s, Japanese direct investment in Europe has increased 
rapidly, from a yearly flow of 1.9 billon dollars in 1985 to 14.8 billion in 
1989, with accumulated stock totalling 44.9 billion dollars in 1989. Ja-
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panese investment in Germany rose as well, although at least until 1989 
Germany was not among the countries mostly preferred by Japanese com-
panies. Bröken down by country, by far the largest share (38.3%) of the 
investment flows between 1987 and 1989 went to the United Kingdom; 
second and third came the Netherlands and Luxemburg, and the Federal 
Republic of Germany was only fourth, with a share of 6.2%. So far it is 
not yet clear whether the preferences of Japanese investors will change 
under the influence of the unification of Germany and the political reforms 
in Eastern Europe. 
Japanese direct investment in the Federal Republic amounted to 3.45 
billions of dollars in 1988. Viewed by economic sector, more than one third 
(1.35 billion) of the investment was in the trade sector, 1.1 billion in bank-
ing, real estate and other Services, and another 1 billion in manufacturing. 
Within manufacturing, Japanese firms were most strongly represented in 
the electro-, electronics, machine manufacturing and chemical industries. 
According to the statistics of the Bundesbank (Federal Bank), the number 
of Japanese-owned firms in Germany was 360 in 1988, with a total em-
ployment of 62,800. The average size of firms thus is relatively small (all 
figures on Japanese investment from Ernst and Hilpert 1990: 45ff). 
Industrial relations in foreign subsidiaries of Japanese firms have at-
tracted the particular attention of researchers for several reasons. A n 
often-discussed point is related to the effects of internationalization on 
the structure of Japanese companies: Are Japanese companies maintaining 
their hitherto strongly centralized and ethnocentric control system, or is 
there a move toward "true" multinationalization and "localization" of 
Strategie decisions, with the consequence also of an increased share of 
locally recruited executive staff? A second comp lex of research questions 
refers to the possible transfer of Japanese management techniques abroad. 
To what degree do Japanese companies try to implement their particular 
management and industrial relations system in their foreign subsidiaries; 
and to what degree, on the other hand, do they adapt to the institutional 
and socio-cultural framework of a foreign society? Is the Japanese man-
agement system really transferable to non-Japanese socio-cultural con-
texts? What are the possible benefits for employees and unions, and what 
are the typical problems and conflicts? 
It is neither possible nor my intention here to recapitulate the vast de-
bate about the transferability of Japanese management which has been 
continuing for about 20 years. I think that a part of the problems addressed 
by the question has found a practical answer, since as a matter of fact 
several originally Japanese Organization practices, such as "just-in-time" 
logistics, "lean" production, worker flexibility and participation have 
been adopted in the meantime, at least in part, by many U.S. and European 
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firms. But it is equally clear that Japanese management is more than a 
simple set of organizational recipes. The proper "functioning" of these 
recipes in turn is based on a set of culturally very specific, often more 
implicit than explicit, norms of social behaviour. According to the cultur-
alist argument, we should expect that because of the vital role that flexi-
bility, informality and implicit understanding play in the governance of 
Japanese firms, Japanese management is bound to a certain extent to its 
domestic socio-cultural context and therefore meets with exceptional dif-
ficulties when being implemented in a different institutional and socio-
cultural framework. 
Against the background of this controversy I want to consider enter-
prise-level industrial relations and the role of works Councils in German 
subsidiaries of Japanese firms. Unfortunately the empirical basis of my 
paper is relatively thin. There are only two non-commercial institutions 
in Germany that do regulär research on Japanese firms in Germany and 
to whose works I shall refer largely in the following: the East Asian Sem-
inar (OAS) in Berlin, under the guidance of Professor Sung Jo Park, and 
the Ifo-Institute in München (Angelika Ernst, Helmut Laumer and Hanns-
Günther Hilpert). Additionally, there are only some rather casual con-
tributions from individual authors. My own research experience is con-
fined to some observations at a seminar with works councillors of seven 
consumer electronics factories belonging to five Japanese companies in 
the region of Lower Saxony (one Düsseldorf-based headquarter was also 
represented), which took place in summer of 1989. Moreover, I refer to an 
interview on issues of organizational decentralization with works coun-
cillors of a Japanese-owned consumer electronics firm near Stuttgart. 
2 . T H E INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
When establishing plants in Germany, Japanese companies are faced with 
an institutional context that is very different from Japanese society as well 
as from other European societies. A first important difference is the social 
security system. In comparison with Japan, the general social security 
system in Germany is much more developed and strongly centralized. 
The level of obligatory non-wage labour costs is correspondingly high. 
Legal non-wage labour costs which have to be paid by all employers 
irrespective of the size of the enterprise (except in the case of marginal 
employees working less than half time), amount to 36% of the wages. 
Additionally, there are a number of fringe benefits determined by in-
dustry-wide collective bargaining agreements or paid on a voluntary 
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basis, which add up to 45% of direct wages, the latter differing to some 
degree by size of enterprise. Thus, no less than 81% of direct wages (27,674 
D M per average employee in manufacturing in 1988) is paid additionally 
in form of fringe benefits and social security contributions (Statistisches 
Bundesamt 1990: 469) - a figure that is around twice as high as in Japan. 
Moreover, Japanese Investors are often said to be deterred by the fact that 
in Germany not only are wage and non-wage labour costs considerable, 
but regulär and overtime working are also among the shortest in all 
developed industrial countries. 
A further difference between Japan and Germany is the mode of conflict 
regulation. In Germany it is far more usual than in Japan to settle in-
dividual and collective work disputes by juridical argument instead by 
informal agreement. A close web of collective bargaining agreements, col-
lective and individual labour laws and a special system of labour Juris-
diction regulates procedural and Substantive issues of labour relations as 
well as the Status, rights and obligations of individual workers and of 
collective interest representation, including worker codetermination at the 
enterprise level. The high level of "juridification" of German industrial 
relations leaves comparatively little room for unilateral employer discre-
tion in handling work, compensation and employment matters, much less 
than Japanese employers and managers are accustomed to having. At the 
same time, the strong juridical position of workers presses employers and 
manager to seek consensual Solutions in work matters with works Coun-
cils and unions. 
A third crucial difference relates to the structure of industrial relations. 
In contrast to the Japanese system of enterprise unionism, unions, em-
ployer organizations and collective bargaining in Germany have their 
focus at the sectoral level. Collective bargaining agreements on wages, 
working hours and other issues apply to all firms in a given industry, 
irrespective of firm size or firm-specific degree of unionization. The Sys-
tem has provided a relatively high level of industrial peace so far, but it 
seems to meet with disapproval from Japanese employers because of its 
egalitarian implications and the limits it puts on employer discretion in 
fixing wages and working hours. In particular, the system does not allow 
that high degree of wage differentiation between large and smalls firms 
which makes Japanese-type subcontracting relations so profitable for the 
large core firms. 
The institutional and economic conditions encountered by Japanese 
and other foreign firms when investing in Germany by no means appear 
unfavourable in every respect. The high educational level and qualifica-
tion of workers, the high rate of productivity, the cooperative structure of 
industrial relations and the well-developed public infrastructure are 
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often-cited factors which contribute to the competitiveness of the German 
economy and without which its international strong position could hardly 
be explained. Nevertheless, it appears particularly difficult for Japanese 
investors to adjust themselves to the cultural, institutional and legal con-
text of industrial relations in Germany, and these difficulties may explain 
the reluctance of Japanese companies to settle in Germany. It is therefore 
of particular interest to see how the relatively small group of Japanese 
companies which, in spite of all reservations, decided to set up transplants 
in Germany are managing the problems of cultural and institutional adap-
tation. 
3 . T H E RELATIONS BETWEEN M A N A G E M E N T A N D W O R K S COUNCILS IN 
G E R M A N TRANSPLANTS OF JAPANESE FIRMS 
The works Council is the core Institution of enterprise-level industrial re-
lations in Germany. Works Councils are not a union organ but are estab-
lished by law, although the DGB unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) 
in fact are strongly represented in most works Councils. According to the 
Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz), works Councils are to 
be established in firms with at least five employees. The works Council 
has no right to call for a strike and is legally obliged to maintain a rela-
tionship of trust and Cooperation with management. It oversees the im-
plementation of existing collective,. bargaining agreements and legal 
norms in the plant and is endowed with a set of explicitly defined rights 
to information, consultation and codetermination. The codetermination 
rights apply to such matters as the performance-based wage Systems, 
work schedules, overtime, regulation of holidays, introduction of control 
devices and personnel issues (not including layoffs, in which case only 
the works Council must be consulted). Consultation rights refer to matters 
of work Organization, design of jobs and work environment, and rights 
to information on economic decisions. Whereas the activities of the works 
Council are focused on the plant level, there is a second level of codeter-
mination at the level of top management of large companies with 2000 
employees and more; this level includes worker and union representation 
on supervisory boards and the inclusion of the so-called Arbeitsdirektor 
(work director) in top management. 
Since Japanese subsidiaries in Germany usually are rather small, only 
the first level of codetermination by works Councils is relevant for us. How 
do Japanese companies in Germany cope with the Institution of works 
Councils? Professor Park and his researchers at the East Asian Serninar 
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(OAS) in Berlin have conducted two empirical surveys on labour relations 
and management patterns in Japanese subsidiaries which also contain 
information on works Councils (Merz et al. 1985; Yasui et al. 1990). The 
first survey was done in 1984/85, the second in 1988/1989. Both surveys 
were based on the same questionnaire in order to allow intertemporal 
comparisons; additionally, the team conducted expert interviews in 1985 
(Demes et al. 1985). Unfortunately the second survey fails to meet the 
criteria of Statistical representativity because of the small number of re-
spondents (29); another shortcoming of both surveys (except for the expert 
interviews in the first survey) was that only the management side was 
contacted. 
The OAS studies show that in most of the small Japanese subsidiaries 
(fewer than 100 employees) works Councils continued to be non-existent 
up to 1989. In middle-sized firms (100 employees or more), however, 
works Councils were already widespread in 1985 and had been introduced 
almost everywhere (94% of firms) in 1989. Bröken down by branches, all 
manufacturing firms had works Councils in 1989, while they were nearly 
absent (89% of firms) in the trading companies. The researchers found a 
strong correlation between the institution of works Councils and the firm-
specific unionization rate. This result is not surprising, and conforms with 
the Situation in many small German firms, which often (in around half of 
small firms) lack works Councils. Interestingly, however, the OAS re-
searchers also found a strong correlation between the existence of works 
Councils and the nationality of the personnel manager: Only one of the 9 
companies which had a Japanese personnel manager had established a 
works Council, but 13 of the 16 firms with a German personnel manager 
had done so. I will come back to the Interpretation of this finding later. 
At first sight one would not expect Japanese executives to have major 
difficulties in Coming to good terms with works Councils. Several ob-
servers, such as Koike (1988), have pointed to the similarities between the 
functions and the intra-firm position of German works Councils and Ja-
panese enterprise unions. Koike (19988: 246) compares the role of works 
Councils and Company unions in intra-firm consultation in the two coun-
tries and concludes that "there is actually a close resemblance". From this 
point of view it should be easy for Japanese executives to establish con-
sultation practices with work concils which are similar to the relations 
with their Company unions at home. 
The reality, however, seems to be quite different. Let me first refer to a 
recent newspaper report on a court dispute between the management and 
the works Council at the central office of Toyota in Cologne (Südwest-
Presse, Nov. 28,1990). The works Council had protested against the high 
amount of overtime (19 to 25 hours, sometimes more than 50 hours, per 
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month) demanded by the Company and against the permanent violation 
of the works Councils' codetermination rights by the management. The 
case was appealed to the highest level, the Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal 
Labour Court), which decided in favour of the works Council, stating ex-
plicitly that workers are not required to comply with "tacit expectations" 
of the employer with regard to overtime. To cite another example: When 
Toshiba opened a new subsidiary at Brunswick in Lower Saxony five 
years ago, the Journal of the metal workers union IG Metall (Metall, no. 
21/1987:14) reported on conflicts between the management and the local 
union. When the factory was opened, the management first tried to pre-
vent the election of a works Council (instead it offered a so called "Com-
pany Council" to the employees); it also refused to stick to the existing 
collective wage agreements. The union had to go to court over both issues. 
My own observations at a serninar with works councillors from Japanese 
firms in Lower Saxony confirm the impression of often rather tense relations 
between management and works Councils. Certainly, labour-management 
relations appeared not to be equally adversarial in all eight firms. But at 
least half of the works councillors reported on lasting disputes with the 
management over labour law and codetermination issues, frequent settle-
ment (Einigungsstelle) procedures and even court disputes. Again the viola-
tion of codetermination rights over working hours proved to be a promi-
nent source of conflict. The problem in the background was that the Tokyo 
headquarters set production targets that were conceived by workers and 
works Councils as excessively unrealistic vis-ä-vis the scarce manpower 
capacity the Company was Willing to employ. The mismatch between pro-
duction targets and actual capacity led to extreme overtime demands by the 
management, which were rejected by the works Councils. 
The picture of a tense work climate is confirmed - last, but not least -
by the OAS studies. A striking result of both surveys was the high rate of 
personnel turnover that was found in both studies: The yearly turnover 
rate exceeded 20% in approximately a third of all firms and varied be-
tween 10 and 19% in a further 36% (44% in the second study). When 
explicitly asked for their evaluation of the work climate, two thirds of the 
managers interviewed in both surveys characterized it as positive and 
less than a quarter as negative. However, according to the second survey, 
the companies with "negative" climates were predorninantly those with 
a German personnel manager and a works Council. Moreover, both sur-
veys showed that the negative evaluation of the work climate was 
strongest in firms with high union density rates. On the other hand, com-
panies with no unions, no works Council and Japanese personnel 
managers characterized their work climate almost unanimously as "posi-
tive". 
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These findings represent the views ofthe Japanese management. They do 
not reflect the opinion of the workers and works Councils, and they are - to 
emphasize it once more - neither representative nor methodologically un-
controversial. But they indicate again the difficulties of Japanese firms in ad-
justing themselves to the German industrial relations context at the enter-
prise level. The OAS studies give no clear evidence about whether these dif-
ficulties are permanent or reflect only temporary adaptation problems: Ac-
cording to the first survey, the intra-firm tensions increased with years of 
Operation; according to the second, they diminished. 
What are the reasons underlying these adaptation and communication 
problems? The works councillors I interviewed often complained about 
the lack of understanding of their Japanese counterparts about the nature 
and the details of German labour law and the Works Constitution Act. 
Some of the Japanese executives even seemed to ridicule the "funny Ger-
man labour law", as one works councillor quoted a manager of his firm 
as saying. Similarly, Demes et al. observed "considerable information defi-
cits of the Japanese management on legal stipulations and practices in 
industrial relations" (Demes et al. 1985: 23). Although there were cases of 
Cooperation between conscientious works Councils and managements, 
collective bargaining agreements and codetermination rights were often 
ignored by the companies. A particular source of conflict was the lack of 
understanding of individual workers' rights on the side of the manage-
ment, such as the right to maternity leave, to füll utilization of holidays 
and to receive an adequate certificate when leaving the Company. In such 
cases, the firms often engaged in pointless juridical disputes that led to 
bitterness on both sides. The root of the problem here is, as Demes et al. 
postulate, not only ignorance of the details of labour law but a lack of 
understanding of the nature of "juridified" social relations itself. Self-con-
scious insistence on individual workers' rights by subordinates seems to 
be something that is difficult for Japanese executives to accept (Demes et 
al. 1985: 25). What we observe here is clearly a cultural barrier in labour-
management relations in Japanese subsidiaries. 
The problems are exacerbated by the ethnocentric personnel policies 
most Japanese corporations are still pursuing at the top management level. 
Although most firms agree to the principle of "localization" of the manage-
ment of their subsidiaries, localization proceeds only slowly in practice. Ac-
cording to the second OAS study, only 3 of the top managers of the 29 firms 
investigated were Germans, and the share of the German executives was 
even lower in the first study (Yasui et al. 1990: 22). The vital managerial 
functions of Japanese subsidiaries in Germany, such as Controlling, financ-
ing and product planning, in most cases continue to be performed by Ja-
panese nationals (Ernst and Hilpert 1990:122f.). German nationals are most 
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strongly represented in personnel management; however, their work is 
usually tightly controlled by their Japanese Supervisors and by the Tokyo 
headquarters. Just the fact that communication with headquarters is con-
ducted in Japanese and mostly has to take place during the night excludes 
them from important decision-making processes. The turnover rate of Ger-
man managers, not only at top level but even more so at middle and lower 
levels is rather high because of frustration over limited promotion prospects 
and the lack of understanding of their Japanese bosses (Heise 1989); these 
are the same reasons Japanese companies are reported to have difficulties in 
attracting qualified local managerial personnel. 
However, a high turnover rate prevails also on the side of the Japanese 
nationals. In order to avoid reintegration problems at home, many execu-
tives stay only for relatively short periods (two or three years) - too short 
to become familiär with their socio-cultural environment. Moreover, most 
of the Japanese nationals and their families live an isolated life in sepa-
rated Settlements and dormitories. As the Lower Saxonian works coun-
cillors told me, many of the Japanese top managers continue their habit 
of going to the office even on Saturdays and Sundays. (The German ex-
ecutives were at first expected to join them, but they refused to do so.) 
Under these circumstances, it is not astonishing that cultural barriers are 
diminishing very slowly. 
4 . " JAPANIZATION" OF W O R K ORGANIZATION? 
So far we can conclude that the idea of union-management harmony 
which usually is attributed to Japanese management can be applied to 
the relations between works Councils and management in Japanese sub-
sidiaries in Germany to only a limited degree. But what about the other 
"typical" features of Japanese management - for example, "loyalty" as a 
vital criterion of recruitment, permanent employment, flexible allocation 
of work, emphasis on on-the-job training, emphasis on quality, small-
group activities, downplaying of Status differentials, etc.? How far do 
Japanese companies attempt to introduce these concepts in their German 
subsidiaries; and, if they do so, what kind of response do they meet? 
The transfer of Japanese production concepts to European subsidiaries 
has been studied thoroughly only in Britain (Takamiya and Thurley 1985; 
Reitsperger 1986; Ackroyd et al. 1988; Wilkinson and Oliver 1990) so far. 
Three important results came out of these studies: 
a) Japanese companies indeed tried to implement their specific Organi-
zation and management techniques in their British subsidiaries, although 
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as a rule they proceeded pragmatically and with caution. The response 
of the employees, however, differed in the blue-collar and white-collar 
realms. 
b) In the blue-collar realm the workers often reacted more positively 
than expected to the "Japanization" of production methods. They seemed 
to appreciate the upgrading of their qualifications, the increase of discip-
line and responsibility and the emphasis on shop floor egalitarianism 
(Trevor 1989), although there were also negative responses to the intensi-
fication of work and the moral indoctrination practised by the Japanese 
management. Interestingly, the strongest negative reactions seemed to 
occur not at Japanese companies themselves but at Western firms which 
tried to emulate Japanese practices. The British Ford blue-collar workers 
protested with the slogan "We're Brits, not Nips" during their strike at 
the beginning of 1988 (Wilkinson and Oliver 1990: 349). 
c) Reactions in the white-collar realm, on the other hand, were more 
negative than anticipated. British managers were often frustrated at the 
monopolization of important decisions by the Japanese executives, the 
lack of promotion prospects, the social distance they feit from their Ja-
panese colleagues and the ambiguity of the decision-making processes 
(Ernst and Hilpert 1990; Trevor 1990). 
The evidence we have about work practices in German subsidiaries is 
much more shaky than that about British ones. However, with appropriate 
caution the following can be stated: The British findings about the nega-
tive response of white-collar employees and local staffs are confirmed. 
Heise (1989: 219) observed considerable frustration of German managers 
with the decision-making process of their Japanese bosses: More than 80% 
of all managers interviewed in Heise's survey feit that the slow, cumber-
some and over-centralized coordination process with the Tokyo head-
quarter created a "negative working environment" which induced little 
or no motivation. According to Ernst and Hilpert (1990:119) the local staff 
often expresses discontent with the lack of clear functional and occu-
pational demarcations and the companies' ignorance of workers' privacy: 
"Japanese management is not familiär with the demarcation of privacy 
and the strict Separation of work and leisure." A further major source of 
complaint for white-collar employees are the low promotion chances, 
which result in a high turnover rate among the most talented staff mem-
bers (Demes et al. 1985: 21). 
The picture in the blue-collar realm is more contradictory. On the one 
hand, some of the British findings are confirmed by the views expressed 
by the experts quoted in the study of Demes et al. (1985). According to 
the latter, German workers, too, seem to appreciate the egalitarian be-
haviour of Japanese Supervisors and the professional attention they pay 
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to the details of the production process. Similarly, a high intensity of work 
("bell to bell" working) and an emphasis on tight work discipline and 
control was observed in German subsidiaries as well. Some of the Lower 
Saxonian works councillors I met made fun of what they feit to be their 
management's Obsession with order, discipline and tidiness. 
At the same time, however, many of the German subsidiaries seem to 
hesitate to transfer Japanese management concepts to the Organization of 
their shop floor work. Probably this has to do with the dominance of the 
consumer electronics sector, with its large share of female workers and 
low-level assembling production processes. None of the seven Japanese 
plants whose works Councils I met at the seminar in Lower Saxony had 
taken any initiative in introducing semi-autonomous work groups or 
other types of flexible work Organization. In all cases the assembling 
process on the shop floor was organized according to classic Taylorist 
principles: monotonous, repetitive and highly intensive work. Quality 
circles or other types of small group activities did not exist either. The 
observations our research team (Deutschmann et al. 1990) made when 
visiting another Japan-based consumer electronics firm near Stuttgart con-
firmed this picture of a rather conservative work environment. The firm, 
which was established by buying out a former German Company in 1975, 
originally had tried to implement a QC programme on the shop floor, 
which met with quite a positive response from the workers. Although the 
Japanese headquarters made a great effort to support the QC movement, 
the initiative failed after some time and had to be cancelled due to lack 
of interest and participation. According to the works Councils we inter-
viewed, the main reason for the failure was hidden Sabotage by masters 
and foremen who feit that their position could be threatened by more 
worker participation. Abo, who visited the same plant some years earlier, 
noted an "excessive presence of the German methods" on the shop floor 
(Abo 1987: 48). Thus, at least in the cases of consumer electronics plants, 
the headquarters in Tokyo apparently did not engage in a consequent 
attempt to change the work Organization in conformity with the concepts 
of Japanese management. 
In examining the practices of recruitment, training and employment 
one again finds much evidence of conservative and pragmatic behaviour 
by Japanese companies. While the authors of the first OAS survey (Merz 
et al. 1975) still found that most firms followed their original Japanese 
practice of putting particular emphasis on loyalty and such other personal 
characteristics as criteria when recruiting, the second survey (Yasui et al. 
1990: 30f.) noted a marked shift towards quälification-oriented criteria. 
Considering the small average size of Japanese subsidiaries in Germany 
and their strong growth, the absence of elaborate internal training Systems 
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via systematic job rotation and personnel development, and of any ap-
proach to "lifetime employment" is not surprising (Kitscha et al. 1988). 
According to Abo (1987), Japanese firms even complain about the high 
training costs imposed on them by the "dual system" of vocational edu-
cation which is institutionalized on a supra-firm level in Germany. The 
reluctance to invest in training corresponds to the insistence on conven-
tional Tayloristic work Organization mentioned above. 
To conclude, there seems to be not much evidence for a "Japanization" 
of the work Organization at the shop floor level in Japanese-owned plants 
in Germany. The positive incentives workers are offered in the Japanese 
system - a flexible Organization of work, broad participation and qualifi-
cation of workers, continuous employment - are largely non-existent in 
the German subsidiaries. Perhaps this is one explanation for the often 
strained labour relations. 
5 . JAPANESE M A N A G E M E N T , EMPLOYER ORGANIZATIONS A N D 
CENTRALIZED COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
The strong "juridification" of labour-management relations which we al-
ready have identified as a source of tension between works Councils and 
Japanese managers surely is one of the most important socio-cultural char-
acteristics of the German industrial relations system. Two other peculiari-
ties, which differ as strikingly from the institutional context of Japanese 
industrial relations, are the centralized and highly elaborate welfare Sys-
tem and the system of sectoral-level collective bargaining between in-
dustrial unions and employer organizations. How do Japanese companies 
cope with the latter? 
The high social security contributions which make Germany a country 
with a very high level of non-wage labour costs is - of course - one of the 
issues that raises frequent complaints from foreign investors. But since 
employer social insurance contributions are obligatory (except - as men-
tioned above - in the case of marginal employment), management has no 
choice but to comply with the legal prescriptions. 
What about the involvement of Japanese firms in the collective bar-
gaining system? The first OAS survey revealed that Japanese companies 
were quite hesitant to join the employers' association of their industry: 
Only among the companies operating already for more than 15 years in 
Germany were the majority (60%) members of an employers' association. 
Of the firms which were established less than 15 years ago, only a minority 
were Willing to join. However, in the second survey (1988/89), the number 
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of Japanese members of employer associations, in particular in the man-
ufacturing, trade and banking sectors, had risen markedly (14 of all 29 
firms were members of employers' associations). Membership ofthe firms 
in the employers' associations correlated closely with the union density 
rate of their employees (Yasui et al. 1990: 44). This can be taken as an 
indication that the Japanese firms joined the employers' associations 
largely as a response to the union activities of their workers, thus gradu-
ally integrating themselves into the sectoral collective bargaining system. 
A similar tendency toward integration becomes visible when we con-
sider the share of Japanese firms observing the existing collective bargain-
ing agreements (on wages, work conditions, working hours, etc.). In both 
OAS surveys, around two thirds of all firms investigated respected col-
lective bargaining agreements; the second survey, however, revealed a 
marked rise in the share of newly established firms who observed the 
collective bargaining agreements (Yasui et al. 1990: 45). A l l banking and 
manufacturing firms paid and employed their workers according to the 
collective bargaining stipulations, and most of them granted an additional 
wage or fringe benefit Supplement. Substandard payment and work con-
ditions occurred only in the distribution sector, and particularly in the 
trading firms. 
6. CONCLUSION 
I have tried to summarize the so far still rather shaky and fragmentary 
results of empirical research on industrial relations in German subsidiar-
ies of Japanese firms. We have considered the relations between works 
Councils and management, the forms of work Organization in Japanese 
companies and the involvement of Japanese management in the institu-
tions of sectoral collective bargaining. Two general results can be con-
cluded from our review: 
First, if one keeps in mind the major institutional and socio-cultural 
differences between the German and the Japanese industrial relations Sys-
tems, it could not be expected that the expansion of Japanese companies 
in Germany would be a process that runs smoothly and without contra-
dictions. Socioculturally founded conflicts become apparent in the rela-
tions between works Councils and Japanese management, in the handling 
of labour law, works constitutions and other juridical matters. A further 
source of conflict and contradiction is the still relatively ethnocentric per-
sonnel policy of Japanese corporations at the managerial level which - as 
at least some observers suspect - is not transitory but reflects a deeper 
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unwillingness of Japanese management to "multinationalize" itself. The 
particular adaption problems of Japanese companies in Germany may 
also result from their specific investment strategies: By confining their 
manufacturing investment to low-value-added assembly processes they 
restrict themselves to a conventional Taylorist work regime which is 
neither particularly competitive at an international level nor allows Ja-
panese management concepts and their productive advantages to be 
brought fully into effect. From this view, much speaks in favour of the 
culturalist thesis that the same cultural peculiarities that have made Ja-
panese management so successful at home inhibit its internationalization 
and its success in other countries. 
Second, it is equally clear that the process of internationalization con-
fronts Japanese firms with the need to adapt in the area of industrial 
relations as well as in other fields. When internationalizing themselves, 
Japanese firms inevitably learn the wisdom of the principle: When in 
Rome, do as the Romans do. They have to observe and adapt to the 
national labour laws, the institutional structure and the socio-cultural en-
vironment. We have found evidence for this gradual adaptation in the 
increase of the number of works Councils in Japanese firms, in (the albeit) 
slow progress of "localization" of Japanese management and in the field 
of collective bargaining. We do not know so far which changes in the 
structures of Japanese corporations themselves will result from these local 
adaptation processes in Germany, as elsewhere. Surely such changes will 
occur only gradually and over the long term, but it is hoped that they will 
move in the direction of true multinationalization. 
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CONTRADICTIONS IN THE TEAM CONCEPT 
A U T O T R A N S P L A N T S A N D L A B O U R R E L A T I O N S I N 
N O R T H A M E R I C A 
Christian Berggren and Torsten Björkman 
ABSTRACT 
In the early 1980s Japanese auto makers started to export plants, and not only cars, 
to North America. In 1990 ten transplants in the US and Canada produced 1.7 
million vehicles. Most of them closely matched Japanese quality and productivity 
levels. This chapter examines working conditions and labour relations, analyzing 
six cases: 
- Honda in Ohio, the pioneer; 
- Toyota in Kentucky, the most elitist of all transplants; 
- Nissan in Tennessee, an aggressively anti-union Operation; 
- Mazda in Fiat Rock, Michigan, where Japanese managers encountered Detroit 
militancy; 
- Diamond Star in Illinois, "a robot wonderland" and 
- C A M I (Canadian Automobile Manufacturing Inc.) in Ontario, the first transplant 
organized by the Canadian Auto Workers' Union. 
The authors find scant support for the widespread Claims that Japanese "lean pro-
duction" revolutionizes working conditions. Fordist rigidities are replaced by new 
strains, resulting in a deeply contradictory pattern of intensified work. Initially 
supportive union locals have started to fight for more solid contracts. The chapter 
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1. INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1. From Export ofCars to Export of Plants 
In the 1970s the Japanese auto companies were very successful in ex-
porting cars to North America. In the 1980s they were equally successful 
in exporting their production system. They have erected new facilities at 
a furious tempo, replicating the fierce domestic competition between car 
producers in Japan in North America. Technically most of the new facto-
ries are Virtual clones of Japanese sister plants, with Japanese production 
equipment ranging from industrial robotics to transfer presses. More im-
portantly, the Japanese manufacturing culture is also transplanted, as is 
the supply strategy. Honda and Nissan were the pioneers; now every 
Japanese car maker has at least one manufacturing facility in North Amer-
ica (see Table 1). In organizational theory, there has been a widespread 
view that organizations adapt to their environment and, accordingly, that 
transferred organizations tend to take on new characteristics, deviating 
from their parents' mode of Operation. The Japanese auto companies in 
North America have tried to apply a different logic, changing the new 
environment, including labour relations and worker behaviour, to suit the 
needs of their production system, rather than adapting their system to 
the different environment. The initial success of this approach was im-
This study was made possible by a contribution from the Swedish Work En-
vironment Fund (Arbetsmiljöfonden). A füll report of the plant Visits is given 
in Berggren et al. (1991). 
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pressive, but recently it has encountered increasing resistance, and the 
long-term mixture of transplantation and adaptation is an open-ended 
question. 





in 1000 units 
1989 
Production 
in 1000 units 
1990 
U.SA. 
Honda Marysville/Ohio 1982 360 435 
Nissan Smyrna/Tennessee 1983 240 240 
NUMMI (Toyota 
& GM) 
Fremont/California 1984 190 200 
Toyota Georgetown/Kentucky 1988 150 220 




Normal/Illinois 1988 90 150 
SIA (Subaru & 
Isuzu) 
Lafayette/Indiana 1989 10 70 
Canada 
Honda Alliston 1988 90 100 
Toyota Cambridge 1989 20 60 
CAMI (Suzuki & 
GM) 
Ingersoll Ontario 1990 - 70 
Sources: Business Week, Aug. 14,1989; Automotive News 1991. 
The transplants have rapidly increased their production. In 1990 the com-
bined Output was 1.7 million units, with quality and productivity levels 
closely matching, and in some cases even surpassing, Japanese levels. The 
announcement in early 1992 of General Motor's (GM) plans to reduce its 
work force by 74,000 employees and idle 21 plants is a measure of the 
enormous pressure the Japanese transplants have created on the American 
manufacturers. 
The focus of this chapter will not be on the remarkable achievements 
of the transplants, but on their working conditions and labour relations. 
Together with Ernst Hollander, also from the Royal Institute of Technology 
in Stockholm, we visited six of the ten transplants in November 1990: 
Nissan, Honda/Ohio, Toyota/Kentucky, Mazda, C A M I and Diamond 
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Star. We met personnel and production managers, process engineers and 
Public Relations (PR) off icials. At the three unionized Operations, Mazda, 
CAMI and Diamond Star, we also had separate meetings with the union 
locals, complemented by Seminars and interviews with researchers at the 
unions' headquarters, United Automobile Workers' (UAW) Solidarity 
House in Detroit and Canadian Auto Workers (CAW) in Toronto. The 
"cluster approach" of visiting a number of plants in the same industry 
during a short time-span, coupled with efforts to get multiple perspectives 
on each plant, gave a broad survey and the opportunity to identify im-
portant patterns. Nevertheless, short plant Visits are no Substitutes for 
careful in-depth research, and we must emphasize the limits of our first-
hand observations. Wherever possible we tried to check our own findings 
with secondary sources. Genuine research on working conditions in the 
transplants has just started. One of the most interesting projects is the 
study launched by the Canadian Auto Workers Research Group, which 
we discuss in the section dealing with the CAMI plant. 
1.2. Two Basic Prerequisites: Rigorous Selection of Suppliers and Workers 
A l l the Japanese factories, except Mazda, are situated in rural areas or in 
small towns with no industrial tradition. The Japanese have tried to escape 
what they regard as the corrupting influence of America's cities on life-
style and morale. Another common feature is rigorous personnel selec-
tion. Auto work is attractive everywhere in North America, because of 
high wages and extensive benefit packages, compared to most manufac-
turing or Service jobs. However, few workers have had any chance of 
getting a job at any of the Big Three companies, since G M , Ford and Chrys-
ler have dismissed far more workers in recent years than they have hired. 
The transplants contrast with this pattern. As a result, the Japanese have 
been able to pick and choose among applicants as few other industrial 
enterprises have been able to do. The opening of all the transplants has 
been accompanied by a large number of applicants and an extensive 
Screening process. The transplant work force represents an elite group in 
several respects, physically äs well as mentally: young, strong, intelligent, 
good mannered, highly motivated and prepared to cooperate. Workers 
are largely white and from a rural background. The Japanese auto makers 
have regarded previous work experience in the American automobile in-
dustry as a serious handicap rather than a merit. 
The transplants have been equally careful in selecting their suppliers. 
With its 600,000 workers and $100 billion worth of sales, the auto parts 
industry is the largest Single manufacturing sector of the U.S. economy. 
Many firms expected to expand their business with the advent of the 
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transplants and were prepared to work hard to comply with stringent 
Japanese demands on quality and just-in-time deliveries. Few were 
successful in obtaining any significant Orders. Especially for sophisticated, 
higher value-added components, the Japanese auto firms preferred their 
traditional Japanese suppliers, and prodded them to build their own sup-
plier transplants in North America. In 1990 there were at least 350 such 
Operations, virtually all of them non-union. Honda has worked hardest 
to establish itself on American soil. Nevertheless, according to a report by 
the Office for the Study of Automotive Transportation at the University 
of Michigan (Business Week, Nov. 18, 1991), American firms provided 
parts for only 16 % of the value of a Honda Civic in 1989, compared to 
the 38% worth of imported parts and the 26% delivered by U.S.-based 
Japanese suppliers.2 
A rigorous selection of workers and of suppliers is a basic prerequisite 
for the Operation of the Toyota production system, which all transplants 
try to implement more or less consistently. Great emphasis is put on cross-
training and flexible transfer of workers to different assignments. Man-
agement expects all workers to participate in the continuous improvement 
activities known as kaizen. For each Operation there is a standardized way 
of doing the work. This is mandatory and portrayed in instructive pictures 
- called programmed worksheets at Mazda - with the required time in 
seconds clearly displayed. Management encourages suggestions for im-
provements in the standardized methods of work, but does not permit 
individual adaptations and personal ways of doing the work. The em-
phasis on visibility and standardization is a typical feature of the Japanese 
system of production control. However, as reported in Automotive News 
(June 3, 1991), the transplants have not been able to implement the in-
spection-free methods supposedly working in Japan. At Toyota in Ken-
tucky, for example, inspectors have to fix problems in 10 percent of the 
cars, and at Honda's plant in Ontario a reject rate of 11 percent has been 
reported. 
A striking feature of all transplants is the strict factory discipline. A l l 
employees wear the company's uniform with their first names and the 
2 Many Japanese supplier firms who followed their customers abroad faced hard 
times in the U.S. According to a report from McKinsey published in 1991 (Au-
tomotive News, May 27,1991), profit margins at the supplier transplants were 
far below the Standards in Japan. One of the reasons was their difficulty in lo-
cating materials and subparts that met Japanese specifications. Another problem 
was that their customer only produced a limited, usually low-priced product 
line in America, whereas in Japan they could also deliver to the car-maker's 
higher-margin vehicles. 
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company's logo on it. Usually no deviation is allowed, except that wearing 
the cap may be voluntary indoors. Honda and Toyota, however, insist 
that employees wear the Company cap at all times. Attendance is carefully 
monitored. At Diamond Star, a worker gets two minus points if he or she 
is five minutes late. Six minus points during one year could result in 
dismissal. 
Transplants have abolished the title of Supervisor, though the function 
remains. New terms are now used, which vary from transplant to trans-
plant. Terms such as "group leader" and "coordinator" are intended to 
create positive and modern associations with team games and Coaching. 
The power of these revamped f oremen has not decreased but is reinforced 
compared to that of traditional Supervisors. The work force is organized 
in small groups led by team leaders, who work together with the teams 
and direct their quality control and kaizen activites. In most cases their 
power is insignificant compared to that of the group leader or coordinator. 
At Toyota in Kentucky the team leader and foreman are one and the same 
person, so the rank and file do not suffer from the ambiguities that are 
characteristic of most transplants. 
At the management level the transplants appear to be very hierarchical. 
The key positions are duplicated by a Japanese dispatchee working to-
gether with an American colleague. The de facto boss is Japanese. Nissan 
is an exception in this respect as Americanization has gone further here 
than at the other transplants. Nissan is the second oldest Japanese auto 
maker and was originally modelled after American car manufacturers. It 
seems to have retained some of its reliance on American management. 
2 . H O N D A IN O H I O - T H E FIRST A N D M O S T SUCCESSFUL TRANSPLANT 
Honda was the first Japanese Company to invest in the United States 
(Honda of America Manufacturing Inc. (HAM)). Its central Ohio complex, 
which started production in 1982, now produces 430,000 cars per year 
and employs 10,000 workers. The Honda Accord is made in Marysville, 
the oldest plant in the complex. Accord has for several years been the 
best-selling car in the U.S. The Honda Civic is manufactured in the East 
Liberty plant which started production in 1989. In the little village of 
Anna, not far from Marysville, Honda has constructed one of the world's 
most highly automated engine factories, which had been in Operation only 
one year at the time of our visit. 
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2.1. Employment and Personnel Policy 
Like all subsequent transplants, Honda had a large number of applicants 
to choose from when it started its first car plant. The first core group of 
100 was selected from among 3,000 job-seekers. Honda's personnel officer 
maintained that they do not weed out people in the same way as at Toyota 
in Georgetown. In his view Honda attempts to create well-functioning 
teams, whereas Toyota chooses the individuals with the best test results. 
Honda commends itself on having a more relaxed atmosphere and a 
workplace that is less characterized by aggressive careerism and competi-
tiveness than at Toyota. 
At H A M everybody wears cap and uniform. There are no indications 
of rank on the jacket, only the person's first name. Employees are awarded 
points for contributions, such as making suggestions for improvements, 
high quality work, and protection and safety work. To start circles of co-
workers on matters of quality, productivity, team spirit, safety issues, etc. 
also leads to the award of points. The highest reward, given to those who 
have participated most in voluntary activities (Voluntary Involvement 
Program - VIP), is 5,000 points. This is worth a Honda car and a trip for 
two anywhere in the world. Judging from the interviews, model workers 
seem to choose to travel to Japan. 
2.2. Military Style Organization of Work? 
Work Organization at the engine plant had a strongly collectivist, quasi-
military appearance. Many departments in the production process 
marked their collective identity with signs, banners, display cases or other 
information materials." You are now entering the best aluminium foundry 
in the world." "Here you can see the progress we have made since the 
start of X-campaign." When a team started its shift, members gathered in 
a group to listen to a summary of the day's tasks by the team leader. He 
used a microphone to talk to them for five or ten minutes. At the end of 
the shift, workers were not allowed to go to the changing rooms individu-
ally. The team assembled at its special Information point in the Workshop, 
before trooping together to the changing rooms. Insistence on uniform 
wearing contributed to the military impression. In some sections of the 
Workshop helmets were mandatory, in others the Company cap. No pro-
duction employees were allowed to wear decorations on their uniforms; 
wrist watches and rings were also prohibited. Management argued that 
this was to protect the engines from damage. Thus there was very little 
freedom of individuality and personal expression. Early reports from the 
car plant in Marysville (for example, in Washington Monthly, July-Aug. 
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1986) conveyed a picture of very high work intensity and considerable 
risks of work injuries. The pace on a manual line, which we observed in 
the engine plant, confirmed this view. Nevertheless, an attempt in 1985 
by UAW to organize the plant was a dismal failure. 
2.3. Discrimination Against Minorities - and American Managers? 
One of the important reasons Honda chose Marysville, Ohio, for its loca-
tion was that the Japanese appreciated the stable rural Community of Ger-
man-Americans. They represented a white population group that Honda 
managers trusted, whereas they were very sceptical toward urban blacks. 
To avoid minority job applications they stipulated that only people living 
within a 30-mile radius of the small town of Marysville could apply to 
Honda. This excluded residents of Columbus, a medium-sized city with 
a large black population. As a result the proportion of minorities was 
remarkably low, only about 4 percent of Honda's work force. This has led 
to accusations of racial discrimination and to court cases that Honda lost. 
Now the Company has to recruit from a larger area, but most jobs have 
already been filled. 
Another area of dissent has been the positions and prospects of Amer-
ican managers. In spite of Honda's long Operation in the U.S. there are 
still several hundred Japanese dispatchees working as advisors. They al-
ways seem to be right, and their word weighs more heavily than that of 
the Americans. This is a widely held opinion at least among the Americans 
who have left key positions at Honda, feeling that an American never 
becomes a füll member of the management team. As a response to this 
criticism Honda has started a programme of sending groups of American 
engineers to Japan for periods of two to three years. The stated objective 
is to enlarge their promotion possibilities and make the American Opera-
tion more self-reliant. According to the Japanese labour economist Inuoe 
Shozo, interviewed in Automotive News (July 8,1991), this programme is 
another way for Honda to tighten control over its U.S. Operation, not 
relinquish it. 
American suppliers form a third discontent category. Many have tried 
to improve their Performance in order to comply with the exacting Ja-
panese demands on quality, cost and delivery. What has come as an un-
welcome surprise for many suppliers, however, is that the Japanese do 
not provide particularly specific or unambiguous Orders. The Japanese 
customer maintains he has not received what he has ordered, while the 
American supplier defends himself by saying he never received such a 
request. (For a reader of Shoichiro Sei's contribution to this volume, the 
plight of the American suppliers will come as no surprise.) In late 1990, 
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Honda was featured in the mass media as a warning example of how the 
Japanese treat their American suppliers. They were accused in the Wall 
Street Journal (Oct. 9,1990) of systematically outmaneuvering the Ameri-
can supplier to favour the Japanese. Honda has refuted the allegations of 
discrimination. It has promised that all suppliers who cooperate and par-
ticipate in development wil l find Honda an excellent Company to supply. 
Honda was the first auto maker to invest in a transplant and has be-
come a prototype for the other Japanese auto manufacturers. H A M ' s 
success is irrefutable and impressive, but the Company has also been criti-
cized for its recruitment policies, promotion practices and supplier selec-
tion. Hitherto, management response has implied only minor adaptations, 
most notably in recruitment practice. Growth and expansion continue. 
Recently, Honda has announced an increased commitment to conduct 
product development in the United States. 
3 . TOYOTA I N GEORGETOWN, K E N T U C K Y - H O N D A ' S PRINCIPAL JAPANESE 
RTVAL 
In the countryside outside Georgetown, Kentucky, Toyota is erecting the 
second largest transplant complex in North America, comprising both car 
and engine production. The first cars rolled off the line in 1989. Initially, 
Toyota was very sceptical about the possibility of transferring its produc-
tion system to the U.S., which it viewed as decaying both industrially and 
in terms of its educational system. To minimize the risks and costs Toyota 
decided to team up with G M in the NUMMI-joint venture in California, 
which used a refurbished G M plant. This UAW-organized Operation 
started in 1984 and was an immediate success. For Toyota it was only the 
beginning. In the future, the Company was determined to go alone and 
non-union, and with a carefully selected greenfield site. 
3.1. Hard Fighting Unionists - Among the Construction Workers 
The surroundings of the Toyota plant in Kentucky are rural. Its neighbours 
are stud-farms. Kentucky, "the Bluegrass State", is best known for horse 
breeding. Lexington, the city closest to Georgetown, is famous as the 
world capital of the horse trade. Toyota has set up an Organization of 
Kentucky suppliers, which is called the Bluegrass Automotive Manufac-
turers' Association (BAMA). In the early 1980s, the local press accused 
Kentucky governor Martha Layne Collins of "losing" the location com-
petition for GM's Saturn plant to Tennessee. Collins was quite determined 
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to capture Toyota. She travelled to Japan several times and assembled an 
incentive package that made Kentucky the best alternative for Toyota. In 
December 1985 Toyota accepted the offer. The plant was constructed by 
non-union companies. Further State support, in the form of additional tax 
abatements extracted from Kentucky taxpayers, led local opinion to turn 
against Toyota. The Company faced several lawsuits for damages. In the 
end Toyota backed down and agreed, among other concessions, to use 
unionized firms. 
When the plant started it was very successful in applying Toyota's 
elaborate production control methods. In 1990 Georgetown had the sec-
ond-highest quality level of any auto plant in North America - second 
only to Toyota's Canadian plant in Cambridge, Ontario. That year the 
construction of a second car plant commenced. When it is completed in 
1994, Georgetown will produce 440,000 cars and 300,000 engines a year 
and be a miniature version of the Toyota city production complex in Japan. 
In the new expansion phase Toyota has been eager to avoid the public 
relation mistakes of the 1980s. Unionized construction workers have been 
employed from the very start. However, the 3,500 plant employees are 
not unionized and UAW has made no significant attempt to organize 
them. 
3.2. Team Toyota 
Toyota refers to its Georgetown work force as "Team Toyota". In the selec-
tion process employees' educational background, as measured by tradi-
tional achievement indicators such as grades, is not important. This pro-
vides a chance for people who did not do very well at school but who are 
ambitious and want to succeed. At the time of our visit we got a daunting 
picture of the tough screening-out process. First, all applicants took an IQ 
test. The half with lower scores was eliminated. Then manual dexterity 
was tested, and again people with poor scores were eliminated. Tests of 
ambition, initiative and creativity followed. Role playing to test group 
orientation and adaptability was also used to weed out candidates. This 
resulted in a work force aggressively orientated toward achievement. 
Workers compete not only to be the best as a group, but also to advance 
their individual ambitions. In a lean Organization this is a dilemma, as 
there are not many steps on the career ladder. The ambitious employee 
is easily disappointed if he or she must remain at the same level with the 
same pattern of work rotation, year after year. Toyota has only been in 
Georgetown for three years. There is a distinct risk that people wil l quit 
and find more challenging and demanding work elsewhere, once the ex-
citing expansion phase is concluded. 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
Both perfectionism and discipline were evident at the Toyota plant. It 
may be hard to identify what exactly creates such a feeling, but some 
examples follow: Everything we saw was extremely clean and well or-
ganized. Most people walked so fast that they were almost running. They 
greeted each other quickly and with military respect. 
Toyota has proceeded from collaboration with G M and the UAW at 
N U M M I to refining its own system at the Kentucky complex. The Com-
pany has been extremely selective in its choice of employees and has the 
most pronounced elitism of all the transplants. Only the best is good 
enough for Team Toyota. Supplier circles talk about Toyota with a com-
bination of fear and admiration. Toyota's resources are several times 
greater than those of the other Japanese companies. Now it is going all 
out in its exclusivist transplant strategy. In all probability it wi l l succeed, 
at the cost of other companies both American and Japanese. 
4 . N I S S A N , TENNESSEE - VICTORY OF A N T I - U N I O N STRATEGIES 
After Honda, Nissan is the most international of Japan's auto companies. 
As early as 1966, the Company built a plant in Mexico. By the end of the 
decade some form of local production facility had been established in 21 
countries. In the U.S. Nissan Stands out as the most Americanized firm. 
The other companies employ hundreds of Japanese managers and advi-
sors in their transplants - after more than a decade Honda is still Staffing 
all central decision making positions with Japanese. Nissan is almost 
completely run by Americans, though the CEO (chief executive officer) 
has always been Japanese. Company uniform is not mandatory, nor is 
participation in quality circles or morning aerobics. 
In the early 1950s Nissan in Japan was a leader in destroying the radical 
auto workers' trade union movement. Nevertheless, the Company union 
subsequently established at Nissan had a stronger position than its equiv-
alents at Toyota and Honda, which meant that rationalization at Nissan 
could not go as far as at Toyota. In the early 1980s a tougher new man-
agement forced the union to back down, which created considerable ten-
sion. When planning its investment in the U.S., Nissan was determined 
not to make any allowances for American unions and appointed 
managers, mostly recruited from Ford, who were outspokenly anti-union. 
The establishment of Nissan in Smyrna, about 20 miles from Nashville 
(a centre in the "Biblebelt"), was announced in 1980. Three years later 
production of a carefully chosen, easily built product, a small pick-up 
truck, started. In 1985 production of a small passenger car, the Sentra, was 
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added. At the time of our visit the Company had 3,900 employees produc-
ing 250,000 vehicles a year. Various Services and maintenance jobs were 
outsourced. There are plans to start production in 1992 of a second pas-
senger car, the Stanza. This would increase the totals to 440,000 vehicles 
and 5,500 employees. Compared to other transplants, the Smyrna facility 
is unusually spacious. Final assembly is completely manual and very flex-
ible: on the fast-moving conveyor belt both cars and trucks are assembled. 
In the anti-union State of Tennessee the average production worker 
earned $6 per hour in 1990. Nissan paid $12-15 per hour. From the start 
the Company also took great pains to promote a new work culture: team 
spirit, Cooperation, trust, an open door policy, commitment circles to dis-
cuss problems, and job security. This provided Nissan with considerable 
Publicity. Almost 200,000 applied for 3,000 advertised jobs! The opportu-
nity for careful selection was great. Among other things, applicants had 
to participate in an unpaid training programme of between 40 and 200 
hours before being hired, in order to give the Company better opportuni-
ties for making its selection. In 1984 Nissan was listed among the 10 best-
run companies in Fortune and was included in the book The Best 100 Com-
panies to Work For in America. When the Company advertised 150 additional 
jobs at the end of 1988, there were 20,000 applicants. 
By then the plant was exposed to a fair amount of criticism in both the 
local and the national press. The main issues raised were the pace of work, 
the high risk of injuries and the difficulties faced by injured workers in 
finding easier jobs. Articles in The Progressive and In These Times suggested 
that the Company had on several occasions fired employees after injuries 
made it impossible for them to work at top speed. According to an inter-
view in The Progressive (June 1987) this was Company policy: 
As soon as people are injured they have no use for them, says Hardin 
(a former foreman). You take the best employee, a hard worker with 
a good attitude, and, say, an elbow goes out from overwork. TheyTl 
say 'Get him the hell outta here'. It is hard for me to believe it, but 
I have seen it. 
In early 1988, the UAW began a campaign to organize the plant. This 
campaign, which is described in detail by Gelsanliter (1990) continued 
until July 1989, when, despite considerable effort, it ended in a shattering 
defeat for the union. Why did it fail so decisively? One important reason 
was the carefully selected work force with its relatively high wages and 
employment benefits (sick-pay, pensions, etc.). Another reason was that 
the Company was able to offer job security. This was very important for 
the employees who had watched one UAW-organized G M plant after the 
other close down during the 1980s. Not even during the large drop in 
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sales in 1988, when tens of thousands of unsold cars cluttered the parking 
lot, were any workers laid off. Right in the middle of UAW's organizing 
campaign in 1989, Nissan announced plans to expand production. Ac-
cording to the Company this would not be of any use to the people of 
Tennessee if the UAW won the election. Then the jobs would go to laid-off 
U A W members from other states, just as had happened at GM's neigh-
bouring Saturn plant! (Management glossed over the crucial difference: 
that Nissan, unlike G M , did not have laid-off workers in any other State!) 
The "soft" contracts the UAW had signed with Mazda-Fiat Rock and Toy-
ota at N U M M I in order to be more attractive to the Japanese were also 
exploited in Tennessee as arguments against unionization. For instance, 
a leaflet quoted an article on Mazda, "The high number of injuries among 
workers at Mazda in Michigan raises fundamental questions", and com-
mented: "Look what UAW did for them". The Company paper Nissan 
News challenged workers to ask union Organizers why " N U M M I em-
ployees, who are represented by the UAW, regard their work as eight 
hours of tough aerobics"? After the union's defeat, Nissan fired many 
union activists, according to information from the UAW in Detroit. 
According to the book The Machine That Changed the World (Womack et 
al.1990), the Smyrna plant is both the most American of the Japanese 
transplants and the least productive. The continued expansion neverthe-
less indicates optimism and self-confidence. In Tennessee Nissan is still 
an attractive employer. "People could kill to get a job there," said the 
woman who drove us to the plant in a taxi from Nashville. 
5. M A Z D A - THE JAPANESE TRANSPLANT I N DETROIT 
Mazda is the fourth largest of the Japanese auto makers, with headquar-
ters in Hiroshima. The plant that is closest to being a prototype for Fiat 
Rock is in Hofu, a few miles outside Hiroshima. The Company has tried 
to compensate for its limited size by entering several alliances. Its most 
important partner is Ford. 
5.1. Sweeping Promises... 
Like Toyota in the N U M M I case, Mazda chose a brown-field site for its 
first American plant. The facility in Hat Rock is located outside Detroit, 
in an old steel and car district in decline. During the 1970s, a large Ford 
factory in Fiat Rock had employed 5000 workers. In 1982 it was shut 
down. Two years later Mazda started the construction work on its new 
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plant. The UAW, under the leadership of President Owen Bieber, ne-
gotiated an unconventional contract, under which Mazda got virtually a 
free hand to deploy workers according to production needs, as perceived 
by management. The UAW hoped to use Fiat Rock as a precedent when 
approaching the non-organized transplants. 
Many were surprised that Mazda dared to establish itself in the heart-
land of the American auto industry. The company's collaboration with 
Ford is probably an important part of the explanation. A section of the 
plant produces Ford cars whose suppliers were primarily staffed by UAW 
members. If the Company chose an anti-union strategy like Nissan, a good 
deal of trouble might crop up in the future. The State of Michigan, where 
politicians in the mid-1980s were fairly desperate after many plant clos-
ings, particularly among auto makers, also offered Mazda very significant 
economic incentives including a 100 percent tax abatement for its first 12 
years. 
Mazda was able to select its 3,000 employees from among 95,000 ap-
plicants. This enabled the Company to set up very clear search profiles for 
the kind of employees wanted. They should be intelligent and physically 
strong, preferably also young with many years to go before reaching re-
tirement, thus moving the payment of pension benefits far into the future. 
Employees should also be highly motivated to work for a Japanese Com-
pany, outgoing, and group-oriented. Under no circumstances should they 
be critical or complaining, according to the battery of tests used to select 
the finest work force. To the surprise of the Japanese, a remarkable number 
of women passed the tests with high scores. Part of the explanation was 
found in the tests of group work and group orientation: the ability to listen 
and encourage others to contribute to a common Solution is more typical 
among women than among men. The employees chosen constituted an 
elite group of strong and positive people. In the autumn of 1990, when 
the atmosphere had deteriorated considerably compared to the produc-
tion start in 1987, every one we talked to still agreed that there were many 
wonderful people at Fiat Rock. 
At the start the Company provided employees with orientation courses 
and many training sessions. Efforts were made to create a broad ränge of 
competence so that in principle each worker could work at most stations. 
Only two job classifications were applied: production and maintenance. 
The skilled workers were in the maintenance teams. In the production 
teams there were virtually no employees with former experience in the 
auto industry. Many of them came from the retail trade or the fast food 
chains, and at Mazda their incomes were two or three times higher than 
previously. The orientation programmes from the period before produc-
tion start-up created the expectation that Mazda would be an ideal work-
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place. Everybody would be able to learn and develop at work. Human 
relations at the workplace would be just that, human, and characterized 
by mutual trust and consideration. 
5.2. ... Which Mazda Failed to Keep 
When expansion began, the promises proved not to be worth much. This 
was particularly true of the rapid work pace when the plant changed from 
one to two shifts in mid-1988. During that hot summer the lack of suffi-
cient Ventilation in the plant was a grave problem. Many employees col-
lapsed. Management allowed no drinks or water coolers on the premises. 
Many employees feit this showed that flexibility was a one-way street, 
meant to promote Company interests. When employees' interests were at 
stake, the Company showed itself to be utterly rigid. 
A much-detested policy has been the difficulty of informing one's family 
about overtime work. Many employees are Single mothers who think their 
children ought to be told what time their mother is coming home. Company 
management has replied that parental concerns are not a Company priority. 
In some periods working hours have been very long and overtime has been 
ordered at very short notice. The union considered the plant heavily under-
staffed. Earnings are higher, but so is wear and tear due to the fast work pace. 
Another source of dissent at Hat Rock was the existence of a second-class 
work force, called the Support Member Pool, consisting of temporary work-
ers hired during production peaks. They did not receive proper training and 
had no job security. If, for some reason, team leaders were dissatisfied with 
them, they were never called back to work again; this was a blow as most of 
them were otherwise virtually unemployed. Despite these conditions, they 
were union members and had to pay union fees. 
According to documents quoted in the Detroit Free Press (July 7,1990), 
the rate of injury was three to four times higher at Mazda in 1988 than at 
traditional auto factories in Michigan. Management has not denied the 
figures but has argued that most of the reported injuries could be ac-
counted for by the inexperience of the employees and were not very se-
rious. The union was of the opinion, however, that many of the reported 
injuries caused irreversible musculo-skeletal disorders that would hand-
icap many employees for the rest of their working lives. In 1988 Mazda 
reported 97 cases of repeat or cumulative trauma disorders, and the fol-
lowing year 95 cases. In 1990 the number feil to "only" 60 cases. Mazda 
attributed the decrease to its ergonomics programme, including installa-
tion of stabilizers and reaction bars to absorb torque shock. According to 
union representatives, however, the main reason for the falling number 
of reported cases was company-induced fear and intimidation. The 
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Detroit press (Automotive News, Dec 9, 1991) cited a number of cases in 
which injured workers had been fired. 
Mazda has received a great deal of bad publicity. The promised mutual 
trust has turned into distrust. "They promised us a rose garden. They 
gave us a desert," was the succinct comment made by the new president 
of the UAW local, Phil Keeling. The question is whether Mazda really is 
worse than the other transplants. Perhaps the Company is simply more 
visible. The plant is located in Detroit, where lay-offs in the auto industry 
have had catastrophic consequences. Many inhabitants of the city have 
mixed feelings about a nearby Japanese car factory. The local press is 
knowledgeable about the auto industry and has had good reason for strin-
gent coverage of Mazda. 
5.3. Union Politics at Mazda 
The plant started with a very cooperative, not to say acquiescent, union 
leadership put in place by the UAW regional Organization. But as a con-
sequence of rapidly growing worker resentment of the new management 
methods, the first local elections resulted in a much more militant leader-
ship. At the time of our visit (November 1990) the new president had 
recently been re-elected and was feverishly preparing for the negotiations 
of a new contract. Some time later, 90% of the workers voted to give this 
leadership the right to call a strike if negotiations stalled. The new Mazda 
contract was finalized in March 1991 and is interesting as the first case in 
which a union, with strong membership Support, has been able to modify 
the "lean production principles". In the 1992 contract negotiations at Di-
amond Star and CAMI, the two other unionized transplants not from 
Detroit, this contract will be an important reference point. The most sig-
nificant novelties of the 1991 Mazda contract were: 
- Advance notice to the union regarding the introduction of new 
technology, including changes in plant layout and work processes; 
- more union influence in Company decisions about the outsourcing 
of work and the use of outside contractors; 
- major improvements of the union's position regarding health and 
safety, such as the establishment of a written health and safety grie-
vance procedure, the addition of an additional full-time health and 
safety representative and a full-time ergonomics representative, a 
Joint ergonomics training programme and union access to informa-
tion such as Symptoms surveys, etc.; 
- elimination of the Support Member Pool, and strict rules for em-
ploying temporary workers in the future. 
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It is not atypical for an American (or Canadian) union to agree to a weak 
first contract in order to establish collective bargaining. The intention is 
to make incremental gains as strength is built up in the local union. The 
second contract with Mazda illustrates this strategy. 
6. D I A M O N D STAR - P A R A D O X OF AUTOMATION A N D UNDERSTAFFING 
Diamond Star (DMS) in Illinois is an independent Company jointly owned 
by Mitsubishi and Chrysler. The contract was signed in 1985 and three years 
later the plant went into production. In 1990 3,000 employees produced 
150,000 cars, still some way from the plant's füll production capacity of 
240,000 cars per year. The 2,300 production workers were local, i.e., they 
lived in Normal-Bloomington and the surrounding areas. Management's 
make-up was different: there were Chrysler employees, Mitsubishi dis-
patchees and managers employed by DMS. Fifty Japanese were per-
manently stationed in Normal, but their number increased to several 
hundred in periods of major changes, for example, when new models were 
introduced. Mitsubishi is solely responsible for developing the products, 
equipment and management. Like Mazda, Mitsubishi is in a lower class 
than Japan's Big Three, Toyota, Nissan and Honda. The Company is backed 
by huge resources, though, as a member of the mighty Mitsubishi group, 
one of the major Japanese conglomerates. Due to Chrysler 's economic prob-
lems, Mitsubishi probably will acquire the whole Joint venture. 
6.1. A Robot Wonderland? Production Design with Blind Automation 
The advanced technology of the factory reflects Mitsubishi's high-tech pro-
file. The philosophy is to enforce very stringent tolerance Standards from 
the beginning by eliminating the possibility of subsequently adjusting and 
adapting the equipment and products. Automatic welding occurs 
"blindly", i.e. without the help of a vision system to fit the parts together and 
control the process. Four reference holes on the body determine exact posi-
tions in both the body and assembly shops. The trim and final shop at Dia-
mond Star is the most automated of all the Japanese transplants, with a total 
of 106 robots of which only 5 were equipped with a vision system. Many 
robots are located directly on the line, next to manual Operations. According 
to our host (a Chrysler manager), much ofthe equipment was unnecessarily 
complex and expensive, and the robots were not always reliable in high-
speed Operations. Despite the investments in automation, manual work 
predominated also in the final assembly of the DMS plant. It seemed to be 
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as stressful there as in the other transplants, with long sections of overhead 
manual work that was not ergonomically adaptable and a narrow car body 
that made work inside the compartment very uncomfortable. 
6.2. Employment Policies and Work Organization 
As at all new auto plants in the United States, many people applied for 
work at DMS, 80,000 for just over 2,000 jobs. A firm was hired to do the 
initial Screening, basic intelligence and dexterity tests, evaluation of apti-
tude for work in a group and a check on drug abuse. Just to participate 
in these tests, applicants had to make three separate trips to the testing 
firm. Those who passed this hurdle were closely interviewed by managers 
at DMS, who were involved in the selection process only after the number 
of applicants was substantially reduced. Employment started with 10 
days of "orientation and indoctrination", to quote our host from the 
Chrysler Task Force. During the first three months applicants worked on 
a trial basis, and only after that the permanent employees were selected. 
There were five levels in the Organization: production team, group 
leader, branch manager, shop manager, plant manager. Process engineers 
organized procurement and equipment development, but there were no 
industrial engineers to balance the lines, conduct time-and-motion stu-
dies, etc. This was done by the first-line managers, the group leaders, who 
played a very central role. To the Outsider management Stresses the im-
portance of team Organization. According to the union, however, its prac-
tical relevance is minor as team leaders continuously have to work on the 
lines because of the staff shortages. This has made it impossible to rotate 
the task of leader in the team, which allegedly was the original intent. As 
at other transplants, demands for "no-fault attendance" are stringent, and 
the uniform is mandatory. As at Mazda, one of the union's struggles was 
over workers' desire not to have to wear caps. 
6.3. An Increasingly Critical Union 
Collaboration with Chrysler meant that Mitsubishi, like Suzuki at CAMI, 
had to accept union presence at the plant. In a short time the new UAW 
local was well organized, and in April 1990 it started publishing an in-
formative and often very critical membership newsletter, Union Spirit. 
A n y expression of a new harmony (wa) of the type often ascribed to Ja-
panese plants was difficult to trace when we interviewed two of the 
union's leaders, Don Shelby and Terry Bolte. In August 1989 the first con-
tract with the Company was signed. During the following year, workers 
submitted nearly 500 complaints about contract violations. Such grie-
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vances either led to a settlement or would go for external arbitration, a 
process that could take several years. The contract was written in vague 
terms and gave the Company great freedom to use the work force as it 
sees fit, in contrast to traditional UAW contracts. Don Shelby and Terry 
Bolte explained this as follows: 
Last year, when we were negotiating the first contract, people told 
us not to be intransigent. The main thing was the jobs and the em-
ployment security. They wanted to believe in the Company, just as 
we did. Today the attitude is altogether different. People do not trust 
the Company any more, even if they teil the truth. 
According to the chairman, a constant staff shortage and constant 
demands for overtime and extra effort have been the most serious bones 
of contention. Personnel shortages in this most highly automated trans-
plant appear paradoxical, but not to Japanese management and its ration-
alization policies. The 1989 contract gives the Company the right to 
demand two hours' overtime per day, but the contract also stated that 
management should give employees one day's advance warning if 
possible. According to Don Shelby and Terry Bolte, however, Orders for 
overtime were generally given on the same day, often only half-an-hour 
before the normal working shift was due to end. This created great un-
certainty for the employees: 
They talk a lot of flexibility, but it is a one way street. It is always 
the workers who are supposed to be flexible, never the Company. 
Sometimes the Company persuaded workers to work double shifts, i.e., 
two shifts in a row, in order to reach production targets without increasing 
the number of employees. In late 1990, management announced that 100 
new employees would be hired, which the union regarded as a victory. 
This did not reduce other kinds of complaints, however. Skilled trades 
workers in particular were angered by the company's efforts to keep the 
maintenance employees at a minimal level by contracting out work. DMS 
had only about 200 maintenance workers, a surprisingly low figure con-
sidering the amount of complicated equipment. Skilled workers perceived 
the outcontracting as a means of using cheap, unorganized labour to per-
form bargaining unit work without having to hire more trades people or 
Upgrade production employees. 
The company's stringent attendance programme was also on the 
union's list of constantly recurring problems. A system of warnings was 
used which led to a successively growing number of minus points. When 
in the 5.0-5.5 ränge an employee is at risk; 6 points means dismissal. 
According to the union the Company accepted virtually no excuses. If, for 
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example, a man worked a double shift and then arrived late for his ordi-
nary shift, he got a warning. The same happened if an employee went 
into hospital on a weekend and remained there on Monday without in-
forming the Company. 
In November 1990, after less than two years in Operation, 50-60 em-
ployees were in the risk zone, and some had already been fired. The Com-
pany had tried to dismiss more, but the union had managed to negotiate 
Jtheir re-employment. Over 200 grievances dealing with the company's 
policy of demanding no-fault attendance were reported during the fall of 
1990 alone. 
Don Shelby and Terry Bolte also thought general ergonomic issues -
uncomfortable working postures, risks of injury and cumulative trauma 
disorder - were likely to become an increasingly important problem 
which would probably be taken up in the next contract negotiations in 
1992. At the time of our visit the number of worker compensation Claims 
for injuries and accidents at the factory was about the same as for the 
industry as a whole. Considering the young age and careful selection of 
the work force, this figure appears to be high. The Company has invested 
large sums in advanced technology, while Investments in ergonomic 
measures have been remarkably modest. 
Union experiences with the Japanese system of management and plant 
Operation at Diamond Star were very similar to what we found at Mazda: 
staff shortages, Orders to work overtime on short notice, relentless demands 
on attendance. Mazda established itself in a traditional auto region. The 
development of a strong union consciousness there, despite the company's 
careful Screening process, can hardly be surprising. What was unexpected 
was the speed with which it developed. DMS in Normal is, however, on a 
greenfield site and has a considerably higher level of technology. It is re-
markable that its union experiences are so similar to Mazda's, and that both 
differ so drastically from the usual impression people have of Japanese 
companies' harmonious and progressive conditions of work. 
7. C A M I - JAPANESE M A N A G E M E N T MEETS THE C A N A D I A N U N I O N 
CULTURE 
C A M I is a Canadian Joint venture owned by Suzuki and G M , and located 
in Ingersoll, Ontario. As in other Joint venture transplants, the Japanese 
provide the technology and products. In Japan, Suzuki belongs to the 
third division among auto makers, but is established as a specialist man-
ufacturer of small cars and four-wheel-drive Sport Utilities. C A M I pro-
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duces a subcompact automobile and a sport utility, which are sold through 
General Motors and Suzuki's different outlets. In 1986, G M and Suzuki 
signed the contract, and three years later production started. For G M the 
CAMI Operation is a Strategie learning experience in cost-effective small 
car manufacturing, flexible assembly, team Organization and the manage-
ment of employee Suggestion programmes, which have been very 
successful at C A M I . In the end of 1990 C A M I added a second shift. By 
that time the plant employed 1,700 workers, of whom only 85 were in 
skilled trades. This is a very small number, considering the advanced 
technology in the body and press shops. Like other Joint venture trans-
plants, the C A M I plant is unionized. The Canadian Autoworkers Union, 
CAW, has a reputation for militancy. Thus it was of particular interest 
during our visit to C A M I to see whether employment policies, plant man-
agement and the local contract differed significantly from those at U.S. 
transplants. 
7.1. Organization in Teams 
Throughout the plant workers were organized into about 200 teams. Man-
agement appointed the team leaders. Foremen and team leaders were 
responsible for gathering employees to reassign work when the pace in-
creased. In the team areas, there were reviews of each member's com-
petence in various tasks, improvement Suggestion statistics for each in-
dividual (there was an informal quota of five per month) as well as at-
tendance sheets in which each individual was listed. The target was per-
fect attendance. Not all the teams filled in these attendance sheets. In a 
handbook received by all union members, the union adopted a disap-
proving attitude towards public display of individual attendance statis-
tics. 
When the plant started production in 1989 it was easy to recruit and 
select the 1,100 workers needed. The recruitment of the second shift 
turned out to be more difficult. Rumors of the extensive Screening process 
had led to negative reactions, so the Company was forced to employ some 
people it had rejected in the first instance. New employees got a four-day 
introduction with a review of the CAMI system, kaizen, etc. The rest of 
their training occurred on the job. The work pace was rapid, particularly 
in the assembly shop, and the Company demanded total concentration on 
the work. In line with this, CAMI managers had tried to prohibit all per-
sonal reading matter. This rule was modified in late 1990. The Company 
allowed personal reading materials in the recreation areas but not at the 
work stations. Management insisted on the uniform. One of the early 
labour conflicts concerned the mandatory cap, an issue on which man-
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agement was finally forced to back down, as had happened at Mazda. At 
the time of our visit, there was a conflict about the prohibition of wearing 
personal tokens on the uniforms. Two workers had put a flower pin (a 
poppy) on their uniforms to celebrate Remembrance Day, the anniversary 
of the signing of the cease-fire treaty that ended the First World War. On 
this day, people wear these pins all over Canada, in Stores, ticket Offices, 
etc. The Company sent these two workers home immediately but the union 
forced it to back down. This result was bad publicity for CAMI. 
7.2. Central Union Issues: Staffing and Overtime 
The union at CAMI, CAW Local 88, is young, and, like the corresponding 
DMS Local, it has rapidly built up a wide ränge of activities. To emphasize 
the new team spirit, CAMI wanted the union to share an office with the 
company's Labor Relations Department. During our visit one desk was 
still there, which the Company used to show visitors, according to Brian 
Clarke, the skilled trades representative. The real union work, however, 
had moved to another office, called the CAW Work Centre. 
Understaff ing and overtime regulation were among the most important 
union concerns during 1990. The union wanted to have a regulär overtime 
schedule while the Company continued to change the overtime assign-
ments at short notice, often on a daily basis. The problem of understaffing 
was on the union's agenda from the beginning. To emphasize its serious-
ness, the union encouraged employees to really use the andon system, 
particularly the red cords that stop the conveyor belts. Another reason for 
dissatisfaction was the company's stringent attendance policy. 
The physical work environment at C A M I was probably the best of those 
at any of the transplants, despite the deficiencies of the assembly shop. 
The high-tech, low-noise press shop was particularly impressive. Other-
wise the management system, personnel policies and Operation of the 
plant were of exactly the same kind as those of the transplants in the 
United States. Why, then, were the Canadian auto workers not more 
successful in affecting their conditions of employment and in winning a 
stronger contract than the UAW at Diamond Star, for example? The fol-
lowing background emerged at a seminar at the CAW office in Toronto: 
The agreement was signed as early as 1986. Suzuki made tough demands 
for a flexible contract. CAW had been formed the previous year and had 
a reputation for rrülitancy that the leadership wanted to tone down. The 
union preferred to come in and build up a local Organization and to im-
prove the contract gradually. Historical experience in Canada has shown 
that the first contract at a newly organized workplace is often thin, but 
can be developed subsequently. This approach is similar to what the UAW 
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has been able to do at Mazda. Further, when the contract was drafted, 
Canadian experience of Japanese management was limited. Some time 
later CAW adopted a Statement on the Reorganization of Work that is 
very critical of the Japanese management system. CAW at C A M I has sent 
a copy of this document to all its members. Local 88 has the objective of 
improving the contract considerably when the next series of negotiations 
take place in 1992. Among other things the union wants a more democratic 
team Organization with the opportunity for team members to replace team 
leaders in whom they have no confidence. 
In early 1990, CAW started a research project at CAMI, with the goal 
of documenting the plant over two years. Every six months the researchers 
interview a panel consisting of a large number of workers, team leaders 
and skilled trades people. This project will provide unique information 
on how conditions of work and attitudes to management and Organization 
develop once the "honeymoon" is over. The two first field studies were 
reported to a colloquium in Quebec in 1991 (see Huxley and Wareham 
1991). On the one hand, the researchers found a consistently high level of 
participation in Suggestion schemes (71% ofthe respondents in the second 
study) and a majority of workers supporting QC activites. On the other 
hand there was a deeply ambiguous assessment of the team concept. 
Workers appreciated the social qualities, but in the second round 41% of 
the interviewees thought teams were a way to get people to pressure one 
another, up from only 19% in the first field study. Also in the second round 
of Observation, the research team discerned a growing overall disillusion-
ment with C A M I philosophy: 78% of the interviewed workers argued that 
CAMI's "team plant" was a place where management still had all the 
power. 
8. " Y o u D O N T N E E D A U N I O N TO G O BACKWARDS" : TRANSPLANTS A N D 
U N I O N ATTITUDES IN THE U . S . A N D C A N A D A 
When Japanese companies began setting up in business in the U.S. in the 
early 1980s they worried about the American work force and the unions. 
They encountered an auto workers' union in decline, however, struggling 
with concession demands and lacking a cohesive strategy for the future. 
For the UAW, among the strengest of American unions, the decline had 
already begun in the 1970s when the auto industry began to farm out 
component manufacturing to non-unionized southern states. During the 
1980s union density in the component sector feil from 50 to 20 percent. 
The really heavy blow came with the deep recession in the early 1980s. 
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At the end of the 1970s, the UAW had over 1.5 million members. Ten years 
later, the number had dropped to just over 900,000. In the past, negotia-
tions had concentrated on which improvements companies would accept. 
During the crisis, under great pressure to give up some of the benefits 
won over the years, the union was forced to engage in concession bar-
gaining. This process seriously undermined auto workers' union con-
sciousness and weakened the general desire to join the union. To quote 
Sam Gindin, research director at CAW, which refused to accept this 
strategy: "You don't need a union to go backwards". Concession bargain-
ing also led to internal factions in the UAW. Action taken by union leaders 
against their opponents and the union's increasing bureaucratization re-
duced its wil l and ability to mobilize members, who were already 
weakened by the crisis. 
UAW - Centraily Resigned, Locally Militant 
The U A W in 1990 was a union pressed in on all sides and without a clear 
policy for dealing with transplants. Further, it did not appear to have a 
cohesive strategy for organizing the growing non-unionized sector. The 
UAW's research department in Detroit had very limited contacts with 
union locals and no analysis of the consequences of the transplants' poli-
cies on the employment conditions of American auto workers. This pas-
sivity at the national level contrasted sharply with the lively activity and 
critical analysis we encountered at the local branches in Fiat Rock and 
Normal. These were very isolated, however. At the time of our Visits, the 
unions at Mazda and Diamond Star had never met one another. The local 
organizations, the real pioneers, got no support from the national head-
quarters in transforming their experiences into a strategy that might 
strengthen members' rights on issues like the regulation of overtime, at-
tendance discipline, freedom at the workplace and a more democratic 
Organization of work. Not waiting for central initiatives, the unions at 
Mazda, C A M I and Diamond Star started to develop direct horizontal con-
tacts during 1991. The auto workers in Ingersoll and Normal were eager 
to learn from the experiences in Fiat Rock when preparing for contract 
negotiations due to take place in 1992. 
In the meantime, the UAW continued to hail N U M M I as a model for 
the future. This policy of meeting the Japanese with concessions, and 
avoiding an independent analysis and strategy vis-ä-vis the transplants 
so as not to aggravate the companies, has created two fundamental prob-
lems for the UAW. First, it impairs the basis for unionization in general. 
Nissan exploited this cleverly during the campaign in 1989: Why should 
you pay union dues if there are no important differences? Second, it 
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widens the rift that occurred in the union after the first round of conces-
sion bargaining. Union mobilization at Mazda, which started in 1988, was 
directed not only at management but with great bitterness also at the 
UAW and its official policy. The splits at local and regional levels have 
further weakened efforts to organize new workplaces. 
CAW - Centrally Critical, Locally Compromising 
In 1985, after several years of Opposition to concession bargaining, the 
CAW broke away from the UAW. In 1982, for example, the Canadians 
went on strike for better working conditions at Chrysler, which was seri-
ously affected by the crisis, despite persuasive UAW attempts to dissuade 
the Canadian union from taking this action. 
In Canada legal conditions for the labour movement are generally more 
favourable than in the U.S. The union density is twice as high (33 percent, 
as opposed to 18 percent). There is a fairly strong labour party (NDP) that 
won the 1990 elections in the most heavily populated province, Ontario. 
Considerably more social welfare policies exist, most notably a system of 
public health insurance. At the national level, CAW has been extremely 
critical of the Japanese system of management for example, a document 
adopted in 1989 contains formulations such as: 
We reject the use of Japanese Production Methods which rigidly es-
tablish work Standards and Standard Operations thereby limiting 
worker autonomy and discretion on the job. 
We reject the use of techniques such as Kaizen (pressure for continu-
ous 'improvement') where the result is speed-up, work intensifica-
tion and more stressful jobs. 
At the local level, as we have seen, the management system and labour 
relation policies at CAMI are generally similar to those at the transplants 
in the U.S. Sam Gindin, Head of the Research Department at CAW, 
pointed out, however, that the context is fundamentally different: 
The U A W regards N U M M I as exemplary and combats its critics. For 
us C A M I is a compromise, which we must improve. At N U M M I 
Toyota's inflexible attendance policy is regulated in the contract. The 
UAW cannot defend its members but has to run around to explain 
how important a perfect attendance record is. At CAMI, on the other 
hand, attendance policy is a Company rule and CAW can demand 
negotiations and in the final analysis file a grievance when manage-
ment takes disciplinary measures. The local Organization is part of 
a lively union structure, is criticized and learns from others, in that 
way building up positions for contract bargaining in 1992. 
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9. CONCLUSION: T H E N E E D FOR A POST-LEAN STRATEGY 
According to The Machine That Changed the World (Womack et al. 1990), 
Japanese or "lean production" is a blessing for everyone, resulting in great 
strides in productivity and quality as well as vastly superior working 
conditions compared to the "Fordist" model. A recent study of North 
American transplants (Florida and Kenney 1991) puts forward the same 
view of lean production as an unequivocally beneficial system. Our con-
clusion is less comforting. Lean production dissolves a number of the 
Fordist rigidities, but replaces them with new strains. The result is a 
deeply contradictory set of working conditions in the transplants. On the 
one hand, American workers find a number of advantages: 
1. Transplants offer substantially more job security than American 
companies. During the recession which started in 1991 they went to 
great lengths to avoid lay-offs. 
2. Their profile is significantly more egalitarian than traditional 
American plants with their conspicuous difference between white-
and blue-collar workers. 
3. The quality of the products is a central issue. Thus many of the 
workers feel justly proud of the achievements of their workplace. 
Management appreciates workers' proposals for improvements, 
even if it is interested primarily in suggestions to improve efficiency. 
4. They select personnel with great care and with a heavy emphasis 
on team-based problem-solving. Those who pass the Screening 
process feel proud of themselves and find it easy to cooperate. At 
the Mazda plant in Fiat Rock, employees regarded the high quality 
of the work force as one of the most positive features of the work. 
These positive aspects contrast with "the other side of the sword", the 
relentless demands of a minimally staffed production system: 
1. There is no regulation of work intensity. With the help of kaizen 
all slack is constantly eliminated. The object is both to utilize the 
work force to one hundred percent and to fester the "wi l l to further 
kaizen". According to this view, if the workers are occasionally able 
to read a magazine at work, the motive force to continually make 
proposals for improvements is destroyed. 
2. There are excessive demands for overtime work (except for reces-
sion times), often ordered at very short notice. In a fundamental 
sense, lean production is not free of buffers. Management uses its 
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far-reaching discretion to determine working hours to reach produc-
tion quotas irrespective of what happens during the day or on the 
shift. Regulated and shortened working hours are part of the clas-
sical Western reform tradition, especially in Europe. This is irrecon-
cilable with orthodox lean production. 
3. Japanese plants stress the importance of safety, to avoid accidents 
that can interrupt production. The intense pace and repetitiveness 
and the long working hours nevertheless lead to significant health 
risks, above all problems of repeat or cumulative trauma disorders 
(CTD). There is very little tolerance of such injuries. At Honda's en-
gine plant in Anna, management did not admit that this was a prob-
lem in any way related to conditions of production, but maintained 
it was entirely dependent on individuals. "There are weak and 
strong people. And there are right and wrong attitudes." 
4. By eliminating buffers, lean production increases management's 
dependence on employees and their contribution. This dependence 
on the work force is more than compensated for by the radically 
stringent factory regulation, reflected in mandatory uniforms, ex-
acting attendance demands, detailed codes of conduct and discip-
line, and the eumination of all personal attributes. In several trans-
plants, teams resembled platoons much more than the empowered 
shop floor groups associated with teamwork in the West. 
The Japanese auto companies have set new Standards for productivity, 
quality and rapid product development in modern mass production. The 
North American transplants have been remarkably successful in transfer-
ring their basic management principles to a non-supportive environment, 
so far with a minimum of adaptation. With an American auto industry in 
a permanent State of retreat, they seem to be invincible. Nethertheless, 
transplants do not represent "best practice" in all fields. They have 
changed the American environment, but they wil l also have to adapt and 
modify their own principles, especially when confronted with mobilized 
union workers. This process has already started. For European unions it 
is urgent to develop a strategy for "post-lean production", with a more 
democratic team Organization and less rigid forms of work and Perform-
ance demands. In this process they have much to learn from the American 
transplant experience and from the union locals striving to hurnanize Ja-
panese management principles. 
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SYSTEMIC RATIONALIZATION, SUBCONTRACTING 
STRATEGIES AND THEIR IMPACT ON LABOUR IN THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
Dieter Sauer 
ABSTRACT 
This paper examines developments in the subcontracting system of the German 
automobile industry which signify a fundamental transformation in industrial pro-
duction. In the attempt to achieve new forms of flexible mass production, strategies 
for reducing in-house production and new forms of integrated production and 
profit formation along production chains play a central role. Through the new re-
lationships that arise between buyers and suppliers, the Company areas of research 
and development, logistics, and quality assurance acquire Strategie importance be-
cause it is in these areas that processes for increasing productivity and exploiting 
productivity gains take place. This results in a new relation of autonomy and con-
trol between buyers and suppliers. 
In spite of the clear differences to the Japanese supplier industry, signs of a hier-
archization or pyramidization in the German supplier industry cannot be ignored. 
This results in ambiguous effects for the employees in the supplier industry: 
Segmentation and polarization characterize the development of work requirements 
and working conditions. 
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1. TOWARDS FLEXIBLE M A S S PRODUCTION 
This chapter deals with the change in subcontracting strategies in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). It is mainly based on empirical stu-
dies of rationalization processes in the automobile industry and its sub-
contractors which we have conducted at the Institute for Social Research 
(ISF), Munich, during the past few years. 
My deliberations will not centre on giving a detailed description of 
specific changes in the German subcontracting system. Rather I shall en-
deavour to point out general trends against the background of more ex-
tensive changes in the methods of industrial production. 
The assumption that forms of industrial production have been under-
going a process of transformation in capitalistic industrial nations since 
the beginning of the eighties is now widely accepted and serves as my 
point of departure. Against the background of shifting market structures, 
traditional Tayloristic-Fordistic methods of production have arrived at a 
crisis worldwide - they are no longer in a position to respond economi-
cally to increased pressure to enhance flexibility. 
We have used the term "systemic rationalization" to express the new 
strategies which attempt to resolve the contradiction between flexibiliza-
tion and cost reduction. Norbert Altmann gave a brief outline of the con-
cept of systemic rationalization in his chapter and the new forms of pro-
duction associated with it. 
Systemic rationalization is characterized in our conceptual frame-
work mainly by its double effect: The various Company functions and 
the individual processes of production and Service within a Company 
are reorganized under objectives drawn up for the Company as a whole; 
among other things this entails the incorporation and/or externalization 
of specific production areas and Company functions. The structures of 
the traditional division of labour between individual companies change 
and so do, therefore, the forms of their reciprocal relationships. Viewed 
from the perspective of the individual Company, the two factors of sys-
temic rationalization form a unity. They are an expression of an exten-
sion and reorientation of the production of surplus value in which at-
tention turns to the material integration of product lines and production 
chains in the value added chain. The conflict between flexibilization 
and cost reduction, which cannot be resolved in the Company by means 
of conventional technology and Organization, appears to be more 
manageable through the reorganization of supra-company relationships 
of production and through the employment of new manufacturing and 
control technologies. 
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Systemic rationalization does not lead to the abolition of mass pro-
duction but to new forms of flexible mass production. It is not a ques-
tion, therefore, of the "end of mass production" but of its reorganization; 
the new dominant principle is not that of flexible specialization but of 
flexible standardization. However, this process of transformation is not 
limited to the traditional area of mass production. Inter-company re-
structuring has an influence in particular on the relationship between 
large-scale companies and medium-sized industry, i.e. on relations to 
the many independent small and medium-sized companies which play 
a central role in certain sectors of German industry. This means that 
companies with classic small series production ranges are also inte-
grated in supra-company production networks and so are affected by 
systemic rationalization strategies. 
In companies such as those in the automobile industry - but not only 
there1 - which are confronted by complex and contradictory demands 
(high degree of technology-induced dynamism, wide ränge of models 
and large number of variants, increased complexity of products to be man-
ufactured and simultaneously rising pressure on costs), strategies for re-
ducing in-house production and for bringing about a fundamental re-
structuring of the inter-company relationships of exchange take on par-
ticular importance as factors of systemic rationalization. 
In the following section I shall use the example of the restructuring of 
buyer-subcontractor relationships in the German automobile industry to 
show the extent to which inter-company strategies of systemic rationali-
zation are already taking effect and which new forms of integrated pro-
duction and profit formation are taking shape along production chains 
and value added chains. My intention is to show the course this process 
of transformation takes, i.e. which mechanisms control it and which 
societal effects it has. Here the focus of attention will be the structural 
consequences for workers. 
Similarly I shall not draw any comparisons with developments in other 
countries. Instead I shall try, in my analysis of the German automobile 
industry, to dehne those structural factors of the changed strategies of 
capitalistic production which we consider generalizable across national 
boundaries, in the sense of a structural convergence as formulated by 
Norbert Altmann in his introduction. 
1 In studies we have conducted in other branches, e.g. in the German furniture 
industry, we have also discovered a trend toward intra-company rationalization 
(Deiß et al. 1989; Döhl et al. 1989). 
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2. N E W STRATEGIES OF INTEGRATED PRODUCTION A N D PROFIT FORMATION 
A L O N G THE PRODUCTION C H A I N 
In Germany, as elsewhere, there are signs of a change of strategy in buyer-
subcontractor relationships (Sydow 1991). In the middle of the eighties 
Piore and Säbel (1984:230) noted that: "West German firms are decentraliz-
ing internally, instead of dissolving into their supplier networks (the lim-
iting case in Italy) or functioning as assemblers of customized components 
(the limiting case in Japan)". Today, however, there are unrnistakable trends 
toward a fundamental restructuring of the subcontracting system. 
The empirical indicators have prompted various visions of the course 
of future development - many Interpret the combination of trends toward 
decentralization and the increasing use of Computer technologies as the 
start of a general break-up of large hierarchically structured Company 
complexes and as the further assertion of market economy principles. 
The quantitative side of this development is for the most part undis-
puted. Figures for the decrease in in-house production and for the growth 
rates in important sectors of the subcontracting industry in Germany 
prove this. What is disputed in the German discussion is the qualitative 
side of the change. What are the reasons for a decrease of in-house pro-
duction? What is the essence of the new relations between buyers and 
subcontractors? Are the general trends toward decentralization and the 
decrease of in-house production linked with any new cooperative buyer 
strategies that at the same time are safeguarding or even increasing sub-
contractor autonomy and which are leading to relationships based on 
partnership? Or - yet another position - are subcontractors becoming 
more and more dependent economically on buyers and is increasing in-
formation technology-based integration intensifying the control imposed 
by powerful buyers? 
Several reasons for a decrease in in-house production are offered in the 
current debate. Some say, for example, that the externalization of produc-
tion processes cuts costs. Others point out that such moves are undertaken 
mainly in order to increase market flexibility and to enable the costs of 
higher quantitative and qualitative flexibility to be passed on to subcon-
tractors. And, finally, a third group argues that subcontractors have a high 
level of product- and production-related know-how at their disposal and 
so are more likely to be capable of cost-effective manufacturing. The gist 
of all the different lines of argument is, therefore, that the decrease in 
in-house production in large companies permits them to lower their pro-
duction, development and transaction costs. No consideration is given as 
a rule to the fact that companies which reduce their in-house production 
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are also relinquishing some of the value-added levels that used to repre-
sent an important basis for their own creation of profit. 
Basically it canbe assumed that companies do not reduce their in-house 
production if their own profitability decreases; on the contrary they will 
take this step in an effort to ensure that their profitability is restored or 
improved. 
The point is to exploit the company's own market position in utilizing 
up- and downstream production stages so as to acquire gains in produc-
tivity via the processes of market mediated exchange not arising within 
the Company itself. The strategy in question is not that of "profit transfer" 
in the sense of a zero sum game, because a traditional market-induced 
relationship of control between buyers and subcontractors would suffice 
for this. Rather it is a strategy aimed at an all-round increase of produc-
tivity in internal and external areas of the Company and at the distribution 
of productivity gains thus achieved. 
This appears to have been overlooked by the authors of the MIT study 
(Womack et al. 1990). In their search for the intrinsic characteristics of lean 
production they limited themselves - at least in Germany - to factual 
characteristics (and even there very superficially), instead of considering 
underlying strategies. Changes in subcontracting relations are registered 
primarily on the level of the transfer of costs (e.g. storage costs) to sub-
contractors. There is hardly any mention of the more profound reorgani-
zation of subcontracting relations originating from the rationalization 
strategies of the automobile companies. Like many foreign scientists they 
have focused their attention above all on the large European sub-
contracting companies (e.g. Bosch in this volume) and their strategies. In 
doing so, they have not taken enough account of the active role of the 
automobile companies and of the relationship between large automobile 
companies and medium-sized subcontracting industries characteristic of 
the German subcontracting industry. Otherwise they could not have failed 
to notice that much of what is referred to as trend-setting in the coordi-
nation of the supply chain in lean production has long been practised in 
the German automobile subcontracting industry. Our empirical studies 
indicate, however, that this coordination does not usually take place in 
cooperative fashion and with mutual benefit, as is claimed to be the case 
in lean production. To be able to understand and explain the change of 
subcontracting relations it is crucial, as we see it, to proceed from the new 
rationalization strategies of the automobile companies. Only then will it 
be possible not just to analyze the strategies for decreasing in-house pro-
duction on the cost and price level - which is what most attempts at an 
explanation do - but also to include the underlying reorganization of 
production structures and associated interests. 
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Decreasing in-house production by applying a strategy of all-round 
productivity enhancement in internal and external areas of a Company 
seems to be possible only if, at the outset, the rationalization measures 
link the internal reorganization with influence over external processes. 
Precisely this is the essence of the double effect of systemic rationalization 
- profitability is obtained not only in the remaining internal areas of the 
Company but especially so in those areas that are externalized. 
What happens is that the subcontractors are not simply degraded to 
the function of extended workbenches but are conceded the right amount 
of autonomy necessary for them to organize their production processes 
to Optimum effect. At the same time, however, the subcontractor's 
economic, technical and organizational dependence on the buyer must be 
shaped in such a way as to enable "profit transfer" in the sense of a "shar-
ing" of productivity gains to proceed without appreciable losses due to 
conflicts. Later I shall consider in more detail the mechanisms by which 
this happens. 
A new relationship of autonomy and control crystallizes: As much au-
tonomy for the subcontractor to achieve maximum productivity, as much 
control to ensure maximum profit transfer. Such an ideal relationship be-
tween autonomy and control, from the buyer's point of view, does not 
arise from one day to the next. Some buyer companies seem to concentrate 
first on guaranteeing the profit transfer by applying rigid price pressure, 
in the manner of a zero sum game. Many subcontracting companies are 
unable to withstand the pressure. This greatly reduces the number of sub-
contractors and results in a market shake-out. Some buyer companies are 
already realizing, however, that price pressure alone is wasting consider-
able potential for productivity among subcontractors. Instead they are 
switching to using autonomy strategically by "supporting" subcontrac-
tors in their efforts to raise productivity. The purpose of such cooperative 
efforts - interpreted by many as a "partnership" - is to increase the extent 
of the productivity gains that can then be re-assimilated through a further 
intensification of price pressure. 
Structures comparable to those in the relationship between control and 
autonomy are also developing in the subcontractors' relations with their 
sub-suppliers. The independence of the direct subcontractors in their re-
lations to automobile companies is all the greater, the more successful 
they are at inducing their own sub-suppliers to increase productivity and 
at enabling a commensurate profit transfer. They, too, need to ensure the 
autonomy of their sub-suppliers to the extent that they remain on the 
market as a source of productivity gains. If the subcontractors manage in 
this way to pass the pressure from buyers further along the subcontracting 
chain, productivity gains will be transferred in reverse direction back to 
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the buyer through several value-added Steps. The relationship between 
autonomy and control differs in form, however, on the various levels of 
the subcontracting process: budding cooperative structures are more 
likely to be found on the first subcontracting level, particularly in the 
relationship between the buyer and large innovative direct subcontrac-
tors, while those forms based on the application of rigid price pressure 
coupled with strong one-sided lines of dependence are more likely to 
occur on the lower subcontracting levels. 
Systemic rationalization as a strategy of supra-company creation of 
surplus value is aimed at the optimization of production processes along 
the entire value-added chain. It is not content with a simple profit transfer 
from the small to the large companies via the medium-sized ones. Rather 
what is important is the assurance of an all-round increase of productivity 
along the entire production chain. 
3 . A U T O N O M Y A N D C O N T R O L BETWEEN BUYERS A N D SUBCONTRACTORS 
"Somewhat between market and hierarchy" is one way to sum up the 
new forms of subcontracting in the current economic and sociological 
debate (cf. Semlinger 1991). Deriving mainly from the early work of Coase 
and Williamson, the discussion surrounding the theoretical and analytical 
explanation of the new subcontracting Systems has broadened over the 
last few years. Yet although this discussion has brought to light a number 
of differentiations and new factors (e.g. make-or-buy decisions in compa-
nies) and produced more complete models (especially of the sociological 
exchange theories), there are still no satisfactory explanations available 
for the type of empirical developments we have found in our studies. 
In many cases the models are also used as a theoretical and ideological 
basis for visions of development in market economies. Admittedly, cate-
gories such as conflict, power and dependence are indeed mentioned in 
the different approaches, but the picture of subcontracting relations re-
mains predominantly harmonious and complies more with normative 
model concepts than with empirical reality. On the other hand, the empiri-
cal developments also provide sufficient grounds for contradictory inter-
pretations: 
Old concepts of the decentralized Organization, e.g. the profit center, 
are being revived, internal and external entrepreneuralism is being pro-
moted (e.g. management buy-outs), companies are being scaled down for 
the express purpose of achieving organizational flexibility (down-sizing), 
and various corporate function areas (research and development (R&D), 
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logistics, data processing, etc.) are being externalized in addition to pro-
duction processes. Inefficiency and the poor flexibility of bureaucratic and 
hierarchical structures are mostly cited as the reasons for the market and 
market mechanisms acquiring more weight. 
At the same time, however, there are other observed processes, namely 
the still increasing horizontal and vertical concentration of companies, the 
centralization of capital, the growing number of Strategie alliances, Joint 
ventures and "value-added partnerships", and the intensified trend 
toward subcontracting, contributing to the development of different forms 
of Company networks. 
Trends toward decentralization and more market conformity on the 
one hand are countered by trends toward Company concentration and the 
Organization of Company groups in the form of networks on the other. 
Depending on the particular viewpoint or, to be more precise, on the par-
ticular scientific and political orientation, different trends in this contra-
dictory relationship will be presented as dominant. As we see it, however, 
the crucial point is not to resolve this contradictory relationship in favour 
of one side or another, but to think of the contradictory trends as belonging 
together and being mutually necessary, i.e. as a new relationship between 
autonomy and control. 
It is also crucial to study the relationship more closely in order to iden-
tify how the new forms of exchange and Cooperation between companies 
actually funetion. I shall return, therefore, to the analysis of subcontracting 
relations in the German automobile industry and to the mechanisms by 
which the processes of productivity enhancement and the processes of 
exploiting productivity gains between buyers and subcontractors take 
place. As was previously mentioned, it is apparently not sufficient just to 
force dependent companies to implement rationalization measures 
through price and cost pressure. Within the relations built up between 
buyers and subcontractors Strategie functional links and concrete techni-
cal and organizational integration develop whose content and form help 
to influence rationalization in the subcontracting companies. 
Those Company functions which become Strategie Interfaces between 
companies obtain central importance in this process. Our empirical stu-
dies indicate that the functional areas acquiring new Strategie significance 
are research and development, quality assurance, and logistics. In these 
areas, in particular, there are fundamental (preliminary) decisions made 
regarding the requirements for Cooperation between buyers and subcon-
tractors. 
Contrary to expectations that might be linked to a decrease in in-house 
production, the traditional key Company functions in the buyer-subcon-
tractor relationship, i.e. the buyer's purchasing department and the sub-
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contractor's sales department, lose influence and must come to terms with 
increasing restrictions on their decision-making powers. The reason, it 
seems, is the growing signif icance of other criteria besides price - the most 
important selection criterion up until now - in the choice of a subcontrac-
tor and as points of reference in negotiations between companies. Aspects 
of price and cost continue to have a central bearing on the formation of 
buyer-subcontractor relations, of course, but they now make themselves 
feit in a different way: They are mediated through concrete material re-
quirements such as quality, innovativeness, logistic reliability, etc. which, 
in turn, are monitored in corresponding Company departments (e.g. the 
QA (quality assurance) department for subcontractor assessment). At the 
same time greater penetration in the control of all processes in terms of 
value and cost is improved; materials, technologies, methods of manufac-
ture and processes of transportation etc. are subjected internally and ex-
ternally to cost analyses and so become more transparent. This goes hand 
in hand with the development of central instruments and institutions of 
forecasting, calculation and control (value analysis, diverse Controlling 
procedures, etc.). Consequently, the commercial functions central to 
market-based relations between companies seem to undergo an extensive 
change - they become mixed with concrete material functions on the one 
hand and merge with abstract general functions of analysis and control 
on the other hand. Even if purchasing continues to exist institutionally as 
an area of the Company, its intrinsic function changes considerably. 
With this in mind, the next section will concentrate above all on the 
functional areas of research and development, logistics, and quality as-
surance. In considering their reorganization, I shall discuss the new au-
tonomy-and-control relationship between buyers and subcontractors. At 
certain points I shall also have a word to say about the changed role of 
purchasing. 
3.1. Research and Development 
The generation of new product and process technologies is becoming 
more important in all companies within the German automobile industry. 
True, these companies are pursuing different innovation strategies, but 
the need to manufacture products in less and less time and at lower and 
lower cost is adding to the importance of R&D departments in all com-
panies. In order to be able to operate successfully on the market under 
conditions of shorter product life cycles, the traditional consecutive 
process of product development is being increasingly abandoned in Ger-
man integration as elsewhere in favour of concurrent engineering (inter-
linking of process and product innovation). While this entails ensuring 
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close ties between R&D departments and other Company departments, 
Steps are also being taken to intensity Cooperation with subcontractors at 
very early stages of product development. This also applies to relations 
with external development and engineering Offices, the manufacturers of 
process technologies, etc. 
Despite the considerable differences noted in the innovation strate-
gies pursued by the automobile companies, they all have one thing in 
common: They want to secure and extend their technical know-how. 
Similarly it can be said that all automobile companies are determined 
not to remain or become dependent on supplier inputs with regards to 
fundamental (scientific and technical) developments which they con-
sider to be of central importance for their specific product. A n extension 
of in-house research is taking place, therefore, in the area of basic 
developments. In contrast, a trend toward a reduction of in-house 
development was noted in all the automobile companies we examined. 
Although the relocation of development costs and Services is resulting 
in a reduction of in-house development in the automobile industry, it 
is possible to discern a widespread increase of in-house planning and 
control on the part of the automobile companies. Even if the subcon-
tractor now carries out - and is expected to carry out - development 
work on a by and large autonomous basis, the buyer is usually quite 
well informed about the State of development. On the one hand, there-
fore, the autonomy of subcontractors is being reinforced by relying on 
the autonomous use of their innovative potential, with buyers restrict-
ing themselves to specifying only outline data with a bearing on 
development work. Still, buyers are not interested in losing, but in in-
creasing their own control potential. They do this by developing com-
puter-supported Simulation techniques (particularly in the plastics 
area), by engaging in material engineering, by the extension of market 
analyses (even into unrelated sectors, e.g. ceramic materials), by self-
production of prototypes, and by so-called procurement engineering. 
There is an attempt to find ways to reduce dependence on the techno-
logical know-how and hence market power of the subcontractor for parts 
traditionally developed and/or produced externally, aspects of the com-
pany's development work delegated to outside firms, and Company pur-
chasing strategies oriented toward the buying of only "black boxes". On 
the market for electrical and electronic components, for example, it can 
be observed how the automobile companies are trying to close the tech-
nological gap to a large supplier by intensifying their own research and 
development at great expense in capital and manpower, while systemati-
cally building up competitors in order to free themselves from a relation-
ship of one-sided dependence. 
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Conversely, subcontractors can strengthen their autonomy in relation 
to buyers if they are in a position to offer product innovations or are in 
exclusive possession of specific new manufacturing processes. Companies 
whose strength lies solely in quickly implementing process innovations 
needed for the cost-effective manufacture of new products are worse off 
in the long term than those subcontractors that are also capable of pushing 
product developments on their own. But here again, the Situation has 
more than one dimension. In no way are the buyers trying to create "a 
second Bosch" when building up system suppliers meant to participate 
in product innovation. In particular it seems to be Standard practice to 
begin by having several subcontractors work on the development of a 
specific component and then to select the one offering the buyer the lowest 
price under otherwise equal terms. The subcontractor's autonomy, in-
creased through development of his innovative potential, is therefore 
limited by his restricted market power. 
Our impression is that the automobile companies are becoming less 
and less Willing to enter a relationship of dependence on subcontractors 
which results from the exclusive possession of a specific product or 
process know-how. Consequently, there are some sub-sectors in which 
the extent of in-house research as well as in-house development is being 
increased by an appreciable amount. 
As a rule there are enough possibilities for buyer companies to ensure 
the exclusivity of their use of specific developments. Buyer companies 
have succeeded in particular in having large subcontractors as well as 
external development offices segment their development departments ac-
cording to customer, so that the results of work performed for one Com-
pany cannot be easily utilized by another. It is a reflection of the limited 
autonomy of even large subcontractors that the buyer companies have 
managed to enforce this requirement without any particular effort. 
3.2. Logistics 
The Strategie relevance of the Company funetion "logistics" is highly evi-
dent in the creation and expansion of central logistics departments in the 
German automobile companies. However, not all have reached the same 
stage of development as regards the rationalization of their logistics. In 
the automobile industry there are some companies, for example, that have 
only just finished installing their central logistics departments, while 
others are already starting to re-rationalize their reorganized logistics 
through the use of modern information and communication technologies 
("reflexive rationalization of logistics"). 
As a rule radical rationalization of logistic procedures is only possible 
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when changing over from one model to another, so the relevance of central 
logistic departments will increase under conditions of accelerated model 
change in the future. Their creation and expansion are expressions of a 
fundamental change of function - the central factor is no longer the mate-
rial distribution function pure and simple, but the contribution it makes 
to the Strategie planning of general production processes. As such the 
development and reorganization of logistics is a factor in extending the 
planning horizon such as is typical for systemic rationalization strategies. 
Internal company-related efforts to optimize logistic procedures have 
a direct effect on relations to the company's own subcontractors and far 
beyond. For example, the extent of in-house logistics in the automobile 
industry is generally on the decrease. Transport, storage and logistic plan-
ning Services in nearly all companies within the German automobile in-
dustry are being shifted to external companies or to the subcontractors 
themselves. This means that to the greatest extent possible the costs of 
logistics are being passed on to the subcontractors either directly or in-
directly via intermediary Service companies. This is having a twofold ef-
fect: On the one hand, the logistics costs are going up at a disproportionate 
rate, i.e. in relation to the complete logistics chain. On the other hand, 
these costs can usually be lowered for the end user. It is not one of the 
buyer companies' primary aims, however, to pass on logistics costs to 
their subcontractors. The important point rather is to increase their own 
organizational flexibility and - in the long run - to lower the logistics 
costs along the chain as a whole. New possibilities for greater transparence 
of the entire logistics chain are also resulting from the computerized con-
nections with companies earlier in the chain. In any event, the buyers' 
new logistic strategies are forcing subcontractors to make their own costly 
adaptions which, in turn, extend far beyond the area of their logistics. 
After a phase of rising costs for subcontractors, the stiffer requirements 
imposed by buyers results in an improvement in the efficiency of logistic 
Systems throughout the production chain. 
New logistic concepts are often discussed in association with the term 
"just in time" (JIT). For now, however, JIT projects with synchronous man-
ufacturing sequences are restricted to a comparatively small spectrum of 
parts and hence to a specific proportion of bought parts. Even if the trend 
continues to head toward just-in-time production, it appears to us - on 
the basis of our findings - that the predominant policy pursued by buyers 
in the German automobile industry is still to set up external or quasi-ex-
ternal warehouses. The advantage of these stores for the buyer is that they 
enable the decoupling of manufacturing processes performed by himself 
and his subcontractors, but still allow him to lower his manufacturing 
risks and logistic costs. At the same time they enable the subcontractor to 
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meet the higher requirements on flexibility imposed by the buyer but still 
allow him to organize his own manufacturing in batch sizes giving Op-
timum economy. (This also applies, of course, for internal Stores at the 
subcontractors.) External warehouses in the direct vicinity of the buyer 
companies have the additional side effect of compensating the locational 
disadvantages of foreign subcontractors. National subcontractors are thus 
helping to eliminate their own competitive advantages. 
The rationalization of inter-company logistic relations serves, therefore, 
as a condition for the mutual reduction of the internal and external logistic 
costs of subcontractors and buyers. It can be used above all to meet the 
higher requirements on flexibilization without having to fully relinquish 
the successful processes for the utilization of economies of scale. It is 
highly functional for "flexible mass production", and not only on the 
buyer-company level. 
The decrease of in-house logistics corresponds to an increase in in-
house planning and control, on the level of logistic relations as well. The 
influence of the buyer's material planning and procurement is increased 
distinctly, not at the exclusion of the subcontractor's autonomy, but 
through the very use of the autonomy of the subcontractor or intermedi-
ary transport companies. Basically speaking, the advanced State of tech-
nical and organizational integration provides the buyer with all the means 
required to obtain information about all the internal logistic procedures 
of his subcontractors. This potential - which undoubtedly exists - for the 
comprehensive control of upstream producers has not been widely used 
so far. 
One of the central aspects of systemic rationalization strategies is the fact 
that the rationalization of a sub-sector of the Company is not undertaken 
simply for the purpose of optimizing it. The rationalization of inter-com-
pany and intra-company logistic Systems also has repercussions far beyond 
the direct area of logistics. For example, logistic aspects are receiving more 
and more consideration in product development. Subcontractors as well as 
buyer companies are interested, for instance, in delaying the differentiation 
of variants as long as possible in the design and production process so as to 
keep the consequences of the exploding numbers of variants in check. The 
creation of product families for the purpose of enabling flexible mass pro-
duction also assumes that logistic aspects receive advance consideration in 
the design process. For us the most important point, however, is that the 
buyer companies are not intent on transferring logistic costs but on reduc-
ing them altogether. The transfer of logistic costs, which indeed takes place, 
is evidently the means by which subcontractors are forced into carrying out 
an "autonomous" self-controlled optimization of their logistics and hence 
into lowering their logistic costs. 
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3.3. Quality Assurance 
Questions of quality or production quality, and hence quality assurance 
have been receiving more attention for a number of years in the German 
automobile industry thanks to technical and organizational changes in 
manufacturing as well as to changed market requirements. 
The transition to systemic rationalization results generally in a need 
for an integrative management of quality. Besides product quality, increas-
ing requirements are placed on process quality (continuity, capacity level, 
flexibility) to the extent that rationalization efforts are redirected at cost 
reduction and synchronization of the entire production flow. 
Highly complex products and highly automated plants do not permit 
any errors or tolerances in the various components of a product (e.g. elec-
tronic Systems) and in parts intended for further processing. Faulty parts 
lead to costly down-times; function faults in a product bring the vehicle 
to a halt. The implementation of new logistic concepts in automobile com-
panies is also aimed at as trouble-free a production flow as possible and 
assumes basically that purchased and self-manufactured parts display 
"zero defect". 
A key characteristic of the new quality assurance strategies is that they 
are applied earlier in the development process as well as in a product's 
manufacturing process, with subcontractors involved to a high degree. 
Far more than ever before, quality assurance becomes a pivotal function 
comprising many other functions within, and beyond, the Company. A l l 
the automobile companies we surveyed were interested, for example, in 
reducing the mcoming inspection for purchased parts to what is (still) 
required legally. This means that the subcontractor has to Shoulder re-
sponsibility for the quality of parts he has produced. 
The trend toward advancing the tirning of quality assurance functions 
corresponds to a trend toward the general abstractification of quality as-
surance tasks. Tests are no longer carried out on the individual product 
but on the process in which it is designed and produced (design and 
process FMEA (failure mode and effects analysis)). Instead of conducting 
checks on the real results, processes are analyzed for their error and prob-
lem potential. Wherever possible, therefore, personal quality inspection 
is being cut back and, in return, computer-supported quality assurance 
in accordance with Statistical and hence objectivized rules is being en-
couraged (Statistical process control (SPC), Computer aided quality as-
surance (CAQ)). A n accelerated pace of development in the inspection 
and sensor system field is also enabling, not only a growing proportion 
of mechanical quality assurance, but also the switch-over from specific 
gauges for each part to universal measuring and inspection machines. 
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What significance does this have for the buyer's relationship with his 
subcontractor? On the one hand, the subcontractor is supposed to meet 
the quality Standards set by the automobile industry. On the other hand, 
control of his efforts in this connection is not relinquished. On the contrary, 
all the automobile companies we surveyed have extended their Service 
department to include highly trained staff that monitor the process relia-
bility of their subcontractors. The buyer companies' interest is not so very 
much to have the subcontractor supply zero error quality; their efforts are 
directed rather at ensuring that the subcontractor produces quality. For 
this purpose programmes are created jointly with the subcontractor, ob-
ligating him to set up his engineering, Organization and labour assign-
ment in such a way as to enable his production process to run without 
disturbances. In this connection, too, the quality assurance work is not 
restricted solely to the area of direct production. The subcontractor's de-
sign and engineering departments are likewise analyzed for possible 
sources of defects. This form of Cooperation generally illuminates all the 
subcontractor's processes, including his cost structure, for the buyer. At 
the same time, however, new rationalization potential is revealed for the 
subcontractor and he is shown new measures for increasing his produc-
tivity. 
A l l the technical potential for enabling close ties between the subcon-
tractor's quality assurance and the buyer is also not exploited in the ques-
tion of quality. The transfer of quality assurance data from the subcon-
tractor to the buyer is entirely possible but waived, not only because its 
evaluation would incur considerable cost for the buyer but because the 
buyer relies on the autonomy of his subcontractor in this connection, too. 
It is precisely in the higher demands on their subcontractors' quality as-
surance Systems that buyers show that for them the autonomy of their 
subcontractors represents a "productive force" which they intend to make 
- controlled - use of. 
Once again it is possible to discern a double strategy: On the one hand, 
some of the buyer's costs are transferred to the subcontractor by giving 
him responsibility for the delivery of zero defect parts; on the other hand, 
this is not accepted as being enough and efforts are made to guarantee 
an all-round increase of the subcontractor's productivity through a reduc-
tion of his quality costs and through a general improvement of his pro-
duction methods. 
The above described developments in the three Strategie function areas 
have been generalized, of course, and would require some differentiation 
in several respects. Strategies on the buyer side take on a different form 
depending on whether the buyers are mass producers or the manufac-
turers of exclusive automobiles, on whether they have extensive inter-
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nationalties, on the Status held by global sourcing, and on how heavily 
the buyers still rely on the national subcontracting industry and so on. 
On the subcontractor side it would be necessary to differentiate according 
to market power, innovation potential, Company size, Status in the sub-
contracting chain and so on. Major differences also result from the branch 
or sub-sector to which the subcontractor belongs - foundries or forging 
companies are treated differently to plastics and electrical and electronics 
companies. 
The following remarks concerning developments on subcontracting 
markets and their consequences for labour are also general. 
4 . T H E EFFECTS OF SYSTEMIC RATIONALIZATION O N INDUSTRIAL 
STRUCTURE: HIERARCHIZATION A N D PYRAMIDIZATION 
The changes in relations between buyers and subcontractors in the Ger-
man automobile industry described above have radical consequences 
for the structure of the subcontracting industries. These consequences 
have been described on various occasions - including by ourselves -
in such key terms as falling numbers of first tier suppliers, the creation 
of so-called system suppliers, the trend toward Single sourcing, inter-
nationalization, regionalization, etc. The culmination is a restructuring 
of subcontracting chains which, from the viewpoint of the final buyer 
is taking on more and more the structure of a segmented tree of logis-
tically orientated relationships of delivery in conformance with the prin-
ciple of modularization, i.e. the supply of pre-assembled components. 
Viewed from the aspect of dependence between the levels of buyer, 
direct supplier or system supplier and the various 2nd tier suppliers 
on the other hand, the new structure can also be described as a hierar-
chically organized pyramid. 
This characterization of the German automobile subcontracting in-
dustry as a tree- or pyramid-shaped structure is inadequate for two rea-
sons when applied to the branch as a whole. For one the picture creates 
the impression that companies grow smaller the closer they are to the 
beginning of the chain, with the respective consequences for relationships 
of dependence and organizational integration. True, this constellation is 
to be found in many cases, but the the shape of the structure is often quite 
different, i.e. large and accordingly powerful companies are suppliers for 
small subcontractors that maintain the contact and close relations with 
the final buyer. 
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Moreover, the picture is valid only from the perspective of isolated 
final buyers, not from the perspective of the industry as a whole. Single 
sourcing is often assumed to be a procurement strategy already pursued 
by automobile manufacturers, yet this is true to a certain extent only, 
because for a number of reasons two or more suppliers are mostly being 
used for the same part; and the converse is certainly not valid, because 
subcontractors usually supply several automobile manufacturers. 
Furthermore, subcontractors often have a second pillar of business out-
side the automobile industry. Seen thus, the picture is no longer that of 
one-dimensional tree or pyramid structures; rather it takes on the struc-
ture of diversely intermeshed and overlapping supplier relations. Thus 
on the whole the automobile and subcontracting industry resembles a 
closely networked system which through incorporation of relationships 
of size and dependence is multi-layered and not one-dimensional in 
structure. In other words, it has several centres that are focal points for 
several surrounding networks - networks between which there is a 
diversity of further links. 
It should be clear from just these indications of essential differentia-
tions in the picture of a hierarchically structured and pyramid-shaped 
network that, contrary to what is often claimed, we are not confronted 
by simply the Japanization of the German subcontracting industry. 
Other characteristics of the German subcontracting system point 
likewise to distinct differences from Japanese conditions: Small and me-
dium-sized industry is not at all as strong a structural factor in the 
German subcontracting system; the economic relationships of depen-
dence are still distinctly inferior; it is not multi-layered, and despite the 
described technical and organizational forms of Cooperation and depen-
dence the market and price mechanism plays a different role than it 
does in the Japanese "cost control system". This is not the place for me 
to draw a comparison between the German and Japanese sub-
contracting system. In the light of our empirical studies it can be said, 
however, that the restructuring process in the German subcontracting 
industry really does show certain features which before now were al-
ways considered to be characteristic for the Japanese system. This refers 
less to the identification of directly comparable manifestations and ap-
plied instruments but more to equivalent structures and mechanisms 
that are different in form yet display similar structural effects. So it is 
impossible, for example, to overlook the clear signs of a hierarchy or 
new pyrarrud-forming in the German subcontracting industry. 
At the top of the supplier-pyramid we find powerful system suppliers 
that benefit from the decreasing in-house production in the buyer com-
panies. They are mainly characterized by a high level of innovativeness, 
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extensive know-how with regards to production processes, and great fi-
nancial strength (often they are subsidiaries of large groups). 
Below the companies on this first subcontracting level that fail to ac-
quire the Status of a system supplier, we find a large number of direct 
subcontractors, most of them suppliers of series products. As a rule the 
latter lack the system supplier's possibilities for passing on stiffer buyer 
requirements to their own subcontractors. Buyer companies are less in-
clined towards Cooperation than to forms of control, however mediated 
in their relations with these companies. Companies of this type are often 
demoted from the level of direct subcontracting to the automobile in-
dustry onto the second level of subcontracting where they are then in-
volved with system suppliers that pass on the pressure from the automo-
bile industry to an intensified degree. 
For some companies that are unable to keep up with the rising require-
ments, the process of restructuring in the German subcontracting industry 
will result in their disappearance from the market. For the time being, 
however, many of the mostly small and medium-sized companies will 
remain on the market but in a different position, i.e. they will move to an 
earlier link in the new logistic chain. This process will be intensified by 
the predatory competition among the remaining subcontractors and by 
the increasing concentration. Furthermore, it is acquiring additional mo-
mentum from the appearance of companies that formerly were not active 
in this market. They include companies that have been operating up until 
now in other branches (e.g. in the electrical and electronics industry) and 
which are establishing a foothold in the subcontracting industry by taking 
over commensurate subcontractors and equipping them with additional 
know-how, technology and capital. 
At present the restructuring process in the German subcontracting in-
dustry is still in füll swing. It wil l hardly be possible, however, to limit 
an analysis of future developments to Germany. The process of inter-
nationalization is already relatively far advanced, particularly in Europe, 
be it through international interdependence, through the international 
procurement strategies of buyer companies, or through the internation-
alization of subcontractors themselves through the establishment of 
branch factories in various countries. If we look on the subcontracting 
system as a form of Company network now in the process of being estab-
lished, the aspect of international integration is probably more important 
for future developments than the current trend in the subcontracting Sys-
tem toward regionalization. 
I am unable to elaborate on this point here, although the trends toward 
internationalization are also becoming increasingly important in the con-
sequences for labour the subject I will now, in conclusion, address. 
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5 . T H E C H A N G I N G R O L E O F L A B O U R I N THE PROCESS OF SYSTEMIC 
RATIONALIZATION 
The question as to the impact on labour can be posed from two perspec-
tives - first, there is the question as to the Strategie function of labour in 
the process of systemic rationalization, and second, there is the question 
as to the consequences for workers in their companies, in our case those 
in the German automotive subcontracting industry in particular. 
To answer the first question I shall elaborate on what I have already 
intimated in my short sketch of systemic rationalization. In one of the 
central theses in our concept of systemic rationalization we assume that 
attempts to attain flexibility in strategies of systemic rationalization are 
mainly being undertaken with the use of new technologies. Computer 
technologies are becoming the essential basis for the control and super-
vision of production Operations covering more than one process and more 
than one Company. Organization and control technologies in particular 
are becoming, as we see it, the decisive flexibility resource for reorgani-
zation beyond the boundaries of any one process or Company. This is the 
resource to be used to overcome the rigidity of mass production and to 
solve the cost problems of small-scale production. Efforts to master flex-
ibility are being channelled - according to our thesis - increasingly into 
the development of supra-company networks which permit a combina-
tion of the advantages of economies of scale with those of economies of 
scope. 
As a result, the process of direct production and the labour involved 
lose their central Status as a reference point for strategies of flexibilization. 
Labour Stands outside of the direct production process whose flexibility 
is achieved through flexible automation technology and information tech-
nology based Systems of Organization and control. The potential for meet-
ing the new requirements on flexibility lies less and less in the internal 
reorganization of the processes themselves, however, and more and more 
in the form and manner of their technology-supported integration both 
within and between companies. This also reduces the weight attached to 
the direct production process in meeting flexibility requirements in the 
overall process. 
Labour's loss of Strategie importance in the direct production process 
is offset by an increase in the importance of skilled labour2 in those func-
tion areas that are significant for the technical flexibilization and the or-
2 Skilled labour in the sense of the German skilled worker who is trained in a 
standardized program and reeeives a State recognized certificate in this occu-
pational field. 
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ganizational configuration of the inter-company division of labour and 
which thus become a point of reference for strategies of systemic ration-
alization. 
The functional areas in question are, on the one hand, those which 
precede or follow the direct production process and play a central role in 
the implementation of new Organization and control technologies. As is 
known from many studies, friction in the process of implementing sys-
temic rationalization - particularly when introducing information Sys-
tems - is a major characteristic of the development. A key role falls to 
skilled labour during the planning, introduction and - sometimes - also 
in the protracted "running-in" phase. Of course, part of the skilled per-
sonnel is withdrawn again once the implementation is successfully 
completed, but skilled labour will still be required in the indirect function 
areas to prepare and control the production process. 
Much of the discussion about the deployment of higher skilled workers 
concerns these groups of workers, although in quantitative terms they 
still make up a relatively small proportion of the total work force. One 
decisive point in the debate - and a by and large still open question - is 
the organizational restructuring of these functions. Is the trend heading 
toward an integration of functions in the production area with a com-
mensurate deployment of skilled labour in the production area, or toward 
their intensified Separation and integration in production-remote areas of 
planning and control, or possibly even toward their complete relocation 
out of the Company, in which case these functions are then performed by 
external centres (e.g. manufacturing firms, engineering offices and so on). 
A certain key role also falls to labour, on the other hand, in those areas 
of the Company which are acquiring Strategie importance within the Com-
pany as interface functions between individual enterprises for the inte-
gration of sub-processes in a flexible overall system. As I mentioned ear-
lier, these areas are principally the functional areas of logistics, quality 
assurance and research and development. New job structures and skill 
requirements in these areas must be seen in close connection with the new 
technologies of Organization and control that are employed there and 
which as a Systems technology represent the real basis for the control and 
supervision of Operations covering more than one process and Company. 
Yet even if the lines of Cooperation and communication between de-
partments and companies are being maintained with more and more tech-
nical support, the workers in these areas are being asked to satisfy specific 
skill requirements of an increasingly extra-functional nature, i.e. require-
ments which address the worker's personal characteristics such as 
willingness to cooperate, capacity for innovative action, etc. What kind 
of Status these elements of skill will retain in the Strategie interface func-
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tions wil l depend not least on the direction of development finally taken 
by the already snowballing technology-based rationalization of Opera-
tions in these areas. This in turn will have a great deal of influence on the 
question, whether labour will still be given a key role to play in the future, 
at least in the areas of logistics and quality assurance. 
In the logistics area, for example, technology-based measures in logistic 
planning processes have already cut the higher Staffing levels (there is a 
trend in particular to replacing simple logistic planning jobs with auto-
matic procedures); similar trends are also evident in the introduction of 
C A Q Systems and in the increasing use of complex technological Systems 
for measurement and inspection. 
Yet with all these indications of the new role of key workers in Strategie 
areas of the Company, it is still an open question as to where, at which 
point in the Company and in which companies these functions are becom-
ing established. It appears as if the debate about the significance of skilled 
labour and the Status of specific key workers - be it the "Systemregulierer" 
in the "new production concepts" in the German discussion or the "prob-
lem solvers" in "lean production" in the international debate - is concen-
trated in specific core areas of industrial activity in large-scale companies, 
areas which in turn assume a focal role in production networks. What is 
disregarded by and large is the fact that in a complementary development 
labour structures are forming in other areas of the production chain in 
which only few companies are profiting from skilled labour's increase in 
importance whereas most are tending rather to lose skilled jobs. 
6. SEGMENTATION A N D POLARIZATION: AMBIGUOUS PERSPECTIVES FOR 
WORKERS 
From our empirical studies we are still not able to identify either a very 
clear or quantitatively signifikant picture of the consequences of rational-
ization processes and changed structures of subcontracting in the German 
automobile industry. It seems that the contradictory impact of the above 
described restructuring processes is causing the consequences for affected 
workers to be concealed, to appear segmented according to functional 
areas, and in many cases to manifest themselves in different internal and 
external areas of the Company than expected. There is a great risk, there-
fore, of making premature and hence biased generalizations. 
In the current German discussion we come across some appraisals 
which, in light of the subcontracting industry's growing dependence, are 
predicting very negative consequences for the workers affected (job cuts, 
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dequalihcation, higher pressure to perform and similar). On the other 
hand, there are some authors (e.g. Säbel et al. 1991) who, focusing mainly 
on the trends toward decentralization and the new cooperative structures, 
anticipate that new production concepts will be implemented on a wide 
scale in the subcontracting industry, too, with at least partially positive 
consequences for workers (job security, requalification and the like). 
In our studies we find evidence to support both appraisals. Generally 
this would seem to substantiate the assumption that reorganization meas-
ures in the automobile companies are resulting in a shift of negative after-
effects into the production stages earlier in the chain. In most sub-
contracting companies you will find: employment risks, changed Status 
of employment (fixed-term contracts of employment, temporary employ-
ment, etc.); changed structure of working time (more shift work and over-
time, loss of autonomy in the timing of production Operations); and 
greater pressure to perform. Differentiations are appropriate, however, 
with respect to the various subcontracting branches and especially with 
respect to the various stages of subcontracting. The process of pyramidi-
zation and hierarchization, which is being effected in the subcontracting 
industry according to stringent criteria of selection, is causing the buyer 
companies' new requirements to exert an influence on processes in the 
subcontracting companies and on the working conditions of their em-
ployees in many different ways. 
It can be assumed, for example, that some of the large and innovative 
companies which successfully complete the process of adaptation will 
profit from their buyers' reorganization measures, including the con-
sequences for workers. As the buyers' in-house production is being re-
duced, so the level and the Status of employment in these subcontracting 
companies stabilize; furthermore, the reorganization of their own struc-
tures of production and Organization leads in many cases to a rise in the 
level of qualification required, at least in certain sub-sectors. The expan-
sion of capacities, e.g. by setting up new branch factories close to focal 
companies, could create new jobs; the Performance of more development 
and design work and the expansion of quality assurance and logistics 
departments increases the proportion of skilled jobs; flexible automation 
in production and the partial relocation of quality assurance functions 
into the production area results in higher skill requirements for unskilled 
and semi-skilled workers. Working conditions are tending to resemble 
those in the buyer companies. Of course, this also applies to the negative 
effects of rationalization and flexibilization - trends toward a polarization 
of skills, higher pressure to perform, changed structures of working time, 
etc. wil l be found here, too. Particularly in those subcontracting companies 
(or their branch factories) that are closely integrated in the logistics chain 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
as direct suppliers, workers are experiencing an intensification - depend-
ing on the extent to which JIT principles are applied - of the familiär 
Stresses resulting from close deadlines and rapid flexible adjustment to 
the buyer's production Operations (hectic working conditions, overtime, 
extra shifts, transfers and similar). 
The subcontractors most hit by a shift of the negative effects of reor-
ganization measures implemented by the automobile companies will be 
those which are unable to survive the selection process, which become 
series suppliers or which are displaced into production stages earlier in 
the chain. The successful direct or first tier suppliers are likewise involved 
in this shifting of negative consequences, for they are passing the buyer's 
requirements on to their own suppliers by developing their own flexible 
production structures, perfected logistics Systems and ambitious quality 
assurance instruments. The problem zones for labour are being shifted in 
this way to stages of production situated still earlier in the chain. A State 
of merciless cut-throat competition currently exists in Germany in this 
sector of non-specialised subcontracting and sub-subcontracting where a 
large number of the country's many small and medium-sized companies 
are to be found. The high proportion of unskilled and semi-skilled work-
ers (which includes many women) in these companies are shouldering 
the biggest risk of the entire restructuring process in the German auto-
motive subcontracting industry. Their jobs are insecure, their Status of 
employment is in many cases marginal (e.g. fixed-term contracts of em-
ployment, temporary work), they are under high pressure of time and 
pressure to perform, as well as being subject to other stresses. In these 
companies there are only very limited training opportunities of the type 
sometimes found in other subcontracting companies due to the higher 
requirements on innovativeness, quality, logistic reliability and the accom-
panying high levels of technology. 
This can be illustrated with a brief example of the way companies are 
responding to new quality requirements. In many small companies, ad-
ditional quality assurance functions are not being integrated in the pro-
duction area but are being transferred to specialized and highly skilled 
personnel. One of the reasons given for such a centralistic Solution is that 
the semi-skilled machine Operator's level of skills is not up to the new 
requirements. In spite of the great difficulties in recruiting highly skilled 
personnel on the labour market, the alternative approach, i.e. to train the 
semi-skilled worker, is rarely taken in this sector of small and medium-
sized enterprises. Further training remains largely unsystematic and 
orientated to short-term requirements, and it is mostly limited to short 
courses of Instruction. Longer-term further training at an external centre 
takes place, if at all, in the form of manufacturer training courses. Un-
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skilled and semi-skilled workers, especially in the upper age brackets, are 
seldom involved. Capacity bottlenecks in the production department, the 
lack of a skill-related personnel policy, and a narrow cost-benefit philos-
ophy are cited as the reasons for the insufficient involvement in further 
training (Mendius and Weimer 1991). In view of the limited possibilities 
for small companies to pursue their own further training policy, some 
hopes are being pinned at the moment in Germany on Cooperation mod-
els, of which so far there are only very few examples. 
The thesis of the shifting of labour problems from the buyer to the 
subcontractor calls for a further point of differentiation. In certain sub-
sectors the automobile industry's decisions to extend its outsourcing of 
parts can also have a backfiring effect.The employment security of whole 
divisions in the buyer companies can be put at risk; the externalization 
of high-quality production processes can also have consequences for the 
level of skills. The same is true for the externalization of functions in the 
area of data processing or in Service and maintenance. The introduction 
of preventive measures of quality assurance results in a drastic reduction 
in the relatively large number of staff in the bought parts inspection de-
partment, with the older semi-skilled workers affected most of all. For 
this group of workers in particular the opportunities on the labour market 
are rather hopeless considering the continuing picture of unemployment 
in the FRG and the extreme labour market Situation in the former GDR. 
The same applies, for example, to the externalization of storage or other 
logistics functions. The reasons for the externalization can vary from case 
to case. For the logistics functions it seems that a major role is played by 
the lower labour costs and other collectively bargained Settlements in the 
Service sector (different unions) which put the workers at a disadvantage. 
Admittedly, our present findings concerning the consequences of sys-
temic rationalization for affected workers are still fragmentary. Generally 
it can be said, however, that every analysis of the development of labour 
must give due consideration to the processes of selection and hierarchi-
zation such as are found in the formation of inter-company networks in 
the automobile industry. The development of labour requirements and 
working conditions differs depending on the position of the respective 
Company in the pyramidal structure of the networks. Statements concern-
ing the general trends in labour development and which are orientated 
mainly to processes of change in large companies or so-called core sectors 
of industry cannot help but show just one side of the coin. They fail to 
cover the overall development with its lines of segmentation and polari-
zation. 
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As lapanese automakers have worked to increase development speed and effi-
ciency, the existence of a cooperative network consisting of parts manufacturers, 
other firms supporting development activities and subcontractors, has been of criti-
cal importance. The role played by these Subsystems in product development by 
Japanese automakers is far greater than that of their counterparts in Europe and 
the United States. This report will investigate new developments in these networks 
during the past few years, with emphasis on the Subsystems - the parts manufac-
turers, prototype subcontractors and other firms assisting development work 
which serve as a foundation for the industry. 
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1 . INTRODUCTION 
The Japanese industrial structure continues to undergo rapid changes 
in the wake of the strong Yen that resulted from the Plaza Agreement 
of 1985. The auto industry is a typical case. Between 1985 and 1990, 
Japanese exports dropped from 6.73 million to 5.83 million units, re-
sulting in a temporary industrial recession known locally as the "endaka 
('strong Yen') slump." During the same six-year period, however, 
domestic auto sales rose by 2.22 million units, from 5.56 million to 7.78 
million, and by 1987 the industry had recovered from the recession and 
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was on the verge of a new boom period rooted in local demand rather 
than exports. 
During the succeeding five years (1986-1990), the strong Yen became 
an established fixture. A total of 38 types of passenger vehicles were newly 
released on the market, and the Japanese auto industry entered an era 
characterized by new product development. By increasing the frequency 
of vehicle model changes and new car development, the automakers have 
succeeded in stimulating domestic demand. 
According to studies conducted in the mid-1980s by Kim Clark, Fu-
jimoto Takahiro and others in a Harvard research group (Fujimoto 1991), 
the product development capabilities of Japanese automakers exceed 
those of manufacturers in Europe and the United States by far. When 
product development capabilities at industries in the three regions were 
compared on the basis of development time and (non-hour) productivity, 
for example, the following results were obtained. 
In Japan, an average of four years is needed to develop a new vehicle, 
while manufacturers in Europe and the United States require an average 
of five years. When development productivity is measured, the Ja-
panese figure of 1.7 million hours compares to 3 million hours for the 
United States and Europe, a nearly two-fold difference. Thus the gap 
in competitiveness is even greater than that for development time. One 
of the main factors behind this discrepancy was the number of new 
vehicles released during the five years from 1982 to 1987; Japanese 
automakers introduced more than 70 new models while U.S. manufac-
turers released only about 20 and European firms about 40. As product 
diversity becomes the key to competitiveness in the auto industry, 
Japan's superiority on the global market is becoming increasingly ap-
parent. 
As Japanese automakers have worked to increase development speed 
and efficiency, the existence of a cooperative network consisting of parts 
manufacturers, other firms supporting development activities, and sub-
contractors, has been of critical importance. The role played by these Sub-
systems in product development by Japanese automakers is far greater 
than that of their counterparts in Europe and the United States. 
This report wi l l investigate new developments in these networks 
during the past few years with an emphasis on the Subsystems - the parts 
manufacturers, prototype subcontractors and other firms assisting 
development work - that serve as a foundation for the industry. 
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2 . SET ORDERS A N D THE CREATIONOF SYSTEM SUPPLIERS 
From an international point of view, one of the most obvious charac-
teristics of the Japanese auto industry is the extremely high ratio of "ap-
proved-drawing components," a fact which leads many parts suppliers 
to participate in the development of specific new products from the early 
stages onward (Asanuma 1990: 20). 
Most of Japan's primary component manufacturers developed in-
house capabilities for detailed design, etc., during the parts group reor-
ganizations which took place during the 1950s through to the 1970s. As 
a result, components based on designs developed by the parts manufac-
turer and submitted to the automaker for approval account for fully 70% 
of all parts procurement by Japanese automakers (Fujimoto 1991: 40). 
In the United States, on the other hand, parts manufacturers tradition-
ally tender bids on designs provided by the automakers. Parts procured 
in this fashion account for fully 80% of the total. Meanwhile, European 
firms follow the Japanese model quite closely. 
Since the appreciation of the Yen, domestic demand has significantly 
grown and product development has become more active. During this 
period, Japanese automakers have attempted to further increase develop-
ment efficiency by adopting a policy of "set" or "system" Orders for their 
major affiliated parts manufacturers (Ikeda 1989: 49). This policy can be 
viewed by the automakers as part of a broader tendency to concentrate 
their efforts on new vehicle development while leaving parts develop-
ment to the affiliated parts manufacturers. 
How, then, has the system of set Orders changed the relationship be-
tween automakers and affiliated parts manufacturers? 
Answers to this question will be sought in the example of the Instru-
ment panel, which functionally speaking is one of the most important 
interior components of an automobile. A certain Japanese automaker 
placed its first set order for instrument panels four years ago, in 1988. 
Until then, the firm had placed direct Orders for approximately 20 large 
and medium-sized components, including the instrument panel, with 
four large plastics manufacturers (one of which, receiving the largest 
order, also produced the gauges to be installed in the panel), while the 
production of approximately 20 small components was contracted out to 
roughly 20 medium and small-sized plastics firms.1 
With the adoption of the set order policy, however, the number of sup-
1 However, some of the small and medium-sized plastics firms were also leading 
parts manufacturers. In addition, not all of the 20 firms received Orders simul-
taneously when a new vehicle was being developed. 
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pliers was cut to the four large firms noted above, and Orders to the remain-
ing 20 small and medium-sized manufacturers are now placed through 
these four. Not only have the supplier Channels been concentrated, but there 
have been a variety of changes in Orders and the way they are made. 
Table 1 provides a summary of changes which occurred in the relation-
ship between the gauge manufacturer described above and the automaker 
before and after adoption of the set order system. 
Table 1: Changes in the relationship between Company A and automaker N before 
and after adaption of the set order system 
UNIT ORDERS SET ORDERS 
JOINT DEVELOPMENT 
Company A jointly develops the specif ications 
and shape of the ordered component with auto-
maker N. Guest engineers are dispatched for 
three months (three engineers in all). 
DETERMINATION OF SPECIFICATIONS 
Provides drawings. 
INVESTICATION OF COMPONENT FITTINC TECHNOLOGY 
Carried out by automaker N. 
EVALUATION OF REUABIUTY 
Performance tests for unit components 
(resistance to heat, cold etc.). 
JOINT DEVELOPMENT 
Company A jointly develops the ordered com-
ponents as well as overail instrument panel lay-
out with automaker N. Guest engineers are dis-
patched for eight months (ten engineers in all). 
DETERMINATION OF SPECIFICATIONS 
Approves drawings. 
INVESTICATION OF COMPONENT FTITINC TECHNOLOGY 
Company A investigates component Atting and 
target quality technology and submits it to auto-
maker N. 
EVALUATION OF REUABIUTY 
Quality of the assembled instrument panel is 
confirmed (impact tests, etc.) and air bags are 
tested, all by Company A. 
QUAUTY GUARANTEE 
Company A guarantees the quality of the 
ordered components. 
SETTINC OF TARGET PRICE 
Target prices are indicated by automaker N for 
each component. 
SCHEDULE PROGRESS MANAGEMENT 
Schedule is managed based mainly on customer 
delivery requirements. 
QUAUIY GUARANTEE 
Company A guarantees the quality of the instru-
ment panel as a whole in addition to the ordered 
components. 
SETTING OF TARGET PRICE 
A set price is indicated by automaker N, and 
Company A must determine its own target price 
for each individual component. 
SCHEDULE PROGRESS MANAGEMENT 
Company A prepares a basic development plan 
which may undergo modifications before obtain-
ing approval from automaker N. 
Source: Survey by the author. 
In the development process, the gauge manufacturer adopted an ap-
proved-drawing system to replace the previous one whereby designs 
were supplied by the automaker. As a result, where before the firm dis-
patched "guest engineers" tö the automaker for only three months begin-
ning in the primary prototype phase, the Company now sends a total of 
ten engineers for a period of eight months beginning in the concept study 
phase, significantly increasing its participation in product development. 
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In addition, the gauge manufacturer is now responsible for guarantee-
ing the quality of both the instrument panel and related components. As 
a result, it shares responsibility with the automaker for instrument panel 
design, an area previously left untouched, and has established an in-house 
design division staffed by several designers. 
Concerning the manufacturing process, the automaker was tradition-
ally responsible for the quality of all instrument panel-related plastic com-
ponents. With the adoption of set Orders, however, this responsibility has 
shifted to the gauge manufacturer, who must now guarantee the quality 
of all of the small components produced by outside plastics firms. In ad-
dition, the gauge manufacturer is provided by the automaker only with 
a set price and must break this figure down into individual target prices 
for the small and medium-sized parts manufacturers. 
As is clear from the above, the promotion of leading parts manufac-
turers to the Status of system suppliers results in the de-facto creation of 
a secondary tier of subcontractors consisting of small and medium-sized 
manufacturers. It is not clear just to what extent the automaker in question 
has pursued the policy of set Orders, but based on the author's studies 
the practice appears to have spread to several fields. 
If the automaker were to continue the full-scale implementation of set 
Orders, the technical know-how for all of its main component assemblies 
would eventually become the property of outside firms, and the auto-
maker himself would be effectively demoted to the Status of assembler. 
Thus it appears that the firm is adopting a degree of restraint concerning 
set Orders for key functional components. 
Based on the author's studies, however, the proliferation of technical 
know-how to parts manufacturers is continually progressing amidst in-
tensified market competition despite the above-mentioned controls. Ulti-
mately it wil l prove impossible for the automaker in question to avoid 
the "black-boxing" of its technology, and automaker controls over parts 
manufacturers wil l probably have to be relaxed. 
3 . PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT A N D REORGANIZATION O F T H E DIVISION OF 
LABOUR 
As the move towards set or system Orders continues to gain momentum, 
primary parts manufacturers will play an increasingly important role in 
the auto development process. In addition, recent trends such as greater 
sales of luxury vehicles and the use of advanced electronics technology 
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will act as a further Stimulus to the development of new products by the 
primary parts manufacturers. 
The implementation of full-fledged product development work by the 
parts manufacturers will , however, entail sizeable development costs. In 
addition, more active product development work will require a larger 
staff for the development division. 2 This problem will be further com-
pounded by the current shortage of skilled personnel. 
In this way, primary parts manufacturers will be forced to reorganize 
their manufacturing divisions if they are to strengthen development capa-
bilities. This will involve a re-evaluation of in-house and subcontracted 
production. 
Let us now examine the case of a leading parts manufacturer engaged 
in the production of fuel injection Systems and car air conditioners. The 
firm recently disbanded its "KS Group," a cooperative association con-
sisting of 60 subsidiaries and secondary subcontractors. Forty firms were 
selected from this group and added to five new companies to form a new 
cooperative association called the SE Group (Nikkei Sangyö Shinbun, June 
17,1989). 
In addition to activities approximating those of the traditional coopera-
tive groups, the newly founded SE Group has established an expert com-
mission to promote technical exchanges between member firms, and two 
instructors were dispatched from the primary parts manufacturer to each 
member firm in order to promote TPM (Total Production Maintenance) 
activities. These and other activities have been undertaken to improve 
manufacturing and management technologies at all group firms. 
The reorganization of this cooperative group can be seen as part of the 
move toward the reinforcement of development capabilities at primary 
parts manufacturers. Previously, the firm in the above example maintained, 
together with a Toyota group supplier, a Virtual monopoly on fuel injection 
Systems, which constituted its leading product. Recently, however, a lack of 
technical advances at the two firms and intensified competition forced the 
firm to devote all of its energies to the development of new products. 
The firm in question depends on outside suppliers for 60% of its com-
ponents, with SE Group members responsible for fully 65% of all procure-
ment in terms of value. Thus the Company decided that the development 
2 To take an example from outside the auto industry, according to an N H K tele-
vision broadcast, Toshiba's Öme plant develops 17 types of personal Computer 
in a Single year. With a six-month development period, each model requires a 
development staff of approximately 1,000 employees. Consequently, the 
development of 17 models would require 8,500 employees (cf. N H K Shuzaihan 
1991: 115). 
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and manufacture of higher-quality, higher-performance products would 
require the enhancement of production capabilities and production man-
agement Systems at all group manufacturers. 
In fact, the main SE Group members have recently begun the gradual 
transfer of production facilities from the parent firm in line with the lat-
ter's development strategies. 
One fully-owned subsidiary, for example, has posted rapid growth in 
sales during the past several years, from 5.5 billion in 1988 to 7 billion in 
1989, 8 billion in 1990 and 9.7 bülion in fiscal 1991. The leading factor 
behind this growth was the promotion of the firm's Status in the Organi-
zation from a processor of parts of the fuel injection system to an assembler 
of higher-value-added unit components. As a result, assembly facilities 
and quality control equipment were transferred from the parent firm. 
Naturally, the parent firm helped the smaller Company to reinforce its 
quality control system for the unit products, and the subsidiary has been 
highly motivated in its efforts to improve production management in the 
newly established cooperative association. 
Another important member of the SE Group, a secondary subcontrac-
tor, is mainly engaged in the processing of components for use in fuel 
injection Systems. After recently receiving several processing lines, includ-
ing specialized equipment, from the parent firm, this Company has also 
made extensive improvements in its manufacturing capabilities. 
As can be seen from these examples, a variety of steps are being taken 
toward the reorganization of the division of labour between primary parts 
manufacturers and the firms in their cooperative networks. 
With the increasing reliance on set Orders, one manufacturer of electro-
motors has experienced a decline in direct transactions with the auto-
makers and instead has become a supplier of parts to system suppliers. 
As a result, the Company is being forced to expand its own development 
activities in order to establish itself as a manufacturer of functional com-
ponents. 
As part of efforts to improve in-house development capabilities, this 
firm will have to selectively reorganize its outside suppliers and coopera-
tive association (Ikeda, 1991). In the past, it boasted a cooperative asso-
ciation consisting of approximately 200 participating subcontractors. In 
1986, however, the firm made a decision to disband this group and com-
mitted itself to reducing the number of group members by one half, to 
100, by May 1995. Of the remaining 100 subcontractors, approximately 
40 wil l be designated key subcontractors (accounting for 70% of the total 
value of parts procurement by the parent firm), to which the parent firm 
will provide a variety of assistance for structural improvements. 
Specifically, the top three key firms have already begun licensed pro-
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duction of unit component Systems. In the past, one group manufacturer 
was involved in the production (processing and sub-assembly) of control 
rod lots for wiper Systems produced by the electro-motor manufacturer, 
but under the reorganization he is responsible for system Orders consisting 
of all processing and assembly for control rods, rubber elements and wiper 
arms. 
With the aim of bringing a greater degree of order to the assembly 
process, the firm is discarding its policy of outside procurement of mass-
produced unit components for one in which these components are pro-
duced using an integrated in-house assembly line, in which different 
processes are put on the same line. Specifically, injection molding, die 
casting and rubber processing, for which the firm previously relied en-
tirely upon outside suppliers, will be put on the line. In order to achieve 
this, the firm plans to invest ¥ 1 billion in the construction of a new factory 
on the premises of an existing facility in the Töhoku region that will con-
tain an integrated production line (the Company also plans to replace rub-
ber components with plastic units). 
When the plan is realized, the Operation of automatic integrated pro-
duction lines will mean increasingly fewer Orders for the firm's subcon-
tractors. As a result, the use of subcontractors wil l be limited to low-
volume production items. 
Actually, the firm's decision to discard its policy of outside procurement 
in favour of integrated in-house production was not solely due to requests 
from the parent firm, which itself was in the midst of reorganizing its 
subcontracting Organization; an important factor in the decision was fears 
concerning the stability of small subcontractors due to the current labour 
shortage in Japan.3 
4 . EXTERNALIZATION OF THE AUTOMOBILE PROTOTYPE DIVISION 
Along with the new vitality of product development activities in the auto 
industry, the prototype divisions which traditionally functioned inde-
pendently within the product engineering divisions of large automakers 
have been externalized and made responsible for a part of the develop-
ment network. 
One prototype manufacturer with 90 employees was previously a met-
al plate subcontractor assisting in the development of sports cars. During 
3 In this sense, as the labour shortage continues to increase in severity, secondary 
subcontractors will likely become dividing points, with the number of tertiary 
subcontractors to be significantly cut back 
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the past several years, however, it has been producing press dies for the 
supply of body panels to a certain automaker for use in vehicle prototypes. 
In the past, this process was handled entirely in-house by the automaker's 
technical center. Today, however, the automaker can place a comprehen-
sive order for all of the processes, including die design, die fabrication 
(wood patterns are procured externally, while casting and machining are 
done in-house), trials, and body panel completion. As a result, the auto-
maker has been gradually increasing his Orders to this prototype manu-
facturer.4 Orders from other automakers are also said to be increasing. 
In Japan, the development time required for a press die is from ten 
months to a year. As can be seen in Figure 1, press dies are fabricated 
during the first through third prototype phases (approximately one year); 
the body panels must be made during the six months from the two mass-
production prototypes to the startup of production. However, the proto-
type press dies are fabricated in advance of the press dies, and body panels 
for the prototypes must be prepared in advance. Specifically, this involves 
the two or three months from the time the prototype designs are drawn 
up to the fabrication of the primary prototype vehicle. 
Figure 1: Development schedule of prototype car (months) 
36 months 
Product planning Clay model 
Concept generation 
Product engineering / P r o t o 
/ drawing 
Pre-production 










Source: Survey by the author. 
4 At present, prototype ordere from the parent automaker are responsible for 60% 
of the total sales by the firm. 
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As a result, the fabrication period for the prototype press die from design to 
delivery of the body panels is only about two months. For the die material, 
therefore, cast iron is replaced with a ZAS mold using zinc alloy or a resin 
mold using a ZAS core (traditionally, concrete and sand were used for the 
core, but such molds could not be reused, and the difficulty of finding a 
place to dispose of them has led to the increasing use of ZAS core molds). 
Since only a small number of panels can be produced from a ZAS or 
resin mold using a hydraulic press, they are not suited to mass production 
using power presses. They are, however, suitable for small-volume, large-
variety production of, for example, 100 or 200 panels. Consequently, the 
firm has built an assembly plant designed to produce not only prototype 
panels but also panels for special vehicles such as super dollies and am-
bulances. The firm also supplies a portion of the panels used by Takada 
Kogyo, which specializes in the production of limited-edition vehicles. 
According to the staff at the firm, a large number of prototype press die 
manufacturers have been surfacing as of late. 
Another field experiencing rapid growth in recent times has been man-
ufacture of the simple molds used in producing prototypes of plastic com-
ponents for automobile interiors and exteriors. Fully 80% of sales at 
N.Proto, a firm with 90 employees, stem from injection molds used in 
prototype fabrication. Due to the characteristics of plastic components, 
the firm's Orders do not come from an automaker but rather from a pri-
mary parts manufacturer which numbers among its parent firms Toyota 
Motor Corp. and all of the other domestic automakers as well. Recently, 
the firm has also been producing some injection molds for use in mass 
production. These now account for 20% of total sales by the firm. 
Aluminum and zinc alloys are used in the production of simple proto-
type molds, and only three to five months are required for development. 
N.Proto introduced a three-dimensional C A D / C A M system seven years 
ago and in the field of injection molds is considered something of a pioneer. 
Fully 50% of the processes at the firm, including design, are now handled by 
C A D / C A M , with customer-supplied designs fed into C A D and connected 
to C A M to achieve significant reductions in development time. 
Although it is primarily a prototype manufacturer, the firm is also im-
proving its ability to respond to Orders for large plastic molded com-
ponents such as bumpers and instrument panels by introducing a 2,500-
ton injection molding machine. 
In addition to these moves toward independence by prototype manu-
facturers, prototype subcontractors affiliated with auto parts manufac-
turers have also posted remarkable growth. Of the 230 subcontractors 
being used by one primary parts manufacturer, more than 30 specialize 
in the fabrication of prototypes and have formed their own sub-group. 
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The Oppama plant of one exhaust system and manifold exhaust man-
ufacturer maintains seven or eight prototype subcontractors. One of these 
produces metal sheeting, and increased Orders for prototypes from the 
parent firm during the past few years have resulted in remarkable growth 
for the Company. Eight years ago, the plant had a staff of three, including 
the owner, while today the payroll has grown to 13 employees and the 
plant is a three-story building with excellent office facilities. 
Delivery times for the prototype Orders received from the parent firm 
are growing shorter and shorter, with typical periods (from the time the 
order is received) ranging from as many as ten days to as few as two. 
Exhaust system components are the most common product, with about 
450 different varieties per month. 
The typical prototype fabrication process is as follows: receipt of design, 
wood pattern (externally sourced), gypsum mold, sand mold, ZAS mold 
(zinc alloy casting), pressing. As a result of development work by the 
owner, however, use of metal sheeting to produce a ZAS mold in lieu of 
the wood pattern makes it possible to complete the entire process within 
a 24-hour period. Although thin pieces and large pieces cannot be pro-
duced with this technique, it is well suited to the production of medium-
sized components. Other than a 400-ton hydraulic press introduced in 
1989, the firm has no special machinery of note, but in the near future it 
hopes to replace its shearing machine with laser cutting and scanning 
equipment and purchase a triaxial N C lathe as well. 
5 . G R O W T H OF FIRMS ASSISTING I N DEVELOPMENT ACTTVITIES 
The press die and body welding jig sectors are two typical sectors pro-
viding assistance for development work in the automotive industry. Both 
experienced rapid growth after the end of World War II, and since the rise 
in the value of the Yen leading manufacturers in both fields have achieved 
international levels of technology. The three firms heralded as leaders in 
the automotive metal die field, for example, depend on foreign auto-
makers for more than half of their total sales.5 
The top manufacturers of welding jigs for bodies, with 150-200 em-
ployees, are somewhat smaller than their counterparts in the press die 
field, having approximately 300 employees. However, they too are depen-
5 For more information on the current State of the Japanese auto press die in-
dustry, see Ikeda (1991a). 
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dent on foreign customers for a significant portion of their sales (20-30%), 
and globalization is proceeding.6 
As shown in Figures 2 and 3, the average product development period at 
representative Japanese manufacturers of auto press and body welding jigs 
is ten months for the former and seven or eight months for the latter. The 
figure for both fields in the United States is approximately one and a half 
years. However, these data are more than ten years old, dating from a time 
when Japanese automakers were still modeling themselves on firms in the 
United States, and do not accurately reflect the current Situation. According 
to more recent information, current development times for both sectors are 
more than two years. The same is true for manufacturers in Europe. 
Figure 2: Die development lead time in the U.S.A. and Japan 
2.1. Die development lead time (U.S.A.) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 II 17 18 19 
Press 
die n aking 
6 For more information on the current State of the Japanese body welding jig in-
dustry, see Ikeda (1991b). 
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2.2. Die development lead time (Japan) 
Die design 4 months 
Casting 1 month 
Machining 1.5 months 
Finishing 1 month 
Trial (and Refinement) 3 months 
Total 10 months 
Source: Survey by the author. 
Figure 3: Comparison of development lead time and time required for each stage 
between Japan and U.S. body welding jig makers 
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Source: Survey by the author. 
Let us then examine why such a large gap has developed between com-
panies in Japan and those in Western countries. Based on interviews, the 
reasons for Japan's global superiority in these fields can be summarized 
in the following four points. 
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Superiority in Equipment and Facilities 
The large manufacturers of press dies in Japan all utilize three-dimen-
sional C A D , taking in data from a master model using Japanese-made 
scanning machines and using these data to cut the mold using a high-
speed N C milling machine.7 Finishing is still mainly done by hand, but 
the short cutting pitch of the N C milling machines allows significant time 
savings in the finishing Operation. The master model is used to create a 
C A D data base - unlike in Europe and the United States, where 
completely model-free C A D programming is used - but this is to avoid 
excessively high Computer costs. The companies are prepared to switch 
to model-free C A D once Computer Performance improves and the capa-
bilities of the prograrriming staff are enhanced. 
U.S. companies have tried to bypass the use of master models in their 
adoption of three-dimensional C A D , but it appears that Japan will be far 
quicker in achieving actual results. In addition, most of the U.S. metal die 
manufacturers continue to use gypsum molds and copy milling machines, 
while even the smaller Japanese press die manufacturers with 20-50 em-
ployees have introduced three-dimensional C A D , scanning machines, 
and N C milling machines and appear to be graduating from the era of 
gypsum molds and copy milling machines. 
Compared with the press die manufacturers, the producers of body 
welding jigs have somewhat lagged behind in their introduction of new 
equipment and facilities. However, the use of two-and-a-half- or three-di-
mensional C A D (the former indicating simultaneous use of two- and 
three-dimensional Systems) is rapidly becoming a reality at many of these 
firms, and N C wire cutters and N C milling machines have been intro-
duced for jig production and connected via C A D / C A M Systems. 
Sharing of Information with Automakers 
Although no guest engineers are dispatched to the customer automakers, 
there is a füll exchange of technical information during the product 
development period. The prototype ZAS mold-prototype panel produc-
tion process, which continues to be found at all European and U.S. man-
ufacturers, has been discarded, with most firms beginning by producing 
the main die. 
There is also thorough unification of information in the development 
Japan's most advanced scanning machines and high-speed N C milling ma-
chines were jointly developed by press die manufacturer Fuji Technica and 
Okuma Machinery Works. 
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project teams set up by the automakers, allowing for the rapid exchange 
of information between the two sides. In the United States, on the other 
hand, development project teams are not bound by function, and as a 
result the evasion of responsibility is a common tendency. For example, 
Japanese die manufacturers often find themselves waiting interminably 
for approval of designs which have been sent to a U.S. firm. 
Job Rotation - Multi-functionalization 
As should be clear from the comparison of Japan with the United States 
in Figures 2 and 3, the reason for the large overall gap in process periods 
despite insignificant differences among individual processes is that U.S. 
manufacturers have adopted a relay system, in which a process is begun 
only after the prior one is completed, while in Japan a "rugby-like" ap-
proach is taken in which the two processes are overlapped and are carried 
forward simultaneously. 
Making this overlapping possible is the widespread adoption of job 
rotation and the excellent communication between work floors that re-
sults. In Japan, for example, the design division is divided (functionally) 
into conception, assembly design, component design and design inspec-
tion. In the United States, however, these four processes are separate jobs, 
and even the salaries paid for each are clearly distinguished. Thus it is 
impossible for the component designer, for example, to supervise the in-
spection of the designs. In this type of environment, active overlapping 
of the processes would be next to impossible. 
Active Use of Subcontractors 
Leading manufacturers of press dies and body welding jigs use outside 
sourcing for between 20% and 60% of their annual sales, a much more 
significant amount than firms in Europe or the United States. Moreover, 
long-term, continuous Orders are the rule when using these subcontrac-
tors, unlike the short-term, "throwaway" approach common in the United 
States. This leads to the fostering of mutual trust and close communica-
tion. Subcontractors can therefore engage in active capital investment and, 
despite their small scale, are becoming increasingly specialized. 
As noted at the beginning, the leading manufacturers of both press dies 
and body welding jigs have actively worked to expand their business 
with foreign automakers since the appreciation of the Yen, while at the 
same time freeing themselves from the control of Japanese automakers. 
In these two fields, Japanese automakers produce 20-30% of the com-
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ponents they need in-house, with the remaining 70-80% being sourced to 
outside suppliers. 
In the latter case, Orders are divided into several fields, such as main 
body panels and under-body panels. 
The continued use of this system has made the grouping of outside 
suppliers possible and limited the degree of independence which they 
could achieve while also reducing delivery times. With the increasing 
importance of international transactions, however, many of the leading 
parts manufacturers are going beyond the framework erected by domestic 
automakers, increasing their independence, and in particular accepting 
set Orders from foreign automakers. By absorbing a wide ränge of man-
ufacturing know-how in this way, some of the firms have made the tran-
sition from merely assisting in development work to conducting inde-
pendent development work on their own. 
One press die manufacturer, for example, accepts Orders from auto-
makers in the developing nations not only for press dies but for vehicle 
design and engineering as well. In another case, a manufacturer of body 
welding jigs is expanding his field of Operations from body welding and 
assembly lines to trim lines. 
In response to these moves towards independence, local automakers 
are taking measures to beef up their in-house press die divisions and 
develop body welding lines, flexible body lines (FBL), and flexible man-
ufacturing Systems (FMS) capable of coping with model changes and pro-
ducing components for different vehicle models.8 It remains to be seen 
just how the industry structure will change as a result, but it appears 
certain that the leading manufacturers will be clearly divided into two 
groups, those specializing in the international market and those who will 
remain affiliated with a specific local automaker. 
In any case, the development-assisting sector will play an indispensable 
role in improving the product development capabilities of the Japanese 
auto industry. 
6. SUMMARY 
Since the appreciation of the Yen, the Japanese auto industry has brought 
about a rapid expansion in the domestic market by reinforcing its product 
development capabilities. The automotive development networks which 
continue to develop are very noteworthy. Although the central role of the 
8 For more information on FBL and FMS, see Yoshida (1991); Shinohara (1991). 
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automakers as industry leaders cannot be denied, independent develop-
ments in the areas of technology and management by sub-systems such 
as the primary parts manufacturers, prototype subcontractors, and 
development-assisting firms should not be overlooked. 
In the future, these development networks will probably make it 
possible for the Japanese auto industry to adapt in a timely manner to the 
new era of large-variety, small-volume production. Furthermore, unless 
U.S. and European automakers can achieve the transition from conven-
tional in-house product development to similar development networks 
incorporating Subsystems, their future will be a bleak one. 
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SUBCONTRACTING STRATEGIES OF JAPANESE 
COMPANIES IN EUROPE AND ASIA 
A C A S E S T U D Y O F T H E E L E C T R O N I C S I N D U S T R Y 
Hiramoto Atsushi 
ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to report the results of a survey on the manufacturer-sup-
plier relationship of Japanese enterprises in Europe and Asia in the TV and VCR 
(video cassette recorder) industries in order to describe the conditions upon which 
Japan's manufacturer-supplier relationship Stands. The results of the survey are 
explained for each parts group, that is, key parts, general electronic parts, plastic 
parts and PCB (printed circuit board) assembly. 
The most remarkable difference in the manufacturer-supplier relationship in the 
electronics industry between Japanese parent plants and their transplants is the 
almost complete absence of PCB assembly subcontracting in the latter. The main 
reason for this is the small wage differentials in foreign countries. In Japan, by 
contrast, the dual wage structure of the labour market constitutes a very important 
basis for the wide-spread subcontracting system. 
But it is also clear that the nature of subcontract transactions can be similar to 
that in Japan even without the wage differentials, as the example of Taiwan's plastic 
parts subcontracting shows. In this type of subcontracting, it seems that the differ-
ence does not lie between Japan and other countries, but between Japan and 
Taiwan, on the one hand, and Europe, on the other. This example also demonstrates 
that Japanese-style subcontracting is possible even against different historical and 
cultural backgrounds. 
The grievances of Japanese transplants managers concerning transactions in 
Europe throw into clear relief the elements of the manufacturer-supplier relation-
ship in Japan: the stronger position of the manufacturer, long-lasting relationships, 
the ambiguity of the contract and an improvement-oriented attitude. These are 
important factors in determining whether subcontracting in a foreign country will 
become similar to that in Japan, or not. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The manufacturer-supplier relationship in Japan bears quite a unique char-
acter and has contributed a great deal to Japan's success in becoming highly 
competitive in world markets. But, the question of whether the character of 
that relationship is unique to Japan or not, remains unanswered. The gener-
ally accepted idea is that the subcontracting system, which constitutes an 
important part of that relationship, is based on Japan's historical and cul-
tural background. But another type of explanation asserts that the manufac-
turer-supplier relationship in Japan can be - and hence should be - ex-
plained in economic terms, especially through the concept of the relation-
specific skill, based upon transaction cost theory, outlined in O.E. William-
son's concept of governance structure (Asanuma 1990; Williamson 1986). 
In terms of empirical study, a key to answering the question of whether 
Japan's system is unique or not will be to investigate the manufacturer-
supplier relationships of Japanese subsidiary companies in foreign coun-
tries. Japanese companies want to establish the same relationships with 
their overseas suppliers as those they have in Japan. It is useful to inves-
tigate whether they can carry out their intention or not, and how they can 
do so in order to clearly identify the conditions upon which Japan's man-
ufacturer-supplier relationship Stands. 
The aim of this paper is to explain the results of our survey on the 
manufacturer-supplier relationship of Japanese enterprises in Europe and 
Asia in the TV and VCR industries and to draw some conclusions about 
their situations. This survey was carried out from 1989 to 1990; it covers 
8 TV plants - 2 in Taiwan, one in China, one in Singapore, 2 in A S E A N 
and 2 in the U.K. - and 2 VCR plants in Germany.1 
In the following sections, the Japanese system wil l be briefly sketched. 
The results of our survey of their parent plants in Japan will be explained. 
Then the manufacturer-supplier relationship in Japanese transplants - in-
cluding the subcontracting system - wil l be examined. Finally, some find-
ings will be discussed. 
In the following the plants are abbreviated by two capital letters. The first one 
Stands for the country Q = lapan, E = United Kingdom, T = Taiwan, A = U.S.A., 
M = Malaysia, G = Germany), the second one for the Company. 
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2 . OUTLINE O F T H E MANUFACTURER-SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIP 
IN T V M A N U F A C T U R I N G I N JAPAN 
2.2. Relationship Types 
TV parts can be classified into three groups, from the viewpoint of the 
nature of the transaction. The first group consists of CRTs (cathode ray 
tubes), ICs (integrated circuits) and microcomputers. These are the key 
parts which basically determine the Performance of the product and, 
therefore, greatly influence the degree of product discrimination. Accord-
ingly, most big TV manufacturers tend to make these parts in-house, not 
at the TV plant itself, but at another division or through affiliated com-
panies. The development of new types of parts is necessary for introduc-
ing new TV models. Low-ranking TV manufacturers cannot afford to 
make these parts by themselves and must buy them from the bigger man-
ufacturers. 
The second group consists of general electronic parts - that is, resistors, 
coils, condensers, etc. - which are supplied by the large parts manufac-
turers. These are articles on the market, but their prices are not made 
public. The manufacturer tries to search for "the proper price" at which 
the supplier wil l seil. When the manufacturer begins to buy new parts, 
its quality assurance department develops a capability test and gives its 
purchasing department permission to buy them. The principle of the man-
ufacturer is basically to buy from multiple vendors, allotting a share to 
each vendor based on its Performance. The price of the parts is negotiated 
once every six months in conjunction with the manufacturer's budget 
planning. The parts makers compete with each other for larger shares. 
Although the share of each supplier can change as, for example, a lower 
price is offered, the transaction itself tends to be long-term. 
The third group is plastic parts and press parts, which are mainly sup-
plied by subcontractors. The manufacturer designs these parts and sub-
contracts their manufacture. Design drawings and metal molds are pro-
vided to the subcontractors by the manufacturer. 
The subcontractors are limited in number and are usually members of 
the supplier's co-operative association. Their dependence on sales to the 
parent plant is usually high. In the case of plant JA, which is one of the 
Japanese TV parent plants we investigated, a portion of the plastic parts 
is made by the plant. The rest is subcontracted. JA deals with three sub-
contractors, whose sales to it ränge from 50% to 70% of their total pro-
duction. 
In the case of plant JV, which is also one of the parent plants making 
VCRs, the prices of these plastic parts and press parts are determined 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
through comparing subcontractors' quotations. The lowest price offer gets 
the order. But the parent plant has a Standard price list, a "cost table", 
which is drawn up by cost accounting for the parts. When the offer price 
is cheaper than the Standard, there are no problems. If the price is higher, 
negotiations must be conducted. Because the parent plant has detailed 
information about the subcontractor - for example, the number of injec-
tion molding machines and their capacities and vintages, the number of 
employees and management staff, etc. - negotiations may be difficult. In 
order to reduce the price, the parent plant often dispatches staff members 
to the subcontractor in order to improve the production process (Hiramoto 
1992). 
In addition to these parts groups, there is another type of supplier to 
TV or VCR manufacturers: suppliers of the assembly of PCBs (printed 
circuit boards). About 50-60% of the total work volume is subcontracted 
in the case of plant IA and plant JV. The parent plants also assemble PCBs 
by themselves, but tend to concentrate their production on mass-pro-
duced-type boards, in order to profitably utilize their automated assembly 
lines which represent such a heavy investment (Tokunaga et al. 1991). 
PCBs with relatively small lots and some types which cannot be profitably 
assembled by the automated line for technical or economic reasons, or 
"sub-PCBs", tend to be subcontracted. This means that the subcontractor 
assumes responsibility for more labour-intensive products or processes, 
while the parent plant is reponsible for more capital-intensive products 
and processes. Fluctuations in business conditions influence this division 
of products or processes - that is, the more demand, the more sub-
contracting. 
The number of assembly subcontractors is limited and their rates of 
dependence on sales to the parent are usually very high. Plant JA deals 
with four subcontractors, each employing 150-450 employees, whose de-
pendent rates are about 90-95%. Among the subcontractors there are usu-
ally a few affiliated companies whose capital is owned by the parent 
plants. 
The price of assembly subcontracting is determined by the following 
cost calculation: 
Price = Standard time (wage rates + overhead costs) 
Standard time (ST) is the time needed to assemble the product. The wage 
rates and the overhead costs in the formula are the subcontractor's. 
The total cost is said to be about half of the parent plant's cost, because 
the subcontractor's labour costs are lower and its overhead is much less 
expensive. The price is reconsidered every budget year. Each item, such 
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as direct labour cost, is re-examined after negotiations with the subcon-
tractor. 
These assembly subcontractors are treated in the same way as the in-
ternal parts of the parent plant in some respects. For example, they par-
ticipate in plant campaigns for improving efficiency. At Plant JV, one case 
in point, a " V Q (video quality) Committee'' has been organized, with the 
goal of increasing assembly productivity and improving the quality of 
products. This committee meets every month under the chairmanship of 
the deputy general manager of Plant JV; its membership consists of presi-
dents or plant managers of subcontractors and department managers and 
section chiefs from Plant JV At the committee meeting, they present the 
results of their improvement campaigns and study one another's im-
provement methods. In the latter half of fiscal 1987, for example, concrete 
targets such as soldering retouching rates of less than 0.02% and ST re-
duction rates of more than 20.1% were set, under the slogan of "Defective 
Products Elimination Strategy".2 Plant JV's staff assist the subcontractors' 
campaigns to achieve these objectives. The banners on which the slogan 
is written are posted on the walls of not only the plants of cornmittee 
members, but also of their subcontractors - that is, the secondary or ter-
tiary subcontractors. 
Plant JV also opens its soldering and assembling tests for workers to 
its subcontractors. The workers of the subcontractors, who solder PCBs 
for Plant JV, must earn a grade higher than fourth on the test. 
The suppliers usually organize a co-operative association which as-
sumes various activities such as quality control, reduction of defects and 
promotion of value analysis. Plant JA and Plant JV both have the co-opera-
tive associations, the members of which include electronic parts suppliers 
and subcontractors. 
2.2. Ordering System 
A n order sheet for parts is sent to the supplier from one month to 6 weeks 
before the delivery date, in the case of Plant JA, and 2 months before 
delivery in the case of Plant JV. In the case of another TV plant, there are 
some parts for which the order is sent only 15 days before delivery. 
There are many parts, however, for which production cannot be 
completed within the time provided if the supplier Starts buying raw 
materials for the products after it gets the order. In order to deliver the 
parts within that period of time, the supplier must arrange for the raw 
materials, manpower and equipment needed for the production before it 
2 "furyö zetsumetsu daisakusen" 
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gets the formal order. This means a supplier must take some risk during 
that period of time. On the other hand, the manufacturer wants to shorten 
this period as much as possible, because the shorter the period is, the 
more easily it can respond to the fluctuation of demand for the products. 
If the period is prolonged, the risk which the manufacturer must assume 
will be increased. 
In order to reconcile these contradictory demands and to eliminate the 
risk itself, the manufacturer gives information about its production 
schedule to the supplier beforehand in consecutive Steps. On the sup-
plier's side, its salesmen make an effort to acquire accurate and up-to-date 
Information about the manufacturer's production schedule. The proce-
dura at both Plant JA and Plant JV can be outlined as follows. 
At the beginning of each half-fiscal year period, the production volume 
for each product for the next six months is announced to the supplier on 
the basis of the budget. From this, the supplier can estimate the total order 
volume for the next half-year. 
Next, the manufacturer makes a month-based production schedule for 
the Coming three months. On the basis of this schedule, the production 
volume of each product for the next three months is announced to the 
supplier at the preliminary meeting which is held every month. 
Through these announcements, the supplier can estimate the order 
volume from the manufacturer and can arrange production for the order 
beforehand. But these announcements do nothing but announce sched-
ules, they are not firm Orders. In the very nature of things, the manufac-
turer's budget or month-based production schedule does not necessarily 
become a reality exactly as planned. Change in work volume and in the 
composition of products are more or less inevitable. Thus to arrange the 
production beforehand means the supplier still assumes some risk. 
One of the important roles of the supplier's salesman, along with en-
deavouring to raise the supplier's share, is to gather information about 
the manufacturer's Situation in order to make the estimates more accurate. 
The salesman must obtain information on any modification of the pro-
duction schedule as early as possible, as well as general information on 
the manufacturer's sales trends, the needs of the manufacturer's designers 
in developing a new model, etc. By and large, informal contacts, not writ-
ten numbers, play an important role here. In order to accumulate infor-
mation, the salesman frequently Visits the manufacturer, mainly the pur-
chasing department but sometimes also the production control depart-
ment and even the design department. 
After these procedures, an order-sheet, with lead-time from one to two 
months, is issued to the supplier. But the delivery date is often changed 
in practice under Instructions from the manufacturer. The alteration can 
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happen through a disturbance in the production schedule itself or by a 
delay in delivery of other parts. In any case, this alteration of the delivery 
date also plays an important role in the manufacturer's ability to adjust 
the production schedule more smoothly. 
The delivery date for parts is generally five days before the start of 
production in the case of plant JA. Delays occur in only 1 to 2% of deliver-
ies. Even in the case of delivery alterations, the delays in delivering by 
the altered date are still only 15%. 
To sum up, the procurement system of parts to support flexible man-
ufacturing consists of three stages: giving information, ordering, and set-
ting the delivery date. 
The above is an outline of the general procedura or practice. There are 
some parts for which order or delivery require special procedures. Orders 
for parts whose lead-times are apparently much longer than the normal 
ordering period - for example, CRTs, custom ICs, lenses (in video camera 
recorders) - are given some months more before delivery as special treat-
ment. 
Assembly subcontracting is also managed differently. Its lead-time is 
on average 8 days in the case of Plant JV. The exact term of delivery de-
pends upon whether the subcontractor further relies on a secondary sub-
contractor. The subcontractor receives the parts from Plant JV 10 days 
before and delivers finished PCBs 2 days before the start of production. 
CRT deliveries are made just a day before the production of TV sets 
begins. The reason for this just-in-time delivery is that CRTs are bulky 
and very expensive. 
3 . PARTS PROCUREMENT IN JAPANESE TRANSPLANTS I N EUROPE A N D A S I A 
3.1. Parts Procurement Problems in Japanese Transplants 
One of the most perplexing problems Japanese transplants have en-
countered is how to procura parts. In a recent survey Japanese transplants 
mentioned as major problem first, "quality of employees and their con-
tinuity of Service" (56.2%), and second, "parts procurement problems" 
(49.5%). (Three items were chosen by respondents from among 14 items 
listed on the survey conducted by the Osaka Furitsu Sangyö Kaihatsu 
Kenkyüsho/Ösaka Shökö Kaigisho 1989). Other problems mentioned in 
the same survey are "rising wage rates" (41.5%) and "fluctuation of for-
eign exchange rates" (38.7%). In the case of transplants in Europe, the 
most important problem was "parts procurement" (81.1%). In North 
America and A S E A N also, this problem was mentioned by high percent-
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ages of respondents (58.6% and 54.3%, respectively). This means that the 
parts procurement problem is an important one in the management of 
Japanese transplants. 
Japanese transplants have, formally speaking, several alternative 
means to procure parts. Imports from Japan still play an important role 
in procurement. According to the above-mentioned 1989 survey, the ratio 
of the purchases from local markets, including in-house production, to 
total purchases is not so high. Companies with ratios of less than 20% 
account for 22.6%; companies with 20-40% account for 20.0%, and those 
with 40-60% account for 20.1% (as of 1988). This ratio is relatively high 
in Europe, compared with that in Asia. 
In the case of TV set manufacturing, this ratio is greatly affected by 
CRT procurement because the CRT accounts for a large part of a TV's 
cost. In Europe, Japanese transplants which we investigated have bought 
CRTs mainly from a local suppplier (in this context, "local" means within 
the European Community). As a result, the ratio of these plants is high, 
about 60-70%. In Asia, they have bought mainly from Singapore or Korea, 
and partly from Japan. If they can buy CRTs from a local supplier, the 
ratio also becomes about 60-70%. 
Parts which tend to be procured from Japan include first of all custom 
ICs and microcomputers, both of which are developed in co-operation 
with the supplier; second, some of the electronic parts, e.g. a large elec-
tronic condenser to which special production skills are needed; and, fi-
nally, some special parts, for example the name plates. In addition, some 
raw materials, e.g. steel plates in VCRs and plastic materials in TVs, are 
procured from Japan. The reason these materials must be bought from 
Japan is that their quality is superior to the materials from local suppliers. 
The source of the parts is related to how and where they are designed. 
The designer decides what parts should be used in the new products, and 
the quality assurance department tests and approves the new parts. The 
fact that TVs and VCRs are generally designed in Japan influences parts 
procurement, because the designer in Japan is inclined to use parts made 
in Japan. When Japanese transplants want to use local parts, they must 
send the parts to Japan in order to obtain approval. 
This dependence on Japanese parts makes the lead-time for the trans-
plants longer than that for Japanese plants. Because of maritime transport 
and customs formalities, transplants in Europe must order Japanese parts 
6 months before production. In ASEAN, they must order 4 months before. 
However, they cannot easily obtain firm Orders for 6 months hence, or 
even 4 months, for their products. Thus, for example, Transplant MB in 
A S E A N must order parts for Japan on the basis not of a firm order but 
of a projection of demand by the sales department. Then the transplants 
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must assume some risk on account of depending on Japanese parts. In 
other words, the transplants' production cannot respond as flexibly to 
fluctuations of demand as domestic plants do. 
3.2. Electronic Parts: International Procurement 
Electronic parts such as coils, condensers and resistors are procured 
mainly by importing from foreign countries. In Europe and Asia, and 
partly in Japan too, transplants buy electronic parts from Asian countries. 
For example, TV manufacturing transplants in the U.K. buy these parts 
from Japanese parts firms located in the U.K., which procure the parts 
mainly from their Southeast Asia plants. 
In connection with this, the companies which we investigated 
developed international procurement Systems for electronic parts. Com-
pany B, one of the companies we investigated, established a large mass-
production TV plant in Southeast Asia and attached an international pro-
curement office (IPO). This office works to buy parts cheaper in large 
quatities, combining the plant's own needs with those of other TV plants 
located in various countries, and then supplies the other plants with parts. 
Company A also has a purchasing branch under its regional headquar-
ters in Singapore. Formerly, this branch belonged to a sales Company in 
Hongkong and was located in Hongkong. When the regional headquar-
ters was established, it was moved to Singapore. The Company still has a 
purchasing branch in Hongkong and two purchasing Offices in Seoul and 
Taipei. The aim of the branch is the same as that of the IPO of Company 
B. In the latter half of fiscal 1989, the branch bought 39% of the parts used 
from Japan, 28% from Korea, 18% from Singapore, 6% from Taiwan, and 
6% from Malaysia, and supplied 25% of them to Taiwan, 12% to Canada, 
11% to Japan, 11% to the U.S., 11% to China, 10% to Thailand, 8% to the 
U.K., and 7% to Malaysia. 
3.3. Plastic Parts: Subcontracting 
In contrast to electronic parts, international procurement cannot play an 
important role in the purchasing of plastic parts and press parts, because 
transportation costs for these parts are usually high; transplants must rely 
on local suppliers or in-house production. According to the above-men-
tioned 1989 survey, 53.0% of Japanese transplants procured plastic parts 
mainly from local subcontractors; 24.9% mainly relied on in-house pro-
duction, and 19.4% procured from Japan. In the case of press parts, the 
percentages are respectively 41.7%, 31.3% and 23.0%. In Europe, the per-
centages of "mainly from local subcontractors" is higher than the average 
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- for plastic parts 66.7% and for press parts 52.9% - and "mainly by in-
house production" is lower (15.2% and 5.9% respectively). 
There is no doubt that one of the most perplexing problems which Ja-
panese transplants face is how to procure plastic and press parts. In every 
respect - quality, cost and delivery - parts made by local suppliers cannot 
easily meet the requirements of Japanese companies. Quality of the pro-
ducts is the most serious problem. According to the survey the problems 
with the local subcontractors which Japanese transplants feit were "inferior 
quality" (68.4%), "long lead-time" (35.6%), and "high cost" (25.2%) (2 items 
were chosen by respondents from among 8 items listed). "No problem" was 
feit by only 11.3%, of which transplants in Asia NIES (newly industrializing 
economies) accounted for a large share. Transplants in Asia feit this problem 
especially acutely. "Inferior quality" was a problem for 77% of respondents 
in ASEAN. In Europe, the problems were "high cost" (25.2%), "long lead-
time" (47.1%), and "inferior quality" (38.2%). 
These problems cause Japanese transplants to tend to rely on Japanese 
suppliers in the districts. Japanese molding companies and press compa-
nies also began to establish transplants in foreign countries. For example, 
Transplant EA in the U.K. operated as follows. 
At first, EA began to deal with local molding companies which supplied 
mainly to the automobile industry and telephone makers. But defects in 
the appearance of the products became a serious problem because of the 
importance of external appearance to a TV cabinet. Inaccuracy of meas-
urements was also a problem as EA wanted to supply parts to the line 
without adjusting the assembly process. The Company dispatched a resi-
dent representative to the supplier to inspect its products. In Japan, a 
supplier may accept a claim for inferior quality after receipt of the pro-
ducts. But in the U.K., such a claim will hardly ever be accepted. Further, 
the local suppliers did not submit cost breakdowns to EA when submit-
ting price quotations. These problems convinced Transplant EA to move 
gradually to in-house production of the cabinet. As of 1990, all back-covers 
for its TV sets were molded in the plant. 
At the same time, Japanese mold companies began to set up branches 
in the U.K., and EA and other Japanese manufacturing transplants have 
tended to deal with these Japanese mold transplants. As of the end of 
1989, EA dealt with 5 mold companies, of which 3 were Japanese trans-
plants. 
But even Japanese mold transplants cannot solve the above-mentioned 
problems all at once. Defects of quality have frequently been found in 
Japanese suppliers' products. Delivery dates cannot easily be changed 
because there are only a few mold companies and many set makers. And 
last, the prices are higher than those in Japan - in extreme cases, 50% 
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higher. Nevertheless EA prefers to deal with Japanese mold transplants 
because it expects that they wil l be able to improve the Situation. 
Parts prices are determined by comparing quotations and reconsidered 
through VA (value added) activities at the beginning of every half budget 
year. But in contrast with a subcontractor in Japan, which endeavors to 
reduce prices of its own accord, in the interest of keeping the prices of the 
manufacturer's products low, the local supplier will not agree to a price 
reduction without a justifiable reason. Further, the local supplier has not 
submitted a detailed cost breakdown, the presentation of which would 
be indispensable to reducing the cost still further by VA activities. 
The lead-time for plastic parts is three months, as it is for other local 
parts. Control of the delivery date of the plastic parts is very important 
because they are difficult to stock. Flexible adjustment of delivery in corre-
spondence with changes in the production schedule has great importance 
for the manufacturer. If the delivery date is moved up, an extra charge is 
sometimes added for, say, overtime pay on Saturday. Claims of this kind 
are also advanced in Germany, but hardly ever in Japan or elsewhere in 
Asia. 
Speaking about this problem, the Japanese buyer for Transplant E A 
expressed the hope that he could deal with a supplier which was located 
near the plant and whose sales depended heavily on it, because such a 
Company would respond quickly to a change in the daily production 
schedule of the plant which was caused by other problems - the major 
one being the delivery of ICs. And when any problem of quality or 
delivery occurred, the buyer could visit the Company more easily if it was 
located near the plant. 
Metal molds needed for molding have heretofore been imported from 
Japan. EA owns the metal molds and provides the supplier with them. 
These transactions of EA with plastic parts suppliers, including Ja-
panese transplants, constitute "subcontracting" in the sense that the sup-
plier provides the parts based on the manufacturer's design. But the char-
acter and the results of the transactions are quite different from those in 
Japan. The suppliers are not limited to a certain number and their rates 
of dependence on sales to one Company are not so high. Their delivery 
dates are not so changeable as are a Japanese subcontractor's. 
Manufacture and sale of plastic parts in Asia bear a somewhat different 
character. Transactions in Taiwan, for example, are more like those in Japan. 
Transplant TA in Taiwan, as a case in point, deals with six mold com-
panies, of which one is a Japanese transplant. The main supplier, espe-
cially of large plastic parts, is the transplant. The continuity of transactions 
with TA for the suppliers is generally long, about 15 years, and their rate 
of dependence on sales to TA is high, on average 40%. 
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The process of selecting a supplier and setting the price is much the 
same as in Japan. The decision is made through comparison of quotations 
from two or three suppliers and negotiations with them on the basis of 
the cost table. The capacity of the supplier and the quality level required 
for the parts are also taken into account. The price is re-examined at the 
beginning of every fiscal half-year. 
Transplant TA gives information about its production, based on the 
budget, to the suppliers affiliated with the "Transplant TA Co-operative 
Association", and issues order sheets about three months before delivery 
is wanted. The delivery date is set at two days before the start of produc-
tion in the case of plastic parts, and one or two weeks before in the case 
of general electronic parts. A meeting with each supplier is held once or 
twice per month, at which TA gives information on its production 
schedule to the supplier. The mold suppliers are said to be able to cope 
with a change of delivery date. If adjustment to the change requires over-
time work, they do not Charge extra for it. 
Transplant TA has a system for evaluating the quality Performance of 
each supplier. Based on the quality of the delivered products, each Com-
pany is ranked from A to D. If a supplier is graded D, TA delegates mem-
bers of the material department and quality assurance department staff 
to work with the supplier to improve quality. 
These features of the transaction are quite similar to those in Japan. But 
supplier Performance is still not as good as that in Japan. 
3.4. PCB Assembly: In-house Production 
Subcontracting of PCB assembly is hardly ever done outside Japan. Two 
plants out of 10 which we investigated - Transplant TA in Taiwan and 
Transplant G A in Germany - subcontracted PCB assembly, but only par-
tially. The subcontract ratios of these plants are much lower than in Japan. 
Almost all the PCBs needed in these 10 plants are procured mainly by 
in-house production and partly by imports from Japan. Transplant G A 
depends mainly on imports from Japan; all the other plants assemble their 
PCBs by themselves. 
The main and obvious reason for not subcontracting is its costs. Almost 
all the buyers we interviewed said that it made no sense to subcontract 
PCB assembly to a subcontractor whose workers were paid at almost the 
same rate as they paid their employees. If there are no wage differentials 
or only small differentials, there wil l be little difference between the cost 
of subcontracting and that of in-house production. 
Though cost is the primary reason for not subcontracting, it is not the 
only one. In Japan there are other factors involved in big companies' deal-
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ing with subcontractors besides cost reduction, and these have to be taken 
into account in the case of foreign countries as well. It is said that "reduc-
ing costs", "taking advantage of special skills" and "responding flexibly 
to fluctuations in demand" are the three main reasons for subcontracting 
in Japan (Chüshö Kigyöchö 1988: 107). In the case of PCB assembly, the 
first and last factors are important to the manufacturers. Thus, there must 
be other conditions that prevent Japanese transplants from subcontracting 
PCB assembly. Taiwan's case is very suggestive on this point. 
Transplant TA subcontracts assembly of PCBs, not for TV sets, which 
are assembled in the plant, but for audio apparatus. About 15% of the 
total work volume is subcontracted to three suppliers. TA started to sub-
contract arrangement work in 1971, two years after the establishment of 
the plant, and in 1976 it began subcontracting of PCB assembly. The trans-
actions with these three subcontractors have continued for about 10 years; 
the longest relationship has lasted 14 years. Each subcontractor has about 
100 employees. 
The Japanese manager of Transplant TA said the main reason for sub-
contracting was to respond to fluctuations in work volume, rather than 
to reduce costs. 
In Taiwan, wages are set at the Company level. But because of the high 
liquidity of labour, wage differentials tend not to increase. Transplant TA's 
wage level is almost the same as its subcontractors'. But the subcontracted 
cost is about 25% less than the in-house production cost, mainly because 
of lower overhead. 
The subcontracted price is determined in nearly the same way as in 
Japan. These subcontractors can respond to fluctuations in work volume 
more easily than the parent plant does, because they can hire workers 
quickly and use them flexibly; for example, they may operate on two shifts 
of part-timers, and they may even rely on further subcontracting. On the 
other hand, the defect rate for subcontracted PCBs is higher than that for 
units produced in-house. Therefore, when a new model is introduced to 
the subcontractor, staff from the parent plant's quality assurance depart-
ment and production engineering department are dispatched to the sub-
contractor for about 3 days in order to ensure a good start. 
It is clearly seen that in this case to "responding flexibly to fluctuations 
in demand" plays an important role in subcontracting, but it creates qual-
ity problems for the manufacturer. 
Transplant TB in Taiwan also has a defect rate problem with a subcon-
tractor. TB used to subcontract PCB assembly of audio apparatus, but gave 
up the practice for two reasons. The first was that the introduction of auto-
matic insertion machines reduced the assembly cost enough to cover the 
cost difference between the subcontractor and in-house production. The 
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wage level of the subcontractor is from 10 to 15% lower than that of TB. The 
second reason was that the introduction of the automatic machine also im-
proved the quality level of in-höuse PCBs, which highlighted the inferior 
quality level of the subcontractor. The defect rate of PCBs delivered from the 
subcontractor used to be 10-20%. (In the case of its parent plant in Japan, if 
the defect rate of the subcontractor reaches 1%, the parent plant dispatches 
its staff members to the subcontractor to improve the defect rate.) 
A high defect rate for subcontracted PCBs is also seen in Transplant 
G A in Germany. Formerly G A had dealt with two subcontractors, one of 
which closed its account with the plant afterward. The defect rate for the 
subcontracted PCBs from the other supplier after delivery is from 10 to 
15 times higher than that in Japan. 
Another example can be added. Transplant EB in the U.K. at one time 
tried to subcontract PCB assembly. But the trial ended in failure. The 
manager of EB said that the transactions could not be controlled well 
enough to stabilize the quality level of the subcontractor, which was so 
low that EB could not accept the assembled PCB. In his opinion, the local 
supplier cares so little about the quality of its products that no Japanese 
companies could deal with it. 
These cases clearly show that the quality is the other reason why Ja-
panese transplants cannot subcontract PCB assembly as their parent 
plants in Japan do. Even in Taiwan, where transactions with the suppliers 
have many similarities with those in Japan, manufacturers cannot rely 
heavily on the subcontractors, mainly because of quality problems. 
Lately a new type of procurement is gaining popularity: the inter-
national procurement of PCB assembly. Transplant EA in the U.K. and 
Transplant A A in the U.S. have begun to procure assembled PCBs from 
their sister plant in Malaysia. Company B's parent plant in Japan has 
begun to import assembled PCBs from Transplant MB in ASEAN, and its 
Transplant AB in the U.S. assembles chassis for import to Japan. The rea-
sons for international procurement seem to be, on the one hand, to reduce 
cost and, on the other, to utilize the idle capacity of one plant to supply 
PCBs for a busier plant. This means that international procurement begins 
to be a partial Substitute for domestic subcontracting. 
4 . CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The most remarkable difference, in terms of the manufacturer-supplier 
relationships between Japanese parent plants in the electronics industry 
and their transplants is the almost complete absence of PCB assembly 
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subcontracting in the latter. The biggest reason for this is the small wage 
differentials in foreign countries. As a countermeasure, transplants must 
assemble all PCBs by themselves or partially import from Japan or another 
country. 
This Situation clearly shows that large wage differentials in Japan, or 
the dual structure of the labour market, constitute a very important basis 
for the wide-spread subcontracting system in Japan. The dual wage struc-
ture influences a great deal the "make-or-buy" problem of the firm; that 
is, it sets the boundaries of the firm, as seen in in-house production of 
PCB assembly in transplants. 
It is, however, at the same time clear that wage differentials are not the 
only reason for subcontracting, because a few transplants have intended 
to subcontract PCB assembly in spite of the small cost differences. If cir-
cumstances would permit, transplants would begin, or expand, the sub-
contracting of PCB assembly. It is clear that the absence of PCB assembly 
subcontracting in foreign countries depends on other factors. Specifically, 
quality is the most serious obstacle to PCB assembly subcontracting. But 
the quality problem itself must be a product of the existing level of the 
supplier's ability and the nature of the transactions. If these conditions 
can change, subcontracting of PCB assembly may be made practicable 
without large wage diffentials. 
Taiwan's case makes this point clear from another angle. Although sub-
contracting of PCB assembly can seldom be done even in Taiwan, the 
nature of the transaction seems to be similar to that in Japan in plastic 
parts subcontracting, which does not have large wage differentials. In this 
type of subcontracting, it seems that the difference does not lie between 
Japan and other countries, but between Japan and Taiwan on the one 
hand, and Europe on the other. This implies three things. First, sub-
contracting can be similar to that in Japan even without wage differentials. 
Second, similarity is possible even where there are different historical and 
cultural backgrounds. Third, it seems, however, at least so far, that no 
similarity is possible in Europe. 
What makes the difference between Japan and Taiwan, in Asia and 
Europe? Here certainly lies a key to the Solution of the question in the 
opening paragraph, to which this case study cannot supply an adequate 
answer. To answer the question, more detailed investigation of each 
country's society and culture will be necessary. 
But it is possible to point out here some differences in the type of trans-
action between Japan and Europe, which Japanese managers of trans-
plants themselves recognize and complain about. Because the crux of the 
problem lies in the nature of the transactions, the discussion might help 
further investigation. 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
First, concerning the position of the supplier, a number of Japanese 
managers are impressed by the fact that the supplier's position is equal 
to or higher than that of the manufacturer in Europe, which is unimagi-
nable in Japan. It is natural for a manufacturer in Japan to expect various 
kinds of Service from a supplier, even when it is a big enterprise, because 
the manufacturer is the customer. The supplier tends to offer Services in 
order to obtain Orders and raise its share of the manufacturer's purchas-
ing. One may think this is natural between a big manufacturer and a small 
supplier, but it also applies to the relationship between big companies. 
For example, the delivery of electronic parts from big suppliers once fol-
lowed a custom named the "cock system", under which parts suppliers 
of their own accord kept a stock of parts in the manufacturer's warehouse. 
Not until the manufacturer took the parts out of its own warehouse was 
the sale formally transacted. This system is still used in a few companies, 
although it has been slightly changed. It was a kind of Service performed 
by the supplier for the manufacturer. 
It is also natural for a Japanese supplier to comply with various requests 
from the manufacturer - for example, making a new type of part, cutting 
costs, shortening lead-time - in order to get a higher share of the manufac-
turer's business. In Europe, by contrast, existing products, costs and its 
lead-time are preconditions set by the European supplier, and it is up to the 
manufacturer to decide whether tobuy or not. If the products are not accept-
able to the manufacturer, the latter had better search for another supplier. 
Japanese managers have other complaints. A supplier in Europe tends 
to dislike Intervention by the manufacturer in its business, and it does not 
want to submit breakdowns of its price quotations, which is a precondi-
tion for the manufacturer in Japan; the equality of the two parties is the 
source of these complaints. 
Second, transactions in Europe are negotiated one by one. In Japan, 
after a basic contract document has been signed, each side of the transac-
tion assumes that it will last a long time. In Europe, each individual con-
tract plays a very important role. As a result, for example, the supplier 
can sometimes charge extra for an advance in the delivery date, which is 
hardly done in Asia. 
The third difference is related. Japanese managers insist that European 
suppliers' greatest concern is to carry out the terms of the contract, that 
is, to meet the quality Standards and delivery date which the original 
contract prescribes.3 The supplier often says that if the manufacturer re-
3 But this difference seems to be a matter of degree. Non-contractual practices are 
common in many routine transactions, even in such a litigious society as the 
U.S. (cf. Macaulay 1963). 
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quires better quality products, it should re-order the products at higher 
prices that reflect the higher quality. To meet a certain quality Standard is 
its responsibility, but to improve it is not. In connection with this, our 
respondents reported that European suppliers wil l not accept Orders for 
which design drawings are not completed. 
In contrast, it is important for a Japanese supplier to endeavour to im-
prove the quality and shorten the lead-time of its products in order to 
continue the relationship. It is also usual for a supplier to accept an order 
for which the design drawing is "like a comic picture" and to comply 
with changes in the delivery dates. In the case of plastic parts procurement 
in the U.K., as we noted, the manufacturer prefers to deal with Japanese 
transplants, not because of their existing Performance but because of their 
willingness to make improvements. 
These complaints of Japanese managers overseas are helpful in clari-
fying the elements of the manufacturer-supplier relationship in Japan. 
These include the stronger position of the manufacturer, a long-lasting 
transaction relationship, the ambiguity of contracts and improvement-
oriented transactions, factors which are certainly all linked. 4 It is safe to 
say that these are important factors in determining whether the transac-
tion of subcontracting in other countries will become similar to that in 
Japan, or not. So far, because transactions in many countries bear a differ-
ent character from that in Japan, especially in Europe, transplants prefer 
to deal with Japanese suppliers' transplants, in both plastic parts and 
electronic parts. 
Whether the Japanese type of transaction can be transferred to other 
countries, or to what degree it can be transferred, time alone will teil. This 
case study shows there are many obstacles which lie outside the realm of 
an individual company's own discretion, both in economic respects and 
in social and cultural respects. 
A long-lasting transaction never means a long-term transaction in which con-
ditions are carefully planned and fixed, based on an estimation of a long-term 
trends in future suppiy-demand relations. On the contrary, both parties to the 
transaction are expected to adjust themselves flexibly to changes in the course 
of the conditions in the long-lasting transaction (Tamura 1986: 133). Thus am-
biguity of the contract and an improvement-oriented attitude are indispensable 
to a long-lasting transaction. 
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PROBLEMS OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AT PLANT 
LEVEL IN THE COMPONENT SUPPLY INDUSTRY IN THE 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
Reinhard Doleschal 
ABSTRACT 
The German automobile component industry is one of the most important and 
most innovative among those of the Western industrialized nations. It is highly 
internationalized through its export and foreign branches. Well-known conglom-
erates as well as many small and medium-sized spezialized firms are typical for 
this industry. Due to massive pressure caused by international competition, the 
practice of co-determination at just-in-time plants is considerably restrained. Deci-
sions made at these plants have a major impact on the suppliers' Operations and 
procedures. Thus, just-in-time concepts paralyze the so far most important co-de-
termination rights of the suppliers' works Council with respect to social and per-
sonnel matters. Existing patterns, institutions and instruments of industrial rela-
tions are by no means an obstacle to structural changes. Trade unions are remark-
ably hesitant in responding to this structural change and the entailing shifts of 
power in the supplier-purchaser relationship. So far, they are still at the stage of 
inter-plant exchange of information and experiences. As far as collective bargaining 
is concerned, the new problems arising from change have not yet been really dealt 
with. For the German industry-wide trade unions the present main problem is that 
of changing organizational responsibility. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper deals with some of the problems which have entailed reor-
ganization or systemic rationalization (cf. Altmann et al., 1986; Altmann 
and Sauer, 1989) in the West German automobile and automobile com-
ponent industry, and which have recently been linked with the catchword 
lean production (cf. Womack et al, 1990). This concerns relations within 
and between manufacturers and suppliers along the lines of logistic value-
added chains (cf. Doleschal 1990a). In this paper I will discuss in detail 
how far this process of organizational change affects industrial relations. 
In this context and from a sociological point of view, the behaviour of 
industrial actors and the framework of their behaviour within the firms 
are of particular interest. 
The enormous success of Japanese car manufacturers in international 
markets and the imponderability of the development of the Single 
European Market shocked West German car manufacturers. As a reac-
tion to the so-called Japanese challenge they have started since the mid-
1980s to increase the flexibility of production and assembly by reor-
ganizing their component supply in order to respond more quickly to 
new marketing concepts. One strategy to improve the shrinking return 
on investment, which in turn was a consequence of the rising invest-
ment expenditure, was to rearrange the complete development and pro-
duction process (of parts, components, and assembly) so that long idle 
times are avoided. By means of extensive computer-aided evaluation, 
selection, and control car manufacturers proceeded to optimize every 
stage of development and supply. This was to reduce development time 
as well as production lead time of parts and components. Specialized 
suppliers feature a more lucrative cost structure in cases of variety pro-
duction. This speeded up a successive reduction of in-house production 
at the final manufacturers' plants and gradually led to a segmentation 
of purchasing and materials management. Thus in the Federal Republic 
of Germany a Situation has emerged in which suppliers - which apart 
from a few exceptions used to be formally independent of the car in-
dustry - produce less and less for an anonymous market. On the other 
hand they have not turned into mere dependants of the car manufac-
turers but are becoming increasingly active in intensive technological 
Cooperation and transfer of know-how with respect to manufacturer-
specific research and production. However, it has to be stressed that 
the reorganization of the supply system does not follow the lines of 
well-planned and tested concepts. Instead, the process must be viewed 
as a "search phase with experimental character" (Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. 
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1990: 97ff.). Each firm with its specific ränge of products, firm structure 
and potentials still has to find its optimal and adequate organizational 
form. 
These technical and organizational strategies are limited neither to cer-
tain manufacturers nor to certain countries.1 Thus, the following question 
arises: What are the effects of these experiments on industrial relations 
within and between the firms? How do they change structures and sub-
stances of industrial relations? And to what an extent do they affect the 
framework of industrial relations within the firm? 
Industrial relations in Germany consist of two structural elements: the 
dual system of intra-firm labour representation ("shop Stewards" (Ver-
trauensleute) and works Councils set up by the Works Constitution Act 
(Betriebsverfassungsgesetz)), and the whole body of labour and social 
legislation (including freedom of association, right of industrial action, 
dismissal protection, the Labor Promotion Law, etc.). Both account for a 
highly regulated system of industrial relations. Thus, the question arises 
of how far just-in-time projects still belong to the "traditional" pattern of 
bi- or trilaterally regulated and influenced proceedings and how far pre-
sent regulations of industrial relations are still de facto of relevance. When 
in the following the component industry is mentioned, this only refers to 
firms which feature works Councils according to the Works Constitution 
Act. 
According to the Works Constitution Act, in firms with more than 
five employees the work force is entitled to elect a works Council. The 
number of Council members depends upon the total number of em-
ployees in the firm. In firms with up to 9,000 employees, the Council 
consists of 31 members. That number rises by two for each additional 
3,000 employees. In firms with more than 300 employees the law pro-
vides for the possibility that one member is exempted from the duty to 
work (and thus being free for full-time representation tasks). However, 
one has to keep in mind that of the total of 336,561 firms in the "o ld" 
F.R.G. with some 8.2 million employees within the manufacturing sector 
(Statistisches Bundesamt 1991), only 33,000 feature a works Council (cf. 
Kittner 1991: 427). One reason for this is that of the total number of 
firms 326,328 have less than 100 employees, totalling a work force of 
some 2.5 million. 
We know from studies on industrial relations within small and me-
dium-sized firms that in firms with less than 100 employees there is only 
Italian and French manufacturers are also forced to adapt their policies to new 
international challenges. 
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a small number of works Councils (cf. Hilbert and Sperling 1990: 178; 
Bosch 1989; Weimer 1983). Wassermann (1991) estimates that works 
Councils have been established in only 2,500 firms - of a total of 18,000 
firms in the metal industry employing between 6 and 49 workers. The 
largest firms (10,233 firms with more than 100 employees each) employ 
5.7 million people; those that employ a work force of more than 1,000 
have a total work force of some 3.4 million. That amounts to 41% of the 
whole work force in the manufacturing sector. While in nearly all of the 
large firms and plants works Councils have been established, this is rarely 
the case in small firms with less than 100 employees. 
From the assumption that in almost all firms with more than 200 em-
ployees a Council exists, one has to conclude that among the remaining 
331,399 firms only 27,851 do have a works Council. Proceeding further 
from the assumption that two thirds (3,347) of the firms with 100 to 199 
employees have a Council, then only 24,504 (7.5%) of the remaining firms 
(i.e. 326,328) feature a works Council. Now the Works Constitution Act 
provides for one Council member to be exempted from work only in firms 
with more than 300 employees. These figures and facts lead to the con-
clusion that professional and permanent work of the works Council can 
only be highly effective in firms of that size and larger ones (cf. Hilbert 
and Sperling 1990: 178). But if one assumes that in almost all firms with 
more than 200 employees (5,162) a works Council does exist, then these 
Councils represent no less than a total of 5.04 million employees, amount-
ing to 61,4% of the total work force of the manufacturing sector within 
the "old" Federal Republic of Germany. Thus some 3.2 million employees 
in 331,339 firms with less than 200 employees each are represented by 
only 27,850 Councils. This amounts to a mere 8.4% of all firms with fewer 
than 200 employees. 
Thus, we primarily deal with medium and large suppliers, which in 
the subcontracting hierarchy (cascade) mainly belong to the first, and per-
haps to the second and third level. In this context in the F.R.G., too, the 
subcontracting hierarchy ranges from direct suppliers of the first level 
over several stages down to homework on contract in peripheral areas. 
This is not at all a Japanese particularity. 
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2. T H E G E R M A N C O M P O N E N T SUPPLY INDUSTRY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
The "old" Federal Republic of Germany, with its roughly 3,600 component 
supply firms that employ a work force of some 780,000, is the most rele-
vant supply country within the EC (cf. Doleschal 1990b). Among those 
3,600 identified German suppliers, there are some 15 just-in-time firms, 
working assembly-synchronously, which produce and deliver complete 
seats, door modules, or bumper Systems in sequences of 20 minutes. There 
are about 800 to 1,000 just-in-time firms which produce and deliver on 
daily schedules. Finally there are some 2,600 to 2,800 traditional com-
ponent suppliers with irregulär production and delivery schedules (cf. 
Doleschal 1990b and Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Automobile supplier pyramid in the F.R.G. 
approx. 30% of all firms 
90% of total employment 
90% of total turnover 
Assembly-synchronous 
JIT-production 
10-15 plants in 1990 





Source: Survey by the author. 
In this group of suppliers some 90% of the work force produces for the 
automobile industry, and 90% of the turnover of this group is obtained 
from supplying the car manufacturers. If component industries are con-
sidered only in a narrow sense, the F.R.G. has a lead in this sector, insofar 
as it features 600 firms and 310,000 employees (cf. Doleschal 1991 and 
Figure 2). 
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In contrast to the other EC member states, Germany features a more 
balanced ratio of large, medium and small firms, which adequately fulfill 
complementary functions within the vertically structured supply in-
dustry. Other West European countries often lack supply firms of the me-
dium-sized group. Frequently they are "producers according to blue-
prints" without a considerable potential in research and development (cf. 
Lane 1991). This is one of the reasons for the fact that the West European 
automobile industry procures nearly all of the sophisticated components 
from German firms. More simple commodities based on steel, iron, or 
plastics as well as standardized and electrical parts, in contrast, are also 
obtained from peripheral West European countries. This is remarkable in 
particular because, for instance, in Great Britain, France and Italy there 
are also some large component suppliers, which operate on an inter-
national level. Some of these are independent from the car manufacturing 
industry, possess R&D (research and development) facilities of their own, 
and have branch plants in Germany and other European countries. Some 
of them (e.g. ECIA, A C G , Magneti Marelli, Teves) belong to larger Amer-
ican or European concems of the automobile or electrical industry (e.g. 
FIAT, Peugeot, G M , ITT). 
Like other branches and industries, the German automobile component 
supply industry is highly concentrated with respect to employment and 
turnover. About 20 suppliers within the area of the "o ld" F.R.G. employ 
a work force of more than 10,000 each, approximately 60 firms employ 
more than 2,000 each, and around 100 firms 1,000 each. The largest West 
German component supplier has more than 60,000 employees working 
only in the car component sector (cf. Doleschal 1990a). Thus, it can be 
assumed that, with a few exceptions, we will find a works Council in 
virtually all of the 180 largest automobile component suppliers' plants. If 
the estimate for the car component supply industry is based on the usually 
applicable central works Council ratio, then 10% of the total number of 
3,600 firms do have a Council. 
The largest 180 component suppliers are usually either limited liability 
companies (GmbH) or Joint stock corporations. In most cases they have 
branch plants within Germany or abroad. Also, they usually possess large 
R&D departments. They therefore have traditionally also been suppliers 
of new developments and, more recently, of Systems or modules. To 
achieve this and the ability to deliver just-in-time call-offs, they sometimes 
install new plants. In these plants, however, one can observe a geographic 
Separation of R&D centers from production and assembly plants: the latter 
are usually installed close to auto factories. This is reflected in a plant-
specific qualification profile of the work force. 
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3 . W O R K S C O U N C I L POLICIES A N D CO-DETERMINATION PROBLEMS 
I N SUPPLIERS' PLANTS UNDER CONDITIONS OF INCREASING VERTICAL 
RELATIONSHIP A N D JUST-IN-TIME PRODUCTION 
In general, one can assume that regulations and subjects of industrial 
relations within the German automobile component industry de facto 
differ significantly from those of the automobile industry itself or other 
industries, although - de jure - they are subject to the same regulatory 
framework. The reasons are, on the one hand, the specific size-structure 
of the industry's firms and plants and, on the other hand, the structural 
dependency upon the oligopolistically structured automobile industry. 
While large firms of the automobile component industry feature, by 
and large, formalized and well-established relations among management, 
trade unions and works Councils, forms of negotiation and co-determina-
tion become less formalized and regulated, the smaller the observed plant 
is. Often, pattems of "shadow co-determiniation'' do emerge, which ex-
clude those actors that are envisaged by both trade unions and the law 
(cf. Hilbert and Sperling 1990: 177). Moreover, suppliers usually belong 
to different industry-wide unions and employer associations. In-company 
actors, therefore, are subject to specific pay agreements and deviating col-
lective norms, which basically result from the respective strength, degree 
of work force Organization and policy of each trade union. 
Works Councils do not have co-determination rights with respect to 
management decisions, e.g. those concerning Investments, relocation or 
new installations of plants, implementation of new machinery, and 
other economic factors. The Works Constitution Act provides only for 
a right to information when fundamental interests of the work force 
are at stake. Consequently, management tends to address the works 
Councils only when conflicts concerning personnel are to be avoided or 
a smooth execution of unpopulär decisions is wanted. For firms con-
sisting of one central and several branch or just-in-time production 
plants - which may be dispersed all over Europe - it is therefore of 
great significance on which level negotiations and exchange of infor-
mation between management and works Councils take place. The most 
important person on the side of the works Councils is in most cases the 
chairman of the central works Council,2 who indeed is usually best 
2 To avoid coordination problems in a firm with several plants, § 47 of the Works 
Constitution Act demands the establishment of a central works Council (Gesamt-
betriebsrat), to which each Single works Council delegates a maximum of two of 
its members. According to § 50 ofthe Works Constitution Act the general Council 
is competent on matters concerning the whole firm and on matters concerning 
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informed. Works Councils in branch or just-in-time plants, therefore, 
significantly depend on this chairman's willingness to cooperate and 
to share information. However, it is self-evident that the chairman tends 
to represent, in the first place, the interest of "his" plant, whose work 
force has elected him. 
The managers of the branch plant often find themselves in a similar 
interest configuration. They, too, depend on the favour and willingness 
to share information of the central management. In particular in those 
cases where branch plants of the same Company compete with each other, 
sometimes quite unusual coalitions of management and labour emerge 
within one dependent plant. For both are "wedged" between the interests 
of the central management and the targets and requirements of the auto-
mobile industry. Thus, when particular interests of the branch are at stake, 
frequently coalitions are formed within the branch plant that are directed 
against both central management and the central works Council. Spurred 
by the intention to strengthen its own position within the Company, the 
management of the branch plant - supported by the works Council - enters 
into a "contract with the devil", i.e., with the automobile industry. How-
ever, not only does this entail the dilution of so far valid rules of industrial 
relations within the component firm, but it also means that existing Space 
for manoeuvre in co-determination areas like personnel or Organization 
of the council's work is being restricted. In general, however, it can be 
claimed that actors within branch and just-in-time plants are more and 
more excluded from fundamental decisions concerning economical, tech-
nical, or organizational areas. For such basic decisions are usually made 
by the central management and the car manufacturer whereas the job of 
the branch plant management is confined to smooth execution. Thus, we 
have not only a puppet-employer (cf. Trümner 1990: 166ff.) but also a 
puppet works Council, with both having only marginal influence on fun-
damental decisions. 
Apart from these structural disadvantages, another has to be men-
tioned: While the members of the works Councils or central works Councils 
(or at least their chairmen) of the mother plants are usually "profession-
als" who have developed a certain mode of communication and negotia-
tion, members of the works Councils of the branch plants are usually much 
less experienced. In addition to this, branch just-in-time plants with 
around 300 employees have only one full-time Council member, who is 
normally burdened with most of the problems and work. The chairman 
is also very often the only addressee for trade union matters. Thus, he 
also is in Charge of organizational tasks, membership recruiting, and serv-
several plants of the firm (cf. Däubler 1991:160ff.). 
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ices for the trade union members. However, there are often disputes be-
tween works Councils and the trade unions o n questions of work condi-
tions, working hours and pay Systems. 
Thus, for inexperienced works councillors it is quite a task to handle 
organizational matters competently with respect to both their social im-
plications and to their compliance with laws and collective industrial 
agreements. 
4 . JUST-IN-TME PRODUCTION EXPERIMENTS A N D PROBLEMS OF W O R K 
CONDITIONS 
Within newly established "green-field-plants", time-tested and well-tried 
social structures and industrial relations do not exist. Therefore, manage-
ment often acts intuitively and pragmatically rather than according to 
legal or collectively agreed regulations. N e w just-in-time plants are also 
labs for new forms of work Organization, of working time, of shift sched-
uling, and of pay Systems. However, in contrast to the automobile in-
dustry, most suppliers are reluctant to introduce new patterns of work 
Organization. Predominantly, they still rely on assembly lines and com-
puter-aided PPS (production planning and steering system). 
In rural areas or those with structural disadvantages, deviation from 
formal regulations is no exception. Far away from the mother plant and 
trade union control, management can enforce decisions which are out of 
line with established regulations. Agreements are often made verbally 
and revised only when required. D u e to the lack of experience or power, 
works Councils go along in most cases. 
Moreover, today there are hardly any works Councils in the F.R.G. 
which fundamentally oppose technical or organizational innovation. 
Until the 1980s works Councils mainly pursued a policy of impeding in-
novation, and in doing so they were backed up by the trade unions. Today, 
disagreement is basically confined to personnel, social and pay policies. 
4.1. JLT Production and Working Time 
Suppliers to the automobile industry - and in particular just-in-time 
plants - are subjected to increasingly stricter targets with respect to quality 
and short-notice call-offs. Whether they like it or not, these requirements 
can only be met through a more flexible deployment of personnel as in 
most cases technical capacities do not suffice to reach the flexibility targets 
otherwise. Extra hours up to the very limit which is legally permitted -
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and sometimes beyond - are by no means exceptional. Consequently, if 
a supplier has at his disposal several branch plants with the same or sim-
ilar equipment, he will place "critical" Orders with those plants where 
overtime is met with hardly any resistance. It is also quite common for 
subtasks which cannot be executed during the normal weekly working 
hours to be subcontracted (with trade unions ignoring the practice) to 
smaller suppliers where work continues over the weekend. While this 
type of rule-dodging is tolerated by the works Councils, at least in boom 
periods, relocation of production abroad is more clearly viewed as a threat 
to job security. In spite of being more and more tied to the automobile 
industry, its suppliers - for technical as well as organizational reasons -
are hardly ever able to adopt the working-time patterns of the former. On 
the contrary, as they are integrated into assembly-synchronous produc-
tion, they have to make their working-time schedules as flexible as 
possible with respect to that of the manufacturer. 
Within the automobile industry, with the emergence of a wide ränge 
of different shift work schedules, work attendance time is becoming more 
and more detached from collectively agreed individual working hours. 
In some shops production has become virtually uninterrupted (fully con-
tinuous shift model); there are plants with four shifts lasting 10 hours 
each, and there are factories with regulär night shifts. In many cases sup-
pliers experiment with similar models. However, some of these have 
proved to be counter productive. 
4.2. JTT Production and Wages 
A further significant factor in production decisions is the wage differential 
between different supply industries as well as between large and small 
firms. In some supply industries - e.g. textiles and paper (car interiors 
and furnishings) the average wage is 30% lower than that of the larger 
metal processing firms. Although for Strategie management decisions 
labour cost is only one factor among many others, it must not be under-
rated. This applies in particular to labour-intensive industries, whose pro-
ductivity is below average. In this respect they sometimes differ consid-
erably from just-in-time plants, which apply a more sophisticated tech-
nology and produce and deliver according to the principle of sequenced 
assembly. As for the wage system itself, in many cases a shift from the 
traditional pieeework rate to a variety of premium Systems can be ob-
served. In particular for just-in-time Systems, Performance according to 
targets is essential. Make-to-stock production is as little desired as are 
shortages. Thus, payment by piece rates no longer serves a purpose. In-
stead, quality and schedule effectiveness are rewarded. 
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However, in spite of all the euphoria over modernization and keenness 
to experimenting which can be observed in the supplier industry - and 
in particular in just-in-time firms - one must not forget that inside the 
supply pyramid there is also a vast number of firms that still apply the 
piece rate system and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future. 
4.3. JTT Production and Works Councils 
Works Council policy will not remain untouched by these technical and 
organizational changes in the supply industry. The closer suppliers - and 
especially JIT plants - cooperate with car manufacturers in organizational 
and technical matters; the more data processing and work proceedings 
are brought into line, the more difficult it will be for the works Councils 
to organize their work according to their own concepts. The problems 
start with scheduling employee meetings and extend to violations of the 
workers' right of complaint. In all activities of both employees and works 
Council one has to consider targets of and obligations to the automobile 
manufacturer. In cases of sequenced and thus ''time-critical'' production 
and delivery targets, there is hardly any space for works Council activities. 
It is true that works Councils in plants supplying component have always 
been in the strait-jacket of co-responsibility for meeting the requirements 
of the automobile industry. However, they used to have a better chance 
of forcing management to lay in safety Stocks. 
In tougher, internationally determined competition, works Councils are 
virtually stripped off this Strategie instrument. Usually, the works Council 
of the supplier has to Orient itself in line with the plans and agreements 
of the works Council of the car manufacturer. The supplier's works Council 
has no voice in these plans nor is it informed, although the decisions of 
the car manufacturer seriously affect the supplier. In the worst cases, the 
works Council of the manufacturer can also decide on extra hours, extra 
shifts or shorter working hours within the supplying plant. The schedul-
ing and duration of employees meetings - as provided for in the Works 
Constitution Act - may be externally determined, too. In order to ensure 
uninterrupted production, in JIT plants closely linked to final assembly 
employees' meetings have to be synchronized. As soon as production at 
the car manufacturer is interrupted, the JIT plants must swiftly respond. 
Works Councils of component suppliers are normally not informed of 
actions by the Councils of the car manufacturers. If they get information 
at all, it is only on matters which are legally subject to co-determination 
rules, at a point when it is too late to influence decisions without jeopard-
izing Orders and jobs. 
On the other hand, suppliers' works Councils have not really tried to 
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establish communication procedures with their counterparts at the man-
ufacturing plants. Communication has remained a sporadic affair. There 
is little interest on the side of manufacturers' works Councils to intensify 
and institutionalize such contacts. Often, members of these works Councils 
conceitedly refer to themselves in a "we-of-the-car-industry" fashion, 
keeping their distance from workers in the supply industries. 
With no formalized and institutionalized Cooperation between works 
Councils of the automobile manufacturers and those of the suppliers' and 
with trade unions being slow in encouraging informal networks - to en-
sure that Councils in the supplying plants receive quicker and better in-
formation - existing Cooperation and trade union strategies based on it 
mainly depend on personal contacts. In the past the large trade unions 
concentrated on assisting works Councils and shop Stewards of the auto-
mobile industry, because these in turn dominated trade union policy to a 
large extent. Only since the mid-1980s have we observed increased activi-
ties of the trade unions on both national and regional levels to integrate 
works Councils and shop Stewards in the supply industry. This is un-
doubtedly a result of just-in-time production and the increasing vertical 
integration of plants within the supply pyramid. 
5 . SUMMARY 
This contribution is intended to show that the increasing vertical and hori-
zontal integration of the automobile industry with its supply industry is 
a double-edged development. On the one hand, suppliers are becoming 
extremely dependent - in technical and organizational matters - on the 
automobile industry. On the other hand, this offers opportunities to mod-
ernize the firm. Make-or-buy decisions, reduction in the depth of produc-
tion, and just-in-time production take place in nearly all plants along the 
procurement chain and, in most cases, entail the relocation of non-profi-
table production departments. Thus, development is uneven in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany. While some firms successfully adjust to new 
conditions and manage to take advantage of the good aspects, for the 
majority of firms only less attractive areas remain. In their cases, prices 
are largely determined by labour costs. Consequently, relocations to low-
wage regions are no exception. 
As for industrial relations within the components supplying industry, 
there are a variety of styles and patterns resulting from the specific 
development of these firms. The size of the firm by no means determines 
the patterns of industrial relations: rather, these depend on specific factors 
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like structures of qualifications and production, location, and the respec-
tive firm's position within the supplier pyramid. 
The industrial relations of just-in-time suppliers whose production is 
sychronized to final assembly demonstrate how a number of time-tested 
rules and rights of co-determination are - de facto - being abolished, in-
dicating a significant weakening of labour representation within the arena 
of inner firms' industrial and social relations. Within the well-tried and 
by and large successful system of interest mediation, a vacuum appears 
that might endanger social peace within the firm and, consequently, just-
in-time production. Today, and against the background of our experiences 
with the Works Constitution Act of the "o ld" F.R.G., we are not yet able 
to teil whether informal agreements can Substitute for formal ones in the 
long run. The collective actors of industrial relations, i.e., trade unions 
and employer associations, and legislation do have to respond to the new 
Situation sooner or later. This is not going to be an easy task, for in the 
future rules and agreements must go beyond national frameworks. They 
must be compatible Europe-wide. Taking into consideration the diversity 
of European industrial relations, the task of establishing socially agreeable 
industrial relations in supplier networks that spread all over Europe 
amounts to a "squaring of the circle". 
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PRICE SETTING AND SUPPLIER SELECTION SYSTEM IN 




The purpose of this paper is to clarify the relationship between the efficiency of 
the Japanese System in Controlling parts prices and the Japanese customer-supplier 
and labour relations. From interviews with about 150 car and parts manufacturers 
in Japan, the U.S. A. and Europe, the following characteristics of the Japanese parts 
price control system have been determined. 
First, in the Japanese auto industry, the target price System is the key to control parts 
prices. In order to realize targets, cost reduction activities are pursued in the supplier 
companies. These activities can be observed nowhere in the world but in Japan. 
Second, Japanese car manufacturers control the suppliers' profit margins and its 
utilization: most of the small profits that suppliers have managed to make must 
be re-invested for expansion. This is the reason why Japanese parts suppliers have 
expanded although they have to offer very low prices to their customers. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In manufacturing industry, the price of a product is usually determined 
by adding a profit margin to its manufacturing cost. However, in setting 
prices for automotive parts in the Japanese auto industry, the target price 
is set first, followed by vigorous cost reduction activities until profitable 
production is achieved. This price-setting process can be compared with 
that of the European and American auto industries: 
Japan Price - Cost = Profit1 
Europe and U.S.A. Cost + Profit = Price 
The objective of this paper is to elucidate how the Japanese method of 
price setting works in actuality, how Japanese automotive parts manufac-
turers have been able to reduce their costs by applying this method, how 
Japanese suppliers have remained under the strict control of car manu-
facturers, and how and why the Western system of competitive bidding 
has been ritualized. Another objective is to examine whether the new 
management system called "Japanese management" in Western compa-
nies is equivalent to management in Japanese companies. 
2 . PRICE SETTING A N D SELECTION OF SUPPLIERS AT THE PRODUCT 
DEVELOPMENT STAGE 
The price for a product is determined at various stages of production: 
development, manufacturing and sales. The price setting at the product 
development stage is the most fundamental one, and the method used in 
the Japanese auto industry is very different from that applied in the 
European and American auto industries. The differences are clarified 
below. 
1 There are various methods by which Japanese auto manufacturers put pressure 
on their suppliers to control parts prices. For example, Toyota Motor Co. main-
tains a special relationship with its supplier companies called kanri genka höshiki 
(Control Cost System), where cost to manufacture parts is reduced while main-
taining the suppliers' profit level. To realize this, Toyota Supports its suppliers 
in their cost reduction activities. 
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2.1. Relationship between Price Setting and Supplier Selection at the 
Development Stage 
The basic characteristic of the traditional method of price setting for au-
tomotive parts in European and American auto industry when they 
develop a new model is that the selection of suppliers and the price setting 
are done at the same time through competitive bidding, as is shown in 
Figure 1. Generally speaking, European and American auto manufac-
turers develop a new model in their own design sections, and their reli-
ance through contracts on engineering companies and parts manufac-
turers at the design/development stages is only supplementary.2 Final 
design drawings are completed in the manufacturers' design depart-
Figure 1: Competitive bidding and introduction of target price System in the pro-




Design drawings (in-house) 
I 
Presentation of design drawings 
Proposal of supplier 
Competitive bidding 
1 
Preparation for mass production Prototypes for mass production 
1 1 
Start of production Delivery 
Source: Interviews in 1989 and 1990 with European and American car manufac-
turers and parts suppliers. 
Contract for development 
• Development cost 
• Delivery date 
• Target cost for mass production 
• Share of developer set 
2 In Western automobile companies, it is quite common to utilize engineering 
companies in the product development stage. For example, a typical engineer-
ing Company, Porsche A G in Germany, often receives an order to develop a new 
engine from car manufacturers and plays a very important role in the European 
automobile industry. 
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ments, and are sent to the purchasing departments, which then announce 
competitive bidding. 3 Parts manufacturers participate in the bidding by 
offering their price estimates, and the winners are awarded the title of 
supplier. Thus, the selection of suppliers and the estimating of prices are 
inseparable in the competitive bidding method. 
The relationship between the selection of suppliers and price setting for 
a new model in the Japanese auto industry is very different. As shown in 
Figure 2, in Japan, suppliers are usually selected from among parts manu-
facturers at the very beginning of the development stage, although the 
prices they offer will not be determined until designs in detail are completed 
or right before the start of mass production.4 Thus, in Japan, the selection of 
suppliers and price setting are clearly separate from each other. In the com-
Figure 2: Supplier selection and price setting in the product development stage 
of Japanese companies 
Product Planning 
Design drawings (in-house) 
Prototype manufacture and 
evaluation 
Preparation for mass production 
Start of production 
Supplier selection 
Design and development 




Source: Interviews with parts suppliers in Japan. 
There are many sorts of design drawings corresponding to each step of develop-
ment, from initial specification documents to final manufacturing drawings. 
Generally speaking, Western drawings are more detailed than Japanese draw-
ings, which do not give instructions in detail. This fact is deeply connected to 
the nature of contracts between customers and suppliers. 
Auto manufacturers become involved in development activities not only of af-
filiate companies but also of independent suppliers. Parts prices are determined 
just before mass production. But it is not unusual to launch mass production 
without payment agreements when price negotiation is extremly difficult. 
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petitive bidding method of Europe and America, the prices that suppliers 
can offer are controlled through competition among parts manufacturers. 
In Japan, as suppliers are selected before price setting, some other methods 
of Controlling suppliers in their setting of prices must be developed. 
2.2. Cost Reduction Activities at the Development Stage 
Japanese auto manufacturers try to control the prices that their suppliers 
can offer by setting target prices at the product development stage. In 
planning a new model, manufacturers first identify target customers and 
price levels for the new vehicle, then the features of the new model and 
the parts to be used, and finally the suppliers. The price of each automo-
tive part calculated from the vehicle price level is set as the target price 
for each and is announced to parts suppliers. Usually, these estimates 
exceed the target, sometimes by as much as 200%.5 
In order to lessen the gap between suppliers' estimates and the targets, 
specifications are reviewed to make them more practical. The main concern 
at this point is how to lower costs while maintaining the level of quality and 
functions. At the same time, research into cost reduction in terms of produc-
tion technology is undertaken by re-examining materials, the shape of the 
original design, processing and assembling methods, etc. Therefore, in 
Japan, suppliers are chosen at the initial stage of development, and, almost 
simultaneously, cost reduction activities begin and continue until prices are 
finally determined. Practical application of this method is different for each 
auto manufacturer in Japan; in the case of Company A, a representative auto 
manufacturer, for example, a staff member in Charge of relations with sup-
pliers is sent to work in the development section of the supplier for a year or 
more, directing cost reduction activities there, as shown in Figure 3. 
In Europe and America, such cost reduction activities based on target 
prices are unrealistic, because prices are already set when the suppliers are 
selected. European and American manufacturers are now beginning to see 
the advantages ofthe target price method, and in many cases they set the tar-
gets for mass-production prices when they draw up development contracts 
with their suppliers.6 However, this method still works within the frame-
work of contracts (see Figure 1) and is different from Japanese practices. 
5 The custom of giving target prices to suppliers is maintained not only in auto-
mobile industry but also in other industries such as the case in electric and 
electronics industries. 
6 In Western countries, price reduction requirements are thus included in the con-
tract. But in Japan, the contract generally does not include price or cost reduction 
requirements. 
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Figure 3: Process of reaching target price in Japanese companies 
Target price 
listimate in the first s>tage 
Cost reduction activities 
(Controlled by seconded 
manager from car manufacturer) 
Price adjustment 
Final price 
Source: Interviews with Japanese parts suppliers. 
3 . PRICE C H A N G E S , BIDDING A N D COST-REDUCTION ACTTVITIES AFTER THE 
START OF PRODUCTION 
3.1. Price-Cutting Requirement Every Six Months 
In Japan, prices of parts are determined at the last moment in the 
development process, and payments to suppliers are made according 
to price contracts. However, ever since the first " o i l shock", it has be-
come almost customary in Japan for auto manufacturers to request price 
cuts every six months, in response to which suppliers discount their 
prices. 7 Characteristics of the practical application of this custom are as 
follows: 
1) There are two kinds of price cutting methods; one is the pay-back Sys-
tem in which the supplier Company must pay some amount as the 
difference between the contract price and the discounted price from 
7 The actual forms of the semiannual price reduction differs from Company to 
Company. In order to give the total image of the Japanese system, I have de-
scribed these various ways here in parallel. 
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the already paid sales amount in the past six months, and the other is 
the price discount for the next six months.8 
2) The price cuts demanded by manufacturers are not broken down into 
prices for individual parts but rather are a total percentage of the sup-
pliers' amount of sales. 
3) Parts suppliers may pay total amounts as the difference between con-
tract price and discount price, and the total amount is then broken 
down into prices for individual parts by the supplier companies. 
4) The discount percentages for each component are examined part by 
part and the prices of special parts which are produced in small quan-
tity or just before the end of the model year are often drastically re-
duced'9 
5) Generally, as a price discount has a major influence on the next price 
negotiations, some supplier companies pay lump sums so as not to lose 
price negotiation capability in the future. 0 
6) As this price-cutting process has become customary, some auto manu-
facturers pay with, for example, a 5% discount on the contract prices 
from the very beginning of production. 
As the above outline of the process shows, production cost is not a starting 
point for price negotiation; rather, the price cutting comes first, and as a 
result cost reduction activity becomes necessary. If this kind of unrea-
sonable discounting is to be endured, cost reduction must be vigorously 
pursued on an everyday basis.11 And cost reduction capability is the sup-
8 Of course, as these kinds of paybacks are conducted sub rosa, it is impossible to 
obtain empirical evidence from companies. These descriptions are based on my 
interviews with Japanese parts suppliers and transplants in the U.S.A. in 1989. 
9 One Company, for example, had to reduce the price of parts whose remodelling 
is expected soon, from 420 Yen to 20 Yen, another Company lowered the price 
of a high-grade product manufactured in low quantity from 1.500 to 1.300 Yen. 
1 0 To demonstrate their Cooperation in price cutting, customers sometimes accept 
suppliers. When the supplier has sufficient technological capability and the cus-
tomer does not have enough cost analysis capability, the customer may be forced 
to accept the suppliers' offer without effective controls. 
1 1 One of the characteristics of Japanese cost-reduction activities is that they are 
controlled by the company's cost accounting section. In Western countries, the 
cost accounting section only analyzes the results of accounting and points out 
the problems it has found. The cost accounting section never is directly involved 
in cost reduction activities. Such difference is related to differences in job Classi-
fication and work Organization between the lapanese and Western industrial 
societies. 
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plier's most important asset in order to maintain a steady relationship 
with a car manufacturer.12 
3.2. Price-Cutting Requirements in Developing a New Model 
A n opportunity for price altera tion also arises when a forthcorning model 
is put on the development agenda. In general, parts prices for the new 
model are not set from Scratch but are determined on the basis of those 
for an older model. In such a case, prices of new parts are set according 
to their design differences in comparison with the older ones. To put the 
matter more concretely, differences in materials, the processing stage, etc., 
must be distinct to give a good reason for higher prices for new parts. If 
auto manufacturers do not change their parts specifications for the new 
model and parts manufacturers just follow the old ones, the parts for the 
new model must be supplied at the same, old prices. Therefore, if parts 
suppliers want to raise their prices, they must try hard to make design 
changes persuasive enough for manufacturers to accept. In fact, parts 
manufacturers constantly endeavour to improve their products, which 
results in the advancement of their technology. Thus the development of 
new technology proceeds along with cost reduction activities in the Ja-
panese auto industry.13 
Price reduction requirements for parts are also given to the suppliers 
at the time of development of a new model. Auto manufacturers set espe-
cially low target prices for new models in order to reduce the manufac-
turing cost of new models and parts suppliers make every effort to realize 
Of course, even in Japan, the essence of competition is price. However, what is 
important here is cost reduction capability rather than each individual price. In 
order to maintain a steady business relationship, suppliers have to meet the 
requirements of customers. The customer Company always watches over its Per-
formance and tries to control its suppliers' management strategy whenever nec-
essary. Thus, a Japanese business relationship can be called an "inter-company 
relationship", which is very different from that of Western companies built upon 
"contracts on an individual commodity base". 
The meaning of "technology" used in Japan has to be re-examined. Generally, 
Japanese manufacturers have a special section called "manufacturing engineer-
ing" (seizö gijutsü) separate from "process engineering" or "production tech-
nology" (seisan gijutsu) section. This manufacturing engineering section usually 
deals with kaizen (improvement) activities mainly related to work Organization 
and the improvement of production processes. Of course, these activities always 
deal with technological matters and sometimes are based upon a newly 
developed process technology. However, the main purpose of these activities is 
to save labour; thus, Japanese technical innovation places strong focus on the 
development of labour-saving technology. 
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these targets. If, however, supplier companies want to maintain or in-
crease their profits, they have to develop new products with new ideas 
or technologies. Higher prices or added value can be realized when these 
ideas or technologies are accepted by manufacturers' design engineers. 
Thus, development of new products or production technologies in sup-
plier companies becomes necessary under severe price-cutting pressure 
from manufacturers.14 
4 . RTTUAUSM OF COMPETITIVE BIDDING IN THE WESTERN SUPPLY INDUSTRY 
In the European and American auto industries, systematic cost reduction 
activities like those in the Japanese industry can rarely be observed. Of 
course, prices once decided through competitive bidding are revised 
every year, and auto manufacturers try to cut prices by repeating com-
petitive bidding. Until very recently, however, the position of parts man-
ufacturers has been so strong that, paradoxically, the prices have begun 
to rise. The reason why this happens will be given below. 
4.1. Car Manufacturers' Inäbility to Control Their Suppliers in the Western 
Auto Industry 
Two cases will illustrate the problems related to exercising price control 
over suppliers in the Western automobile industry. 
Case 1: Inäbility to Control Parts Prices in American Industry 
In Western countries, customer companies very often cannot reject sup-
pliers' demands for price increases. In one case, an American car manufac-
turer sponsored competitive bidding based on rough design drawings and 
rough specifications. A n American parts manufacturer joined this bidding 
with extremely low price estimates without concrete technical backup, in 
order to undercut the price offered by a Japanese transplant. The order was 
given to the American Company. In producing prototypes, however, this 
supplier Company had to change its original specifications and design 
In recent years, improvement in manufacturing engineering has come to an end, 
making more fundamental examination of manufacturing processes and pro-
duct technologies necessary. Thus, more attention is given to further improve-
ment of product technologies or re-examination of the entire manufacturing 
process from original design drawings to mass-production process. This is the 
reason why simultaneous (synchronized) engineering between the design 
drawing and the process engineering sections has become even more important. 
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drawings owing to the parts' lack of sufficient strength and function, and 
was likewise forced to request price increases. In this case, the customer 
Company could not reject this request and the final price became higher than 
that offered by the competitors in the original bidding. 1 5 
Case 2: Change ofPurchase Prices from British Parts Supplier 
The case of one British Company illustrates an actual Situation of sup-
plier control as it is resulting from a traditional customer-supplier re-
lationship in a European Company. Table 1 shows the percentage of 
price reduction in the British Company. In this Company, when half the 
employees were laid off in 1983, all members of the purchasing section 
were made redundant. To reorganize the section, one engineer was 
moved to the position of chief buyer. As an engineer who could evaluate 
processing methods and price levels of each part, he found that all parts 
were too expensive. He began to examine all prices and design draw-
ings and started negotiating to reduce the prices with his suppliers. As 
a result, 30 to 40% reductions of parts prices for 200 items were realized 
within six months.1 6 
Table 1: Reduction of purchase price: British parts supplier (in 1983) 
Level of new price No. of parts 
+ 21 % 1 
+ 2% 1 
- 0 - 9% 9 
- 10 - 19 % 8 
- 20 - 29 % 13 
- 30 - 39 % 6 
- 40 - 49 % 8 
- 50 - 59 % 8 
- 60 - 69 % 5 
- 70 - 79 % 4 
- 80 - 89 % 1 
93 % 1 
Total no. of parts 65 
According to interviews, the total number of the items whose prices were reduced 
was about 200. 
Source: Unpublished document of a British parts manufacturing Company. 
From my interview in 1989 with the Japanese transplant in Tennessee, U.S.A. 
From my interview in 1982 with a British parts manufacturer conducted to-
gether with Prof. Masayoshi Ikeda of Chüö University, Tokyo. 
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Several Factors to Ritualize the Competitive Bidding 
The basic reasons for the difficulties in Controlling the parts prices are as 
follows: Generally speaking, supplier companies want to maintain 
sovereignty in setting their prices; even if they are small or medium-sized 
companies, it is common to add some percentage of profit (1% or 2% 
higher than the interest rate) to the manufacturing costs. It is also quite 
common to keep Orders, receivable from one major customer at less than 
30% of total Orders, to avoid being controlled by big companies. As a 
result, customers and suppliers are independent from each other in West-
ern countries in a way that is completely different from the Situation in 
Japan. 
Another factor in the ritualization of competitive bidding is the exist-
ence of an agreement between car and parts manufacturers. For example, 
in case of the American auto industry, assemblers purchase parts from 
in-house parts-producing divisions even if their price is 5% higher than 
that of outside suppliers. Also, in the European auto industry, as the num-
ber of parts suppliers has been reduced, it is quite easy for parts suppliers 
to reach "gentlemen's agreements" to maintain prices.1 7 
Big parts manufacturers in the Western auto-components industry are 
sometimes bigger than car manufacturers and are suppliers to the aero-
space, military or electronics industry as well, with key technology in 
engines, transmissions, brakes and so on. It is impossible for car manu-
facturers to control parts prices and select suppliers with a free hand be-
cause of their monopolistic positions.18 
Revision of Traditional Price-setting Practices 
European and American auto manufacturers have just begun to im-
prove their traditional price-setting practices by introducing a long-term 
contract system, under which they encourage facility Investments on 
the part of parts manufacturers and try to realize systematic price re-
ductions.1 9 As is shown in Figure 4, they try to make contracts with 
their suppliers on a long-term basis, ranging from 3 to 5 years, or cover-
From my interview in 1990 with Japanese transplants in Spain. 
From my interviews in 1990 with German auto manufacturers and suppliers. 
Pricing policies of Western companies differ from that of Japanese. In Western 
companies, prices differ according to the cost. Therefore, when a product is pro-
duced with old and depreciated equipment, its price becomes very cheap. This 
pricing is economically quite logical, but it tends to result in the lowering of 
manufacturing capability and the technological level. Here, we can observe the 
fundamental contradiction between economical thinking and manufacturing 
capability or between short-term and long-term competitiveness. 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
ing the entire period of the life cycle of a specific model. A n annual 
price discount ratio is usually promised in these long-term contracts. 
However, this practice again works on the basis of contracts and thus 
is different from the Japanese price-cutting custom, in which contracts 
are almost insignificant.20 
Figure 4: The discounting in long-term contracts in European and American com-
panies 
Requirement for bidding 
5-year long-term contract with 5% annual dis-
count, 25% in total 
Response from the suppliers 
5% discount for the initial year, 2% for the sec-
ond and 1% annually thereafter 
Competitive bidding 
Contract based on the agreed-upon discount 
plan 
Source: Interviews with parts suppliers in Europe and the U.S.A. 
5. T H E G R O W T H OF SUPPLIERS U N D E R PROFIT CONTROL BY CUSTOMER 
COMPANIES IN THE JAPANESE A U T O INDUSTRY 
In addition to setting strict price reduction requirements for parts manu-
facturers, Japanese auto manufacturers go as far as to control the profit 
margins of their suppliers. The reasons the Japanese parts suppliers have 
been able to expand under such severe conditions are discussed in the 
following. 
5.1. Control Over Suppliers' Profit Margins 
As has already been explained, Japanese parts manufacturers generally 
try to keep costs at a minimum. However, they do not do this voluntarily 
in order to gain profits. Rather, their strict and systematic cost control 
Again, the important point is not how low the price is but how the price is 
reduced. For example, a famous purchasing manager of one German car man-
ufacturer realized a 10% price reduction on average; his method was placing 
strong pressure on his suppliers, telling them that he would replace them if they 
were not cooperative. In another case, a British car-manufacturer introduced a 
new style of contract, which set a price reduction target and exacted a promise 
to cooperate with customers' purchasing policy. Unlike lapanese auto manufac-
turers, however, they never teil the suppliers how to reduce costs, and the latter 
simply axe prices in the end in order to fulfill the contract. 
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activities are passive and defensive reactions against the price reduction 
demands forced upon them by their customers. In other words, price re-
duction is not the result but the cause of cost reduction. 
Table 2: Margin ratios of Japanese, American and European companies 
Country Company Margin-ratio1 Profit-ratio Ratio of S G & A 2 
A 15% 5% 10% 
Japan 
B 13% 5% 8% 
C 20% 10% 10% 
D 10% - -
E 40% 15% 25% 
U.S.A. F 54% - -G 80% - -
H 27% 9% 18% 
Europe I 20% 7% 12% 
J - 8% -
1 Margin ratio is the total of profit margin and SG&A. 
2 SG&A: Sales, general and administration cost 
3 Manufacturing cost = 100 
(Manufacturing cost include only direct production costs as materials, parts, 
depreciation equipment and direct labour cost. Excluded are all indirect costs.) 
Source: Interviews with Japanese, American and European companies. 
Cost reduction is not sufficient for auto manufacturers to realize the 
prices they want: they must control the component of prices, namely 
profit margins. As shown in Table 2, the maximum margin ratio (service 
general & administration cost (SG&A) + profit margin) that Japanese 
parts manufacturers take is about 15% (10-13% on average), of which 
of 8-10% is SG&A and 5-6% is gross profit margin. 2 1 In the case of 
European parts manufacturers, the margin ratio is 20-30%; with 10-20% 
SG&A and 8-9% profit margin. Interviews with American parts man-
ufacturers reveal that in the U.S. margin ratios rise as high as 30-40% 
in many cases.22 
From my interviews in 1989 with Japanese parts manufacturers and the manag-
ing director of a Japanese car manufacturer. 
It is quite difficult to get exact figures for profit margins and also to compare 
these figures, because there are different ways to dehne the profit margin. The 
figures I have cited are rough ones I have collected in my interviews with Ja-
panese transplants and American parts manufacturers in 1989, with German 
manufacturers and parts suppliers in 1990, and with British small companies 
in Birmingham and Coventry area at the beginning of the 1980s. 
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5.2. Control Over Suppliers' Applications of Profits 
Obviously, the profit margin of Japanese parts manufacturers is kept at 
the lowest level. And yet Japanese parts manufacturers have realized con-
tinuous growth and expansion in the past. This seemingly contradictory 
mechanism has worked out only because Japanese auto manufacturers 
have not only suppressed profit margins but also directed their suppliers 
in how to use this narrow margin: most of the small profits that suppliers 
have managed to make are re-invested for expansion. As explained above, 
Japanese auto manufacturers' demands for lower prices are very strong 
and continuous. Therefore, to satisfy them, parts manufacturers must rely 
on the best and newest facilities and equipment; that is, they must always 
invest in streamlining, energy and labour saving, and so on. The com-
plaint often made by Japanese parts manufacturers, "We are always short 
of cash although we always make a bit of profit" - vividly describes the 
Situation they face.23 
As a result of the continuous investment in facilities and equipment 
extorted from such a small profit margin, solid increase of production 
volume is secured in the Japanese auto industry. Remembering that 
growth is another name for the expansion of production and is itself a 
form of capital accumulation, we can thus conclude that the profits of 
Japanese parts manufacturers are expressed in the form of their growth 
and expansion. Thus, simple comparison of profit ratio figures does not 
suffice in the attempt to understand the profit-making mechanism of Ja-
panese and Western companies. 
6. COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DESIGN A N D PURCHASING 
DEPARTMENTS - RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN T W O K I N D S OF DIVISION OF 
L A B O U R 
As seen above, there is a difference between Japanese and Western sup-
plier relations, which ought to relate to the structure of each country's 
intra-company division of labour. The relations between two kinds of di-
vision of labour will be examined here. 
2 3 From my interviews in 1989 with Japanese transplants in Ohio, U.S.A. 
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6.1. Job Classification of Design Engineers and Purchasing Managers Reflects 
Supplier Relations 
Generally, in Western nations, companies present only price estimates 
in competitive bidding; they do not present the cost structure that 
makes up the price. Cost structure is proprietary information for each 
Company and is not considered open to the public. When a Western 
Company tries to select a supplier by comparing estimates, the buyer 
first examines all the materials presented by the companies participat-
ing in the bidding and requests additional materials, if necessary. By 
this procedure, the buyer does not try to clarify the price and cost 
structures but only tries to compare different companies on an equal 
basis. 
In Western companies, the buyer is a clerical worker who basically 
selects suppliers on the basis of price estimates and draws up purchase 
contracts, he does not analyze costs. Meanwhile, designs are planned by 
engineers who are very much technology-oriented. Therefore, purchasing 
and designing are two different kinds of work (Figure 5). In the Western 
custom, the buyer cannot step into the technological field even if he wants 
actual proper manufacturing costs, because this might be considered over-
stepping his authority. In the Western nations, the same phenomenon can 
be observed in the relationship between customers and suppliers: design 
work based on technological Standards is pursued independently from 
the selection of suppliers and the determination of prices that are based 
on competitive bidding (cf. Figure 1). 
Figure 5: Division of labour between buyers and design engineers in Western 
companies 
Design enj 
Delivery of drawings 
»eis tmyers i n purchasing 
section 











Source: Interviews with European and American companies. 
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Recently Western companies have begun to introduce cost tables fol-
lowing the example of the Japanese method of selecting suppliers. For 
example, Company B in Germany has developed its own cost table based 
on materials of the German Automobile Manufacturers' Association 
(VDA), and asks suppliers to fill it in. However, only a few suppliers of 
small and medium size, who must accede to the requests of car manufac-
turers, might present their own cost tables.24 
In another case, a new job junction which mediates between the design 
and purchasing sections has been introduced. For example, Company B 
in Germany has set up a new position called "economic-engineer". This 
is a single-status position whose incumbent coordinates design and pur-
chasing. In still another Company the buyer participates in negotiation 
with the suppliers at the design stage.25 However, the buyer might not be 
able to control such negotiations effectively because traditionally en-
gineers enjoy high Status in the West. 
6.2. Functional Working Dizrision Between the Design and Purchasing 
Sections 
As in Western companies, the purchasing sections of Japanese companies 
also engage in the selection of suppliers and conclusion of price contracts. 
However, as far as ordinary work is concerned, the main assignment of 
the purchasing section in Japan is to coordinate purchasing functions, 
which are dispersed among various sections in the Company (Figure 6). 
For example, the development section controls purchasing related to parts 
design, the quality control section controls the quality of purchased com-
ponents, and the cost accounting section controls parts prices; all these 
functions are related to purchase. The purchasing sections of Japanese 
auto manufacturers receive information about suppliers' Performances 
and attitudes; if a problem occurs, the section quickly moves to coordinate 
policies and also to check on and control suppliers' managements and 
policies. In short, the sections work in coordiriation. 
From my interviews in 1990 with an engineering Company and a car manufac-
turer in Germany. 
From my interviews in 1990 with German car manufacturers and the sales office 
of one lapanese parts supplier in Germany. We can find the same kind of reor-
ganization of purchasing sections in other auto manufacturers. For example, 
one French car manufacturer reorganized the purchasing division and started 
a new training programme for buyers in the late 1980s (from my interview with 
a French automobile Company). 
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Figure 6: Functional working of purchasing section in a Japanese automobile 
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Source: Interviews with auto manufacturers. 
In this style of cooperative working, every section must coordinate with 
every other by sharing its know-how. For example, the design section 
must comply with various requests, such as price targets presented by 
the cost accounting section, quality targets set by the quality control sec-
tion, and delivery targets set by the production control section. One Com-
pany, a representative Japanese car manufacturer, calls this style of 
cooperative working "functional working" , and holds "functional meet-
ings" at which the views of all sections are coordinated and adjusted. 2 6 
In such a job-sharing type of Organization, each section must understand 
the objectives of all others and must try to actualize them. In practice, this 
From my interview in 1991 with a lapanese car manufacturer. 
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means that each section must do everything necessary to win the com-
petition for customers, and in the process begins to be deeply involved 
in the work done by other sections. This involvement is further related to 
the fact that the work of different sections is simultaneously pursued at 
the design and development stages. As work overlaps, the relationship 
of direction-giving and receiving is complex. 
As should be clear from the above, the division of labour between de-
signing and purchasing in Japanese companies is completely unlike that 
in Western companies. This difference can also be observed in the division 
of labour between customer companies and their suppliers. 
7. S U M M A R Y A N D CONCLUSION 
The relationship between auto manufacturers and their suppliers in terms 
of the selection of suppliers and the method of price setting can be sum-
marized as follows: The essence of price-setting in the Japanese auto in-
dustry lies in the target prices set by auto manufacturers at a very early 
stage of product development. In order to realize the targets, parts sup-
pliers pursue cost reduction consistently from the development stage to 
the manufacturing stage. These activities of necessity accompany innova-
tions in the fields of production and product technologies, which not only 
are utilized to develop the next model but are also accumulated to enhance 
competence of the parts manufacturers. 
Cost reduction activities of this kind can be observed nowhere in the 
world auto industry except in Japan, where the selection of suppliers and 
price setting are separated at the product development stage. This means 
that the customer-supplier relationship is the key to successful cost reduc-
tion activities like those of the Japanese. Auto manufacturers consistently 
maintain close ties with their suppliers, and therefore continue to choose 
them as suppliers. Again, as their ties are so tight-knit, auto manufacturers 
can set target prices, and suppliers in turn must engage in energetic cost-
reduction activities on a company-wide basis to satisfy these targets. Parts 
suppliers make strenuous efforts to meet the unreasonable price reduction 
requirements of their auto manufacturer customers, and technological in-
novations follow these efforts. 
Japanese car manufacturers control not only the cost of products but 
also the profit margins of supplier companies. Obviously, the profit 
margins of Japanese parts manufacturers are kept at the lowest level. 
And yet these suppliers have achieved continuous growth and expan-
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
sion in the past. This seemingly contradictory mechanism has materi-
alized only because Japanese auto manufacturers have not only 
suppressed profit margins but also directed the use of this narrow mar-
gin: most of the profits that suppliers have managed to make are re-in-
vested for expansion. 
The precise mechanism of Japanese parts manufacturers' profit-
making is yet to be clarified. Japanese parts manufacturers usually 
begin their production of individual parts without profits or with defi-
cits in many cases, and then gradually acquire profits through mass 
production and rationalization. This approach is not viable in their over-
seas transplants, where figures for interest, payment, re-investment and 
individual profit ratios need to be calculated and rationally explained 
at a time. 2 7 The way Japanese parts manufacturers turn deficits to profits 
in the process of production is a key question that remains to be an-
swered. Here, I would like to close my article by only suggesting that 
the answer probably wil l be found in the analysis of "cost reduction 
activities" such as QC circles, participation in rationalization and kaizen 
activities by all employees, and in-house improvement and production 
of machinery At the same time, Cooperation by machine and material 
suppliers wil l have significant importance for parts manufacturers in 
recouping investment costs. 
This special customer-supplier relationship in the Japanese auto in-
dustry is deeply related to the division of labour between the design and 
purchasing sections. While design and purchasing are separated 
completely in Western companies, the coordination of the two jobs is one 
of the most important characteristics in the Japanese auto industry, as it 
is in most Japanese companies. This system of Cooperation, called 
"functional working", works like a multiple-layered printed circuit board 
(PCB) where work is pursued simultaneously. As jobs overlap, the rela-
tionship of direction-giving and receiving is complex. 
In conclusion, the uniqueness of Japanese-style management lies in the 
fact that suppliers not only obediently accept unreasonable requests from 
auto manufacturers but also endeavour to overcome these requests by 
embracing them as their own targets. Two kinds of division of labour -
the intra-company relationship between design and purchasing sections, 
and the inter-company relationship between customer and supplier - in-
From my interviews with many Japanese transplants in the U.S.A. and Europe 
in 1989 and 1990. One managing director of a holding Company of Japanese 
transplants in Germany mentioned the difficulty in transferring the Japanese 
style of management to foreign countries. 
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fluence each other. A n d all of these are combined under the concept of 
"economic growth". This organizational Dattern functions most effec-
tively in severe international competition. 
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mann and other members of the Institute for Social Studies (ISF) in Munich, 
and to Mr. Helmut Demes of the German Institute for Japanese Studies in Tokyo. 
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LABOUR STANDARDS IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMY 
C H A L L E N G E S A N D PERSPECTIVES 
Werner Sengenberger 
ABSTRACT 
The internationalization of the economy is accelerating, spurred by the activities of 
multinational enterprises, emergent trading blocs aimed at supra-national 
economic integration, and homogenizing consumption patterns. In contrast, labour 
institutions and labour market regulation remain largely constituted on the national 
scale and below. Hence, is there an increasing disparity between the economic and 
social Organization of the labour market at the international level? If so, what would 
the implications be? These are the key questions raised in the paper. 
In addressing the issues it is investigated how much the existing system of the 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) of setting and Controlling labour Stand-
ards is apt to Channel international activities in constructive ways. While in prin-
ciple the ILO machinery can regulate international competition, it appears 
hampered today by insufficient power for Standard enforcement, and also by the 
widening cross-national gap in productive power, real income, and wealth. This 
makes it exceedingly difficult to impose universal worldwide common Substantive 
Standards, such as common minimum wage, or common minimum age for em-
ployment, or common minimum safety Standards. 
Nevertheless, progress in Standard setting, and internationally co-ordinated 
labour policies, would be essential in order to diminish the gap between rieh and 
poor countries, and to permit internationally balanced and sustained development. 
The ILO philosophy, according to which "poverty anywhere endangers prosperity 
everywhere" is as valid as ever before. 
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Signs abound that the industrial landscape is changing. Markets and pro-
duction Systems are moving in a significant way beyond national boun-
daries, and to some extent also within national borders. The increasing 
importance of multinational enterprises, transnational Strategie alliances, 
transnational subcontracting and sourcing of production and Services, 
and cross-national regional economic integration signal the trend towards 
an internationalized economy. 
In contrast, labour institutions and labour market regulation remain 
largely constituted on the national scale and below. It is at the level of the 
nation-state, or subnation-state, that pay, employment rules, working con-
ditions, occupational health and safety, and social security are legislated 
and executed. 
The growing incongruity between the economic Space and the social 
Space of Organization creates a major challenge to economic, political 
and social stability. As companies and capital move ever more freely to 
where they expect the best returns, and large enterprises grow ever 
bigger and more powerful - with the sales of some of the giant cor-
porations well exceeding the gross national product (GNP) of small 
nations - national governments and national labour organizations tend 
to be deprived of the sovereignty to govern economic behaviour within 
their borders. They tend to lose part of their autonomy of action. Such 
a Situation is likely to throw national social "models", and national 
Systems of labour institutions, into the arena of intensified international 
competition. It could, in the worst case, provoke economic war, fol-
lowed by harsh and destruetive social conflict, and a new upsurge of 
nationalism. But it could, if properly handled, also lead to new aecords 
on the international plane, enhanced mutual understanding in a more 
cosmopolitan world, better resource utilization and the resolution of 
such pressing problems of international character as poverty and en-
vironmental pollution. 
To meet the challenge constructively, labour institutions will have to 
adjust. In order to be effective, labour organizations and labour market 
regulation have to be coextensive with the size of the market. Otherwise, 
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labour organizations can be whipsawed, labour Standards undercut, and 
free riders encouraged. Fears of a downscaling of labour Standards, or 
"social dumping", as the trade unions call it, are being voiced in the 
European Community, which is about to enter a Single European market. 
While trade union Organization and collective bargaining are still largely 
national, and progress towards the European Social Charter of Commu-
nity-wide social Standards is slow, economic integration is moving much 
faster. Nevertheless, the discrepancy in Europe looks minor in comparison 
with other regions which are taking initiatives towards regional economic 
integration. In every one of these regions labour market Organization is 
far from matching even in a remote sense the degree of internationaliza-
tion of production and trade relations. 
This paper will address the gap in the territorial Organization of 
business and labour. After giving a brief historical account of the ad-
vancement of international economic integration as far as the present 
day, it will analyze the institutional responses, actual and potential, to 
reconcile labour policy, and labour Standards in particular, with the 
expansion of markets and production, and the changing nature of com-
petition. 
2 . T H E INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE E C O N O M Y 
While there has been trade over shorter and longer distances in various 
parts of the world since time immemorial, it has nevertheless been the 
case in the past two centuries that the internationalization of the economy 
has progressed at a rapid pace. Yet, when we say that, we immediately 
need to recall that national boundaries are of fairly recent historical origin 
as well. The "nation State" in any Version recognizable to us today is, as 
Eric Hobsbawm showed, no older than the American Constitution and 
the French Revolution, both dating from 1789. In a number of Western 
countries, the nation-state was rising to significance as a unit of political, 
economic, and social Organization in the nineteenth Century when 
national economic activity was used by Hamilton in America, Bismarck 
in Germany, Japanese rulers in Charge of the Meiji restoration, Garibaldi 
in Italy, and others, to put muscle behind their political ambitions (Hobs-
bawm 1990). In many other quarters of the world the nation State is much 
younger still. More than half of the existing states are less than 40 years 
old. Only with the existence of the national economy can we logically 
speak of internationalization. 
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2.2. Growth of Trade and Foreign Investment 
The upsurge in economic activities across national borders is reflected in the 
growth of foreign trade and investment. The value of exchange between the 
major trading nations increased from 1.5 billion dollars in 1800 to about 4 
billion in 1850 to 20 billion in 1900 and 40 billion in 1913, showing a clear 
trend of acceleration in the second half of the nineteenth Century (Levy 
1931). Whilst the rate of growth was again more moderate between the 
world wars, a new big push came after World War II. In 1990 world-wide 
trade in goods and Services amounted to some $ 4 trillion, a 13-fold increase 
in real terms from 1950. The inter-penetration of markets is indicated by the 
fact that the export rate rose faster than the volume of production. World 
production in the period 1950 to 1984 increased roughly by factor 5, whereas 
total exports rose about 9-fold, and exports of manufactured goods even 
15-fold (GATT 1987:14). Market integration is further signalled in the in-
creased trade reliance of national economies. Between 1967 and 1986 the 
share of trade in GNP doubled in a number of important countries, and 
reached levels of almost 60% in the Netherlands, 41% in the United King-
dom and 32% in the Federal Republic of Germany (Table 1). 
Table 1: Share of exports in GNP for selected countries and selected years (in%) 
1967 1973 1980 1986 
The Netherlands 39.5 48.4 59.8 58.9 
United Kingdom 22.2 31.7 38.9 41.2 
Germany 21.3 23.5 30.5 32.1 
France 14.7 20.2 27.1 26.8 
Italy 13.8 19.2 25.3 22.1 
Mexico 10.4 10.2 15.6 19.6 
Brazil 6.8 10.4 12.5 11.7 
Japan 10.3 10.8 15.5 11.1 
United States 5.7 8.0 12.8 10.6 
Source: de Granut (1990: 9). 
The opening of the economies is also apparent from international invest-
ment. There are many ways in which capital can move across borders, 
including: foreign direct investment (FDI), which is linked to multi-
national companies setting up subsidiaries abroad; indirect (portfolio) in-
vestment, where shares are bought in an undertaking abroad; borrowing 
of foreign capital; non-equity forms of investment, such as licensing and 
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franchising; and official development assistance (ODA). A l l affect in one 
way or the other, in both the source and the recipient country, the transfer 
of technology and productivity, and future employment opportunities. 
Table 2: Outflows of FDI from five major countries 1981-1987 (in million U.S. $) 
Country 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 
France 4,583 2,844 1,700 2,134 2,227 5^ 39 9,080 
Germany 3,868 2,473 3,186 4,346 4,904 9,597 9,129 
Japan 4,917 4,526 3,603 5,945 6,427 14^ 36 19396 
United Kingdom 12,118 7,156 8,047 7,956 10,982 16393 25,745 
United States 12,704 6,286 3,509 4,798 13,823 22,494 41397 
Total above 38,190 23,285 20,045 25,179 38,363 68359 105,247 
all countries 54,006 32,546 36,465 41,993 58^ 66 92360 134398 
Source: de Granut (1990:16). 
The stock of estimated foreign direct investment increased worldwide from 
14 billion dollars in 1914 to 66.7billion in 1960, and 380 billion dollars in 1978 
(de Granrut 1990). FDI flows have accelerated in the past two decades. In 
the last three years of the 1980s, FDI flows measured in 1980 dollars were 
more than 100 billion a year, ten times as much as they had been in the first 
three years of the 1970s (again in 1980 dollars) (The Economist, Dec. 22,1990). 
Table 2 demonstrates that levels of outflow of FDI climbed enormously in 
the five largest Western industrialized countries in the 1980s, which account 
for about three-quarters of total foreign investment. The annual flow of FDI 
from Japan had increased ten-fold at the end of the 1980s in relation to the 
beginning of the decade. In France, the equivalent number was seven-fold. 
In the 1980s, the United States became the major host country for Invest-
ments, while at the same time the U. S. increased its Investments in Europe 
at an accelerating rate (Campbell 1991). 
2.2. The Rise ofthe Multinational Enterprise (MNE) 
The pivotal driving force behind the internationalization of the economy is 
the MNEs. They account for the bulk of foreign direct investment by estab-
lishing facilities abroad, and a significant component of foreign trade is 
made up of trade between the parents and the subsidiaries of MNEs. In a 
real sense, multinationals have become the private regulators of borderless 
economies. 
According to ILO sources, at the beginning at the 1980s MNEs employed 
at least 65 million workers worldwide, of whom 43 million were in the 
countries where the parent enterprise was located. Afurther 15 million were 
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in industrialized countries and only 7 million in developing countries (ILO 
1981). These figures say little, however, about the Strategie role of the multis 
for the process of internationalization and globalization in relation to the 
transfer of technology and managerial techniques and skills. In the last two 
decades there has been a change in the competitive strategy of the multi-
nationals. Particularly in the 1970s, the multinationalization of manufactur-
ing proeeeded through international subcontracting and outsourcing. Parts 
of production were located in developing countries with lower labour cost 
levels to reduce variable costs. This contributed to the growth of intra-in-
dustry trade, and created an international division of labour, as well as new 
investment and technology links, between countries of the North and the 
South, implying for the latter a kind of export-oriented industrialization. 
For instance, the initial phase of growth of the "four dragons" - the Republic 
of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore - was largely built on the use 
of cheap, unskilled labour for the manufacturing of parts and components 
by subsidiaries of foreign-owned MNEs. This phenomenon sparked a 
theory on the "new international division of labour" (NIDL), according to 
which massive outmigration of capital would generate structural unem-
ployment in the OECD world, and exploit workers in the Third World. 
Therefore, in order to make it work, the existence of global labour and capi-
tal markets and a global labour reserve army would be imperative (see, e.g., 
Froebeletal. 1977). 
In the 1980s, various events induced enterprises to alter their strategy. 
Variable-cost competition was superseded by fixed-cost competition. 
Growth came to be driven by the spread of cost-reducing and quality-en-
hancing advancements in the electronics-based industries (semi-conduc-
tors, telecommunications, Computers, consumer and industrial electron-
ics) which swept increasingly into production processes of other manu-
facturing industries, such as the automobile industry, and into the Service 
sector. Together with the reduction in the cost of air travel and shipping 
- partly due to deregulation - information could now be carried by elec-
tronic impulses in less than seconds around the globe, enabling and ac-
celerating globalization on a higher level. Moreover, the new technologies 
generated a new wave of automation, and this put pressure on producers 
to cut fixed costs by boosting sales and broadening markets. The more 
labour-intensive Operations started to be farmed out to a second tier of 
newly industrializing countries (NICs), such as Thailand, Malaysia and 
other A S E A N countries that offered even lower labour costs. 
At the same time, the shortening of product cycles, and the concomitant 
acceleration of product innovation, led MNEs to enter into Strategie alli-
ances with their competitors, often from another region, to share sharply 
rising R&D costs, pool resources, and gain better access to different tech-
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nologies and markets. The linkages and inter-firm networks created by 
such inter-firm alliances and collaborative agreements primarily spanned 
the United States, Europe and Japan. 
The relationship between product turnover and outlays for R & D is 
apparent in Figure 1. Product cycles are short and the share of R & D in 
sales is high in exactly those industrial sectors which are most often as-
sociated with globalization, like electronics, aerospace, pharmaceuticals, 
automobiles and the electrical goods industry. 
In addition to altered and extended links between multinationals, their 
internal structures tend to be adapted by vertical disintegration in the 
course of contracting out production and Services to other firms, often of 
a smaller scale. The big firms tend to externalize functions considered to 
be of less Strategie importance, retaining those viewed to be essential for 
keeping Strategie control. 
Figure 1: Product life cycle and the share of R & D in total sales 
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Source: Canadian Council of Professional Engineers (1983: 5). 
2.3. Are We Reading towards Globalization? 
The rapid expansion of international investment and offshore markets, 
along with the assertive role played in it by corporate strategies of the 
M N E s , have led observers to speak of the "globalization" of the economy. 
This term has different meanings for different people. To Petrella (1991), 
globalization marks the third phase of cross-national economic integra-
tion. It leaves behind it a first phase based on international exchange of 
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goods and Services, which Petrella calls "internationalization", and a sec-
ond phase linked to foreign direct investment, which he terms "multi-
nationalization". In contrast, "globalization" affects all phases and activi-
ties upstream and downstream from producing goods and Services , in-
cluding conception, development, manufacturing, distribution and con-
sumption. In addition, it puts an end to national institutions, such as the 
nation-state, national currency, national economy, national bank, national 
postal Services, national education, national culture, etc., and replaces 
these by international institutions. 
Other writers are less ambitious when defining globalization. Next to 
the inter-penetration of markets and the more generic nature of the new 
information technologies, reference is often made to an accelerated ho-
mogenization of consumer tastes, product Standards and production 
methods on a global scale, to mergers and acquisitions bound to affect 
global restructuring, and to the trend of large corporations to be less de-
pendent on any one nation's economy. These phenomena are said to have 
weakened the ability of the State to control the behaviour of other major 
economic actors theoretically under its Jurisdiction, and have pushed the 
boundaries of policy-making into the sphere of the global rather than the 
national economy (OECD 1989). In fact, certain writers seem to suggest 
that for true and sustainable globalization something like global govern-
ment would be indispensable. 
But, even short of the political dimension of globalization, one may ask 
whether and how far globalization on a purely economic level has really 
been a worldwide phenomenon. Two major reservations may be made 
on that account. First, one may argue that the economic world has tended 
to become multipolar rather than global. Some speak of a "triadization", 
meaning that the three economic superpowers of lapan, the United States 
and Europe, and their satellites, form the essential perimeter of the global 
economy, to the exclusion of the LDCs of the South. This becomes clear 
from the regional distribution of FDI outflows (Figure 2). In fact, while 
many developing countries enjoyed more rapid economic growth than 
industrialized countries for some time, their share of total production in-
creased merely from 12.2% to 13.9% in the period 1966-84, during which 
they should have been the main beneficiaries of the global shift of pro-
duction, if one believes in the NIDL theory. In the same period, the newly 
industrializing economies (NIEs) could increase their share of manufac-
tured goods from 5.7% to 8.5%, which is a comparatively minor gain. But 
worse, in the 1980s, Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa faced a serious 
loss in world trade and entered a State of crisis which is not just an 
economic crisis. So one would be hard put to speak of restructuring in 
favour of the South. Rather, growth in developing countries was concen-
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Figure 2: Sources of foreign direct investment outflows: Annual averages (in %) 
1 9 7 5 - 8 0 
W. Europe - 45.7% 
1 9 8 1 - 8 5 
Japan - 5.5% Japan - 11% — ' 
Other industrial ized 
countr ies - 12% — 
Other industrial ized 
countries - 6% 
Developing countries - 1.3% Developing countries - 2 % — ' 
Source: United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (1988: 11). 
trated in a few countries such as the East Asian NIEs. The over-riding 
event in the international economy in the past three decades has not been 
the rise of the developing world but the steadily increasing share of Japan 
in world production. 
A second reservation to be raised against the thesis of globalization 
concerns economic "regionalism". In place of an increasingly borderless 
worldwide economy we may well see a freer circulation of capital, goods 
and labour within some regional groupings of countries, such as the Single 
European Market, the zone of the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
MERCOSUR in the Southern American cone, and the Japanese-led trading 
bloc in the Pacific rim; regional integration could easily retard internation-
alization to the extent that it is accompanied by defensive import pro-
tectionism at its external borders, something which is visible in Japan, or 
also in the term "fortress Europe". 
In concluding this brief sketch of trends of international economic inte-
gration, it may be said that there is doubtless an enormous advancement in 
international market penetration since the beginning of industrialization, 
indicated by the growth of trade flows and foreign investment. The fruits of 
this integration, however, are unevenly distributed in regional terms. 
Above all, they come to benefit the industrialized world, which is also the 
home of the multinational companies that are the driving force behind 
cross-border activities. Much of international integration consists of re-
gional grouping, which suggests that there is a multipolar rather than a 
global economy. 
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3 . LABOUR STANDARDS AS A N INSTRUMENT FOR REGULATING 
INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION 
Theoretically, the internationalization of the economy adds an important 
dimension to competition. How important it is, de facto, wil l depend, inter 
alia, on the nature and magnitude of cross-national disparities in the treat-
ment and remuneration of labour. The more wages, hours and other terms 
of employment differ, and also the more labour productivity varies, the 
more tempting it wil l become for firms to exploit such gaps in seeking to 
attain competitive advantages. This then could generate the risk of a 
general down-slide of pay and working conditions. The problem of ex-
porting products and Services that owe their competitiveness to low 
labour Standards was recognized early in the course of economic integra-
tion, and repeatedly considered at international Conferences. In the 
Covenant of the League of Nations of 1919, for example, the member 
states agreed to endeavour to secure fair and humane conditions of labour, 
both at home and "in all countries to which their commercial and in-
dustrial relations extend" (see: Treaty of Versailles, Part I, Art. 23(a)). 
In principle, the problem of exploiting differing labour conditions, vari-
ably termed "social dumping" or "unfair competition", can either be 
tackled by creating international labour Standards, i.e., creating common 
benchmarks and rules for the treatment of labour by all competitors in all 
countries, or alternatively by restricting trade in one way or the other. At 
different points in time, declarations were adopted that emphasize the 
link between trade and labour conditions. Without fair competition in the 
labour market, it was argued, liberalization in trade would be unsustain-
able. 
3.1. Labour Standards Defined 
The term "labour Standard" has two connotations. It means, first, the ac-
tual level attained in remuneration, real income, health and safety, in-
dividual and social rights and other aspects of the material conditions of 
workers. In a second sense, labour Standards are norms prescribed by law, 
collective agreement or common practice, which are set to prohibit par-
ticular behaviour or action in employing and deploying labour, or to elicit 
and promote action which is regarded as socially desirable. In other 
words, labour Standards are variably used to mean "what is" and "what 
ought to be" with regard to the use of labour. 
Following the normative use of the term, we may further distinguish 
between various types of Standards. Standards of protection - set minimum 
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and maximum terms for the utilization of labour resources (e.g. minimum 
wages laws, maximum number of weekly hours, maximum noise levels, 
maximum weight carried by a worker, protection from toxic substances, 
etc.); Standards of participation - regulate the collective Organization of 
actors and the relations and forms of negotiation between them; Standards 
of promotion - provide ways and means of support or promotion of par-
ticular courses of action or Services (e.g. public agencies for the placement 
and training of workers). To be effective, the different categories of Stand-
ards have to form a coherent, interactive and mutually reinforcing pack-
age of Intervention into the labour market (Sengenberger 1990). 
3.2. International Labour Standards and the ILO 
Labour Standards are set at various organizational levels, such as the es-
tablishment, enterprise, industry, region, nation and international 
economy. The need for providing Standards at the international level was 
increasingly feit as the opportunity of competing through wages and 
working conditions expanded with increasing cross-border competition 
in Europe in the late nineteenth and early twentieth Century. In the inter-
national debate which culminated in the foundation of the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) under Article 19 of the Treaty of Versailles in 
1919, labour Standards at the international level were opposed by some 
countries on the grounds that they would handicap them on the inter-
national market by increasing their costs relative to other countries not 
covered by the common rule. For example, the ratification of the Hours 
of Work Convention, which was the first Convention adopted by the ILO 
in 1919, was slowed down by this consideration. Others, in contrast, ar-
gued that international agreements to set Standards would ensure that 
competition was not at the workers' expense and would in fact amount 
to a code of fair competition between employers and between countries. 
This argument was in fact embodied in the Preamble of the Constitution 
of the ILO, which states that "the failure of any nation to adopt humane 
conditions of labour is an obstacle in the way of other nations which desire 
to improve the conditions in their own countries" (ILO 1986). 
It was perhaps not by accident that the ILO was created as an auton-
omous body at the end of World War I, when nations had just passed 
through a period of political and social disaster. At this time there existed 
- as was the case later after World War II - the "community of suffering" 
which can give rise to sufficient consensus capable of generating inter-
national order. There was agreement in the industrialized countries in 
1919 to seek to create an Organization apt to set international labour Stand-
ards in order to relieve the social effects of international economic com-
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petition and, more generally, advance justice in relation to the social con-
ditions aggravated by the ravages of industrialization and the appalling 
working environment caused by it. The principles that "universal and 
lasting peace can be established only if it is based on social justice" and 
"labour is not a commodity" form further centrepieces of ILO philosophy. 
The following more specific objectives of the ILO are stated in its Con-
stitution: 
- regulation of working hours, including the establishment of a maxi-
mum working day and week; 
- regulation of the labour supply; 
- prevention of unemployment; 
- provision of an adequate living wage; 
- protection of the worker against sickness, disease and injury arising 
out of employment; 
- protection of children, young persons and women; 
- provision for old age and injury; 
- protection of the interests of those working in countries other than their 
own; 
- equal remuneration for work of equal value; 
- recognition of the freedom of association; 
- Organization of vocational and technical education. 
From the beginning, the ILO was heavily involved in normative work, 
and the setting of international labour Standards has been its core activity. 
The ILO, which at present has 156 member states, has a unique tripartite 
structure which enables national governments and workers' and employ-
ers' organizations to share power in the decision-making bodies, of which 
the Governing Body is the executive organ, and in the International 
Labour Conference, which elaborates and adopts international labour 
standands. Once Standards are adopted by the Conference, member states 
must submit them within a year to their parliaments or other legislative 
authorities for the enactment of national legislation or action. These 
authorities remain free to decide whether or not they put them into effect, 
but they are in any case obliged to inform the Director-General of the ILO 
of the actions taken. 
Today's International Labour Code consists of 171 Conventions and 
178 Recommendations, the two forms that ILO Standards can take. Con-
ventions have a legal Status similar to international treaties. Once ratified 
by the competent national authority, they involve binding international 
commitments. Appropriate documentation has to be supplied by the 
country's govemment about how the Convention wil l function. The ILO 
Constitution also requires non-ratifying member countries to report peri-
odically on the extent to which their laws and practices implement the 
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provisions of unratified Conventions. They must indicate what is pre-
venting or delaying the ratification. Recommendations do not create any 
international Obligation but are designed to provide guidance to govern-
ments in formulating their social policies. They have been found most 
suitable or appropriate whenever a subject is not yet ripe for the adoption 
of a Convention, or to Supplement a Convention, or where it seems 
desirable to leave a wide latitude to states as to which action should be 
taken. 
The application of ratified Conventions is closely monitored through 
ILO's reporting and review machinery, involving the International Labour 
Office as the secretariat of the ILO, as well as tripartite committees of the 
Conference and independent experts. Reports are scrutinized with a view 
to helping governments to overcome difficulties which they may have in 
making Standards effective. As concerns compliance, any member has the 
right to file a formal complaint with the International Labour Office if it 
is not satisfied that any other member is securing the effective observance 
of a Convention which both have ratified. The matter is then made subject 
to inquiry, and eventually recommendations are made as to the necessary 
Steps to be taken to meet the complaint. The governments in question 
then have to either accept the recommendations or refer the complaint to 
the International Court of Justice, whose decision is final. 
More than 5,000 ratifications have been made so far by member states, 
which averages more than 30 per member. Among the Conventions most 
commonly ratified are the Convention of 1930 on Forced Labour (No. 29), 
the Convention of 1957 on the Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105), the 
Convention of 1948 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right 
to Organise (No. 87), the Convention of 1949 on the Right to Organise and 
Collective Bargaining (No. 98), the Convention of 1951 on Equal Re-
muneration for Men and Women (No. 100), the Convention of 1958 on 
Discriminationin Employment and Occupation (No. 111) and the Conven-
tion of 1964 on Employment Policy (No. 122). These key Conventions, each 
of which has been ratified by more than 100 member states, are seen as 
fundamental human rights being of particular concern to the ILO. 
It is recognized as a problem that the record of ratification varies vastly 
across countries. With some notable exceptions, most ratifications are 
made by the industrialized or near-industrialized countries, while the 
developing countries have ratified far fewer Conventions. It has been de-
bated at great length, both inside and outside the ILO, whether the 
developing countries can even afford to apply the minimum Standards 
laid down in the International Labour Code. The ILO itself has responded 
to this question by providing some flexibility in introducing Standards to 
take account of the widely varying economic and social conditions and 
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legal and political Systems. In view of such variety, two extremes are to 
be avoided. One is to set Standards which can be accepted at once by the 
greatest possible number of countries, with the risk that the common de-
nominator is apt to result in a Standard too low to produce any significant 
progress. The other is to aim at too high a Standard which will not be 
immediately practicable in most countries. Many Standards are formu-
lated in fairly general language, thus giving governments latitude either 
in the scope of setting the Standard or in the methods of application. 
It is generally held that the Standards promulgating fundamental 
human rights mentioned above should apply independently of the State 
of a country's development. For example, no matter how rieh or poor a 
country is, it cannot be accepted that trade union leaders be harassed, be 
jailed, disappear, or be murdered. Substantive Standards, on the other 
hand, usually contain flexible formulas of one kind or another. For ex-
ample, with regard to minimum wages, Convention No. 131 speeifies that 
a country should have a system of minimum wages in one form or 
another, but it does not stipulate the minimum wage required. It would 
be unrealistic to set a Substantive rule given the enormous differential of 
wages across member states. (In the United States, for example, the min-
imum wage per hour is about the same as for a füll working day in ad-
jacent Mexico.) Even so, it is the ambition of the ILO to adhere to the 
principle of universality in setting and enforcing Standards, and not admit 
regional Standards for groupings of countries of different degrees of 
development. Regional Standards would accentuate rather than reduce 
differences in development, and would mean that in certain regions there 
would be "sub-standards" for "sub-human people" (Valticos 1969: 218). 
The other way in which the ILO, together with other specialized United 
Nations agencies, has attempted to deal with the wide differential in 
national labour conditions has been through technical co-operation. This 
includes education, consultation and technical assistance, and is given 
primarily to the countries of the South to assist them in their development 
process, e.g. through public works projects, setting up vocational training 
and rehabilitation centres, promoting füll employment, forming rural co-
operatives, building safety and health Systems and establishing Systems 
of social security. The setting and application of labour Standards and 
technical co-operation are seen to complement and strengthen each other. 
Technical co-operation is to be designed with the aim of achieving pro-
gress towards the ratification of and compliance with international labour 
Standards. 
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3.3. Labour Standards and Multinational Enterprises 
In 1977, the Governing Body of the ILO adopted a Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy. To date, this 
constitutes the only universally applicable code of conduct for MNEs. The 
OECD guidelines for the conduct of multinationals is a limited regional 
instrument, and negotiations going on since 1973 for a U N Code of Con-
duct on Transnational Corporations have never reached agreement. 
The ILO Declaration originated in concerns in the 1960s about increas-
ingly powerful companies that operated across national boundaries and 
were subject to differential labour laws. Many governments and trade 
unions demanded that international rules be drawn up to govern the ac-
tivities of MNEs and def ine the terms of their relations with host countries. 
The Tripartite Declaration was the ILO's response to calls for guidelines 
which could help to mitigate the social and labour problems of M N E 
activities, and encourage the positive contributions that they could make 
to economic and social progress. The Declaration is a voluntary instru-
ment. There has not been consensus for a legally binding ILO Convention 
on that matter. 
The Declaration consists of a preamble and five major sections dealing 
with general policies, employment, training, conditions of work and life 
and industrial relations. In the section on general policies, governments 
are called upon to ratify a number of key Conventions, or comply with 
them, if they have not done so. A l l parties involved are to make these 
Standards the guiding principles of their social policy, especially in coun-
tries where this has not been the case. The MNEs are specifically requested 
to offer in the host countries of their subsidiaries wages, benefits and 
working conditions no less favourable than those provided by domestic 
employers. Moreover, they are asked to maintain the highest Standards 
of safety and health, in conformity with national requirements, bearing 
in mind their relevant experience within the enterprise as a whole, includ-
ing any knowledge of special hazards. Furthermore, MNEs are called 
upon to observe the ILO Conventions on collective Organization, collective 
bargaining and other Standards of industrial relations, endeavour to in-
crease employment and training opportunities and Standards, provide 
employment stability and social security, extend equality of opportunity 
and treatment in employment and adapt technologies to the needs and 
characteristics of the host countries. 
In triennial surveys, the International Labour Office collects informa-
tion on the extent to which governments, employers' and workers' or-
ganizations respect the principles and recommendations contained in the 
Tripartite Declaration. There is also a procedure for the examination of 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
disputes over the meaning and interpretation of the Declaration. Com-
plaints against MNEs were filed, for instance, in relation to cases of work-
force reduction in which the enterprises failed to inform the repre-
sentatives of the workers. Union avoidance is one of the main problems 
of M N E conduct in foreign countries. Under the Tripartite Declaration, 
multinationals must not relocate Operations from a country or site in order 
to evade unions or collective bargaining. In this regard, it is important to 
know that the ILO introduced a special procedure to deal with cases in-
volving Conventions 87 and 98 concerning freedom of association and the 
right to organize and bargain collectively. While in general complaints of 
violation of ILO Standards can only be filed against a member country 
that has ratified the Convention in question, complaints in relation to Con-
ventions 87 and 98 can also be lodged even against states that have not 
ratified these Conventions, as is the case with some of the NIEs in South-
East Asia, but also against the United States of America. Recently, there 
have been complaints about the industrial relations practices in the U. S. 
of subsidiaries of three foreign MNEs - BASF, ENI and Norsk Hydro -
which have been brought to the attention of the ILO Committee on Free-
dom of Association. 
The ILO Code of Conduct for MNEs has been found relevant for the 
actual behaviour of multis. In a meeting held by the ILO in 1990 on the 
overseas activities of Japanese enterprises, the Japanese Ministries of In-
ternational Trade and Industry and Labour, as well as Nikkeiren (Japan 
Federation of Employers' Association) and Rengö (Japanese Trade Union 
Federation) stressed the importance of the Tripartite Declaration for guid-
ing behaviour abroad (ILO 1991). It was recognized that the sharp rise of 
FDI by companies of Japanese origin, particularly after the revaluation of 
the Yen in 1985, has given rise to bad relations and conflicts between 
affiliates of Japanese MNEs and the local communities in the United 
States, Europe and Asia. These have included labour-management prob-
lems such as difficulties of communication, imposition of Japanese-style 
management without respecting local practices, discrirnination between 
Japanese and local staff as regards promotion, working conditions and 
other related matters. The controversial practices were attributed mainly 
to a lack of experience as well as lack of awareness or misunderstanding 
of the socio-cultural environment and laws of host countries in which 
they operated. (The same could be said, presumably, for the MNEs of 
other nations.) It appears that information and guidance is especially rel-
evant in host countries where the practice of union avoidance is prevalent, 
where countries have not ratified key ILO Conventions (e.g. Conventions 
87 and 98), and where there is a high density of "free enterprise zones" 
or "export processing zones" (EPZs), such as in South-East Asia, Mexico 
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and the Caribbean Basin (on this subject, see ILO and UNCTC1988). These 
zones were created by certain developing countries to attract capital from 
Europe and North America by offering especially favourable social, tax 
and other conditions. 
3.4. Linking Labour Standards and Trade 
The International Labour Code and the ILO machinery to monitor it have 
doubtlessly advanced the international regulation of the labour market, 
and contributed to levelling labour conditions within and between coun-
tries. Yet major deficiencies remain when it comes to taking labour out of 
destructive competition, and these become more visible with the advance-
ment of internationalization of the economy. The following shortcomings 
may be mentioned: 
1) Although the process of ratification of ILO Standards has reached im-
pressive levels, progress has slowed down in the past decade. Major 
areas of labour competition remain uncovered by Standards, leaving 
countries with a well-developed labour code exposed and vulnerable. 
Think, for example, of the competitive pressure exerted by the use of 
Sunday work in industry on countries which do not allow it, or the 
pressures resulting from the use of child labour (the ILO estimates that 
there are 120 million children engaged in gainful commercial work). 
2) The power entrusted to the ILO for sanctioning the failure of countries 
to set and enforce Standards is limited. The ILO has little executive 
power to police its Standards. It acts by making cases of non-compliance 
public. By invoking the disapproval of the world Community, it brings 
moral suasion and moral pressure to bear. As a former Director-General 
said, the ILO is not a world-wide Ministry of Labour. It can set guide-
lines for national action and stimulate such action, and assist in its 
implementation when requested. But it cannot Substitute itself for 
governments, or for trade unions, or for employers' organizations 
(Morse 1969). The ILO can only be as strong and effective as its con-
stituent groups and its member States want it to be. 
3) Given the enormously varying, and obviously exacerbating, differ-
ences, in the level of development between industrialized countries, 
NIEs and LDCs, it is impractical to issue strictly defined norms on 
conditions of work and levels of remuneration that could exert a force-
ful levelling effect. 
The recent push towards globalization of economic activities, and the con-
comitant intensification of competition, bring the relevance of ILO Stand-
ards back into prominence. There has been a search for new or better 
measures which, in pursuit of ILO Standards, afford a surveillance, polic-
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ing and sanctioning function reaching beyond what is available in the 
ILO's supervisory machinery. 
One of the recent initiatives has been to link labour Standards directly 
to trade. The basic idea of trade-linked Standards is to inhibit the trading 
of goods that are produced under employment and working conditions 
which violate ILO Standards. The International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICFTU), and notably one of its members, the International 
Metalworkers' Federation (IMF), which represents 165 engineering and 
metalworking trade unions in 70 countries worldwide, have spearheaded 
a campaign to link trade preference agreements to the maintenance of 
labour Standards (ICFTU 1986; IMF 1988). The IMF argues that this could 
be done through national and international legislation, but also and per-
haps best through the insertion of a "social clause" on workers' rights in 
the rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). GATT 
can intervene in trade relations if it believes that governments are unfairly 
distorting world trade through preferential subsidies, discriminatory 
tariffs, or dumping. The IMF would like to see cases of clear breach of the 
labour rights laid down in ILO Standards and international jurisprudence 
- such as the infringement of the freedom of trade union action, dangerous 
working conditions, excessive number of working hours, pay below 
value, the use of forced labour and child labour - brought under GATT 
sanctioning procedures in order to generate greater leverage.The IMF con-
siders the abuses of workers' rights an unfair subsidy to firms or countries 
that are unable or unwilling to comply with labour Standards, and an 
obstacle to the development of both industrialized and developing coun-
tries. 
Pressure to link trade agreements to the maintenance of labour Stand-
ards is not a new phenomenon. As early as 1906, an international labour 
Conference in Bern adopted a treaty, later ratified by 12 European coun-
tries, which prohibited the manufacture and trade of matches containing 
white phosphorus, a Compound that caused particularly distressing dis-
eases amongst the workers who produced it. In 1948, the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Employment was to write a Charter of the In-
ternational Trade Organisation (which later became GATT, with more 
limited ambitions). The initiative then failed, due to the refusal of the 
United States Government to ratify the Constitution of the Organisation 
because of the explicit link between trade and labour Standards in Article 
7 of its founding charter. More recently, however, the United States has 
shifted its position and has begun to take account of the labour Standards 
operating in the countries with which it has trading agreements. For ex-
ample, in 1983, it was stipulated that before a Central American or Carib-
bean country could take advantage of provisions for duty-free admission 
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to U.S. markets, it should be examined whether "workers in such coun-
tries are afforded reasonable workplace conditions and enjoy the right to 
organize and bargain collectively". Other similar pieces of U.S. legislation 
followed. Recently, a panel of the Economic Policy Council of the United 
Nations Association of the U.S.A. viewed it necessary to make GATT the 
venue for imposing economic penalties on countries and industries not 
in compliance with labour Standards and other international norms of 
trading conduct (Economic Policy Council of United Nations Association 
of the USA 1991). The European Parliament also advocated trade-linked 
Standards when in 1983 it called for a new GATT article requiring mem-
bers to respect ILO Conventions, and a social clause is being debated in 
connection with the completion of the Single European Market. 
Some critics, among them governments of developing countries, con-
tend that trade-linked labour Standards are a disguised form of protection-
ism on the part of the industrialized countries (Servais 1989; van Liemt 
1989). They feel that linking labour Standards to trade will in fact work 
against the very people it seeks to help by removing one of their few 
competitive advantages, such as low wages and low labour costs. If 
developing countries were forced, it is argued, to raise labour Standards 
in order to secure trade agreements, they will erode their own competi-
tiveness, lose their attraction for MNEs and thus kill the goose which lays 
the golden eggs. The IMF has responded to this criticism by showing that 
its affiliate trade union organizations in developing countries, such as in 
South and East Asia, do not cling to such arguments and were generally 
in favour of trade-linked labour Standards. 
As yet, the inclusion of a social clause has been limited to the agreement 
concluded by the United States and a few international commodity agree-
ments, such as those on rubber, sugar and tin (for a füll account, see Servais 
1989; van Liemt 1989). To date, there is no majority in international forums 
in favour of action that would use GATT as a lever for effectuating labour 
Standards. Attempts by the IMF to raise the inclusion of a social clause in 
GATT based on ILO Standards, first in the Tokyo Round, then in the 
Uruguay Round of negotiations, have failed. The proposal to include a 
social clause in the Lome Convention (between the EC and the countries 
of Africa) also feil through. But it could well be that pressure is mounting 
in the 1990s to a level which leads to trade-linked Standards on a multi-
lateral basis, be it in a coercive manner through trade sanctions or restric-
tions of capital flows, or in a more conciliatory manner by using inter-
national mediation. 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
4. L A B O U R STANDARDS AS CONTESTED TERRAIN 
Despite being enshrined in international agreements at the highest level, 
such as the ILO Labour Code, U N international agreements on economic, 
social and cultural rights, the European Council's Conventions for the 
Protection of Human Rights of 1950, labour Standards have remained a 
battleground of controversial viewpoints and diverging interests. From a 
historical point of view, we observe a conjuncture for labour policy. Peri-
ods of broadly favourable public opinion and support alternate with pe-
riods in which labour Standards have been subject to significant con-
troversy. It seems that big leaps forward in advancing Standards were 
encountered in the years following the two world wars, when, under the 
fresh impression of political and social catastrophy, governments were 
Willing to take greater responsibility and commitment in the area of social 
policy, and when employers' and workers' organizations were prepared 
to co-operate. Such a "new frontier" spirit is reflected in important enact-
ments, at both the national and the international level, in labour policy in 
the decades following the wars. The period 1919-1921 was one of heavy 
standard-setting at the ILO, dealing with the long-standing demands by 
workers for the 8-hour-day and the 48-hour-week, and Conventions were 
drafted dealing with unemployment, night work by women and young 
persons, the minimum age for industrial employment and the employ-
ment of women before and after confinement. Conventions 87 and 98 on 
the freedom of association and the right to organize and bargain collec-
tively, perhaps the most important Conventions of all, were adopted in 
the aftermath of World War II in 1948 and 1949, respectively. 
In contrast, the 1980s turned out to be a decade of limited advancement 
and Stagnation in labour policy. Although the ILO had more member 
states than ever before, the rate of ratification in this period was dragging, 
and a number of countries even denounced Standards. It was a period of 
exacerbated international competition and increasingly global interde-
pendence in which labour conditions and labour Standards became the 
subject of competition as well. The sentiment was to liberalize the econo-
mies and deregulate the labour market, rather than Coming up with 
farther-reaching international accords in labour policy that could have 
taken labour out of competition. At the turn of the 1990s, the demise of 
the C O M E C O N world was interpreted by many as witnessing to the 
failure of State Intervention into the economy, and demonstrating the su-
periority of capitalist market-type Systems. A l l this created hard times for 
progress on labour Standards. 
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4.1. Objections to Labour Standards 
Objections raised in the 1980s against labour Standards were primarily 
couched in economic terms. Academics and practitioners alike asserted 
that a trade-off exists between labour Standards and economic develop-
ment, a position that clearly strikes against basic tenets of ILO philosophy, 
which sees economic and social progress as mutually reinforcing. 
On a more theoretical level, labour Standards and labour market reg-
ulation have been charged in recent years - mainly by orthodox free 
market economists - with constraining, or even impairing, economic 
growth, structural adjustment, and the expansion of employment. Such 
impacts are alleged particularly with regard to developing countries (see, 
e.g., World Bank 1988), but similar criticism has been launched of ad-
vanced industrialized countries (for Germany, see Deregulierungskom-
mission 1991). Critics see the effect of labour Standards, such as minimum 
wage legislation, trade union actions, collective agreements and active 
employment policy, as raising the price of labour above its opportunity 
cost (or market-determined level), creating undue levelling of wages and 
other terms of employment, distorting Optimum factor allocation, impair-
ing downward adjustment of real wages to changing market conditions 
and, in the final analysis, diminishing the demand for labour and gener-
ating lasting unemployment (for details, see Wilkinson 1991). 
Incorporated in the criticism is a challenge to the principle of univer-
sality of labour Standards. It is claimed that Standards interfere in detri-
mental ways with the competitive advantage of developing countries, 
which stems from low labour cost and a business setting free of rules and 
State Intervention. This comes close to arguing that labour Standards con-
stitute a sort of "luxury" good which only the prosperous can afford while 
the poor have still to earn it. It suggests that development comes first, 
Standards second. Standards are, in this view, an Output, but not an input, 
of development. 
Frequently the economic dynamism in East and South-East Asia has 
been called upon to serve as chief witness to these ideas. It was contended 
that the Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and also 
A S E A N countries such as Malaysia and Thailand would owe their ability 
to have successfully mastered the adverse economic shocks in the last two 
decades to the lack of normative Standards in the labour market, whereas 
Western industrialized countries suffered from insufficient adjustment 
and economic sclerosis due to an over-extension of labour and social 
policy. It is true that the Asian NIEs have a comparatively poor record of 
ratification of international labour Standards. Deplorable working condi-
tions, such as long hours of work, prevail. It may also be true, as the 
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International Metalworkers' Federation asserted, that in these countries 
potential Investors are not encumbered with any extra production costs 
from social policies (IMF 1988:15). Nevertheless, it would be too simplistic 
to follow the populär stereotype and attribute the economic Performance 
of the Asian NIEs exclusively to brutal labour exploitation, and it would 
be equally wrong to explain their success by reference to unfettered 
market forces. Studies available on the Republic of Korea (Amsden 1989) 
and on Singapore (Lim 1990) present a more differentiated picture based 
on substantial State Intervention and also on an increasing role for welfare 
policy, induced partly by worker militancy and partly by government 
policy. Downward real wage flexibility was not a major contributory fac-
tor to the success of the Asian NIEs. In the Republic of Korea, for example, 
real wage growth in manufacturing was extremely rapid, amounting to 
9.3% a year betweeen 1965 and 1984 (Amsden 1989). In the period between 
1980 and 1990, real wage earnings in Korea increased nearly 100%. Real 
wage growth amounted to 86% in Thailand between 1980 and 1986, to 
around two-thirds in Singapore between 1980 and 1988, and to about 53% 
in Hong Kong over the same period. China and Malaysia also recorded 
substantial real wage gains in the 1980s. This contrasts clearly with sub-
Saharan Africa, where minimum wages feil by about one-quarter in most 
countries and more than 50% in some countries, and with Latin America, 
where real minimum wages feil by about 25% in the 1980s. In this decade, 
progress in the incidence and importance of collective bargaining was 
made in the Asian NIEs, whereas the opposite was true for Latin America 
and Africa (ILO Governing Body 1990). What's more, the Asian countries 
provide examples of restructuring upmarket, moving from low-wage, 
labour-intensive lines of production to upgraded, more value-adding and 
skill-intensive technologies. Such transformation was facilitated by rising 
quality of labour supply through educational and training policies which 
could explain why they continued to move so fast in spite of labour short-
ages and rising real wage levels (Labour and Society 1989; Amjad and 
Mohanry 1991). 
4.2. Labour Standards as Economic Opportunities 
The philosophy which is in Opposition to the one just mentioned sees 
labour Standards as an indispensable input, or ingredient, to balanced 
and sustainable development (e.g. Sengenberger 1990). It dismisses the 
luxury argument as inappropriate to any country, whether developed or 
less developed (the terms "developed country" and "developing country" 
signify a misnomer anyway, to the extent that elements of advanced and 
retarded development co-exist in virtually any country). 
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This line of thinking does not assume, as do the neo-liberal critics of 
labour Standards, that there is one best way of structuring the economy, 
determined by economic and technological forces. Rather, it sees the 
labour process as a political one which can take account of a narrow, or 
a wider, ränge of interests and forces of power, and consequently take 
different courses of action and arrive at different results. Labour Standards 
can bring a broader spectrum of interests into play. They can, for example, 
contribute to balancing the development of various regions through 
schemes of inter-regional financial transfer, or arrange through social 
security Systems the accommodation of interests of successive genera-
tions. They are not meant to promote the attainment of short-run gains 
in limited economic units. Rather, they are to assist in servicing more 
general interests through averting individual opportunistic action, and 
facilitating exchange and Joint development. To this effect, a good deal of 
criticism is misplaced that assesses Standards largely or exclusively in 
terms of their short-term costs and benefits for individual firms, thereby 
neglecting negative externalities, that is, effects produced elsewhere in the 
economy, or impacts showing up at a later point in time. It has to be 
admitted, however, that in reality labour institutions and labour regula-
tion exist in many quarters that do have a narrow, parochial scope (e.g. 
union Organization and collective bargaining solely on the Company 
level). Such regulation would miss some of the opportunities that accrue 
from a wider interest accommodation. For example, as the cases of steel 
and shipbuilding demonstrated, more and better options of resolving in 
a socially acceptable manner the decline of a local industry exist if the 
costs of restructuring are shared, and the risks diffused, through a policy 
scheine involving local, regional and national levels of Organization and 
resources. 
The role and importance of labour Standards do not generally lie in 
restricting competition. While competition can evoke the abuse of labour 
Standards, it can also further the spread of Standards where these are held 
to promote competitiveness. In fact, as Edgren notes, the most blatant 
cases of labour exploitation and deprivation are not normally found in 
manufacturing industries which produce for export. The worst offences 
are usually found in plantations and mines, the construction industry and 
small service firms working entirely for the domestic market (Edgren 
1979:529). The role of Standards lies in channelling, directing and manag-
ing economic activities in such a way as to prevent "destructive" com-
petition, and to elicit and promote a "constructive" competitive regime. 
For suppressing destructive competition an effective minimum floor (or 
maximum ceiling) to wages, hours of work, safety and other terms of 
employment and conditions of work is essential. The common Standard 
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removes from the employer the (tempting) possibility of seeking and gain-
ing competitive advantage from cutting wages, or paying sub-standard 
wages. It removes the opportunity from the worker, or the public, to "sub-
sidize" firms that cannot pay a living wage, as Ray Marshall terms it 
(Marshall 1988). This argument should appeal to neo-liberal thinkers who 
take any opportunity to object to wage-cost subsidies, or any form of 
subsidization. The availability of undervalued labour provides, in fact, a 
way of compensating for managerial, organizational and other forms of 
inefficiencies and inadequacies (Wilkinson 1991). 
In practical terms, the question is where wage subsidization begins. Is 
it the evasion of paying legal or contractual wages? Is it the lack of a 
rrunimum wage rule? Is it the (deliberate) pay below value of product 
which occurs if productivity improvement is not passed on to real wages 
so that consumption power is withheld from the (domestic) worker? For 
example, Japanese industry in the 1970s, and the Asian NIEs in the 1980s, 
were blamed for deliberately practising undue wage restraint in order to 
gain advantages, and this policy, if practised on a large scale, would 
generate overproduction and underconsumption on the international 
market. What seems clear is that the type of export-led growth which we 
could observe in the economies of the Pacific rim, and to some extent also 
in Germany, cannot serve as a generalized strategy of world development, 
simply because trade surpluses for all countries are logically impossible. 
In addition, it tends to provoke protective measures by the less successful 
economies. The internationally more acceptable Solution to the problem 
would be to raise real wages to a point where sufficient domestic demand 
for absorbing the production could be generated. 
Labour Standards have an important role to play to stem downward-
directed wage and price competition. They oblige firms to be active and 
look for alternatives other than low pay and poor working conditions in 
order to gain competitiveness, such as product and process innovation. 
The latter amounts to bringing down unit labour costs, rather than total 
labour costs. Keeping labour costs low, as is suggested for poor countries 
to spur their development, is simply not a good recipe. Rather, develop-
ment depends ultimately on making labour more productive. Firms are 
just not inclined to invest in human resources if they are cheap. 
Yet, experience has shown over and over again that the mere blocking 
of downward-directed wage competition, or protection from dismissal, 
may not suffice to induce firms to shift resources from less to more efficient 
use. Employment protection is hardly effective unless coupled with poli-
cies of training and income support that help the firm restructure its 
Operations so that it can keep and redeploy its incumbent work force. 
Similarly, a Convention that prohibits child labour is of little value for 
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halting this abuse unless supportive programmes of income support and 
social security help to overcome the root causes of employing child labour. 
More generally speaking, protection Standards have to be complemented 
with Standards promoting an active labour market and social policies that 
set firms on the track to socially desirable Solutions. 
By obviating destructive labour competition, labour Standards can also 
help to promote co-operation, that is, the Joint development, pooling and 
sharing of resources for gaining greater economies, or for generating 
political voice. Co-operation requires minimum levels of stability in social 
relations, security and mutual trust. None of these will come about on a 
broad scale unless there is some form of collective agreement that assures 
each competrtor that undercutting wages and other destructive competi-
tion is illegitimate, and not to be tolerated. While there have been cases 
of tacit agreement among employers to suppress labour competition, nor-
mally it takes trade unions to assure the conclusion and control of effective 
collective agreements. 
This analysis leads me to stress the "package" character of labour Stand-
ards. Standards of participation, protection and promotion have to effec-
tively combine to produce desirable economic outcomes, and sustainable 
and comprehensive economic and social development. Seen from this 
angle, charges of excessive Standards are mostly ill-founded. Looking 
closely into the labour process in various countries, one finds that the 
problem is one of missing categories of Standards, rather than one of over-
extension. In one way or another, practically all countries fall short of 
living up to the füll ränge of Standards. Most produce partial, selective 
strength. East Asian economies have been able in recent decades to im-
prove the quality of their labour supply through better schooling and 
vocational training, and thereby to achieve an upgrading of their tech-
nology and large productivity gains. At the same time, they often have 
less than satisfactory working conditions, such as exceptionally long 
hours of work, which sooner or later may lead to losses in the productive 
power of these countries. Furthermore, these countries are far from using 
their füll productive capacity as a result of overt discrimination against 
women and the resulting labour market segmentation by gender. In con-
trast, many Western industrialized countries may be better able to control 
excess efforts of their labour forces and discrimination by gender, but have 
made little headway in their human resources policies. 
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5 . CONCLUSIONS 
The internationalization of the economy has progressed at an accelerated 
rate in recent decades. This is indicated by the volume of trade, the ac-
tivities of multinational companies which are capable of escaping the con-
trol of national regulation and national public authorities, and emergent 
or incipient trading blocs that aim for supra-national regional integration. 
It is argued in this paper that, to be effective, social Organization is 
required on a scale commensurate with economic Organization. The reach 
of labour Standards has to be co-extensive with the market. Given the 
advancing internationalization of the economy, the question is how much 
the existing system of setting and enforcing labour Standards can con-
tribute to channelling international competition in constructive ways. In 
principle, labour Standards can help to guide competition in desirable 
directions by setting and enforcing a minimum floor or a maximum ceil-
ing for pay, terms of employment and working conditions, and also by 
eliciting and promoting co-operation within and between the social par-
ties. These two effects are likely to come about if Standards of participa-
tion, protection and promotion at various organizational levels combine 
and reinforce one another. 
ILO Standards are an essential instrument for channelling competition 
at the international (and national) level. They set guidelines for national 
action, stimulate such action and assist in its implementation. Most im-
portant, they stipulate basic rights for workers and employers to organize 
and bargain collectively, and set a code of conduct for these actors, as well 
as for governments. The actual effects of international labour Standards 
remain limited, however, as powers to legislate and execute these rules 
are largely reserved for national authorities. In addition, the impact of 
ILO Standards is seriously hampered by large, and partly increasing, 
cross-national disparities in productive power, real income and wealth. 
This makes it impractical to impose world-wide common Substantive 
Standards, such as a common minimum wage, minimum age for employ-
ment, or minimum safety Standards. Substantive common bench marks 
would be imperative to take some of the destructive competition out of 
the labour and product markets. Perhaps, before such common Substan-
tive Standards become feasible, progress on the enforcement of procedural 
norms, such as freedom for trade union action, is indispensable. Ob-
viously, there is a problem of circular, cumulative causation of weak, or 
suppressed, worker representation and internationally unbalanced 
economic development. 
In view of this quandary it is not, a priori, possible to predict the actual 
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meaning for labour Standards of the intensified competition emanating 
from accelerated globalization. Will it trigger, as trade unions fear, the 
downscaling of Standards, notably in countries with a well developed 
labour code? Will it, on the contrary, induce pressures for international 
cross-fertilization, not only of the hardware component of technology, but 
also of those social models and Standards that have proven to stimulate 
adjustment and efficiency? This trend is already apparent in the spread 
of human resource development to many countries of the North and the 
South. Or will the present upsurge of globalization soon be followed by 
a backlash that would reproduce national or sub-national economies, and 
an emphasis on autocentric, rather than internationally integrated 
development? Whatever the outcome, it is hardly conceivable that lasting 
liberalization in trade wil l occur without progress in attaining universal 
labour Standards. 
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The decision to create the Single market by the end of 1992 gave fresh impetus to 
the integration of the European Corrurtunity, and is to be followed in the longer 
term by further projects such as the European Monetary Union. The unions, the 
Commission and some governments are demanding that a common social space 
be constructed as well. The paper explains in detail the process leading to the Single 
European market. It explains its expected economic effects and the social risks in-
volved. This is followed by accounts of the development of the European social 
space up to now and a brief analysis of European collective bargaining. The con-
clusions are: The "European Social Space" has yet not been extended very far. Ex-
cept for the area of health and safety protection, the legal basis for common min-
imum Standards is inadequate. The unanimity of the 12 member states required to 
deal with fundamental issues such as co-determination, working-time, etc. has 
hitherto been lacking. Due to contrasting levels of social Standards and divergent 
forms of regulation (State versus collective agreements, centralized versus decen-
tralized regulation), general harmonization of social Standards is not possible. 
However, to prevent social dumping, minimum Standards are regarded as an ade-
quate means of promoting social integration of the member states. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The European Community (EC) was founded in 1957 by six countries. It 
has now grown to include twelve member states.1 The total population 
of the Community is approximately 326 million (Table 1), which repre-
sents an enormous potential for economic power, technological develop-
ment, productiveness and cultural diversity. In purely quantitative terms, 
the EC is a considerable force on the world stage: 
- The Community accounts for 18% of world income and of world pro-
duction, while only 7% of the world's potential earners (people be-
tween the ages of 15 and 64) live in the various member states (Figure 
!)• 
- The Community ranks considerably higher in world trade. It accounts 
for more than 35% of world exports and imports, or about 20% if trade 
within the Community is excluded - a greater share than that of the 
United States or Japan. 
Such figures sound impressive, but cannot hide the fact that the EC is in 
no way an integrated economic area comparable to the U.S.A. or Japan. 
It is true that customs duties have to a large extent been eliminated in the 
first 30 years of the EC's existence. However, the EC does not yet have a 
Single currency, and the individual member states, anxious to retain their 
sovereignty have surrendered only a small, though increasing part of 
their Jurisdiction to the Commission. And despite the abolition of customs 
duties and many non-tariff barriers to trade, there are still many trade 
barriers left. The diversity of languages within the Community makes it 
difficult to develop a lingua franca that would facilitate communication 
within Europe. 
The decision to create the Single internal market by the end of 1992 
gave fresh impetus to the process of integration, and is to be followed in 
the longer term by further undertakings such as the European monetary 
union. The fundamental purpose of this process of integration is to create 
a common economic space. At the same time, the trade unions, in particular, 
and also the Commission and some national governments are demanding 
that a common social space be constructed as well. The harmonization of 
social Standards is intended to prevent the undermining of the highly 
In 1957 six states founded the European Economic Community. In 1965 other 
European authorities (for the coal, steel and nuclear industries) were integrated 
and the name was changed to European Community. In this paper I only use 
the actual term European Community. The present members are: Belgium, Den-
mark, Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands and Portugal. 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
Table 1: Key employment indicators in the Community 
Units: Millions 
1965 1975 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
Total 
Total population 293.2 312.2 322.0 322.8 323.6 324.6 326.1 
Population of working-age (14-64) 188.0 198.1 216.9 216.9 217.6 219.0 
Total employment 122.6 124.8 124.3 125.3 128.1 130.5 132.6 
Ratio of employment to working-age population 65.3% 63.0% 57.6% 57.8% 58.9% 59.6% 
Total unemployment 2.6 5.5 14.9 14.9 14.6 13.8 12.7 
Unemployment rate 2.1% 4.3% 10.8% 10.7% 10.3% 9.7% 9.0% 
Youth (14-24) unemployment rate 23.1% 22.3% 20.9% 19.6% 17.4% 
Employment in agriculture 20.1 13.9 10.5 10.1 9.7 9.4 9.0 
Employment in industry 49.5 48.3 40.7 40.6 41.2 41.5 42.1 
Employment in Services 53.1 62.2 73.1 74.6 77.2 79.5 81.4 
Share of employment in agriculture 16.4% 11.2% 8.5% 8.1% 7.6% 7.3% 6.8% 
Share of employment in industry 40.3% 38.8% 32.7% 32.4% 32.2% 31.8% 31.7% 
Share of employment in Services 43.3% 50.0% 58.8% 59.5% 60.2% 60.9% 61.5% 
Men 
Total population 151.9 156.6 157.0 157.5 157.5 158.8 
Total employment 82.2 78.1 78.2 79.6 80.5 81.2 
Total unemployment 3.3 8.0 7.8 7.4 6.7 6.0 
Unemployment rate 9.4% 9.2% 8.6% 7.8% 7.0% 
Youth (14-24) unemployment rate 21.4% 20.6% 18.8% 17.2% 14.9% 
Employment in agriculture 6.8 6.5 6.4 6.1 
Employment in industry 31.4 31.2 31.6 31.9 
Employment in Services 39.9 40.5 41.7 42.5 
Share of employment in agriculture 8.8% 8.4% 8.1% 7.6% 
Share of employment in industry 40.1% 39.9% 39.7% 39.6% 
Share of employment in Services 51.1% 51.7% 52.2% 52.8% 
Women 
Total population 160.3 165.4 165.8 166.1 166.5 167.3 
Total employment 42.5 46.2 47.0 48.6 49.9 51.4 
Total unemployment 2.3 6.9 7.1 7.2 7.1 6.7 
Unemployment rate 12.9% 13.0% 12.9% 12.5% 11.9% 
Youth (14-24) unemployment rate 25.0% 24.3% 23.3% 22.2% 20.1% 
Employment in agriculture 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.3 
Employment in industry 9.4 9.4 9.5 9.7 
Employment in Services 33.0 34.0 35.6 37.0 
Share of employment in agriculture 8.0% 7.5% 7.3% 6.6% 
Share of employment in industry 20.5% 20.1% 19.8% 19.3% 
Share of employment in Services 71.6% 72.4% 72.8% 74.1% 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (1989: 72). 
developed social security Systems that exist in most EC member states as 
a result of deregulation being necessary due to increased competition 
within the Community. There are sufficient grounds for such fears. Ger-
man employers - and in this respect they are no different from those in 
other member states - see the internal market as the "greatest deregulation 
programme in history". According to a member of the board of Höchst 
A G , the "supply shock calls into question over-regulation, excessive taxa-
tion and outmoded structures that restrict employers' room for 
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Figure 1: Distribution of World Income - 1988 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (1989:39). 
manoeuvre and offers a unique opportunity to create a free, un-
bureaucratic economic order". For another employers' representative, 
Europe 1992 will serve "to open up outdated structures". 
It remains to be seen whether the EC internal market will really lead 
to the creation of an economic and social area that will serve as a model 
throughout the world, as Jacques Delors had repetitively claimed (Delors 
1988), or to the deregulation of the most highly developed social security 
Systems in the world. The outcome will depend on the extent to which 
social security Systems in Europe can be harmonized, at least partially, or 
common minimum Standards created. There are grounds for the assump-
tion that the implementation of common Standards of social security will 
take considerably longer to achieve than economic integration. 
This paper will first describe the process leading to the completion of 
the single European market by 1992 and give an account of its expected 
economic effects (Section 2) and the ensuing social risks (Section 3). This 
will be followed by accounts of the legal bases for socio-political harmoni-
zation within the EC (Section 4) and of the development of the European 
social space up to now (Section 5). The paper will conclude with a brief 
analysis of the development of a European collective bargaining policy 
(Section 6) and consideration of prospects for the future (Section 7). 
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2. T H E SINGLE EUROPEAN M A R K E T 
2.1. Origins 
As the former vice-president of the EC Commission, Lord Cockfield, 
pointed out that the reasons for increased European integration had little to 
do with idealism and a great deal to do with "solid economic concerns", 
namely the recognition that the Community would increasingly lose 
ground and market share to its main competitors, the U.S. A. and Japan, if it 
did not succeed in fully exploiting the potentially enormous Single market 
of its 12 member states. By the 1970s the European market had lost the 
power it had held in the 1960s as customs duties were gradually abolished. 
A few figures will serve to clarify the Situation: Between 1965 and 1973 
exports from the Federal Republic of Germany to other EC countries in-
creased by 13.5% per year, while imports from member states grew by 
11.6%. Trade with non-member states expanded less rapidly (exports in-
creased by 8.5% per year and imports by 5.6%). This initial impetus from 
the EC came to a halt with the first oil crisis of 1973. Between 1973 and 
1984 there was a great increase in trade between the F.R.G. and non-EC 
countries (non-member states: exports +9.6%, imports: +12.0%; EC coun-
tries: exports +9.5%, imports 9.5%) (cf. Busch 1988; Office for the Official 
Publications of the European Community 1987/1988). Moreover, since 
1973 the internal economic dynamic of EC countries had been weaker 
than that of the U.S. A. or Japan. "In terms of gross domestic product, EC 
member states in the period 1969-1972 ranged on the second place behind 
Japan, still a recently industrialized country at that time, and thus ahead 
of both the U.S. A. and the EFTA countries. In the period after 1972 the EC 
countries, despite regional expansion, ranked behind Japan, the U.S.A. 
and the EFTA countries" (Dicke 1989: 91; cf. Figure 2). 
This economic slow-down was accompanied by considerable decrease 
in employment. At the beginning of the 1980s, individual countries were 
increasingly attempting to introduce subsidies and import controls. There 
was a risk that economic integration might be undermined. 
2.2. The Single European Act and the White Paper 
The prevention of further relapses into national protectionism required a 
fresh strive toward integration, which at the same time seemed more 
advantageous to all member states than going it alone. Thus in 1982 the 
Council of Ministers made plans for creating an internal market. 
Customs union had already been achieved, i.e. tariff obstacles to trade 
had been eliminated. The Commission hoped to give fresh impetus to the 
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Figure 2: Evolution of gross domestic product, gross investment and employment 
in the industrialised countries (Annual average changes in %) 
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process of integration by elimmating important non-tariff obstacles. In 
order to put the plans for the internal market into practice, the Commis-
sion produced a so-called White Paper containing almost 300 proposals 
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for the elimination of existing physical, technical and tax restrictions. 
These 300 individual measures harmonize regulations, or liberalize them. 
In the case of liberalization, the principle of country of origin applies, 
that is national governments mutually recognize their own various legal 
regulations, Standard Systems and examination and licensing procedures. 
In order to avoid difficult harmonization procedures, precedence was 
given to liberalization. In particular, the White Paper contains measures 
on: 
- the implementation of the free movement of goods (in particular the 
elimination of so-called technical obstacles to trade, such as variations 
in vehicle safety requirements); 
- the development of free trade in Services (e.g. access for foreign in-
surance companies to other national markets); 
- mutual recognition of qualifications in order to open up the labour 
market for skilled workers to all Citizens of EC member states; 
- the liberalization of the movement of capital (e.g. opportunity to open 
a bank account in any EC country); 
- the liberalization of public procurement Systems (opening up of calls 
for tender to foreign bidders); 
- the creation of a "European Company" that would be readily accepted 
in all member states; 
- the alignment of indirect taxes (particularly VAT); 
- the eÜmination of border controls. 
The White Paper is based essentially on employers' proposals which have 
largely been accepted by the Commission. It is therefore hardly surpris-
ing that the White Paper contains no declarations at all on social policy. 
In 1986 the so-called Single European Act was signed. This represents 
the most comprehensive reform of the Treaty ofRome of 1957 and creates 
the legal framework for the completion of the Single European market 
by the end of 1992. The sweeping away of borders within the Commu-
nity of twelve is intended to lead to the free circulation of Services and 
capital, freedom of movement for goods and European workers and 
the abolition of technical and tax obstacles to trade.3 In concrete terms, 
2 In 1985 the former head of Philips wrote a paper on "Europe 1990". This paper 
was subsequently approved by the Round Table Group of European Industrial-
ists. The Commission simply adopted large parts of this text and made it official 
policy for the Single European market. 
3 The amended EC Treaty defines the Single market as follows: "The Single market 
comprises a space without internal frontiers within which the free movement 
of goods, people, Services and capital is guaranteed in accordance with the pro-
visions of this treaty" (EEC Treaty, Article 8a). 
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this means that, by the end of 1992, the 300 measures listed in the White 
Paper are to be put into practice. With this decision, the national govern-
ments and the Commission deliberately put themselves under pressure 
to succeed. The deadline of 1992 served primarily to send a political 
Signal. It was evident to the Commission "that it could not have shifted 
national policies at all without such an ambitious target" (Schloser 1988: 
89ff.). The deadline was also an attempt to generate a campaign atmos-
phere within the EC. Individual governments have further fuelled this 
atmosphere through television broadcasts. In this respect there were 
and are considerable differences between the various European coun-
tries. In the less highly developed EC countries great hopes have been 
placed on assistance from the richer member states and great impor-
tance attached to the completion of the Single market. In the Federal 
Republic, on the other hand, reactions to these new developments have 
been late to materialize; at least in the '80s due to the high trade sur-
pluses most Germans did not feel threatened by the increased competi-
tion. 
2.3. Economic Consequences 
The plan to create a Single market still lacked academic justification, so 
the Commission requested a group of researchers under the direction of 
Paolo Cecchini to investigate into the economic consequences ofthe Single 
market. This group's report concluded that the impact on growth and 
employment would be positive. Cost reductions for firms, reductions in 
expenditure for governments and increased competition, particularly in 
hitherto protected markets, would lead to additional growth in gross 
domestic product of +4.5% to +7.5% and an increase in employment of 
1.8 to 5.7 million within six years (Cecchini 1988). These effects are greater 
than in comparable studies carried out in the 1970s. The main reason for 
this is that the macroeconomic models used in the study assume increas-
ing rather than constant or even decreasing economies of scale. In other 
words, it is assumed that the size of firms in Europe is not optimal, but 
will have to be increased as a result of larger markets (Dicke 1989: 90). 
This assumption has rightly been criticized for ignoring the decrease in 
the size of firms in several sectors as a result of the flexible specialization 
of production and for the query of classic principles of mass production. 
For example, it is argued the Federal Republic's favourable competitive 
Situation in the machine tool industry cannot be strengthened by the tran-
sition to mass production. 
A further criticism is that the negative effects on the labour market 
caused by C o m p a n y shutdowns are not being sufficiently taken into ac-
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count. Such negative effects will, moreover, be concentrated in certain 
industrial sectors and regions. Thus, for example, increased competition 
will have a particularly serious effect on producers operating in pre-
viously protected national markets (e.g. steam boiler plants, railway loco-
motives, telephone and tele-communications installations, turbogenera-
tors) (Figure 3). The free movement of goods, capital and Services wil l 
favour individual regions and put others at a disadvantage. Maps are 
already being drawn in many places, on which the winning and losing 
regions are being marked. The regions currently tipped to be winners are 
the five small, dynamic regions of Baden-Württemberg, Rhöne-Alpes, 
Lombardy Catalonia and the South-East of England. Other regions with 
a high proportion of endangered sectors and an unfavourable geographi-
ca! location will be among the losers. 
Figure 3: Sectors vulnerable to potential restructuring (Industrial restructuring as 

















Boilers 2000 20% very low 12 6 20% 
Turbine 
generators 2000 60% very low 10 2 12% 
Locomotives 100 50-80 % very low 16 2 20% 
Central 
Computers 10000 80% 30-100 % 5 9 5% 
Telephone 
exchanges 1000-5000 70% 15-45 % 11 4 20% 
Telephones 5000 90% very low 12 17 -
Lasers 500 50% very high + 1000 + 1000 -
1 The reduction in costs represents economies of scale resulting from a doubling 
of production. 
2 European Currency Unit. 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General for Em-
ployment, Social Affairs and Education (1988: 43). 
And as a result of cross-border Cooperation between regions, the various 
regions will presumably also begin to compete with each other more in-
tensely than before. Previously unchallenged national centres, in the 
spheres of finance or the media for example, wil l now have to assert them-
selves in the face of European competition. 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
Where regional and national competition within the EC overlap and 
reinforce each other, there is a risk of competition to deregulate social 
Standards if such competition is not suppressed by the introduction of 
social Standards that are applicable throughout Europe. A negative ex-
ample in this respect is provided by the U.S.A., where individual states 
seek to undercut each other in their social security Systems in order to 
create a climate favourable to investment. In the indices of favourable 
investment climates published in the U.S.A., strong trade unions, short 
working hours, high health and safety Standards etc. are always listed as 
negative points.4 
2.4. On the Road to Monetary Union 
At the last EC summit in Maastricht in December 1991 the national 
governments reached an agreement on the introduction of economic 
and monetary union until the end of the Century. In the initial phase, 
all Community currencies are to join the exchange rate mechanism of 
the European currency system and to coordinate financial policy more 
closely. In the second phase the European central bank system is to be 
established, which wil l initially be responsible for financial policy, al-
though without releasing member states from their responsibility for 
monetary policy. Furthermore, the financial and economic policies of 
member states are to be more closely coordinated by certain rules. 
Changes in the broad exchange rates between member states are to be 
possible only in exceptional cases. In the third and final phase the 
European central bank system wil l take over füll responsibility for the 
Community's monetary policy The broad exchange rates between the 
currencies wil l be fixed definitively and the E C U (European Currency 
Unit) introduced as the common currency. 
The details of this monetary union have not yet been fully worked out. 
It is also questionable whether the monetary union can be introduced in 
the late 90's since the precondition is a large degree of convergence in 
economic development and economic policy between the member states. 
Until now differences in rates of inflation, the development of productiv-
ity etc. have been reflected in the exchange rate. Thus in the 1980s the 
German Mark was revalued by 60% against the Italian Lira and by 30% 
against the French Franc (Busch 1991: 273ff.). There are many indications 
that economic policy and economic development are evolving differently 
in the various member states. In consequence, the draft for economic and 
monetary union sets up guidelines for budget policy that are, however, 
4 This is impressively analyzed in Tarullo (1989). 
320 
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only recommendations. "The discontinuance of the exchange rate mech-
anism in an economic and currency union will create an additional prob-
lem for European trade unions, namely that wage costs will have a much 
more direct influence than today on national and regional competitive-
ness... (This) wil l force the European trade unions, to a much greater 
extent than today, to coordinate and organise collective bargaining policy 
on a Europe-wide basis and in accordance with the system" (Busch 1991: 
277). 
. 3 . T H E SOCIAL RISKS OF THE SINGLE M A R K E T 
The Single European market involves considerable risks for wage and 
salary earners, the significance and scope of which are assessed very 
differently in the various European countries, and even within those coun-
tries. These divergent assessments are hardly surprising, since the restruc-
turing of the European economy will produce winners and losers. 
The main fear of trade unions in the more highly developed EC coun-
tries is competition with the less advanced member states, where wages 
and social benefits are far below the EC average (Figure 4). High social 
Standards can be undermined in the following way: 
- With increasing competition between various regions of Europe, com-
panies will shift production to countries with low wages and social 
Standards. This will lead to job losses, and moreover European coun-
tries will try to improve their competitive position by deregulation of 
the welfare State. Since the expected monetary union will deprive in-
dividual states of the possibility of using devaluation to offset competi-
tive disadvantages, there will be an increasing tendency to devalue social 
Standards. 
- As a result of the mobility of capital and labour, social Standards in 
respect of existing jobs will also be put at risk, since the internal market 
provides various opportunities for legal avoidance of existing social Sys-
tems. Thus, for example, a French Company can use temporary employ-
ment contracts to hire Portuguese workers in France at Portuguese 
wages and dismiss its French employees. 
Such legal avoidance is also possible between countries with similar levels 
of development but differing social Standards. Thus, for example, a Ger-
man Company could transfer its head office to England in order to escape 
the German system of co-determination, although its production facilities 
and the larger part of its administration remain in the Federal Republic 
as before. 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
Figure 4: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per person employed 
Source: Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General for Em-
ployment, Social Affairs and Education (1988: 90). 
Most welfare State safeguards are based on a monopoly operating within 
a delimited sphere of application, corresponding to the boundaries of na-
tion states, that is at risk of losing its foundation. The territorial principle 
(social regulations apply to all employees in a given region) is at risk of 
being undermined by the principle of country oforigin (the regulations of 
the country of origin apply whatever region of the EC employees are 
actually working in). 
The peripheral EC countries are expressing quite different anxieties. 
They point to the advantages in modernization enjoyed by the more 
highly developed countries and see themselves as the losers in a Situation 
of unbridled competition. The competitive advantages of the richer EC 
countries are self-evident. The Federal Republic, for example, because of 
its high level of technological development and the high Standard of train-
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ing among its work force, tends to be seen as a winner in the expanded 
EC market.5 Given the existing differences in levels of development in 
Europe, excessive haste in the harmonization of social Standards would 
simply render the less developed countries hopelessly uncompetitive. 
These countries are also justified in asking that their concentration on 
areas of production that are more wage intensive, and in which they are 
consequently more able to be competitive, should not be included in any 
definition of social dumping.6 
It is agreed that the long-term social, political and economic cohesion 
of the EC can be achieved only through the convergence of living con-
ditions.7 However, there are differences of opinion as to whether such 
convergence can be achieved via the market or whether regulatory In-
tervention wil l be required. There are two basic approaches to this issue: 
1. Employers and conservative governments, in particular, consider any 
attempt at social regulation to be the "wrong road". 8 Differences in 
labour costs are considered to be a precondition for the efficient al-
location of resources in the various countries, so long as marginal 
productivity rates differ. If resources were redistributed via the 
market, this would automatically lead to convergence. Harmoniza-
tion of social Standards would only increase unemployment in the 
less highly developed countries. Advanced social policy regulations 
would not have an adverse effect on the competitiveness of the more 
highly developed countries if employees followed the rules of the 
5 cf. Ermer et al. (1990), particularly Chapter 2.3.1 on the "social dumping" argu-
ment. 
6 The concept of "fair working conditions" is being discussed in the ILO; social 
dumping is taken to include the creation of competitive disadvantages by failure 
to observe internationally recognized and agreed minimum Standards. The 
GATT definition, in contrast, seems barely acceptable. In Article VI, paragraph 
1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the definition of dumping 
includes only prices that are lower than the production costs or the price that 
the exporting country itself must pay. Thus starvation wages are legitimized as 
the market price. 
7 Thus in the Single European Act the following goal is formulated: "In particular, 
the Community sets itself the target of reduding the gap between the various 
regions and the backwardness of the most disadvantaged areas" (Art. 130a). 
8 cf. for example Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Feb. 12, 1989 (The Social 
Charter is the Wrong Way). Elsewhere it has been stated that "From the point 
of view of trade policy, it is not necessary to adjust social Standards in order to 
protect the "high Standard countries". Rather, the chronic current account defi-
cits in the peripheral countries make an increase in their exports seem desirable 
.. . An increase in their labour and social costs brought about by harmonization 
would be an obstacle to that" (Kotios and Schäfers 1990: 202). 
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market and combined such advantages with the renunciation of wage 
increases. 
2. The need for regulation is particularly emphasized by trade unions and 
social-democratic or socialist governments. Purely social arguments are 
increasingly being supplemented by economic arguments. Because of 
their low social Standards, the peripheral countries are regarded to be 
at risk of concentrating solely on wage intensive production and thus 
obstructing their development in the long term. Agradual convergence 
of social Standards would be an endogenous factor in economic 
development that would force companies in these countries to inno-
vate.9 In the developed European countries it is feared that the welfare 
State will slowly be eroded, initially just at the edges (increase in pre-
carious working), which will increasingly encourage companies to im-
prove their competitiveness by cutting wages rather than through in-
novation and increased productivity. Thus the maintenance of the 
existing economic dynamic requires the welfare State to be stabilised 
or indeed extended. 
These approaches are not always so clearly differentiated in practice as 
the ideal types outlined above. To some extent, employers and trade un-
ions in the poorer EC countries are united in their Opposition to exces-
sively high Standards, which in their view would place too great a strain 
on their economies. And then again supporters of deregulation, such as 
the current German and British governments, have closed ranks against 
those governments, such as the French and Danish, that are in favour of 
regulation. 
4 . T H E L E G A L BASES FOR SOCIAL STANDARDS I N THE E C 
The EC's competence to respond directly in the sphere of social policy is 
extremely limited. The EC developed as an economic Community and con-
siders social policy to be largely the responsibility of the member states. 
This is clear from its genesis. France, in particular, feared that its high 
level of social protection would lead to competitive disadvantages and 
insisted on a comprehensive harmonization of social policy; however, the 
9 In this respect, see particularly Sengenberger's contribution to this Conference. 
1 0 The example of Great Britain is often used as a warning in this respect; by pur-
suing a strict policy of deregulation and eschewing any industrial policy, the 
British government has systematically ruined the country's competitiveness, to 
the delight of the major exporting countries. 
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French proposals met with stern resistance from the Federal Republic 
(Weinstock 1989:15ff.). 
The legal competencies of the EC in the sphere of social policy are 
correspondingly weak. 
- Articles 117 and 118 of the Treaty of Rome stress the Obligation of mem-
ber states to cooperate in the formation of their social Systems, although 
the concrete arrangements remain a matter of the individual member 
states. 
- Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome formulates the principle of "equal 
pay for men and women for equal work". Article 120 gives expres-
sion to the desire to retain the existing equality in respect of the 
regulations on paid holidays. Both of these articles are somewhat 
unusual in that they are directed at concrete provisions. The reason 
for this lies in the efforts of the French govemment to avoid being 
at a disadvantage as a result of the relative equality of pay for men 
and women that has been achieved in France and its lengthy holiday 
entitlement. 
- Articles 48-51 establish freedom of movement for employees. In ac-
cordance with Article 123, the Commission has the task of "fostering 
the employability and the geographical and occupational mobility of 
workers within the Community". 
- Recourse to general regulations contained in the Treaty does offer the 
EC some opportunities for action. Thus the Corrununity can - although 
only on the basis of unanimity - issue guidelines "that have a direct 
effect on the establishment or functioning of the common market" (Ar-
ticle 100). 
The Single European Act has done little to change the EC's lack of com-
petence, except in the area of economic policy. It contains three new reg-
ulations: 
- The Council can, with a qualified majority, decide on the alignment of 
legal and administrative regulations in so far as they concem the crea-
tion or the functioning of the internal market. However, this does not 
apply to regulations on the rights and interests of employees, but only 
to the measures contained in the White Paper (ArticlelOOa). 
- In accordance with Article 118a, the Commission can, with a qualified 
majority, issue minimum regulations for the improvement and har-
monization of the working environment (particularly health and 
safety). These are always minimiim regulations that can be improved 
by national legislation. 
- Finally, the Commission is to try to promote a dialogue between the 
social partners in Europe, which may also lead to contractual relation-
ships if the partners so wish (Article 118b). 
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If the member states agreed, they could pass virtually all conceivable so-
cial policy regulations. In practice, however, unanimity is rarely given. 
Differences of opinion are possible only in the area of health and safety 
at work, which is interpreted in a restrictive way. The need to reach füll 
consensus has until now proved to be the most effective means of blocking 
the harmonization of social regulations or of establishing common min-
imum Standards. 
The majority of the member states therefore wanted an extension of 
qualified majority voting to a wider ränge of employment-related issues 
and the establishment of mechanism whereby European-level employ-
ers' organisations and trade unions could have a greater role in the 
formulation and implementation of Community social policy. At the 
last EC Summit in Maastricht in December 1991 the U.K. Conservative 
Government feit, however, unable to sign any treaty which contained 
provisions in these areas, claiming that resultant legislation would im-
pose centralized regulations on the U.K. which might damage its com-
petiveness and cost jobs. In order to secure the U.K.'s signature to the 
European Treaty and the monetary union itself, a compromise was 
sought on the social policy issue. The chapter on social policy was 
entirely ommitted from the new Treaty. The current social policy pro-
visions will thus remain the only social provisions applicable to all 12 
member states. Instead a protocol was added to the Treaty stating that 
11 of the member states wish to continue along the path laid down in 
the Social Charter of 1989 (see Chapter 5.2 below). The protocol there-
fore states that the 12 agree to authorize the 11 to make use of the EC 
institutions, procedures and mechanism to take and apply the necessary 
decisions among themselves. The 11 agreed to majority votes on "work-
ing conditions" and "the information and consultation of workers". So 
a wide field of issues are now subject to majority votes. The 11, however, 
exempted from majority votes some crucial areas of national social 
policy like "social security and social protection of workers" which still 
require unanimity. In addition, the position of unions and employers 
is strengthened. If the commission intends to enact a regulation, man-
agement and labour may decide to reach a collective agreement on the 
issue in question. The compromise reached in Maastricht arguably 
raises more questions than it answers. The main question is: How wil l 
it be possible to use the institutions and mechanisms of the EC to 
develop social policy for 11 states only (European Industrial Relations 
Review 1992: 2-3)? 
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5. E C SOCIAL POLICY TO D A T E 1 1 
5.1. The Period 1958-1987 
The years from 1978 to 1982 saw the introduction of regulations governing 
the free movement of labour within the EC. Apart from that, virtually 
nothing happened, and the Commission had to limit itself to comparative 
analyses of the various social Systems. 
The 1970s saw the development of the first action programme in the 
field of social policy. In 1974, the member states committed themselves to 
the implementation of approximately 40 measures within a period of 3 to 
4 years. This resulted, among other things, in the introduction of the fol-
lowing directives that are binding for the member states: 
- Several directives established the principle of equal pay for men and 
women and of equal treatment for both sexes regarding the access to 
employment and vocational training and in the area of social security. 
The prohibition on discrimination was also extended to recruitment, 
and sanctions were sought in the event of discrimination. 
- The 1975 directive on mass redundancies reformulated the concept of 
mass redundancy as defined in the regulations providing protection 
against dismissal. The threshold at which dismissals are defined as 
mass redundancies is now lower than in the legislation then in force 
in the Federal Republic. 
- The directive on the protection of employees' rights when the owner-
ship of companies, establishments or divisions changes provided for 
the continued application of collective agreements and Company agree-
ments in the event of takeovers. 
A l l these guidelines had to be incorporated into national legislation. 
Where this did not take place in due time, it was enforced through the 
European Court. For example, a series of actions enabled women to push 
through the elimination of legislative (not actual) discrimination 
(Schunter-Kleemann 1990 and 1991). It is characteristic of this period that 
the effect of EC directives in shaping legislation was not even transparent 
to experts. The debates on necessary changes to legislation were actually 
conducted throughout Europe solely on the national level. 
However, a number of other attempts to formulate directives on tem-
porary or part-time work failed. As in the sphere of economic union, the 
late 1970s saw the beginning of a phase of Stagnation. The period of reform 
in Europe, heralded by the political changes that occurred at the end of 
The following observations are based essentially on Crijns (1987) and Däubler 
(1991). 
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the 1960s (May 1968) came to an end with the beginning of mass unem-
ployment in the mid-1970s and the change to conservative governments 
and supply-side economic concepts. 
5.2. The Years since 1987 
Since 1987 the European Federation of Trade Unions had been demanding 
the introduction of basic social rights within the Community that would 
establish minimum Standards in social policy. Several drafts were drawn 
up. Even the Economic and Social Committee of the EEC decided on a 
list of basic rights approved by several employers' representatives. The 
Commission, on the other hand, proposed only a "solemn declaration", 
which was mitigated even further in several meetings with the govern-
ments involved. At the Strasburg summit Conference of Dec. 8/9, 1989 
this declaration was adopted. It turned out to be less solemn than planned, 
since the British government could not be persuaded to approve of it, 
despite numerous concessions. 
The Charter (see box below) contains nothing that exceeds existing 
laws. The Cornmission's social policy action programme of November 
1989 went further, with a list of measures to be implemented by 1993. 
Five of these sets of measures are described here through examples: 
The Directive on European Works Councils 
With the completion of the Single European market there will be a rapid in-
crease in the number of Company mergers in the Community. In accordance 
with EC competition law, 197 of the 1,000 largest companies in the EC were 
involved in Joint mergers in 1988/1989 (the corresponding figure for 
1983/84 was only 29). Such a Community-wide trend towards concentra-
tion avoids all national regulations on consultation, information and co-de-
termination. In a draft guideline of December 1990, the Commission pro-
posed that European works Councils should be established in companies 
with at least 1,000 employees and at least two establishments with a min-
imum of 100 employees in two member states.12 The modalities of appoint-
ment to these works Councils are to be laid down separately in each member 
State. The rights of the works Councils are to be determined in negotiations 
with the companies concerned. However, the minimum rights will include 
one meeting per year with the Company management and information on 
This draft guideline is based on a number of group agreements, which have 
already led to the establishment of group committees, such as Thomson Grand 
Public, Gillette or Volkswagen (cf. Hans-Böckler-Stiftung 1991). 
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the company's economic development and on any important changes af-
fecting employees. This directive is based on Article 100 of the Treaty of 
Rome, and therefore requires unanimous acceptance. The employers are 
blocking the proposal. They consider it to be a stereotypical and 
bureaucratic form of centralized employee representation. In their view, 
problems affecting employees can be resolved only at local level. 1 3 
The Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of the 
European Parliament of April 12,1989 
Emphasis should be placed in the first instance on the declaration of the 
inviolability of human dignity (Article 1), the affirmation of the prin-
ciple of equality, which in particular prohibits discrimination on the 
grounds of nationality and sex (Article 3) and the freedom of move-
ment granted to all Citizens of the Community in accordance with Ar-
ticle 8, paragraph 1. Article 12 is concerned with the narrower sphere of 
fundamental social rights; it does not guarantee the right to work, but 
does State that workers should have access to vocational training ap-
propriate to the abilities of each individual and that they shall be free to 
choose their occupation and place of work and shall not be disadvan-
taged for unobjective reasons. While Article 13 lays down minimum re-
quirements for fair working conditions, Article 14 guarantees a system 
of collective bargaining and the right to collective action, including the 
right to strike. Furthermore, employees should be granted rights to in-
formation and consultation in respect ofthe economic and financial Sit-
uation of the undertaking in which they are employed (Article 14, para-
graph 3). While the right to health protection and social security (Ar-
ticle 15) and the right to education (Article 16) belong to the traditional 
stock of fundamental social rights, Articles 18 and 24 go further: the 
former guarantees the individual's right of access to information, while 
the latter is concerned with the environment and consumer protection. 
Source: Däubler (1991: 315). 
The European Company 
Proposals have been put forward for the establishment of a new, supra-
national legal form for companies in different member states seeking to 
merge. A l l plans for the creation of this so-called European Company have 
so far foundered on the issue of co-determination. Several years ago the 
cf. Handelsblatt March 22/23,1991 (Die Arbeitgeber wurden im Sozialausschuß 
überstimmt). 
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Commission proposed that Company management and work force should 
be able to reach agreement on one of three models of co-determination: 
the German model of co-determination at the level of the supervisory 
board, a separate employee representative body independent of the other 
bodies (the French model) and collective bargaining Sys tems (the Swedish 
model). A European Company without co-determination is inconceivable. 
The employers and a few governments are blocking co-determination and 
want a European C o m p a n y "without restrictions". 
Directive on Certain Aspects ofthe Shaping of Working Time 
The draft issued at the beginning of 1990 contains the following minimum 
regulations: a minimum daily rest period of 11 hours, i.e. a maximum daily 
working period of 13 hours and one day off per week; the restriction of night 
work to eight hours, together with a ban on overtime in the case of certain 
dangers; special breaks for night and alternating shift work and special ar-
rangements for health checks and the change from night to day work. The 
majority on the Economic and Social Committee have criticized the pro-
posal on the grounds that it lags far behind existing regulations in member 
states. With the exception of Great Britain, the maximum daily working pe-
riod in all member states is already 12 hours or less. The proposal is also 
criticized for saying nothing about the dura tion of working hours, overtime 
bonuses or the banning of Sunday work. In this respect it lags behind earlier 
proposals (the 1974 recommendations of the Council on the 40-hour week). 
The reason for the inadequate proposal certainly lies also in the weak legal 
basis. In order to reach a majority decision only regulations under the terms 
of Article 118a and relating to health and safety issues were accepted. 
Proposed Directives on Atypical Employment Relationships 
The Commission has proposed three directives addressing atypical work 
relationships founded on different legal bases: Articles 100 (requiring u-
nanimous approval in the Council of Ministers), 100a and 118a. 
The first directive based on Article 100 is the most important of the 
three aimed at giving workers employed on atypical contracts treatment 
equal to that of other employees in respect of employment and working 
conditions. It is proposed in the directive that part-time and temporary 
workers should have the same access to vocational training as normal 
staff, in relation to their working time and their tasks, and that employers 
would have to inform employee representatives if they want to use part-
time workers. Also casual workers should be informed in due time if the 
Company plans to recruit workers for full-time employment, so that the 
casual worker has a chance of application. 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
The second directive proposes that casual workers be granted the same 
entitlements to annual holidays, dismissal and seniority allowances as 
full-time employees, in proportion to the total hours worked, while the 
third proposal entitles part-time and temporary workers to the same 
health and safety provisions as full-time staff. 
Since the number of part-time and temporary workers has risen in 
recent years and work on casual terms has become an almost "typical" 
form of employment, legal provisions ensuring at least minimum Stand-
ards of social protection for casual workers are needed. The proposed 
directives are aimed at setting these minimum Standards. 
These guidelines have also turned out to be very weak because of the 
fragmentation of their legal basis. In several respects they would require 
German legislation to be amended. For example, part-time employees 
working fewer than 15 hours per week would have to be included in the 
social security system. Because of this improvement, the German Federal 
Government has rejected these guidelines out of hand. 
Directives on Health and Safety 
In virtually no other area is the Commission as active as in health and 
safety. There are two reasons for this. On the one hand, the legal bases for 
majority decisions have been established (Article 118a). On the other hand, 
health and safety are closely connected with technical Standards; common 
minimum Standards are a precondition for the unimpeded export of 
machinery 1 4 Even before the Single European Act, several directives were 
adopted (particularly protection against hazards caused by asbestos, noise 
and lead) that had a considerable influence on national legislation. Since 
1986 the work of the Commission in this area has been systematized. It 
has submitted not only additional directives on individual measures but 
also draft directives on the structuring of health and safety protection. 
According to these proposals, for example, working environment regula-
tions will have to be extended to all employees (certain groups are ex-
cluded in the Federal Republic) and employee representatives wil l have 
to be involved in setting up Standards. Efforts will be made to harmonize 
registers of occupational diseases.15 In general, EC harmonization has 
For this reason, several guidelines (in accordance with Article 100a) are binding 
for all countries, so that, for example, the import of machines cannot be pre-
vented because of inadequate safety Standards. 
More occupational diseases are recognized on the European level than in most 
of the individual member states, including the Federal Republic. At EC level 
there are approximately 900 hazardous substances and only 385 in the Federal 
Republic (cf. Konstanty and Zwingmann 1991). 
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brought improvements for employees in an area virtually ignored by the 
public, although there have also been some retrograde steps. 
The "European social space" has not yet been extended very far. Except 
in the area of health and safety protection, the legal bases for common 
mmimum Standards are inadequate. The unanimity required to deal with 
fundamental problem areas such as co-determination in Europe has so 
far been lacking. The European economic space can be further integrated 
on the basis of majority decisions. Social policy, on the other hand, is 
subject to the restraining effect of unanimity. 
Another constraint at least on the harmonization of social Standards 
that is almost as important in practice is to be found (a) in the contrasting 
levels of development of social Standards and (b) the divergent forms of 
regulation. 
(a) In the developed welfare states in the EC, almost 30% of gross 
domestic product is spent on social security; the corresponding figure for 
the less developed countries is barely 20% (Table 2). The convergence of 
expenditure levels requires comparable levels of economic development. 
Table 2: Social security expenditure in the E C (1984) 
As % of GDP Per capita1 (in ECU) 
The Netherlands 32.8 4,074 
Belgium 29.6 3,482 
France 29.4 3,713 
Denmark 28.9 3,840 
ER. Germany 28.5 3,762 
Italy 27.3 2,829 
Luxembourg 25.2 3,724 
United Kingdom 24.6 2,900 
Ireland 23.9 1,890 
Greece 20.0 1,306 
Spain 17.4 1,460 
Portugal 15.2 1,047 
EC 25.23 2,836 
1 adjusted for purchasing power. 
Source: Eurostat quoted in Lecher and Naumann (1991:126). 
Thus the EC structural funds, which are primarily intended to provide 
assistance to more backward regions and those experiencing problems in 
the adjustment of agrarian structures, as well as to those regions with 
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Figure 5: Respective roles of laws and collective agreements in the various areas 
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Source: Commission of the European Communities, Directorate-General for Em-
ployment, Social Affairs and Education (1988: 72). 
declining industrial development (particularly coal, steel and shipbuild-
ing), are of fundamental importance for future EC social policy. The re-
sources for structural policy interventions in the EC will be increased from 
7.2 million ECUs in 1987 to 14.5 million ECUs in 1993. A l l regions of 
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Portugal, Greece and Ireland can receive support for regional develop-
ment from the funds, but only about 30% of the French and 20% of the 
German regions have this opportunity. The allocation of resources from 
the structural funds is subject to the Submission of regional development 
plans, in order to prevent subsidies being paid out without there being 
any prospects of development.16 
(b) Social Standards are not regulated uniformly in the various member 
states. In several countries, the State plays a decisive role in labour law, 
while in others the same matters are the subject of collective negotiations 
(Figure 5). Or social security Systems are financed to a large extent from 
the national budget (e.g. the figure for Denmark is almost 80%), while in 
others they are financed for the most part through employers' and em-
ployees' contributions. Thus harmonization would require not only an 
alignment of Standards but also of modes of regulation, which will be at 
least as difficult to implement. 
Therefore most supporters of the Social Charter stress that in the field 
of social Standards harmonization is not possible, only minimum Standards 
are regarded as an adequate means of promoting social integration of the 
member states. They allow for diverse Systems of regulations and different 
levels of economic development. 
6. EUROPEAN COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY 
It is becoming increasingly difficult for individual member states to go it 
alone in the area of collective bargaining policy, on working time and 
wages policy for example. The European dimension is playing an increas-
ingly prominent role in disputes about collective bargaining. In the dis-
pute about the 35-hour week in the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
employers' side based their Opposition primarily on the longer working 
hours in other EC countries. IG-Metall tried to bring about the harmoni-
zation of working time requirements within the European Metal Workers' 
Association. Thus collective bargaining policy in Europe must be more 
closely coordinated. And the trade unions in particular consider that 
European collective agreements are required within the foreseeable fu-
ture. 
1 6 cf. Gabriel (1990). Obviously redistribution in favour of the poorer EC countries 
is not entirely without benefit to the richer countries. The opening up of borders 
increases the export opportunities available to their more competitive manufac-
turing industries. The structural funds provide compensation and are a precon-
dition for acceptance of the Single European market in Southern Europe. 
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A common collective bargaining policy requires European structures 
on both the trade union and employers' sides that have the power to take 
action. At the end of the 1960s, the Western European trade unions had 
17 
five supra-national trade union organizations. These were subsequently 
merged to form the European Federation of Trade Unions, which does 
not yet, however, include the French CGT, the Portuguese Intersyndical 
and the Spanish Commissiones Obreras. However, the structural weak-
nesses of the European Federation of Trade Unions (EFTU) relative to its 
national member federations and the employers' side are inestimable. A 
total of 35 EFTU employees find themselves confronted by more than 
1,000 offices and branches of the business lobby in Brüssels alone. In 
several European countries, the trade unions are fragmented and are not 
even capable of coordination at the national level (as in France, for ex-
ample). Several trade union federations, particularly the German DGB 
and the British TUC, are not empowered to conclude collective agree-
ments, a right which remains the prerogative of the member unions. 
European collective agreements appear at present to be conceivable 
only at sector level. They must take up topics on which a national collec-
tive bargaining policy already exists (cf. Lecher 1991 and 1989). Working 
time (cf. Bosch 1989; Bosch et al. forthcoming) might, for example, be such 
a topic, since it is regulated in most countries by collective agreements. 
One step towards real collective negotiations that has already been taken 
is the agreement between the central association of public sector employ-
ers in the EC (CEEP) and the European Federation of Railway and Energy 
Workers' Unions. According to the terms of this agreement, both parties 
are to make considerable efforts to offer training and further training to 
their employees, to promote equality between men and women in their 
working lives and to cooperate in a European sectoral study of the trans-
ferability of employees' social rights. 
The European umbrella Organisation for private business (UNICE) has 
hitherto strongly opposed all European agreements on collective bargain-
ing. The same applies to the employers' associations in the individual 
countries. The president of the German metal industries employers' as-
sociation, Gesamtmetall, sees "no current problems specific to the sector 
that can be discussed or resolved on the European level". He fears that 
These were the following organisations: The European Trade Union Secretariat 
of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) member fed-
erations in the EC; the Secretariat of the EFTA trade unions in the ICFTU; the 
European regional Organisation of the ICFTU; the trade union office of the World 
Confederation of Labour (WCL - Christian trade unions); the liaison office of 
the C G T and the CGIL (cf. Rath 1991). 
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the trade unions are proceeding on the basis of selecting the richest pick-
ings from each national system. "This would mean that Danish wage 
levels would be combined with German holiday entitlement, Belgian 
working time and French child allowances. The dream of many trade 
unions would then become a nightmare for employers" (Kirchner 1988). 
In June 1991 UNICE relaxed its uncompromising attitude and indicated 
for the first time its readiness to negotiate. 
The first steps towards European collective bargaining policy will prob-
ably be taken in the next few years with outline agreements at sector level 
on individual issues, such as working time and equality between men 
and women at work, which leave a lot of space for national differences. 
The trade unions will first have to develop structures capable of function-
ing at the European level, which will also induce the employers to estab-
lish corresponding structures. The current fragmented trade union struc-
tures, even at national level, suggest there is still a long way to go before 
a European collective bargaining policy is established. A further difficulty 
lies in the decentralization of collective negotiations in individual member 
states themselves, which reduces the issues that can be dealt with at 
national and international level. The Commission wil l play a decisive role. 
It can encourage negotiations by threatening to issue guidelines if the 
social partners cannot reach agreement themselves. It is for precisely this 
reason that the employers are so sceptical even about dialogue between 
the social partners promoted by the Commission (in accordance with Ar-
ticle 118b of the Treaty of Rome). 
7. DIFFICULTIES IN THE FORMATION OF SOCIAL STANDARDS I N EUROPE 
The EEC is, as its name suggests, primarily an economic Community. The 
Common Market can function without common social Standards, though 
less effectively. Although the EC enjoys comprehensive legal power in the 
realization of the internal market, its competencies in the social sphere 
are strong only when they are closely associated with technical Standards, 
namely in the area of health and safety. In other areas, social Standards 
and social security Systems are considered to be an essential "attribute of 
national legitimation and sovereignty, which member states and their 
national governments do not wish to renounce" (Bieback 1991: 47). 
Furthermore, there are enormous practical difficulties in the formula-
tion of common European Standards, which can be attributed to variations 
in levels of development and modes of regulating the welfare State. Par-
ticular mention should be made of the following problems: 
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- National social security Systems are structures that have taken time to 
develop and are linked to particular attitudes (e.g. towards co-deter-
mination). 
- The distribution of roles among the various actors in the sphere of social 
policy (state, trade unions, employers, intermediäre bodies) varies con-
siderably from country to country. 
- Social security Systems in many countries are currently being reformed 
or are under threat of deregulation. "If individual member states are 
making heavy weather of implementing the necessary reforms, it is 
difficult to see how a "super bureaucracy" in Brüssels, remote from the 
scenes of social problems and social conflicts, can be expected to cope 
with them" (Bieback 1991: 46). This is all the more true since the Com-
mission is unable to fall back on a developed European policy on col-
lective bargaining that would gradually establish social Standards for 
subsequent incorporation into legislation. 
- The financial effects of a uniform social policy are completely unpre-
dictable. 
- The great differences in levels of economic development in Europe 
means there is only a small basis for a European social policy. 
A l l these reasons indicate that the creation of a European social space is 
a project that will take many decades to accomplish and in which very 
many divergent national traditions will remain. It seems absolutely nec-
essary that also the U.K. should sign the Maastricht protocol on social 
policy that would allow majority decisions regarding social Standards 
which are binding for all member states. The advocates of a European 
social space will initially build up an apparently haphazard patchwork 
of social regulations, which will subsequently develop a dynamic of its 
own and lead to the establishment of that social space. 
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THE GERMAN UNIFICATION PROCESS AND THE 
ORGANIZATION OF TRADE-UNION AND 
CO-DETERMINATION STRUCTURES IN EAST GERMANY 
Volkmar Kreißig 
ABSTRACT 
Starting with a description of the history and functioning of the real-socialist union 
movement in the former German Democratic Republic (G.D.R.), the present article 
then focuses on the formation of employees' Councils on Company level taking 
place in the economic transformation process during the political change in 1989. 
A n account of the contradictive impacts as well as possibilities and limitations of 
the employees' Councils is followed by a description of the problems in the adop-
tion of the West German dual model unions of workers' interest representation by 
works Councils. The radical changes in the former G.D.R. on the one hand and the 
growing need for reform in West Germany on the other, lead to new requirements 
regarding the model of industrial relations in unified Germany. As a special aspect 
of industrial relations, the job market perspectives of women in their specific Sit-
uation in the former G.D.R. and the present demands posed to the unions are dis-
cussed. Finally there is an account of the unsolved problems in the reorganization 
of industrial relations in Germany. 
CONTENTS 
1. Trade unionism in the former German Democratic Republic 
2. The emergence of works Councils in the course of the political turnabout and 
the adoption of the trade union model of the Federal Republic in the unification 
process 
3. The reorganization of the trade unions and co-determination trends in the East: 
Outcome and consequences for industrial relations in unified Germany 
4. Prospects for women in the labour market as a special problem of the former 
G.D.R., and today's trade-union actions in East Germany 
5. Unsolved problems in the reorganization of industrial relations in Germany 
1. T R A D E UNIONISM I N THE FORMER G E R M A N DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 
In discussing the trade unions' and employees' approach to the Organi-
zation of industrial relations in the former German Democratic Republic 
(G.D.R.), and presenting the problems which arise in the Organization of 
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novel industrial relations in East Germany at present, first of all a short 
analysis of the past is necessary. After 1945, a trade-union and co-deter-
mination model which was based on the individual industrial trade un-
ions and works Councils of the Weimarer Republik (Weimar Republic) had 
developed in the Soviet zone of occupation just as in the Western zones. 
The trade unions founded in 1945 were linked together in the East in 
February 1946 into a unified Federation of Free German Trade Unions 
(FDGB). Over the course of time the Federation's head office's dominance 
over the individual industry unions became more obvious, in contrast to 
the West German DGB (Federation of German Trade Unions), which has 
largely granted autonomy to its individual trade unions and has even 
come to depend on the strongest unions to a greater or lesser extent. 
In 1948, there was an important turning point in industrial relations. 
The platform adopted at the Bitterfeld Conference of the FDGB, referring 
to the Soviet zone of occupation, said: "The still existing unpolitical, pure-
trade-union element within the trade union movement results time and 
again in underestimating class warfare, which is being developed by the 
enemy of the working class against the progress of the democratic 
economy,... The trade-unionism - only attitude that adheres to old bour-
geois working methods, and is reluctant to keep close and permanent 
working contacts with the factory trade union groups, must be overcome. 
The new working style must be pushed through against them" (Ulbricht 
et al. 1966: 498). 
"New working style" versus "pure-trade-unionism", in Bitterfeld 
terms, meant: 
1. Belief of the trade unions in class warfare against "West German Im-
perialism". In other words, unionists should become aware of being 
opponents of West Germany, and also of the reformist (from a Stalinist 
point of view) trade union leaders there. 
2. Renunciation of effective bargaining. Motivating the employees to 
achieve planned targets was given priority, largely irrespective of the 
central determined contents of the plans. This meant Opposition to 
economic "co-determination" and cancellation of labour conflicts in the 
nationalized enterprises, and principal orientation toward "Socialist 
competition". 
3. Close connections with the "party-politically"1 motivated activists' 
movement which inspired better results in competition without 
guaranteeing equivalent interaction between higher Performance, on 
the one hand, and wage negotiation and determination by employers 
and employees, on the other hand. 
German: parteipolitisch. 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
4. The trade unions' defining themselves as "schools of socialism" - in 
other words, as Stalinist "party-politically" determined training insti-
tutions for the employees who were organized in the unions. This was 
highly important in view of the fact that 80 to 90% of workers at that 
time were unionized. 
A decisive resolution passed at the Bitterfeld Conference - whose partici-
pants had been providently selected, and not elected, as representatives 
to the trade union congress - was to delegate the works Councils' rights 
and duties to the factory trade union committees. This way the democrati-
cally elected grass-roots Councils, which represented Syndicalist options 
more emphatically, were dissolved or integrated into the factory trade 
union committees, which were already largely dominated by the party. 
In the view of the party-political historiography of the Stalinist SED (So-
cialist Unity Party), "the coexistence of works Councils and factory trade 
union committees" threatened to become "a serious obstacle". Thus, the 
way was paved for increasing the Stalinist and party-political Subordina-
tion of the trade unions. Trade unionist traditions which were quite well 
developed in Germany (in contrast to other East European countries) were 
wiped out and displaced. Consequently the West German trade union 
and co-determination model which has been efficient for decades and 
which is characterized by the dual action of works Councils and the in-
dustry unions under one united umbrella Organization could not develop 
in East Germany (Weiß 1987). 
In spite of the criticism expressed by today's theoreticians concerning 
the sluggish reactions of trade union organizational forms to industrial 
changes at present and in the recent past, the co-determination and trade 
union model of the Federal Republic has proved its resistance and capac-
ity to act in the development of industrial relations and the determination 
of internationally high working Standards (Martens 1989). The ideas of 
what trade unions stand for got lost in East Germany, where the unified 
FDGB was increasingly developed into an unchallenged pillar of the 
political system. Reasons for this phenomenon are that the "leading 
cadres" of the trade union, including those at the Company level were 
also selected or confirmed by the party leadership. 
Thus, it was largely impossible for "party-politically" nonconformist 
trade unionists to be elected. On all levels in companies, groups, and 
state-run centralist industrial organs as well as in the public Service, a 
"triumvirate" consisting of officially appointed and "party-politically" 
confirmed managers, party leaders and trade union committees had es-
tablished itself. Together they motivated and supervised the fulfilment of 
the centralistically and bureaucratically planned production targets. 
Within this triumvirate the factory trade union committees were normally 
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degraded to the Status of Willing tools of second-rate importance in re-
sponse to Orders issued by the state-controlled management and the party 
leaders. In many cases the trade union officials themselves were members 
of the party leadership, being directly accountable to and bound by the 
party in their decisions. Consequently, they had no power to reject unre-
alistic production figures, or to connect the achievement of production 
quotas and wage claims. On the contrary, it was their job to explain the 
correctness of the centralist production targets to the employees. 
Factory trade union committees worked to neutralize and filter toward 
the "triumvirate" the criticisms of employees concerning frequent inter-
ruptions in the production process, blocked material and information 
flows, and poor production scheduling. This way, a sophisticated system 
disguising production grievances was developing which promoted 
lethargy and lack of discipline. Simultaneously, the factory trade union 
committees were increasingly forced to play the part of a buffer between 
Orders and instructions from the company's management and the party 
leaders on the one hand, and the increasing annoyance of the almost 
completely unionized employees about grievances and senseless, central-
istically caused "frictional losses", on the other hand. 
The trade unions, and particularly their leaders in the companies, had 
a number of social measures at their disposal to stimulate the achievement 
of production targets. Among them were the allocation of holiday stays 
in factory-owned holiday homes and central union-owned holiday 
homes, dispensation of therapeutic and prophylactic rest eures, co-deter-
mination in the allocation of bonuses and the awarding of many official 
decorations and medals and Company appreciations, and participation in 
the Organization of labour conditions. The worsening Situation in foreign 
trade placed limits on the financial and material elbow-room of the trade 
unions in the companies. Nevertheless, they had a wide variety of 
supporting social measures to use in ameliorating the difficult production 
conditions in order to prevent the conflictual situations from escalating. 
The unified trade unions - especially at the Company level - were sta-
bilizing the system, not only owing to their centralist Subordination to the 
party leadership and the state-controlled management, but also due to 
their ideologizing function. In particular their political function as buffers, 
the social regulative measures they controlled, their role in calming and 
mediating conflictural situations, and their Obligation to protect the in-
dividual employee against harsh diseiplinary measures of the manage-
ment contributed to the system's stabilization to the extent that they were 
realized and aecomplished. Yet their most important task was to avoid 
the settling of collective conflicts in public - in other words, to avoid 
confrontation between employees and the State as the owner of the com-
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pany - primarily by Joint action with the other members of the triumvirate. 
However, the ideologizing measures taken by the trade unions were quite 
moderate in comparison with the rigid disciplinary measures taken by 
the party leaders against their members. Trade union activities neutralized 
potential conflicts, and aimed at compensation through wage policies and 
in other spheres in order to avoid the politically f ar-reaching consequences 
of exaggerating situations. 
But the trade unions were also co-initiators of the "real-socialist"2 Tay-
lorism that was being applied to mass production in many industries. The 
inäbility to contribute to initiating flexible Solutions in production mech-
anisms - which was one of the reasons for the real-socialist system's 
failure - was largely owing to the lack of discussion and proposals con-
cerning trade union policy. The blocking out of flexible working hours, 
job sharing, and part-time employment which many women had been 
longing for, as well as the lack of recognition of the systematic rational-
izing effects of sporadic and "isolated Solutions"3 are only a few examples. 
Consequently, the factory trade union committees, particularly at the Com-
pany level, were faced with a constant dilemma in their work: on the one 
hand, they had the decreed duty to be a party-subordinated political sta-
bilizer, on the other, they feit the need to bring to bear their potentials and 
possibilities in social policy making in the field of individual and collective 
labour conditions. Therefore, workers became increasingly disaffected 
with trade union activities when Symptoms of an economic and political 
crisis became more and more apparent in the 1980s. 
The majority of workers remained in the FDGB trade unions, perhaps 
merely for reasons of tradition, indolence, or widespread opportunism. 
However, the Organization was of little importance to them. Grass-roots 
functionaries who were critical of the defects in the companies' production 
process and the deficiencies of trade union work were either politically 
disciplined or ignored by the responsible members of the triumvirate. At 
higher levels of the trade union leaderships, functionaries were already 
corrupted by their few privileges, accepted their destiny of ideologizing 
idleness, and escaped to private niches and widespread alcoholism. 
Simultaneously, it can be stated that in a more and more central controlled 
economic system with a steadily developing Taylorist orientation in the 
economic competition among Systems, only such a trade union model 
seemed to be possible. 
Works Councils with a more company-specific approach would cer-
tainly have reflected employees' criticisms in a more direct way than did 
2 German: realsozialistisch. 
3 German: Insellösungen. 
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the higher-level unified trade union comrnittees. They might have inter-
fered in distribution conflicts and tried to eliminate the Stagnation in pro-
duction and information deficiencies resulting from real-socialist Tay-
lorism. Sooner or later they would have clashed with the real-socialist 
economic model if only from the point of view of the self-interest of the 
Company, as this system was based on the distribution of economic losses; 
hence, the works Councils' early elimination was a logical consequence of 
Stalinist system development and centralist economic control. 
2 . T H E EMERGENCE OF WORKS COUNCILS IN THE COURSE OF THE 
POLITICAL TURNABOUT A N D THE ADOPTION OF THE TRADE U N I O N M O D E L 
OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC IN THE UNIFICATION PROCESS 
The 1989 mass movement in the G.D.R. was primarily against the political 
system of the then SED leadership, with the following items being subject 
to particular attack: 
- the inäbility to reach at least an approximate level of consumption com-
parable with that of former Federal Republic; 
- the refusal to allow Citizens to freely travel abroad (including to the 
West) which brought about the feeling of being permanently locked up 
behind a "wall" ; 
- the increasingly total incapacity and unwillingness to concede the Cit-
izens and employees participation in politics and enterprises. 
The steadily increasing Taylorist orientation of management strategies 
towards mass production combined with the above-mentioned frictions 
in the production process meant ultimately that "real socialism" was fal-
ling farther and farther behind capitalism in the Western industrialized 
countries that could flexibly respond to new production requirements and 
adopt innovative rationalization measures. 
The mass movement against real socialism was initiated by intellectuals 
who had originally been striving for a modern "third way" as an alter-
native to capitalism and "real socialism". In the G.D.R. these intellectuals 
were subsequently outstripped by the masses who wanted a market 
economy on the West German pattern. Initially, the workers in the pro-
ducing areas assumed a wait-and-see attitude toward this intellectual 
movement; some were skeptical, while others sympathized (Kädtler and 
Kottwitz 1990), so there were no serious confrontations in the companies 
for the time being. 
After the political movement succeeded in eliminating the SED leader-
ship and the "Berlin Wall" without being faced with considerable re-
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sistance, it took root in the companies through various activities at the 
middle and lower levels of the management and the staff. Works Councils4 
were gradually formed, in the initial stage frequently in Opposition to the 
triumvirate of works management, SED leadership, and factory trade 
union committee. Their first concern was to eliminate the company's party 
leadership and to dissolve the paramilitary voluntary forces - the work-
ers' militia branch - which was led by party functionaries. Originally the 
party had planned to mobilize these workers' militias to help suppress 
the demonstrations, but the militias disobeyed in many cases and were 
disbanded. Bloody clashes with the mass movement were avoided, and 
the process of the collapse of the political system proceeded peacefully as 
the army and police did not take action either. 
This stage was followed by confrontations between the works Councils 
and the works managements. The factory trade union committees that 
had been part of the triumvirate, being politically discredited, were par-
ticularly attacked. The deep integration of these factory trade union com-
mittees into the existing system, and their inäbility to foresee political and 
economic ruin in time, sealed their fate. They neither spearheaded the 
mass movement spreading in various enterprises nor backed the strikes 
and strike calls sporadically flaring up. On the contrary they frequently 
justified and defended the old system; they were anxious to deal with 
troubles in a familiär way, and assumed a largely defensive or at best 
passive attitude. Only a few functionaries were able to fully understand 
the Situation, and with some of them were accepted by their colleagues 
as grass-roots trade unionists due to their partially critical positions; they 
were participating in the political process that was under way. Others, 
becoming aware of their failure, retreated. 
In many cases the initiators of the works Councils movement were 
people who had formerly been disciplined or discriminated against; and 
usually non-party members or formerly humiliated SED members joined 
them. The initiators often came directly from various political groupings 
of the Opposition movement, such as Neues Forum (New Forum), Vereinigte 
Linke (United Left) and Demokratischer Aufbruch (Democratic Uprising). 
With their frequently only fragmentary knowledge of possible co-deter-
mination and trade union models, they immediately focused on the 
former Federal Republic. Illusory ideas concerning trade unions' un-
limited spheres of action and manifold rights of co-determination in the 
capitalist system (some of them promoted by several trade-union officials 
Coming from West Germany) dominated the debate. Trade-union organi-
These were not identical with the West German Betriebsrat established by the 
Works Constitution Act (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz). 
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zations or co-determination models other than those of the Federal Re-
public were not accepted as guiding patterns; they were not taken into 
consideration at all. Many West German trade unionists were appealed 
to for help in the development of co-determination bodies and trade union 
structures. And among the unionists from the West, in return, many hopes 
came to life about the contributions to social "modernization pushes" that 
this peacef ul, supposedly revolutionary movement in the East could bring 
to the institutions and industrial relations in the Federal Republic. 
At the same time, West German trade unionists feit quite insecure in as-
sessing a Situation that changed almost daily, and were careful not to inter-
fere. The central offices of the industry unions and of the DGB (parent Or-
ganization of the West German individual industry trade unions) also kept 
up their contacts with the East German "FDGB partner Organization" for a 
long time, until they recognized their desolate Situation and the contempt in 
which the FDGB was held by the masses. Eventually they turned away 
rather helplessly, without knowing how to approach the development of 
new trade union and co-determination structures in the East. 
A study made by the Chemnitz Institute of Economic and Social Re-
search (WISOC) in January/February 1990 showed that a sizable majority 
of the employees were Willing to join renewed trade unions. At this time 
they expected rationalization pushes for their firms as a result of Western 
investments. In view of the Stagnation in the production process, these 
pushes were considered to be desirable, and the higher stress on Perform-
ance was expected to help deal with existing grievances. Expectations that 
a part of wages would be paid in hard currency as a result of close Co-
operation with Western firms turned out to be very rare among the inter-
viewees. This illustrates the enormous political consequences of the an-
nouncement of the economic and monetary union which enabled the con-
version of savings accounts in the summer of 1990 at an exchange rate of 
1:1 or 1:2. The previous unofficial rate of exchange fluctuated between 1:5 
and 1:20. 
It was not only the workers who were not quite aware of all the social 
consequences of this monetary union and that it would promote a deep 
economic crisis. They did not realize the problems which would arise in 
the G.D.R. economy when it unpreparedly confronted West German com-
petitors. In January/February 1990, unemployment was not an important 
point to the majority of the interviewees who considered that it would be 
a temporary phenomenon, if it arose at all. Only lazy employees, mostly 
those working in the administrative machinery and thus being redundant 
in any case, would justly be afflicted by joblessness, it was thought. The 
expected forthcoming tremendous reconstruction work was expected to 
eure the ills of economy, heal ruptured communities, and help in other 
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fields; unemployment would not develop into a permanent and consid-
erable phenomenon. The workers, relying primarily on their good skills, 
trusted that there would be work to be done everywhere in the country, 
and expected irnmediate help from the economically strong Federal Re-
public and its big industrial groups. This opinion was also shared by the 
majority of works Councils and representatives of Opposition groups -
which had been formed in the period of transition from the centralist 
regime of the SED leadership to the market-economy model outlined in 
the process of the German unification. 
The Situation in the companies was very different at that time. There 
were repeated fierce confrontations between new works Councils, man-
agement, and the still existant factory trade union committees after the 
companies' party leaderships and the workers' militias had been dis-
solved. The confrontational Situation largely developed from formerly re-
pressed conflicts, but also from the economic Situation of the companies. 
As the majority of the new managements had been members of both the 
SED and the factory trade union committees, they lost more and more 
credibility when they suddenly left the party They were called political 
turncoats by the workers. In many cases the managements feit compelled 
to sign agreements with the newly formed works Councils granting them 
far-reaching rights of economic and social co-determination. 
In other firms, with less profound conflicts, the formation of works Coun-
cils was partially encouraged by management itself, which wanted them to 
be the old West German type of employees' representations. Under these 
old-style bodies, the decisions taken by the management would be legi-
timized, and the company's staff would work to achieve consensus and 
"observance of the works peace" under the works industrial-relations 
scheme. With the cancellation of the hitherto practised legitimization of 
management decisions by the national planning commission, or higher 
party or government bodies, insecure "post-socialist" managers tried to ob-
tain this legitimacy via discussions with the newly formed works Councils. 
In many cases, the managing board proposed a vote of confidence. For lack 
of alternatives, many former managements were backed up by the majority 
of their personnel; there were only a few cases in which representatives of 
the middle level of management took the lead. So far, the author has heard 
of only one case where grass-root committees that had occupied their Com-
pany for a short period were able to install a top manager elected by them, 
and to influence the sale of their factory by the trust Company. The removal 
of particularly hated managers, formerly called "socialist heads", was ex-
ceptional in the transitional period. 
But there were also companies with active works Councils that forced 
quite far-reaching interim rights of co-determination in content and forms 
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of production and in financial arrangements. Sometimes works Councils 
feit insufficiently competent to interfere in such company-strategic ques-
tions. In part, the old factory trade union committees were pushed away 
by the works Councils; in part, they co-existed; in a few cases, some sort 
of temporary division of labour was developed, based on the political 
constellation in the Company in question. 
At the inter-company level, the old FDGB trade union on the one hand, 
and the individual industry trade unions - who were meanwhile aiming 
at more independence - on the other hand, were embroiled in personal 
and political controversies during and after their last congress in 1990. 
Their generally defined object was reconstruction under a model based 
on the industry unions of the old Federal Republic. With the help of a 
G.D.R. Trade Union Act that was formulated within a short time, they 
tried to provide the factory trade union committees with far-reaching 
rights, but also to make them again the sole representatives of the workers, 
as their subordinate bodies. To push through this Act, the FDGB even 
threatened - for the first time in its existence - to call a general strike. 
Simultaneously, the new works Councils were again deprived of their 
legitimacy. 
This Act was also vehemently attacked by the employers' associations 
as an obstacle to Investments because it would have resulted in a consid-
erable reduction in managements' areas of competence, in favour of the 
factory trade union committees' co-determination in economic and social 
questions. Even more significantly, however, the new works Councils, 
which had not been taken into consideration in this Act, also turned 
against it. 
The G.D.R.'s subsequent accession to the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic and the following reunification also meant that the dual trade 
union and co-determination model of the old Federal Republic would be 
applied. In the process, both the autonomous far-reaching rights of the 
works Councils and the factory trade union committees were abolished. 
As a consequence, in the early period of staff reductions and of disin-
tegration of the former structures of the combines (industrial groups)5, 
through industrial reorganization, there existed partially only badly 
functioning, and sometimes legally not legitimized, bodies of repre-
sentation in the companies which made rigid action - primarily by the 
old and often re-confirmed managements - easy. Works Councils repre-
sentatives who were brought up in the old centralist spirit sometimes 
even accepted dismissals of colleagues without offering resistance or de-
claring their solidarity with those concerned. Owing to this attitude, but 
5 German: Kombinate. 
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also out of ignorance of the possibilities of legal protection against unlaw-
ful dismissal, several works Councils constituted only a slight protection 
for their companies' staff. In most cases, they quickly took a posture of 
Submission to management decisions. 
As a result of the adoption of the West German legal order, new elec-
tions in the companies were necessary, in line with the existing pattern 
and the electoral procedure. Faced with the first dismissals, the impact of 
economic crisis, and rising social problems, former activists of the works 
Councils movement were frustrated; many of them did not stand in the 
new elections, and retired. In the aftermath, intellectuals - who are more 
eloquent and also often aware of the regulations concerning protection 
against dismissal applied for positions on these bodies. As a result, a num-
ber of East German works Councils have been "intellectualized", a phe-
nomenon which is quite atypical for the former F.R.G., and which may 
open up new possibilities in the sphere of poHcy-making. 
Initially, the West German trade unions had different views on the ques-
tion whether to include only union members or to also include function-
aries in the process of reforming supra-company and industry-related 
trade unions. Rather conservative unions, such as the Chemical Industry 
Union and the Mining Industry and Energy Union, decided to take over 
parts of the still functioning apparatus and to select from it later on, in 
order to be equipped with working structures for the time being; the Metal 
Workers' Union and the Public Service and Transport Trade Union, how-
ever, which have the largest memberships among German employees' 
organizations, decided to take only those members who were Willing to 
join, and to reorganize from the grass roots. 
The reorganization of the official body was taking place and promoted 
by temporarily delegating many West German functionaries to the East, 
and by training and incorporating active members of works Councils into 
higher trade union structures. The trade unions' unification normally took 
place at a Joint East-West trade union congress where East and West rep-
resentatives were elected members of a common executive committee, 
according to a set ratio of distribution. When the differently structured 
East German trade union model was taken over, there were also disputes 
between the individual industry trade unions concerning the affiliation 
of Company staffs on the fringes of various industries. In general, the 
reorganization processes, the replacements and resignments of former 
FDGB functionaries, the hesitant delegating of West German repre-
sentatives and the reluctant training of East German grass roots function-
aries resulted in a shortage of trade union functionaries at the middle and 
lower levels, and in significant delays in the creation of functioning struc-
tures. This was quite unfortunate, the more so as in this period the East 
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was faced with deep crisis, a new orientation in wage policies, and mass 
dismissals; by 1992, between 2.4 million and 4 million people are expected 
to be unemployed. This lack of functionaries had to be compensated for 
- sometimes quite sparsely - by delegating younger university graduates 
who often lacked experience in problems of Organization, and by employ-
ing West German pensioners who had formerly acted as functionaries. 
In my opinion, the East did not manage to establish responsive trade 
union and co-determination structures within a short time; in addition, 
the scope of conflicts and processes to be solved, e.g. in the Organization 
of regional industrial policies, is much more comprehensive and compli-
cated than in the West. West German pensioners contributed their ideas 
of trade union policies of the 1960s and 1970s, which were frequently 
focused on disputes over wage rates, in which younger functionaries were 
quite inexperienced. This had an adverse effect on the handling of specific 
problems arising in the transformation of a so-called "real-socialist" Sys-
tem into a capitalist one after the model of the old Federal Republic, and 
the handling of other questions concerning the Organization and deter-
mination of the individual union members' work and lives. 
The variety of problems to be solved in this enormous structural and 
adaptive crisis, such as the prevention of further mass dismissals and 
bankruptcies, the influence of the state holding trust Company in the sale 
of companies to private applicants, the valuation of management concep-
tions, the development of alternative regional economic and industrial 
settlement policies and the gradual approximation of East and West wage 
rates and social Standards are a big challenge to trade-union activities and 
reorganization projects. Therefore, it is of almost existential importance 
to future trade-union action in East and West to show substantial results. 
This is illustrated by the fact that in 1991 Eastern wage rates wil l reach 
up to about 60% of the West German Standards, though mass unemploy-
ment contributes to acceptance of lower working Standards; and there are 
many attempts to continue an all-German process of labour flexibilization 
in the form of already widespread illegal loan labour, or jobs paid much 
lower than standardized wage rates. Equal wages in East and West Ger-
many cannot be expected until 1995. 
At present, the trade union and co-determination structures in the East 
seem generally to be considerably overtaxed in dealing with the new mul-
tifarious problems in both strategic-political and organizational terms. So 
far, the works Councils' area of competence has been mainly confined to 
bargaining for social benefits and severance pay. Participation in sales 
policies or even the development of balanced, alternative economic and 
political industrial and regional concepts is not on the agenda; and there 
are no approaches at the lower levels to such actions, either. 
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3 . T H E REORGANIZATION OF THE TRADE UNIONS, A N D CO-DETERMINA-
TION TRENDS IN THE EAST - OUTCOMES A N D CONSEQUENCES FOR 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN UNIFIED G E R M A N Y 
The system of trade unions and co-determination bodies in the companies, 
now in its initial stage, is faced with the following problems: 
1. Trade union representatives and works Councils6 in East Germany 
seem to be overtaxed as regards their ränge of action and competence as 
well as their staff. This applies not only to the socially quite good cush-
ioning of the structural and adaptive crisis, the hardness, duration, and 
progress of which cannot be foreseen yet, but also to creative influences 
on economic reorganization and rebuilding. Parallels were drawn with 
structural adaptations in the Ruhr District and in the Saarland, and with 
adaptive difficulties in the coal, steel and textile industries, in the course 
of which more than a million jobs had to be replaced. But these processes 
took decades; they could be balanced and cushioned with the massive 
help of the Federal budget, and with municipal and European funding. 
They were not accompanied by the collapse of a completely different 
political system and the loss of the historical identity of millions of people. 
Thus, the reorganized trade union and cc^determination structures in East 
Germany are immediately being confronted with demands that go be-
yond the traditional scope of activities in recent times. This is especially 
the case as the crisis in East Germany comprises all spheres of economic 
activity: from the broken-down, helplessly obsolete automotive industry, 
through textiles and the dangerously polluting chemical industries to the 
lignite and uranium mining industry as well as machine building and 
shipbuilding. Apart from unemployment compensation and enormous 
injections of money into East German communities and federal states, 
there are no efficient conceptions of structural policy. It seems to be quite 
clear to trade unionists: without massive political intervention, financial 
aid and the creation of appropriate conditions, political peace in East Ger-
many could be endangered, and economic recovery could become quite 
complicated. 
2. At present, the split economy in Germany is characterized by pros-
perity in the West and deep crisis in the East, by split wage rates and still 
deviating social Systems in East and West, as a consequence of which 
economic reconstruction and rebuilding seem to have become harder. Not 
only regional political crises but also factors like tendencies toward Stag-
nation in the international machine tool industry are becoming noticeable. 
6 Now according to the Works Constitution Act of the F.R.G. 
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Due to the precarious economic Situation, many younger well-trained 
employees migrate from East to West, either temporarily or permanently. 
In 1991, more than 10,000 employees left the new federal State of Saxony 
monthly. In view of the exodus of qualified workers and the serious short-
age of apprenticeship places for young people, the future reorganization 
of flexible economic structures will become more complicated, even when 
equal wage Standards are introduced and extensive Investments are 
made. Long-term destruction of the environment and deficiencies in the 
infra-structure - in other words - a lower living Standard, at least in the 
medium run, will not bring the return of those who have left, or attract 
new settlers. 
3. Important decisions concerning the locations of big industrial groups 
such as Volkswagenwerk, Adam Opel, Siemens/Nixdorf, Philips and 
Standard Electric Lorenz (SEL) have partially been taken already, but the 
dimensions of new industrial Settlements and their effects on employment 
policies are not quite clear. At the same time, complicated and often still 
open questions of ownership tum out to be impeding new Investments. 
The politically supported strategy pursued by the "trust Company"7 State 
holding, of considering all justified claims of ownership at first and sub-
sequently selling firms and plots of land to other applicants, is another 
big obstacle to quick Investments which would have positive effects on 
the labour market, as are ecological rebuilding requirements which are 
not measurable. A law relating to the acceleration of Investments facili-
tating the trust company's sales, and providing compensation for poten-
tial claims of ownership, has not yet shown positive effects on efficient 
restructuring. In this respect, precipitate and rash decisions on industrial 
locations have been taken which are largely irreparable. But these 
processes go far beyond trade-union policy-making, possibilities of Inter-
vention and competence of action. Thus, in East Germany, recapitalization 
and selection of industrial locations are primarily taking place with regard 
to factors like the availability of qualified workers at present, geographical 
position, and good infrastructural relationships. Therefore, all weaknesses 
involved in spontaneous decisions on industrial locations dictated by 
shortsighted market-economic considerations, including possible new 
ecological deficiencies, have to be taken into account. Trade union partici-
pation and capability were almost completely excluded in both sales by 
the trust Company and the allocation of local trade rooms. This naturally 
may damage all the ecological and working Standards which have been 
achieved in the Federal Republic so far. Mass unemployment and ig-
German: Treuhand. The biggest state-owned Company in the world, founded to 
privatize the former nationalized property of the G.D.R. 
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norance of West German Standards are making East German employees 
more and more likely to accept labour conditions as well as social benefits 
and wages Standards which have not been tolerated by their Western 
colleagues for a long time. Therefore, negative repercussions are likely to 
be feit on existing Standards. 
4. Major parts of the labour force remaining in the East German regions 
will be deprived of their skills and qualities because of longer-lasting job-
lessness. As a consequence, they will only qualify to a certain extent for 
the developing labour market. Attempts to bridge over the period to a 
possible economic prosperity by means of a large-scale educational project 
faced various difficulties: 
- Future demands on the labour market cannot be assessed yet. 
- High-level training facilities are presently not available, or they are 
being destroyed by liquidations or dismissals in the public Service; 
therefore the labour exchanges often feel compelled to accept offers for 
retraining made by private and somtimes dubious educational institu-
tions. 
- The focusing of retraining measures on the tertiary sector, particularly 
on the Service industries as the supposed motor of a prospering 
economy in the future, is a problematic approach as mass unemploy-
ment wil l not create the spending power which would be necessary 
for the rapid growth of a Services sector. 
5. In spite of the above-mentioned decisions regarding industrial loca-
tions, e.g. by electronic and automotive groups, which are backed up by 
Federal Government funds, positive effects on the labour market have not 
been produced so far, owing to the insecure international economic Sit-
uation dimensions resulting in a downward movement on the Western 
market, as well as to the still open question of the location of sub-suppliers. 
It is not clear whether they wil l be settled in just-in-time Operations in the 
western part of Germany, as stable and flexibly applicable work Systems 
have been established here as well as good infra-structural fundamentals. 
The staff necessary could be variably recruited from among resettlers and 
workers living in the East and working in the West. The first signs of 
settlement of sub-suppliers in the regions around the auto assembly 
plants, mainly in co-operation with or bought up by West German me-
dium-sized sub-suppliers, are becoming obvious. It remains to be seen 
whether a sector of medium-sized companies having innovation power 
of their own will develop, or whether only work to third-class subcon-
tractors will be farmed out by medium-sized West German companies. 
Both just-in-time production around the big assembly plants by co-oper-
ating medium-sized companies and the tendency to become elongated 
work-benches of West German works are emerging at present. Which of 
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the tendencies is prevailing will determine whether economic recovery 
can be expected in East Germany, or whether the new federal states will 
remain structurally weak regions. Without systematic structural and in-
dustrial policies, this improvement seems to be impossible. 
As wages are likely to be kept low over a longer period, the estab-
lishment of peripheral sub-suppliers in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and 
Hungary may be encouraged by the qualified labour available there, and 
the lower labour Standards. 
6. The social expectations of East German employees cannot easily 
be met by the conventional West German value patterns: East Germans 
have not been confronted with the current stress of Performance before, 
nor had they experienced social insecurity to the current extent, which 
is diametrically opposed to their traditional Version of social security. 
Their sociocultural, practical background, determined by real-socialist 
experiences, wil l affect developing industrial relations over a longer 
period. The centralist orientation seems to be a sign of willingness to 
acquiesce in controversial management decisions without raising objec-
tions. 
7. Many employees are being overtaxed and frustrated by the imme-
diate adoption of a completely unknown legal, administrative and politi-
cal system under which they are often kept from engaging in trade-union 
activities. The formerly forced political proclamations in favour of the 
Stalinist system - largely backed by the FDGB trade unions - have pro-
duced aversion to political activities, and contributed to widespread 
depoliticalization, individualization and dislike of being organized. Ex-
tended frustration tends to be increasingly translated into political right-
wing radicalism, primarily among the youth. 
8. The desire to join a trade union is basically guided by a strong need 
for protection and by the belief that jobs can be secured mainly by trade 
union action. These are areas in which trade-union competence has tradi-
tionally shown weakness. Yet, for the sake of their right to exist in future 
and the maintenance of the trade unions' strength of influence, it is nec-
essary to open just these new spheres of action on a wider scale. In this 
connection, the Metal Workers' Union's attempt to increasingly turn to 
the problems of unemployment may be a beginning. 
9. The East German employees' readiness to submit as well as to 
accept low Standards results in considerable barriers to mobilization. 
This was illustrated by scheduled demonstrations of the trade unions 
in spite of the precarious Situation in East Germany. So far the em-
ployees' personal obedience has prevailed, along with vague hopes for 
a distant future. According to a survey made in June 1991, 70% of the 
East Germans were still optimistic about their future (Freie Presse, June 
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29-30 1991). It must be taken into consideration that in 1991 unemploy-
ment is only a short-term phenomenon and many people involved still 
do not know how to deal with it. A l l these aspects are connected with 
lower sensitivity to technological and ecological conflict spheres, and it 
may be that debates and discussions on trade-union policy-making, 
which have been held quite successfully in West Germany will be set 
back as a result of the German unification. In East Germany it is now 
a higher priority to have a well-paid job than it is to deal with the 
problems and contents of policy. 
10. The East German employees' initial good wil l toward all West 
Germans has quite quickly changed into disillusionment as many em-
ployers and job brokers have proved to be charlatans. As a result of 
serious social problems, public opinion is increasingly turning into ag-
gressiveness against West Germans. Dishonest competition is being re-
cognized, and distrust is growing between East and West Germans. 
These quickly changing positions among the workers must also be 
taken into consideration in order to avoid false estimations of spon-
taneous individual positions that can result in a menace to trade-union 
achievements and successes. 
11. The evolution of autonomous policy-making alternatives in all 
spheres of the process of transformation from a real-socialist system 
into a market economy system characterized by regional development, 
the Organization of supplier relationships, vocational training and 
further education and environmental redevelopment schemes are re-
quired. But this novel Situation can hardly be coped with by the hitherto 
available trade-union expertise. Within a short time, diverse investiga-
tions, discussions, and strategy development are necessary. Therefore, 
debate on trade union structure and alternative social defence strategies 
is an immediate priority. 
12. At present, the restructuring of the industries in the East must be 
made the main field of action of trade-union influence and co-determina-
tion in the companies. This way, all decisions to be taken in these spheres 
will not completely be left to the trust company's sales strategies, the 
buyers' plans and imaginations, and the communities and the Chamber 
of Industry and Commerce where many ''narrow-minded and anxious 
old cadres" are still working. Within the scope of action of these East 
German authorities, decisions about the future development of work in 
unified Germany are being taken. Any chance of trade-union influence 
on the trust Company or on the works rehabilitation plans must be 
achieved via the boards of directors and works Councils, and must take 
advantage of all rights of information and co-determination in the 
development of ideas and proposals. 
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4 . PROSPECTS FOR W O M E N O N THE L A B O U R M A R K E T AS A SPECIAL 
PROBLEM OF THE FORMER G . D . R . A N D T O D A V S T R A D E - U N I O N ACTIONS 
IN EAST G E R M A N Y 
The former G.D.R. had a very high percentage of gainfully employed 
women by international Standards, and compared to the old Federal Re-
public. Altogether 91% of the women between 15 and 60 had been work-
ing for a living, or undergoing training in the G.D.R. in 1989 (Winkler 
1990), as against the old Federal Republic's ratio of 54%, which included 
a considerable share of part-time jobs. Job-sharing or part-time jobs were 
exceptions in the G.D.R. as a consequence of the partially artificially pro-
duced but sometimes real labour shortage. Women with children, older 
female employees and others striving for part-time employment for 
various reasons were frequently compelled to work full-time by the offi-
cially appointed management8, sometimes in co-ordination with the 
factory trade union committees. Rigid planning based on full-time em-
ployment was another factor contributing to making impossible the part-
time work which had been desired by many women. Flexibility in work 
for women as a particularly large efficiency reserve hardly existed in East 
Germany, in contrast to Western countries.9 This is also an important rea-
son for the East's falling behind in productivity. 
Due to system-internal circumstances, many women had undergone 
one or several courses of vocational training by the time of university 
or College graduation. Only 6% of working women had no vocational 
training. Owing to the low wage Standard, gainful employment of 
women, whose average share of contribution to the family budget was 
about 40%, was an essential requirement for ensuring a living Standard 
in the G.D.R. which was quite high compared to that in other COME-
C O N countries. To almost 430,000 Single mothers, gainful employment 
was of the highest importance; unemployed, they and their children 
would fall back into the lowest social classes. This applies also and 
particularly to women who have graduated from universities and Col-
leges. Interviews with women, for example in the textile industry, show 
8 Especially in the textile and chemical industries where continuous shifts over 7 
days were widespread. 
9 Official statistics showing a high degree of part-time employment should be 
doubted. For example, two part-time jobs were often occupied by one full-time 
worker in order to avoid cancellation part-time jobs at the end of the year, which 
was part of the usual planning methods. These jobs are reflected as two part-
time jobs in the statistics (Winkler 1990). 
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that work ranks as one of the most important things in their lives, and 
that they did not work exclusively for economic reasons. To many Single 
mothers, to Single women and to many highly qualified women, the 
social and communicative ties which evolved in many years of work 
were beneficial to their egos. 
At present, joblessness among women is very high. One example is the 
textile industry, where women were 66.9% of the work force; the total 
number of employed is expected to be reduced to one fifth or sixth of 
present levels, which means that these women lose not only an economic 
base but also one of the basic elements in their lives, which are mainly 
focused on work. New approaches to problems of self-analysis and self-
fulfillment such as women's groups, women-centered alternative employ-
ers or political associations are developing slowly. 
As the industry union model of the Federal Republic does not include 
special overlapping women's unions - such as exist, for example, in 
Denmark - dealing with specific feminist problems, with the Organiza-
tion of women's action committees against joblessness, with problems 
involved with the upbringing of children, etc., this system seems to be 
rather helpless in dealing with problems specific to women. A reaction 
both to rising mass unemployment, with its political and social con-
sequences, and to the large share of women who are jobless in the East 
is required. Though the majority of the Textile, Clothing, and Leather 
Industry Union's functionaries are women, even this union had taken 
no women-specific approaches to the problems of women's unemploy-
ment with all its consequences. The unions' conventional way of re-
acting to staff reductions cannot lead to any alternative Solutions, espe-
cially insofar as women are concerned. Temporary Solutions such as 
protection against unlawful dismissal, employment schemes and re-
training can only delay or disguise the problems. Works Councils, some-
times unaware of the consequences of labour market policies, persuade 
women to participate in dead-end retraining courses, thus depriving 
them of the right to severance pay in the case of a dismissal which is 
agreed upon in the social schemes. Women's right to protection against 
dismissals and social demands are being substantially reduced as bodies 
of co-determination put up with low qualification Standards which have 
little chances of success. Work on the problem of women's employment 
and on their wage-scale and social equality as well as on their security 
will be essential aspects of trade-union action alternatives in the course 
of German unification. Ways of acting and fundamental reforms in the 
activities of trade unions, in a field which produces specific conflicts, 
is a very big task in the process of reorganization of industrial relations 
in East Germany. 
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5 . UNSOLVED PROBLEMS IN THE REORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL 
RELATIONS IN G E R M A N Y 
As we analyze the various problems described above, challenges to reor-
ganization and trade-union activities are becoming evident. 
1. When structural changes in the field of the production Systems and 
methods had been completed in the Western industrialized countries in 
the 1970s and 80s, the existing system of industrial relations found itself 
in a crisis. Adaptation and modernization were required in order to keep 
up with changing industrial structures and policies, as well as with the 
mechanisms of power and control. In this connection, trade union struc-
tures and areas of competence as well as the co-determination models of 
the Federal Republic, Sweden and Austria turned out to be more adapt-
able and flexible than those of Italy, France, Great Britain and the United 
States. Nevertheless, they are increasingly being faced with reformative 
pressure. The trade unions' bias toward the creation of industry-related 
wage agreements and homogeneous labour Standards for various em-
ployees' and qualification groups is opposed to the process of differen-
tiation and increasing flexibility of labour conditions and Standards cate-
gorized according to employees' and qualification groups, to whether per-
sonnel are in core or peripheral spheres, and to the Organization being a 
Company or a group-related entity. The introduction of participatory 
labour organizing methods by modern management, the increasing util-
ization of the intellectual potential of manpower and women, and work-
ers' wage and sociopolitical motivations are frequently accepted and 
backed by the cc>-determination bodies. Developments in East Germany 
seem to promote the shifting of industrial relations to the Company level. 
2. German unity descended rather unexpectedly upon the initiated de-
bate on necessary reforms regarding collective agreements and other 
trade-union approaches to problems of Organization and policy-making. 
This way, many new challenges to the trade unions concerning Organiza-
tion, wage rates, and policy-making were emerging. The unification of 
two completely different Systems of industrial relations, with the real-so-
cialist system breaking down and the market economy system just at the 
beginning of a process of reform, will bring up different problems in the 
shorter and longer terms. There are completely varied positions regarding 
the contents and possibilities of trade-union action in East and West, 
different production cultures, or the hitherto existing ability of East Ger-
man workers tö achieve efficient bargaining - particularly using "passive 
resistance" (Voskamp and Wittke 1990). These different approaches must 
grow together into a unified position as quickly as possible. This goal 
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cannot be reached merely by adopting the West German legal system, or 
by the import of managers and trade unionists. East German workers' 
way of seeing themselves in their jobs, their behaviour patterns within 
the working process and their hitherto gained socialization experiences 
have not essentially changed. The beginning of mass unemployment has 
resulted in increased disciplining, frequently voluntary exploitation of 
individual productivity reserves and acceptance of changed labour con-
ditions. Yet, first analyses and interviews illustrated that former sociali-
zation and behaviour patterns became obvious and emerged again when 
jobs seemed to be quite secure. 
3. A n unusual feature of East German workers' socialization is their 
relatively close identification with their Company and their way of think-
ing in terms of the company's efficiency; in other words, some kind of 
"real-socialist corporatism" has developed. In spite of the fact that "pas-
sive bargaining" was an obstacle to this corporatism in real socialism as 
it veiled efficiency reserves, the phenomenon continues to exist. Several 
authors refer to this appearance as co-operation between the Company 
management and representative bodies as well as staff members aiming 
at maintaining the Company as an institution (Voskamp and Wittke 1990). 
This mechanism is being spoilt by staff reductions and the simultaneously 
produced widespread understanding among "works Councils" as to the 
"necessity" such staff reductions. This corporatist way of thinking can 
promote further company-related flexibility of working conditions in the 
future and the modification of working Standards. The utilization of effi-
ciency reserves within the process of adaptation of former "real-socialist" 
companies to the market economy, which wil l be difficult in the medium 
term, is possible under this way of thinking. 
4. Due to the largely Taylorist mass organized production methods 
which were practised in many fields, and the social problems - which are 
not discussed here - resulting from the application of flexible manufac-
turing Systems that had selectedly been installed in East Germany without 
leading to Western results, neither in pay nor in personnel policies is there 
any sensitization to the effects of available modern rationalization and 
flexibilization strategies. Consequently, for the time being it seems to be 
much easier in the East to automate than in the West, where it met with 
resistance and partially alternative Organization concepts. In this connec-
tion, the high-tech euphoria produced by the party and government of 
the former G.D.R. may be quite beneficial. 
5. The trade unions in the former Federal Republic faced a dilemma: 
on the one hand they were (and are) engaged in a debate on the modern-
ization of their policy and adaptation of their structures and positions to 
the changing conditions in industrial relations; on the other hand they 
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feit compelled to apply the old unchanged union and co-determination 
model - which is obviously in need of reform - to the East. In addition, 
they have encountered a production and working culture which has 
largely remained unchanged in comparison to the West. East German 
workers have not yet developed sufficient sensitivity and mature action 
patterns, or even alternative ideas. The newly recruited union function-
aries as well as the co-determination bodies at the Company level will not 
be able to develop an adequate reaction to flexibilization strategies and 
high-tech models unless the workers, co-determination bodies and trade 
union structures in the East turn out to be extremely capable of learning 
and reacting, as a result of inner reserves. It wil l be important to modern-
ize industrial relations by adapting union structures and Contents. Other-
wise, there wil l be a relapse into existentially dangerous, old and merely 
passive-reactivist defence strategies which open no new possibilities in 
policy making. 
The most important problem is to ensure that the process of discussion 
and reform in trade-union strategies and co-determination structures will 
be continued. In this respect, the fusion of two different economic Systems 
and production cultures must not be an obstacle. The question is whether 
it wil l be possible to cope with the structural and adaptive crisis in the 
course of this process. 
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T H E ROLE OF UNIONS IN INNOVATIVE SMALL AND 
MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES 
A C A S E STUDY OF FLEXIBLE SPECIALIZATION IN 
E M I L L A - R O M A G N A 
Vittorio Capecchi 
ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the relations between trade unions in the region Emilia-Ro-
magna and the ways industrial development took place in the same area. Differ-
ences in political behaviour between local unions and local government on the one 
side and unions and government at a national level on the other as well as differ-
ences in welfare policies between local and national government, were taken into 
account in the course of the analysis. In the paper some specific terms are utilized 
like flexible specialization, industrial districts and urban industrial sub-systems. 
Three periods of time have been considered: (a) from 1900 to the end of World War 
II; (b) from 1945 to 1968; (c) from 1969 to the present day. 
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Industrialization in Italy developed differently in the three principal areas 
(Bagnasco 1977). In the so-called "third Italy", industrial development has 
taken place only since the Second World War, and has been characterized 
by the diffusion of small and medium-sized firms. In this area, Emilia-
Romagna is the region where industrial development, based on the en-
gineering industry, has been most marked. The following pages wil l try 
to Single out the factors which have contributed to this development -
today Emilia-Romagna is economically one of the richest regions in Italy 
- and to identify the role unions have played in it. 
Considering the peculiar kind of industrialization in Emilia-Romagna, 
the analysis has been divided into three different time periods: from 1900 
to 1945; from 1945 to 1968; from 1969 to the present. Before a comparative 
analysis of these periods is developed, it is worth defining some of the 
specific terms which we will use.1 
1. U N I O N S A N D INDUSTRIALIZATION 
1.1. Italian Unions 
Unions started in Italy with the establishment of the Camere del Lavoro, a 
type of "horizontal" unionism that caters for all workers in a given terri-
tory (the first Camera del Lavoro was established in 1891 in Milano and 
was followed by those in Torino, Pavia, Roma, and Bologna). In 1893 these 
Camere del Lavoro constituted a Federazione delle Camere del Lavoro at the 
national level. Trade unions of a "vertical" type began in 1901; these craft 
unions catered, in a given territory, for people doing a given kind of work. 
The Federazione Nazionale dei Lavoratori della Terra (National Federation of 
Farm Workers), for example, was established in 1901, only catering for 
people who, in a given territory, did rural work; the Federazione Italiana 
degli Operai Metallurgici (Italian Federation of Metal Workers) was also 
established in 1901, and so on. Therefore, in every given territory (i. e., 
Milano or Bologna) there are both "horizontal" unions, which try to see 
as a whole the problems of all the workers in a given territory, and several 
"vertical" unions, which try to defend the particular interests of given 
categories of workers. At the shop floor level, workers were represented 
by the Commissioni interne, elected work bodies which had been estab-
lished during the First World War. 
Fascism came to power in 1922 and by 1926 only the fascist trade unions 
Parts of a former essay of the author on flexible specialization have been used 
in this paper. See Capecchi (1990). 
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were legally recognized; all independent unions were considered outside 
the law. 
The Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL, General Confed-
eration of Italian Labour) was resurrected in 1943. As Contini (1985) wrote: 
It was a direct result of an agreement between representatives of the 
various political parties cooperating within the framework of the 
resistance, and the new union confederation retained its heavy de-
pendence on these parties throughout the period of postwar recon-
struction. [...] With the onset of the Cold War in 1947, however, the 
Italian political Situation changed radically De Gasperi, the leader 
of the Christian Democrats, decided to form a new government 
which for the first time excluded the Communists and Socialists and 
won a sweeping victory in the first postwar legislative elections in 
June 1948. [...] These events highlighted the political tensions within 
the CGIL and provided the occasion for the Catholic and Social 
Democratic factions within the union to break away and form their 
own Confederations, the CISL (Confederation of Italian Workers' 
Unions) and UIL (Union of Italian Workers). 
In this way, the Italian unions' structure was formed. This structure, made 
up of the three confederations, is still existing and operating today. 
Furthermore, it is important to remember that in Italy trade unions 
operate at five levels: national, regional, local, area (smaller territories into 
which the provinces are divided), and shop level. 
1.2. Flexible Svecialization and Mass Production 
Flexible specialization refers to a system of producing either investment 
or consumer goods; it can best be characterized by comparing it to a very 
different, Fordist model of production.2 The main differences between the 
Fordist and flexible specialization models can be described as follows: 
a) In the Fordist system there is mass production or large-batch pro-
duction, while with flexible specialization, factories engage in small-batch 
2 The differences between the Fordist model and the flexible specialization model 
have been analyzed in Piore and Säbel (1984) and Säbel and Zeitlin (1985). In 
my analysis of the flexible specialization model in Emilia-Romagna, I pay more 
attention to the differences between women and men in social and economic 
life, to the difference between the informal and formal economy, to the way in 
which skills are transmitted (in technical schools, in the family, etc.), and to the 
process of social mobility. In this analysis, I have been strongly influenced by 
the research of Adele Pesce. See Capecchi and Pesce (1983); Capecchi (1987, 
1989a, 1989b, 1989c); Barbagli et al. (1987); Pesce (1987,1989). 
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production, producing prototypes and custom-made machinery and/or 
products. 
b) In the Fordist model the Organization of work is basically Taylorist, 
i . e., there is a clear Separation between white- collar workers, who are in 
the minority, and the majority of unskilled blue-collar workers. In flexible 
specialization, however, the Organization of work is based on tri-level 
co-operation between white-collar workers, skilled workers, and un-
skilled workers. 
c) The key to the system of flexible specialization is the middle, skilled, 
group who come to the factory as professionally skilled workers and, 
while on the job, increase their professionality with experience. The com-
bination of experience and professional know-how permit these skilled 
workers to leave the factories and become small independent entre-
preneurs. It is clear, therefore, that the flexible specialization model of 
industrialization allows for the possibility of social mobility among the 
working class, a mobility which would not be possible in the Fordist 
model. 
d) Production procedures in the Fordist model are standardized as is 
the product. The most important element is the price. In flexible special-
ization, production procedures require close collaboration between the 
factory and the client, resulting in a custom-made product. 
e) In the Fordist model production takes place in a few big factories, 
while in the flexible specialization model production takes place in many 
small and medium-sized firms organized into industrial districts and an 
urban industrial sub-system. 
1.3. Industrial Districts 
When flexible specialization is organized in a particular way it is said to 
have developed within the framework of an "industrial district". 
If we use Marshall's (1919) definition of an industrial district, which 
was introduced in Italy by Giacomo Becattini (1979)3, then we have an 
industrial district when: 
a) Production is flexible and tries to meet the different needs of clients 
and, if the client is a wholesaler, is able to make the whole ränge of the 
production series for which the wholesaler asks. 
b) There are many small firms in a given territory which have the same 
type of flexible production. 
c) Among these small or medium-sized firms, some seil their products 
3 For a more recent discussion on industrial districts, see Becattini (1987, 1989); 
Brusco (1989); Regini and Säbel (1989). 
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directly on the market, while others carry out particular processes or pro-
duce component parts of a product; "final firms" and "stage firms" inter-
act with each other (Säbel 1982). 
d) The Separation between those firms which seil their products and 
those which act as sub-suppliers to other firms is not rigid: a small firm 
can, at a given moment, be a sub-supplier and, at another, a seller; 
e) The relations between firms that seil on the market take the form of 
an interweaving of competition and co-operation: this means that the 
firms do not fight one other but try to find market places for new products 
without having destructive effects within the industrial district. 
f) The zone is so defined because it refers to a very limited geographical 
area which is specifically characterized by a certain dominant type of 
production. 
g) There is a strong interconnection between the district as a production 
reality and the zone as a mixture of family, political, and social life. 
On the basis of this definition, it is possible to identify districts in 
Emilia-Romagna wherein a small town corresponds to a predominant 
type of production: Carpi, in the province of Modena, for example, is 
characterized by knitwear clothing production whilst Sassuolo, another 
town in Modena, is characterized by ceramic tile production. 
1.4. Urban Industrial Sub-systems 
We talk about urban industrial sub-systems, however, when there is a Sit-
uation which has the characteristics of points (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e), but 
not of (f) and (g). For example in the city of Bologna we can identify many 
industrial sub-systems producing, measuring, packaging, and wrapping 
machines or motorcycles, but no one of these sub-systems characterizes 
the whole productive system of Bologna. Carpi is identified with knitwear, 
but Bologna is not identified solely with measuring, packaging, and wrap-
ping machine production. 
2 . 1 9 0 0 - 1 9 4 5 : T H E R O L E OF U N I O N S IN THE FOUNDATION OF FLEXIBLE 
SPECIALIZATION I N E M I L I A - R O M A G N A 
In Italy, the period from 1900 to 1945 includes two different phases. 
A first phase, from 1901 to 1914, when the Socialist Giolitti was at the 
head of the Italian government (first as Minister of the Interior and after-
words as Prime Minister), was characterized by a policy more favourable 
to the working classes. 
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In the second phase (after the First World War), when Fascism came to 
power (Mussolini became Head of State in 1923) the political parties which 
had been democratically elected and the independent labour unions were 
put outside the law. Unionism had spread widely in Emilia-Romagna since 
the beginning of the Century. It was a unionism deeply rooted in the Socialist 
culture, widespread not only in the urban areas but in rural ones as well. 
This kind of unionism constitutes a strong element of cohesion; it can there-
fore be considered as one of the seven factors which help to explain the kind 
of industrialization which spread after the Second World War. 
Unionism and Socialist Culture in the City and in the Country 
During the early part of the Century female rice growers and male farm-
hands in Emilia-Romagna became involved in rural struggles. These were 
so important that between 1904 and 1925 the leadership of the Federterra, 
the union federation which includes all farm workers (farm-hands and 
share farmers), was entrusted to a woman from the province of Bologna 
named Argentina Altobelli. Socialist ideas spread in both the cities and 
the countryside of Emilia-Romagna with the establishment of the Camera 
del lavoro and the formation of provincial associations of farm labourers. 
By 1909 (Baldissara 1987), the Socialists represented 40% of the electorate, 
and when universal male suffrage was introduced in 1913 four provinces 
in Emilia-Romagna (Bologna, Ferrara, Reggio Emilia and Parma) voted 
Socialist. 
The presence of this kind of unionism and Socialist culture in rural 
Emilia-Romagna led to the creation of co-operatives. The wide ränge of 
these co-operatives shows how a part of the Emilian entrepreneurship of 
today originates directly from the union movement. 
The Communist party, which was created in Italy in 1921 (after the split 
of the Socialist party), from its beginning attracted a large following in 
Emilia-Romagna. The Emilian Communist party derives from the inter-
lacing of two cultures: the anarchic-revolutionary culture and the co-
operative-reformist one, with the second one becoming progressively 
prevalent over the first one. 
During the 1930s Fascist forces (D'Attore 1980) tried to create conflict 
between the two principal types of farm workers, farm-hands and share 
farmers, just as they did in the city between skilled and unskilled workers. 
However, the resistance movement to Fascism during the Second World 
War brought a reconciliation among the greater part of the industrial and 
agricultural working classes. Consequently, by 1948 Emilia-Romagna was 
"red" with 52% of votes going to the Communist and Socialist parties as 
compared to an average of 31% for the rest of Italy. 
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University and "Universita Popolari" 
(Socialist Teaching Centresfor the Working Classes) 
The University of Bologna (Tega 1987) concentrated various disciplines 
of intellectual knowledge that advocated an important, fruitful relation-
ship between the social and economic communities in Emilia. This con-
centration in a "red" province favoured an active role by the intellectual 
groups, who, utilizing Socialist aims, tried to spread both scientific and 
non-scientific culture in the interests of all social levels. As a consequence, 
in 1901 the Universitä Popolare Giuseppe Garibaldi, one of the most impor-
tant of its kind at a national level, was founded in Bologna. 
A Rural Area Characterized by the Presence of Small Entrepreneurs 
During the period from 1900 to 1945, Emilia-Romagna remained a region 
strongly marked by agriculture. The percentage of the active population 
in agriculture was 65% in 1901,61% in 1931 and 52% in 1951, whereas in 
the rest of Italy the corresponding figures were 62%, 52% and 42%. 
The composition of the population working in agriculture in the north 
was very different from that in the south. According to the 1901 census, 
only 40% of the population working in agriculture in Emilia-Romagna 
were male or female wage workers (farm-hands or farm labourers); 60% 
were workers on contract as share farmers (mezzadri) or on rented land, 
or were small farm-owners. Thus, 60% of the population working in ag-
riculture had the experience of small farm entrepreneurship. Another sig-
nificant factor is that the experience of people in the countryside (espe-
cially that of women) extended beyond cultivation or animal husbandry 
to include proto-industrial experience in hemp processing, weaving, and 
straw braiding.4 
The Presence of Industrial and Proto-industrial Districts 
In many small towns of Emilia, which often served as centres of rural 
areas, industrial and proto-industrial districts were already established 
during the period 1900-1945; these would be continued or adapted during 
the following period. 5 
4 The life in rural areas of Emilia-Romagne in 1900-1950 is described in Adami 
and Tamagnini (1983); Broccoli (1979,1988); Poni (1982). 
5 The history of the industrial district of Carpi is described in Cappello and Prandi 
(1973). 
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The Transmission of Technological Knowledge by Means of Technical Schools 
The most important transfer of knowledge for the industrial development 
of Emilia-Romagna region has been in the field of mechanics. In Bologna 
this was facilitated by the work of two intellectuals, the experimental 
physicist Giovanni Aldini and the economist Luigi Valeriani6, who, at the 
end of the eighteenth Century and the beginning of the nineteenth, were 
inspired by nations like Great Britain and France. During their trips to 
London and Paris they documented the methods of teaching advanced 
technology used in these countries. 
When they died, in 1828 and 1834 respectively, Aldini and Valeriani 
willed their property to the city of Bologna for the purposes of opening 
technical schools for the diffusion of mechanical know-how. Con-
sequently, in 1839, the Technicals Schools of Bologna were established 
with the co-operation of the municipal administration, the University, and 
the Association of Artisans. In 1878, these schools became the Institute of 
Arts and Crafts Aldini Valeriani, where technical and practical subjects 
were taught. Other technical schools of this type were the Corni Institute 
in Modena, founded in 1921, and the Alberghetti, founded in Imola in 
1881. A l l this helps to explain the skill in mechanical design and planning 
found in this region. The technical school for agriculture founded in Reg-
gio-Emilia in 1879 is another example.7 
In the small industrial and proto-industrial districts in this period the 
transmission of knowledge occurred through apprenticeships, or through 
schools where specialized workers acted as teachers. In Carpi, women 
straw braiders taught their techniques on the job and in schools; in Sas-
suolo the same was done by potters. In the other cities of Emilia, special-
ized staff members taught embroidery tailoring and Sewing. In Bologna, 
the Elisabetta Sirani Technical School was established by a women work-
ers' association in 1895. The transmission of more complex knowledge 
was carried out by scholars connected to the university world. 
An Industrial Society Oriented Towards Flexible Specialization 
In the period 1900-1945, there was limited industrialization in the regions 
that remained essentially agricultural. However, there were many in-
dustrial districts and the beginnings of urban industrial sub-systems in 
the engineering industry organized on a flexible basis. In Bologna, for 
example, the majority of industries were oriented towards the production 
6 The history of Giovanni Aldini and Luigi Valeriani has been described in Com-
une di Bologna (1980). 
7 The history of Antonio Zanelli is told in Cafasi (1979). 
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of custom-made machinery or the production of prototypes of automo-
biles or racing motorcycles. 
A Different Power Relation Between Men and Women 
In all the aspects considered so far, the relationship between men and 
women is more equal than in other regions: in Emilia-Romagna women 
have had more power than in other regions of Italy (Pesce 1987, 1989). 
They were the initiators of small firms in sectors like clothing and ceram-
ics. In engineering, women were excluded from technical schools and 
therefore never participated in machine projects; however, they partici-
pated in the management of firms, especially small ones. 
3 . 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 6 8 : T H E ROLE OF U N I O N S IN THE SPREAD OF 
INDUSTRIALIZATION IN E M I L I A - R O M A G N A 
It is very important for our analysis to understand what happened in Italy 
during the period between the end of the Second World War and 1968. 
There are two main points which characterized this period. First, Emilia-
Romagna diverged more and more from most of the Italian regions: in 
politics, in its kind of industrialization, and in its socio-economic model 
of development. The second point has to do with the big changes involv-
ing Italian unions which caused a deep transformation in industrial rela-
tions at the end of the 1960s. 
3.1. The Characteristics of Industrial Relations in Italy 
The first years after the end of the Second World War (1945-1947) were a 
period characterized by the reconstruction, by large unemployment, by 
major social and political struggles, and by coalition governments of all 
the antifascist parties. 
After the liberation of Italy, a wave of major strikes spotlighted the 
problem of shop floor bargaining. At the same time, however, these 
struggles tended to increase the differentials in wage rates existing be-
tween industries and regions. 
As Contini (1985) wrote, in the face of this risk of fragmentation among 
workers, the egalitarian orientation of the CGIL 
... led it to conclude a series of agreements with the Confindustria in 
1945-6 which concentrated all bargaining activities at the centre, thus 
reducing wage differentials at the cost of abandoning the plant level. 
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After the split of CGIL in the 1948, the three new unions (CGIm, CISL, 
and UIL) emphasized their political features but neverthless found it nec-
essary to negotiate agreements with the Confindustria at the national level. 
Industries were very strong, and they could afford to pay very low wages 
because of unemployment. In 1948, 14 wage areas had been fixed: the 
same job was paid 29% less in Sicily than in a northern region such as 
Lombardy. Trade unions accepted these wage areas since they hoped en-
terprises would be encouraged to invest in the southern regions, helping 
to diminish unemployment. Furthermore, in this period there was still a 
wage differential between male and female workers. In 1960 the number 
of wage areas had decreased from 14 to 7 and the wage differential be-
tween male and female workers was reduced, but not until 1969 were 
wage areas abolished and wage equality between men and women for-
mally established. 
Also in the 1950s, Italian unions chose not to develop plant-level or-
ganizations. Lacking an effective Organization at the factory level, the 
working classes defended themselves utilizing the law. In fact, the Civil 
Code retained certain clauses regulating piece rates; and the presence of 
this law, theoretically protecting workers against rate cutting, produced 
the informal shop floor bargaining characteristic of postwar Italy. As Contini 
(1985) wrote, 
... although possible in principle an appeal to the courts over piece-
rate payment was very difficult in practice. As a result, workers were 
pressed to find some structure in the factory which could enforce 
their legal rights: the Commissioni interne (re-established after the 
war but not engaged in any direct bargaining) and Communist 
factory cells came to assume this role. 
By the end of the 1950s, the political Situation was changing. In this con-
text, the industrial unions resumed their role in taking the initiative, and 
in 1956 the National Agreement of Metal Workers (which had not been 
renewed since 1948) was signed. In the same period, a large intellectual 
movement prepared the ground for a progressive liberalization in the 
legal framework governing industrial relations. New laws were enacted. 
In 1956 the Status of "apprentice" was legalized: industries were able to 
give professional training to young workers in exchange for the possibility 
of paying them less during the period of professional training. At the end 
of the 1950s and in the early 1960s, labour subcontracting was prohibited 
and temporary employment contracts were limited. These two kinds of 
relations between employer and worker involved most of the migrants 
from the south of Italy working in the big factories of the north. 
In 1959 the erga omnes law extended the coverage of collective agree-
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
ments to all workers, even to those who worked in enterprises not belong-
ing to the Confindustria (most of the small-sized enterprises, for example). 
Finally, a law stipulating that employers had to demonstrate "just cause" 
as a basis for dismissals was approved by the Parliament in 1966. This 
law was clearly a first point of arrival. But it was, at the same time, the 
starting point for many leftist-democratic lawyers which would yield 
some years later, during an extraordinary season of struggles, the Statuto 
dei Diritti dei Lavoratori (Charter of Workers' Rights). 
Towards the end of the 1960s, industrial relations in Italy were deeply 
changed. There was much less unemployment; the policy of low wages 
and of total enterprise control over workers' productivity during the 1950s 
could not continue. The "hot Autumn" was drawing near. 
3.2. The Characteristics of Political and Socio-Economic Development in 
Emilia-Romagna 
The main political and socio-economical characteristics of Emilia-Ro-
magna in the 1950s and in the 1960s can be summed up as follows: 
The Construction of a Political Community in the Region 
After the Second World War, the Italian Communist and Socialist parties 
had an absolute majority and governed the Emilia-Romagna region as 
well as the cities of Emilia. 8 One of the peculiarities of the Italian Com-
munist Party in Emilia, which has distinguished it from the Communist 
parties of France and Spain, is its emphasis on sustaining the creation of 
small businesses and helping salaried workers to became self-employed 
and create small enterprises. The Communist Party and the Socialist Party 
have the majority in Emilian unions and also represent the majority in 
the Organization of small artisans' businesses and co-operatives. These 
associations of artisans and co-operatives, co-ordinated by people belong-
ing to the Communist and Socialist parties, became extremely important 
centres of economic power, and served as bases for training in business 
and in the management of small enterprises. 
By this means a kind of Communist and Socialist "political Commu-
nity" was formed wherein people of the same political leaning came to 
be in charge of local and regional government, trade unions, small artisan 
associations, and firms organized as co-operatives. 
Women have played an active and recognized role in this Community 
For a history of a political Community of Bologna, see Arbizzani (1961) and 
Arbizzani et al. (1988). 
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(in contrast with other regions) and the local administration in Emilia-Ro-
magna has provided many social Services such as day-care centres or 
Kindergartens in order to allow women with small children to participate 
in the working world. Great attention was devoted to social policies (with 
the help of Catholics in the region), speculation in construction was re-
sisted and small businesses were given support, thereby increasing social 
mobility as well as assisting economic development. 
A Big Change Within the Work Force 
In this period, industrial development was very rapid in Emilia-Romagna. 
The proportion of the population active in agriculture dropped from 52% 
in 1951 to 20% in 1971 (a decrease of 32%), and that of industrial workers 
increased from 25% to 43% (an increase of 40 per cent); during the same 
period in the rest of Italy, the variations were less extreme (a decrease of 
25% in agriculture and an increase of 12% in industry). During this 20-
year period, emigration to other regions and countries was static. There 
was, however, internal movement from the mountain areas and the 
smaller centres to the larger cities and towns. 
Per capita income increased, as did Emilia-Romagna's share of total 
Italian exports. The latter rose from 6% in 1963 to 8.4% in 1974, with radical 
changes in the type of goods exported. In the 1950s Emilia-Romagna ex-
ported agricultural products and clothing, while in the 1970s exports were 
primarily machines and mechanical products. The number of employees 
in the engineering industries as a percentage of total industrial employ-
ment rose from 17% in 1951 to 32% in 1971 and to 41% in 1981, the other 
main sectors being textiles, clothing, and food (Barbagli et al. 1987). 
Gradual Agricultural Transition 
The way in which agriculture was transformed (cf. Fuä and Zacchia 1983) 
also contributed to a higher Standard of living in this region. The drastic 
fall in the agricultural population did not, in fact, mean an end to agri-
cultural production. There was a change of direction towards capitalistic 
agriculture which brought about a dramatic increase in productivity per 
hectare. 
A process of industrialization based on the diffusion of middle-sized, 
small, and very small firms took place in rural areas as well as in the 
towns; the majority of farrning families could leave the agricultural world 
without too much difficulty. Within these rural areas, some proto-in-
dustrial activities became industrial, and the industrial areas within the 
small towns became increasingly important. 
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The Development ofthe Engineering Sector 
The heart of industrial development in Emilia-Romagna is represented 
primarily by the engineering sector, exports from which exceeded (in 
monetary terms) those from agriculture and other industries. In the earlier 
part of the Century, there had only been a few industries characterized by 
versatile production in towns such as Bologna, Modena, and Reggio 
Emilia. This versatility was used during the two world wars in manufac-
turing war products that surely contributed to the strengthening of these 
industries. After the Second World War, this type of know-how, based on 
technical school education and professional training in the firms, was 
strongly encouraged by a strengthening of market demands, as all the 
industries producing consumer goods required machinery for the pack-
aging of their products. 
Flexible production in Emilia was therefore oriented towards the pro-
duction of machines for different types of industry and agriculture, in-
cluding measuring, packaging, and wrapping machines that allowed 
firms which produce foodstuffs, pharmaceutical products, or cigarettes 
to have custom-made equipment, ranging from cigarette packaging ma-
chines, through blistering machines for pharmaceutical products, to pack-
aging and wrapping machines for all types of foodstuffs (cakes, sweets, 
tea, etc.). A very high market demand and the possibility of undertaking 
production with limited capital made extended development possible. 
This development was of an urban industrial sub-system type, and, as a 
consequence, there was an increase in the number of medium, small, and 
very small companies. 
Local Government Policy Towards Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
EHiring the postwar period, the small firms in Emilia-Romagna have found 
backing and assistance for their growth from the local authorities. The local 
governments of Emilian citi.es adopted several industrial policy measures 
which took the form of a kind of town planning: infrastructures and in-
dustrial areas were created for small firms. These measures, together with 
those emphasizing social policy (professional training, social Services, pub-
lic transport, etc.), will have a very favourable effect, increasing the scale of 
social mobility from the working classes to small entrepreneurial ones.9 
9 As Linda Weiss (1988) has written, analyzing European national government 
policy towards small firms, the Italian government is the most favourable in 
Europe to small firms, especially if we compare it with the French and German 
governments. The best Illustration of this assumption is the Artisan Statute in-
troduced in 1956. 
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3.3. The Industrial Relations in Emilia-Romagna 
Düring the period of the right-centrist national government, the labour 
movement in Emilia-Romagna faced a strong political repression of all 
workers who were members of the leftist parties and of the CGIL. The 
results of this repression, however, were opposite to those which had been 
expected by the Christian Democratic Party. The repression Consolidated 
the leftist political identity of the region against the national government 
and increased adherence to the CGIL, which became the absolute majority 
union in Emilia-Romagna. 
If in Italy "until the late 1960s job control by workers had been con-
fined to limited informal bargaining" and "industrial relations had been 
dominated by broader political interests" (Contini, 1985), in Emilia-
Romagna the Situation was different. The union which asserted itself 
after the struggles against the repression of the early 1950s was surely 
"political"; it was also concrete and pragmatic. Each Single part of the 
"political Community" we mentioned could act with comparative au-
tonomy. Trade unions carried out their tasks, and their action was legit-
imated. 
Concerning the contradiction between the centralized model of Organi-
zation and action and shop floor bargaining, which is very sharp at the 
national level, the Emilian union does not have to face large companies 
trying to recover their control over the work force; the diffusion of small 
and medium-sized firms within urban industrial sub-systems and dis-
tricts makes centralized bargaining at the territory level effective. In this 
kind of bargaining, workers often introduce a high level of informality; 
this informality, however, is part of a system recognized both by unions 
and by employers. 
The strong "horizontal" structure of the CGIL in Emilia-Romagna en-
courages the diffusion of solidarity among workers of small firms in a 
given territory and, at the same time, rouses in each small firm the desire 
for interfirm co-operation, if only as an answer to the union initiative. In 
fact, the associations of small firms become very influential, and they tend 
to form national organizations (for example, the C N A , National Confed-
eration of Artisanal Enterprises). 
Another important aspect, as we have already mentioned, was the 
peculiar kind of work force, the great degree of autonomy and Space 
for workers' self-management that employment in small firms per-
mitted. This autonomy produced a high degree of workers' social mo-
bility, with frequent changes in Status from that of employee to that of 
employer and vice versa. Often these different statuses existed in the 
same family, giving birth to a complex structure of social classes and 
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leading to a sort of "complicity" between skilled workers and small 
entrepreneurs. Trade unions must take into account this "complicity" 
(Capecchi and Pesce 1983). 
The Emilian union was therefore less "conflictual" and more "contrac-
tual" than trade unions in the rest of Italy. It managed (much more than 
elsewhere) to apply the strategies developed by national unions and to 
exert real control over some specific aspects of work conditions and on 
the enforcement of new labour laws (for example, those concerning ap-
prenticeship). 
Emilian unions can do that because they are not required to 
completely take care of the general conditions of workers. This role has 
been played by the local authorities, whose social policies (quality of 
housing, environment, health, cultural activities, kindergarten, etc.) are 
a very important "local social wage". Thanks to this social wage, Emil-
ian workers' lives are on the average better than workers' lives in other 
Italian regions. 
We can conclude by saying that there are two main points which dis-
tinguish the industrial relations in Emilia-Romagna and which have their 
roots in the early postwar period. 
On the one hand, the union protects unskilled workers (women for 
the most part) against dismissals and the piece-work system, and in-
duce owners to respect the laws (on apprenticeship, etc.). On the other, 
it leaves space for the formal and informal bargaining carried on by 
the skilled workers in the more innovative firms. In fact, it is worth 
remembering that in Emilia-Romagna many enterprises (most of them 
engineering industries) had their start in the period 1945-1968. Most of 
these enterprises were established by skilled workers who had a 
technical background and were able to project it onto a larger scale. In 
these new firms (all small-sized at the beginning), the owner, who once 
was a worker himself, works side by side with the skilled workers. 
There is a deep collaboration between them which creates a very differ-
ent kind of industrial relation from those available in the largest facto-
ries. 
It must be added also that in medium-sized firms the large number of 
skilled workers makes them stronger in bargaining than unskilled work-
ers. In consequence, Emilian unions are on the whole quite different from 
the trade unions which we find in the large northern companies, where 
the Taylor-Ford Organization of work diffuses the Standing of the un-
skilled worker, who is very weak in bargaining. 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
4 . 1 9 6 9 TO THE PRESENT: T H E ROLE OF U N I O N S I N INNOVATIVE S M A L L 
A N D MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES 
In Italy the debate on industrial relations has centred mainly on the 
experience of large firms and on the central political system. Productive 
structures different from the large firm were usually considered as if they 
were not covered by industrial relations. In reality however, small firm 
development has been a crucial aspect of the Italian economy in recent 
years (Trigilia 1990). 
4.1. Industrial Relations in Italy 
If we consider the changes involving Italian trade unions in the period 
from 1969 to the present, we can distinguish two different phases: a) the 
period 1969-77, characterized by great union achievements, by the unitary 
action of the three confederations, by greater strength of the industrial 
vertical unions compared with the horizontal ones, and by increased rates 
of unionization; and b) the period from 1978 to the present, characterized 
by the recovery of a centralized union policy, by the end of union unity 
by a drop in the rates of unionization, and by less strength of the industrial 
vertical unions compared with the horizontal ones. 
In 1969, the struggles in the factories were so widespread that people 
refer to the "hot autumn of 1969". 
The contracts of 1969 created shop Steward committees (consigli difab-
brica), formed by freely elected representatives of workers who cannot be 
dismissed for political reasons. Wage areas were eliminated, and füll wage 
equality between male and female workers was reached. A greater com-
mon level in wages was established (with the eHmination of individual 
piece-work): wages were grouped in accordance with given classes of 
professionality. Some classes of wage and professionality are common to 
blue collar and white collar workers. 
This union Organization established at the plant level is characterized 
by a deep collaboration among the three Confederations. The metal-
workers unions decided to join, forming a Single Organization (the FLM). 
Furthermore, in this phase of "unitary struggle" vertical unions (such 
as the metalworkers' union) became stronger than horizontal ones. Bar-
gaining at both firm and area level became more important than cen-
tralized bargaining at the national level, and at the beginning of the 
1970s the regional structures of industrial unions were created in order 
to co-ordinate action and establish a link among the specific regional 
situations. 
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At the national level, however, there are also some important initiatives. 
The gains reached by the trade unions through bargaining are officially 
legitimized with a labour law promoted by leftist jurists and enacted by 
the parliament in 1970. This law, called the Charter of Worker's Rights 
(Statuto dei Diritti dei Lavoratori), concerns all workhands in private in-
dustries (except for artisan enterprises). The Charter prevents groundless 
dismissals, protects union activists from discrimination and victimization 
in the workplace, defends the right to education, and establishes new 
rules for the employment bureaus. 
After 1969, Italian trade unions became more and more important and 
the rates of unionism increased more and more; CGIL membership went 
from 2,461,000 in 1968 to 4,528,000 in 1978. Union actions took more differ-
ent directions. Trade unions fight to protect workers' health in the work-
place started in 1969 and attained important goals - first of all, the right 
to send confidential experts into the factories. By talking to the workers, 
these experts can identify unsafe practices and materials in the workplace 
and the stress deriving from too rapid a working pace. 
A further gain concerning the right to education was reached by the 
trade unions in 1973: the so-called "150 hours" (150 ore). This measure 
provides that workers (especially those who have not finished com-
pulsory school) can finish their studies using, in a one-year period, 150 
hours of their free time and 150 hours of their work hours. 
In this same period, trade unions got in touch with the women's move-
ment, and several feminist initiatives began in the trade unions to better 
conditions for women in the workplace. These initiatives also led to new 
forms of women's Organization within the trade unions: the women's com-
mittees which spread at all levels (national, regional, sector, shopfloor, 
and so on). The F L M (unitary union of metalworkers) is one of the first 
unions in which these initiatives took place. 
At the end of the 1970s, national unions moved their attention from 
shopfloor bargaining to the political theme of the great reforms necessary 
in Italy. It is important to remember that in 1975-76 the Communist Party 
made enormous electoral gains: for the first time since 1947 a coalition 
was formed which was supported by the PCI, officially described as a 
"government of national unity". This political change affected trade un-
ions' choices, especially the CGIL's: for the CGIL the entry of the Com-
munist Party into the government coalition is the only possible political 
goal of the workers' struggles. 
In 1978 the CGIL launched a new line reversing the unions' former 
strategy. This new strategy, known as the "EUR line" (after the Roman 
exhibition grounds at which it was adopted), presented a policy of nec-
essary sacrihce for the workers in the interest of economic revival and 
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Investments in the underdeveloped southern regions. For the first time 
since the Hot Autumn, the union's defence of workers was relaxed. 
The economic crisis, the strong inflation, the outset of the technological 
changes which would be spreading in the 1980s, and the attempts of em-
ployers to re-establish managerial authority and destabilize the shop 
Steward Organization in the plants created a Situation in which industrial 
relations were politicized and centralized again. But the new line remains 
at the programmatic level, with few practical achievements to its credit. 
In this phase, the limits of what has been considered the main feature of 
union action in Italy come out - a system characterized by a bipolar struc-
ture, with both centralized and decentralized bargaining: on the one hand, 
general union representation and politicization of industrial relations at 
the national level; on the other, general workers' representation and an 
high degree of conflict in the workplace (Deila Rocca 1987). At the begin-
ning of the 1980s, the unions at the national level found themselves in a 
dangerous impasse. At the same time, unions' structures at the plant level 
have gradually lost their capacity for mass mobilization. According to 
many union scholars, the decline of factory militancy is a consequence 
partly of the increasing aggressiveness of management, and partly of the 
determined efforts of the union leadership to shift conflict from the shop 
floor to the political arena. However, this decline is also the product of an 
ideological crisis among the shopstewards themselves, resulting from the 
failure of the highly politicized struggles over work Organization to bear 
practical fruits of either a revolutionary or a reformist variety (Contini 
1985). 
In 1980, the defeat of the Fiat 35-day strike marked the end of a phase. 
In this strike the union leadership was forced to call off their struggle as 
a result of the so called "march of 40,000", an enormous back-to-work 
movement led by foremen and white-collar workers. In this defeat trade 
unions paid for their scanty representation among white-collar workers 
and technicians and for the prominence given to unskilled workers at a 
time of deep technological and organizational change on the part of the 
large industrial companies, when several industrial sectors are declining 
and tertiarization is more and more increasing. 
In 1983, a "concordat" (within what has been called the "triangulär 
concertation") was signed between government, unions, and Confindustria 
(National Employers' Confederation) which promised to transform Italian 
industrial relations (especially concerning the reduction of wage indexa-
tion and of shop floor bargaining). 
In 1984, the government (the so-called pentapartito, a coalition without 
PCI, which Supports industrial reorganization and reduces workers' 
wages without starting a programme of reforms) chose unilaterally to cut 
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the sliding scale, arousing workers' protests. The Commtinist Party, which 
after the defeat of the coalition of national unity had returned to the line 
of strong Opposition, proclaimed a referendum among all workers against 
the government's decision. Only the Communist leadership of the CGIL 
supported the referendum, against the advice of the Socialist leadership 
of the CGIL, of CISL, and of UIL. It was the final breaking union unity, 
which had already been undermined by the Fiat defeat. 
The trade unions' decline has continued during the whole of the 1980s. 
The figures for the rates of unionization are very striking. From 1977 to 
1987 the Italian membership of the three confederations went from 
7,225,000 to 6,065,000 - a drop of 1,160,000 workers in ten years. If the 
growth of the Services sector, the so-called tertiarisation, weighs in the 
decrease in the rates of unionization, there is also a strong political factor 
- the crisis in perceptions of unions' representativeness. 
Today a recovery is recorded, though a difficult one. The three Confed-
erations (CGIL, CISL, and UIL) talk again of close collaboration, and the 
watchwords are solidarity among all workers, rights for individuals, and 
co-determination. Since the fall of the Eastern European Communist reg-
imes, the most important element in the Italian political Situation is the 
transformation of the PCI into the Left Democrat Party. 
In this new phase, wil l the ambivalent, unstable, and peculiar relation-
ships between Italian unions and the political system continue? 
4.2. The Changes in Emilian Industrial Districts and Urban Industrial 
Sub-systems 
In the period from 1969 to the present, the main characteristics of the 
industrial system in Emilia-Romagna remain unchanged: flexible special-
ization and a close collaboration between the firm and the client. On the 
other hand, the mass production factories are moving toward a more flex-
ible system of production. The small and medium-sized firms organized 
into districts and urban industrial sub-systems must face increasing in-
ternational competition, technological changes, and the process of terti-
arization. 
4.2.1. Changes in International Competition and New Technologies 
The dissemination of electronics and informatics has had enormous re-
percussions on the industrial system in Emilia-Romagna (Capecchi 1989c; 
Brusco 1989). There are two closely linked reasons for this: the increased 
competitiveness of the big multinationals, and the need for a complete 
reconversion of the engineering industries which predominate in the re-
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gion. The increased competitiveness of large firms is very important. Until 
recently, the big Fordist-type units, such as Fiat in Italy, had inflexible 
production lines; the replacement of one type of product with another 
was slow and very costly, whether in terms of time or of work Organiza-
tion. 
Today high technology allows even big engineering firms to change 
their type of product without particular problems or loss of time. In-
dustrial development in Emilia-Romagna between 1950 and 1970 oc-
curred in a context of competition only with other European or American 
small-series industrial producers, and without competition from large-
scale industry. Today, however, only some multinationals can compete in 
the production of capital goods in limited series which is typical of Emilia-
Romagna. 
Actually, flexible specialization in Emilia-Romagna has established 
very close links between producers and consumers, and the international 
competition finds it very difficult to break these links. Neverthless, the 
competition increases, and Emilian firms must face three kinds of innova-
tion: product innovation, innovation in the production process strictly 
speaking, and innovation in the management and Organization of the 
different functions of Workshops and of work. 
The search for "total quality" raises the problem both of innovation in 
management and Organization and of reorganizing the links between the 
firms which make up a sub-system. This leads to the standardization of 
procedures in order to reduce costs. These are the difficult problems which 
firms and sub-systems must solve in order to establish ever-tighter links 
between marketing, programming and production. 
There is thus a phase of great technological and managerial change 
which corresponds to the great social changes taking place at this time. 
One of the most important changes is the increase, in the younger genera-
tions, of the level of education of women, who are reaching higher scholas-
tic levels than those achieved by young men. Women have thus been able 
to enter tertiary professional activities (today in continual expansion) and 
top positions in the management of small companies linked to the en-
gineering industry. 
4.2.2. Institutional Strategies 
By the end of the 1980s, the region had experienced an increase of exports, 
a growth in the gross regional product, and high levels of employment. 
Significant to this success, and to dealing with current problems of change, 
are the strategies applied by all the institutions of Emilia-Romagna, in-
cluding the local and regional administrations, unions, associations of 
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small enterprises, co-operative leagues, industrialists' associations, and 
universities. The institutional strategies are in several directions: flexible 
Organization of Services to firms; professional training; policy of increas-
ing association among small firms. 1 0 
4.3. Role of Unions in Innovative Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
As we have already mentioned, the principal characteristic of trade unions 
in Emilia-Romagna is that they are more pragmatic than the national ones, 
less conflictual and more contractual. The persistence of Community 
values drives trade unions to find Solutions involving other institutional 
actors: regional and local authorities, artisans' associations, and so on. The 
role of the institutional context is considered an important variable in 
increasing development. 
The problems trade unions have faced since 1970 are the following 
ones. 
Deep Knowledge and Control of the Technological and Organizational 
Changes in the Industrial System 
In order to play an active role in local industrial relations, Emilian unions 
have created "bureaus of studies" (ufficio studi), with the collaboration of 
professors from different universities. The first one was set up in 1974 by 
the Federation of Metal Workers of Bologna.11 These bureaus aim to in-
tervene both in production processes and in the Organization of work. 
During the 1970s, most of of their initiatives concerned engineering in-
dustry. Many reorganization plans were worked out, focusing both on 
given sectors - i . e., textiles and clothing, foundries, farm-industry - and 
given companies such as Ducati and Lombardini in Bologna. At the begin-
ning of the 1980s, the internal strives among CGIL, CISL, and UIL brought 
"unitary" bureaus of studies to an end, and research activities have been 
suspended for some years. 
In the second half of the 1980s, however, Emilian trade unions resumed 
their interest in economic and political research, following the "codeter-
mination line". The bureaus of studies of the Federation of Metal Workers 
and of the Camere del lavoro of Bologna are currently reflecting on in-
dustrial districts and on the Organization of work. 
On professional training and institutional strategies in Emilia-Romagna, see 
Capecchi (1987). 
Vittorio Capecchi had the responsibility for the regional and provincial "bureaus 
of studies" of metal workers' union from 1974 to the time of the union split. 
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Search of Alternatives for Firms in Crisis 
When in the 1970s trade unions created their regional structures, the 
bureaus of studies were organized on a regional level. The Federation of 
Metal Workers' regional bureau of studies analyzed many industrial sec-
tors. Through this analysis of the regional Situation, it tried to intervene 
in national policy, trying to move the Investments of the larger companies 
(such as Fiat) from the northern and central regions of Italy to the southern 
ones. 
During the 1970s, many Emilian firms of different sectors (engineering 
industries, textile, etc.) passed through a crisis both of market and of work 
Organization caused by technological changes and international competi-
tion. Emilian trade unions (especially the metalworkers') adopted the 
strategy of the "production Conference" (conferenza di produzione), in which 
the bureaus of studies, the political leadership of the trade unions and 
technicians, blue- and white-collar workers analyze the sector or the Com-
pany in crisis and write a study which contains alternative proposals 
about production and Organization of work from the trade unions' point 
of view. In a production Conference this study is publicly shared with 
employers and political parties, who can discuss and advocate or oppose 
the trade unions' proposal. 
These "procedures" are still used today when Single firms or districts 
are passing through a crisis. 
Working for Changes in the Districts and Industrial Urban Sub-systems 
In the 1970s, after the Hot Autumn struggles, the large companies were 
regarded as central by trade unions at the national level, both as a site of 
power and capital management and as the privileged battleground be-
tween capital and labour, the only place where the workers' movement 
is able to score some success (Brusco and Pezzini 1990). 
Along these lines, at the beginning of the 1970s, trade unions in Emilia-
Romagna regarded small firms (all of them, without distinction) as the 
result of the decentralization of large companies. This position (thanks 
also to the analyses of the bureaus of studies) has been changing since 
1975. Trade unions have begun to understand the differences existing 
among small and medium-sized firms according to the district or the Sub-
system they belong to. Trade unions understand that in the majority of 
cases small firms are not marginal (as had been supposed); that they are 
able to make use of new technology, to penetrate international markets 
and to pay salaries comparable to those paid by large companies. 
Union initiatives on technical-organizational innovation take place pri-
marily by pushing the more innovative firms to acknowledge the higher 
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level of technical skill (the control of complex machinery, such as numeri-
cally controlled machines) which the "new" process of production requires. 
In the more innovative small and medium-sized firms, work is re-
garded by unions as a possibility for individual and group development, 
open to qualitative improvement. Bargaining at the firm level increases, 
and workers in small business are involved (as had not happened before) 
in the process of formulating the bargaining platform at the national level. 
At the area level, many initiatives are realized in order to equalize work-
ers' rights in the small firms with those existing in the largest industries 
(the so-called "integrative bargaining"). 
This union action plays a very positive role since it drives small firms 
to innovate themselves. 
"Codetermination" in the More Innovative Small and Medium-sized Firms 
In the late 1980s, Emilian unions launched the new policy line of "code-
termination". This line draws inspiration from industrial relations in 
Sweden, using as well Italian experiences with the Organization of work 
and the rights to the disclosure of information. These latter rights (re-
quested and obtained in 1975 through the national bargaining) give access 
to information on investment programmes, innovation, and technological 
modmcation. With these rights to verify and examine information, the 
unions intend to attempt to control the expected consequences of techno-
logical innovation with respect to workers' work condition, mobility and 
employment. On the part of the companies, however, in most cases the 
disclosure of information has only been observed so far as to inform un-
ions of decisions already made. 
The new "codetermination" (also asserted at the national level by the 
CGIL at its last congress), on the contrary, means discussing the decisions 
before making them, in order to influence work conditions; unions and 
enterprise managements, although each of them have füll autonomy to 
propose according to given rules and procedures, must work together to 
outline an enterprise's strategies and codetermine its Organization and 
management. Linking the quality of production to the quality of work, 
codetermination might be capable of realizing new forms of industrial 
democracy. This is clearly a very difficult aim to reach (and there are still 
few actual experiences we can recall). 
Education and Workers' Professional Training 
During the 1970s, "150 hours" urged trade unions to take an interest in 
the educational system since they had to organize courses for the com-
pletion of compulsory schooling in conformity with local and national 
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educational institutions. The "150 hours" are now used especially by 
young people who did not finish their studies or by women who want to 
investigate and reflect on their condition. 
Today trade unions turned their attention to professional training. In 
spite of the commitment of the Emilia-Romagna regional government and 
of the employers' associations, available data show that many enterprises 
(especially small and medium-sized ones) are not increasing their Stand-
ards of professional know-how. Furthermore, when these enterprises offer 
professional training they do not do it in accordance with trade unions' 
policies. 
Emilian unions' strategy has oriented itself in two main directions. In 
one, there are favourable experiences such as that of Mec-track, a medium-
sized firm of Bologna, where professional training has been managed by 
three "actors": employers, provincial government, and trade unions. In the 
other, there have been attempts to set up professional training courses using 
the existing laws. In 1991, for example, the trade unions and associations of 
artisans signed an agreement to facilitate professional training of small-
sized enterprises' workers based on the peculiarities of these firms. 
Health and Environmental Preservation 
In the 1970s, the safeguarding of workers' health was entrusted to in-
dustrial physicians acting on behalf of unions. In Emilia-Romagna, this 
has led to the creation of a unitary union regional centre (Research Centre 
for Prevention), which is still a reference point for workers' health policies. 
This attention towards risks inherent in working conditions (not only 
physical hazard risks but also psychological stress with the use of Video-
terminals and data processing equipment) has been extended to general 
enviromental preservation as well. In 1990, the Camera del lavoro of 
Bologna created the Gaia Association to promote research and initiatives 
on pollution due to industrialization and use of chemical substances in 
agriculture. 
Women's Condition in the Workplace and the New Organization ofWork and 
Services 
Adele Pesce (1990), in her report for the Regional Commission for Equal 
Opportunities between Men and Women, points out two different lines 
of action, which are both followed by women's groups in the trade unions. 
The first line (which produces only partial initiatives) considers 
women's condition in the workplace. Union women's groups, for ex-
ample, have reported enterprises where women have fewer career oppor-
tunities than men have, less access to high-level positions, fewer oppor-
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tunities to attend professional training, etc. They also report working sit-
uations where both men and women are paid less because they do a job 
which is considered more "womanlike" than other jobs of equal complex-
ity but traditionally judged more "manlike". 
This disparagement of "womanlike" work (which expresses itself in 
different wages for jobs of equal complexity) may be found especially in 
the Services sector, in professions such as teaching in primary school, nurs-
ing, social assisting, etc. This want of balance exists in industrial sectors 
as well. There are jobs in the textile sector (where most workers are 
women), for example, which are paid less than jobs of equal complexity 
in the engineering sector (where most workers are men). 
There is, however, a second line of action which does not merely try to 
reach equality between men and women. On the basis of a theory which 
brings out sexual difference as a positive fact, it wants to criticize the 
whole Organization of work considered as the result of exclusively male 
thought. Therefore, "work" is not only the work done in factory or office 
but housework as well, traditionally unpaid and done by women. Times 
and compensation for all work should be taken into account, in both pro-
duction and reproduction areas. On this subject, there is a very interesting 
bill (promoted by the women of the Left Democrat Party (PDS) and sup-
ported by the women of the trade unions), which proposes a new Organi-
zation of hours in workplaces and in urban areas. 
A New Group of Workers: The Immigrant People 
Trade unions must face the major presence of immigrant people from far 
countries who arrive in Emilia-Romagna with low levels of professional 
skills or eise with professional skill which are not required by Emilian 
enterprises. At the same time, for Emilian small and medium-sized enter-
prises it is now very difficult to find skilled labour because of the drop in 
the 16-29 year-old population, which will continue for the next ten years. 
The problem is how to increase the professional know-how of immi-
grant people in order to put them at in higher professional levels. Here-
tofore, male immigrants (especially those from Morocco, Senegal and 
Tunisia) have only found very unskilled and dirty work; female immi-
grants usually work only as housemaids. 
Emilian unions have stipulated an agreement (we can call it a "Conven-
tion") with small entrepreneurs' associations, co-operatives, and local 
government in order to offer paid professional training together with part-
time jobs to immigrant workers. This kind of agreement among trade un-
ions, local government, and entrepreneurs' associations (started in Bologna 
in 1991) is typical of union strategy and of industrial relations in this region. 
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WORKING CONDITIONS IN SMALL AND 
MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES IN JAPAN 
T H E C A S E OF O S A K A 
Tamai Kingo 
ABSTRACT 
In the 1980s working conditions in Japan changed drastically. In order to under-
stand these new trends occurring in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), 
we carried out research in Osaka, which is often called a typical SME district. We 
analyzed working conditions by industry type and size of workplace. Although 
there are some differences related to the type of industry, our survey shows that 
the smaller the workplace, the worse the working conditions are. From our re-
search carried out in workplaces with up to 299 employees, we should like to 
draw attention to the fact that 60% of our sample were workplaces employing less 
than 30 persons. These very small workplaces probably have the worst working 
conditions among Japanese SMEs and collecting data on them is very difficult; 
therefore little research has so far been conducted. We believe, however, that even 
studies on general working conditions in enterprises of different sizes should 
include the smallest workplaces, because - as shown by our study - they often 
represent the worst examples. Our study focuses on current issues like the em-
ployment of older and female workers, labour force shortages, etc. In addition, 
we are able to predict future industrial relation problems. We hope that this study 




2. General employment and working conditions 




In the 1980s new trends arose in Japanese industrial relations. Notable 
was, for instance, an increase in the number of workers in tertiary in-
dustry, a reduction in trade union membership and a shortage of work-
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ers on the labour market. These facts are enough to Warrant a recon-
sideration of the traditional view of Japanese industrial relations. 
Furthermore, the government passed new measures opening opportuni-
ties to female workers and the disabled, who had long been regarded 
as marginal to the labour force. Thus it can be claimed that the 1980s 
brought drastic changes with regard to employment and working con-
ditions. 
This paper focuses on working conditions in small and medium-sized 
enterprises in Osaka which is famous in Japan for its preponderance of 
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). If we want to discuss 
working conditions in SMEs in detail, this city offers a good sample 
since a lot of information is available and new SME trends can be per-
ceived. Although many opinions are expressed on Japanese industrial 
relations, they often only refer to big companies. However, in order to 
get a notion of the true picture of Japanese industrial relations in an 
international setting, we should study SMEs. Undoubtedly it is impor-
tant to analyze relationships in the production structure between big 
business and SMEs, but we should also look at real working conditions 
in SMEs. 
Table 1 shows the sample size of our research. The total number of 
workplaces1 in Osaka Prefecture covered by this survey is 1,424. They 
have been selected at random from the members of the Osaka Federation 
of SMEs for the Improvement of Personnel Management (Ösakafu Chü-
shö Kigyö Römu Kaizen Shüdan Rengökai). The numbers classified by 
industry are as follows: construction 117, manufacturing 675, wholesale 
and retail 474 and Services 158. The numbers of workplaces classified by 
number of workers2 are: 1-9 persons 405,10-29 persons 412, 30-99 per-
sons 403 and 100-299 persons 204. Of these, there are 817 workplaces 
(about 60%) employing less than 30 persons. This fact is vital as research 
on the smallest workplaces, i.e. those employing less than 30 persons, has 
been very limited. For example, many Statistical surveys of the Ministry 
of Labour such as the Survey on Employment Management (Koyö kanri 
chösa) and the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (Chingin közö kihon chösa) 
cover only workplace establishments of 30 and more persons. Even the 
Monthly Labour Survey (Maitsuki kinrö tökei) is carried out only partly at 
1 In most cases the selected workplaces have been legally independent enter-
prises. However, in a few cases also branches of other enterprises have been 
included. 
2 Usually, in Tapan there is no distinction in (employment) Status between blue 
and white-collar workers. In this paper the terms 'workers' and 'employees' 
refer to both groups and are used synonymously. 
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smaller establishments. Our research has therefore the advantage of ana-
lyzing working conditions in such workplaces and indicating their current 
problems. 
The main fields of our research include employment in general, em-
ployment for older workers, employment for the disabled, health and 
safety, wage and retirement allowances, working hours, welfare system, 
female part-time work and industrial relation problems. It is impossible 
to include all our results in this paper3; we wil l concentrate on employ-
ment and working conditions in general. 
Table 1: Number of workplaces surveyed by size and industry 









1-9 employees 37 20 35 55 HO 207 51 405 
10-29 employees 36 34 94 71 199 127 50 412 
30-99 employees 30 20 113 98 231 103 39 403 
100-299 employees 14 14 45 76 135 37 18 204 
Total 117 88 287 300 675 474 158 1,424 
Source: Survey of the author; Ösakafu Chüshö Kigyö Römu Kaizen Shudan Ren-
gökai (1990: 3). 
2. G E N E R A L EMPLOYMENT A N D W O R K I N G CONDITIONS 
The first issues to be tackled are average age and duration of employment. 
The average age of workers is 38.8 years. By industrial division, the aver-
age age is 42.2 years in the machine and metal industry and 35.9 years in 
the service industry. The average age in relation to the number of workers 
at the workplace is as follows: 1-9 persons 41.4 years, 10-29 persons 38.9 
years, 30-99 persons 37.4 years and 100-299 persons 35.2 years. It is ob-
vious that the average age in the smallest workplaces is higher than in 
others. The average duration of employment is 11.2 years, and more than 
10 years in 56.7% of the workplaces. 
3 The complete results of our survey have been published in Japanese by the 
author (Ösakafu Chüshö Kigyö Römu Kaizen Shudan Rengökai 1990). 
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Table 2 gives an account of the workplaces which have rules of em-
ployment (shugyö kisokuf and a union. The percentage of workplaces 
using rules of employment is 77.6. In the smallest workplaces with less 
than 10 workers, however, the percentage is 38.0. This means that about 
60% of the smallest workplaces have no rules of employment which can 
guarantee basic working conditions for workers. The percentage of work-
places with a union amounts to 11.8, so about 90% of the workplaces are 
without a union. In particular, only 2.6% of the workplaces in the con-
struction industry and 1.3% in the wholesale and retail industry have 
union representation. The percentage in the smallest workplaces is also 
very low: 1-9 persons 1.5% and 10-29 persons 2.9%. The large difference 
between type of industry and number or workers is surprising. The lack 
of a union means that there is no formal bargaining between employers 
and workers. This is a serious problem in industrial relations in the small-
est workplaces. 
Table 2: Ratio of workplaces with or without rules of employment and labour 
unions by size and industry (in %) 
Workplaces with labour unions Total 
Workplaces 








Industry \ . 






erated union Total 
Industry 














100.0 ( 88) 
Machine & metal 89.9 15.7 1.4 17.1 85.7 100.0 (286) 
Others 85.0 21.7 3.0 24.7 73.0 100.0 (300) 
Wholesale & retail 68.2 1.3 0.0 1.3 66.7 100.0 (472) 
Services 75.9 8.2 1.3 9.5 80.0 100.0 (158) 
Size of workplace 
1-9 employees 38.0 1.5 0.0 1.5 33.3 100.0 (405) 
10-29 employees 89.0 2.2 0.7 2.9 83.3 100.0 (411) 
30-99 employees 95.0 13.4 2.0 15.4 82.3 100.0 (402) 
100-299 employees 100.0 40.4 2.5 42.9 80.5 100.0 (203) 
Total 77.6 10.6 1.1 11.8 79.6 100.0 (1,421) 
Source: Survey of the author; Ösakafu Chüshö Kigyö Romu Kaizen Shudan Ren-
gökai (1990: 14). 
4 cf. Articles 89-93 Labour Standard Law. 
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Table 3 depicts the age and gender structure of workplaces. The age struc-
ture is as follows: 30-44 years 33.7%, 20-29 years 25.3% and 45-54 years 
24%. For workers older than 55 we note one major characteristic: their 
percentage in workplaces employing between 1-9 persons is 17.2, whilst 
in larger SMEs (100-299 persons) it is 8.6. Thus, the percentage of workers 
over the age of 55 is indirectly proportionate to the size of the work force, 
which indicates the difficulty of the smallest workplaces to recruit young 
workers. 
Table 3: Age groups of employees and gender structure by industry and size of 
workplace (in %) 
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Construction 5.8 23.9 35.8 22.2 12.3 88.2 11.8 100.0 ( 5,160) 116 
Manufacturing 
Textile 






































Wholesale & retail 7.0 31.2 34.2 19.1 8.5 67.0 33.0 100.0 (13,324) 688 
Services 8.2 32.6 30.2 19.7 9.3 63.4 36.6 100.0 ( 6,451) 156 
Size of workplace 
1-9 employees 3.1 16.3 35.5 27.9 17.2 63.0 37.0 100.0 ( 2,006) 393 
10-29 employees 5.5 20.1 31.9 27.7 14.7 71.3 28.7 100.0 ( 7,034) 533 
30-99 employees 6.0 23.0 32.5 26.0 12.5 70.1 29.9 100.0 (21,016) 503 
100-299 employees 6.7 28.2 34.7 21.8 8.6 68.5 31.5 100.0 (34,702) 204 
Total 6.2 25.3 33.7 24.0 10.8 69.2 30.8 100.0 (64,758) 1,633 
Source: Survey of the author; Ösakafu Chüshö Kigyö Römu Kaizen Shudan Ren-
gökai (1990: 20). 
The gender structure is as follows: male workers make up 69.2% and 
female workers 30.8% of the work force. In our sample, the percentage of 
female workers may be a bit low in comparison with the norm. The high 
percentage in the textile industry is particularly striking. 
Next we turn our attention to other important problems in SMEs: 
wages, working hours, holidays, the retirement age, etc. 
The annual spring wage negotiations called shuntö are characteristic of 
Japanese labour-management relations. In spring 1989 the percentage of 
workplaces conducting negotiations was 77.6. There were, however, some 
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marked differences in the findings. For instance, percentages where high 
(85.9%) in the manufacturing industry, but low (57.0%) in workplaces 
with less than 10 employees. Here we have an example of the worst 
excesses of employment in the smallest workplaces. Moreover, we can see 
the previous average level, which amounts to 259,171 Yen. The average 
wage increase resulting from the spring wage negotiations amounted to 
10,811 Yen or 4.2%. 
Working hours are being dealt with in Table 4. The average scheduled 
working week consists of 45:05 hrs. There are, however, differences in 
working hours by workplace size: 1-9 persons 47:07 hrs, 10-29 persons 
45:49 hrs, 30-99 persons 44:34 hrs, and 100-299 persons 41:21. According 
to Table 4, 31.2% of the workplaces had a 48-hour working week, whilst 
13.4% worked less than 40 hours per week. In this case the results differ 
by workplace size. Furthermore, the percentage of workplaces with a 
working week of more than 48 hours is 5.8, even though there are wide 
differences between top and bottom. In general, we can note a long work-
ing week in SMEs, and the smaller the workplace, the longer the working 
week. 


































Construction 6.7 2.9 4.8 3.8 10.5 5.7 11.4 49.4 4.8 100.0 (105) 46:14 
Manufacturing 8.1 4.7 7.0 4.4 24.2 5.3 15.3 28.7 2.3 100.0 (639) 44:50 
Textile 6.0 2.5 1.3 9.7 17.1 1.2 14.7 42.6 4.9 100.0 ( 82) 45:30 
Machine & metal 7.9 3.9 6.4 3.5 26.1 6.1 14.2 30.6 1.3 100.0 (280) 45:25 
Others 9.0 6.1 9.4 3.6 24.2 5.8 16.6 22.7 2.6 100.0 (277) 44:06 
Wholesale & retail 10.1 3.5 5.5 7.6 14.4 8.8 10.6 28.2 11.3 100.0 (397) 45:18 
Services 11.8 6.3 6.9 4.2 6.9 6.9 11.8 38.3 6.9 100.0 (144) 44:49 
Size of workplace 
1-9 employees 5.6 3.4 1.2 6.2 9.0 5.6 10.5 46.0 12.5 100.0 (324) 47:07 
10-29 employees 4.8 2.4 5.6 5.3 14.9 8.8 11.7 40.7 5.8 100.0 (377) 45:49 
30-99 employees 9.0 3.9 9.3 5.4 24.8 6.4 16.5 22.1 2.6 100.0 (389) 44:34 
100-299 employees 23.1 10.7 10.8 3.6 25.7 4.6 13.8 6.7 1.0 100.0 (195) 41:21 
Total 9.0 4.4 6.4 5.3 18.1 6.6 13.2 31.2 5.8 100.0 (1,285) 45:05 
Source: Survey of the author; Ösakafu Chüshö Kigyö Römu Kaizen Shudan Ren-
gökai (1990: 72). 
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According to Table 5 the average number of annual working days are 279. 
The percentage of workplaces with 271-280 and 281-290 annual working 
days is 24.5 and 24.9, respectively. Surprisingly, 4.3% of the workplaces 
have 301 annual working days. In particular, the smallest workplaces in the 
construction, wholesale and retail industries have few holidays. On the 
other hand, 5.2% of the workplaces have less than 250 annual working 
days. Of course we should bear in mind when we study these figures that 
there is a serious shortage of labour in SMEs in Osaka. However, to work 
more than 300 days is very taxing. We will later return to this labour short-
age problem when studying the employment patterns of older workers. 





and size of N. 
Less 251 261 271 281 291 301 More Total Average 
than to to to to to to than (No. of working 
250 260 270 280 290 300 310 310 workplaces) days 
workplace \ 
Industry 
Construction 6.2 3.1 12.5 27.1 21.9 21.9 4.2 3.1 100.0 ( 96) 282.0 
Manufacturing 4.3 8.0 24.1 24.3 25.5 11.1 0.8 1.9 100.0 (585) 276.3 
Textile 4.7 6.3 25.1 15.7 20.3 21.8 1.5 4.6 100.0 ( 64) 279.2 
Machine & metal 4.2 3.8 24.1 26.1 29.1 10.3 0.5 1.9 100.0 (261) 280.0 
Others 4.2 12.7 23.8 24.6 23.1 9.2 1.2 1.2 100.0 (260) 274.8 
Wholesale & retail 5.5 3.7 20.4 25.6 23.5 17.1 1.5 2.7 100.0 (328) 279.0 
Services 8.0 2.4 16.8 20.8 28.8 14.4 4.0 4.8 100.0 (125) 285.7 
Size of workplace 
1-9 employees 5.1 2.8 11.4 18.5 33.5 22.4 2.4 3.9 100.0 (254) 288.0 
10-29 employees 3.4 2.5 17.1 23.1 29.3 18.7 2.8 3.1 100.0 (321) 281.0 
30-99 employees 4.9 6.8 23.2 32.0 21.9 8.2 1.1 1.9 100.0 (366) 275.0 
100-299 employees 8.8 13.0 37.4 20.7 12.4 6.7 0.0 1.0 100.0 (193) 270.0 
Total 5.2 5.7 21.3 24.5 24.9 14.1 1.7 2.6 100.0 (1,134) 279.0 
Source: Survey of the author; Ösakafu Chüshö Kigyö Römu Kaizen Shudan Ren-
gökai (1990: 75). 
Table 6 deals with the number of days-off per week. The percentage of 
workplaces which have a 5-day working week is 57.8. However, there 
are differences according to the type of industry and workplace size. For 
instance, the percentage in the construction industry is 44.5, whilst in 
workplaces which employ 1-9 persons it is 28.8, with 10-29 persons it is 
54.4%, with 30-99 persons 74.4%, and with 100-299 persons it is 86.5%. 
Thus, although the percentage with 2 days-off per week is high, we ought 
to bear in mind the large differences according to the type of industry and 
workplace size. 
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Construction 45.5 2.7 44.5 2.7 4.6 100.0 (HO) 57.3 
Manufacturing 28.0 1.5 61.0 6.6 2.9 100.0 (667) 51.3 
Textile 38.6 0.0 53.4 4.6 3.4 100.0 ( 81) 41.0 
Machine & metal 28.7 1.8 60.2 6.8 2.5 100.0 (279) 51.6 
Others 24.4 1.7 63.9 7.0 3.0 100.0 (299) 54.2 
Wholesale & retail 36.2 2.2 57.4 2.2 2.0 100.0 (447) 47.7 
Services 37.9 2.6 54.9 3.3 1.3 100.0 (153) 47.7 
Size of workplace 
1-9 employees 63.5 1.6 28.8 1.9 4.2 100.0 (378) 44.7 
10-29 employees 35.4 2.5 54.4 3.7 4.0 100.0 (401) 54.4 
30-99 employees 16.3 2.0 74.4 6.5 0.8 100.0 (399) 47.9 
100-299 employees 5.0 1.5 86.5 7.0 0.0 100.0 (199) 56.8 
Total 33.2 2.0 57.8 4.5 2.5 100.0 (1,377) 50.2 
Source: Survey of the author; Ösakafu Chüshö Kigyö Römu Kaizen Shudan Ren-
gökai (1990: 60). 
However, how often do workers actually take füll weekends per month? 
According to our research, a 5-day working week can be taken four or 
three times per month or less often. Yet, only 6.7% of the workplaces grant 
their employees 2 days-off every week. The percentage of a 5-day week 
three times per month is similarly low (5.5%). Comparatively few com-
panies offer 5-day weeks three or four times per month. However, the 
percentages with regard to 2-day weekends once or twice per month are 
very high. 
As regards paid annual leave, on average a worker in his first year 
of employment is entitled to 4.4 days. In the second year of employment 
the figures are as follows: less than 6 days 18.5%, 6 days 49.3%, 7-14 
days 30.7%, and more than 15 days 1.5%. In general, workers in their 
third year of employment are entitled to an increase in paid annual 
leave by 1 day every year. However, some workers choose not to use 
up their paid annual leave due to busy working schedules, labour short-
age, etc. This is an aspect of the much-criticized overwork patterns of 
the Japanese work force. Recently the government proposed that work-
ers should take as much of their paid annual leave as possible. 
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It is obvious that these results are in contrast to widely held views on 
Japanese industrial relations which often over-concentrate on large enter-
prises. In this sense, in order to get an impression of real working condi-
tions, we should pay greater attention to SMEs, mainly the smallest work-
places, rather than big business. 
3. CURRENT ISSUES IN S M A L L A N D MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES 
This section Covers some current issues in SMEs: retirement age, female 
part-time work and employment for the disabled. It is evident that these 
problems are gaining importance. 
Table 7 focuses on retirement age (of workplaces without differentiation 
according to gender). At 60% of the workplaces the retirement age is 60. 
However, 22.0% of the workplaces have a retirement age of 55. This pat-
tern is characteristic of SMEs. Therefore it is natural that some SMEs 
should also be raising the retirement age. 
Table 7: Retirement age at workplaces practicing retirement age regardless of 
gender by industry and size of workplace (in %) 
\ . Retirement 
\ age Less Total 
IndustryNjyears) than 55 56 57 58 59 60 over 60 (No. of 
and size of 55 workplaces) 
workplace 
Industry 
Construction 0.0 8.9 0.0 14.3 3.6 0.0 69.6 3.6 100.0 ( 56) 
Manufacturing 0.0 19.6 1.5 6.0 6.5 0.6 61.0 4.8 100.0 (464) 
Textile 0.0 23.3 2.3 11.6 2.3 0.0 60.5 0.0 100.0 ( 43) 
Machine & metal 0.0 15.0 1.4 7.7 6.8 1.0 61.8 6.3 100.0 (207) 
Others 0.0 23.2 1.4 3.3 7.0 0.5 60.4 4.2 100.0 (215) 
Wholesale & retail 0.4 30.5 0.4 5.5 5.9 0.0 54.8 2.5 100.0 (236) 
Services 0.0 20.5 1.2 1.2 10.8 2.4 62.7 1.2 100.0 ( 83) 
Size of workplace 
1-9 employees 0.0 27.9 1.5 4.4 7.4 0.0 55.9 2.9 100.0 ( 68) 
10-29 employees 0.0 20.6 0.4 6.3 6.7 0.0 58.1 7.9 100.0 (253) 
30-99 employees 0.3 22.0 0.9 5.8 7.3 0.9 61.0 1.8 100.0 (327) 
100-299 employees 0.0 22.0 2.1 6.3 4.7 1.0 62.3 1.6 100.0 (191) 
Total 0.1 22.0 1.1 5.9 6.6 0.6 60.0 3.7 100.0 (839) 
Source: Survey of the author; Ösakafu Chüshö Kigyo Römu Kaizen Shudan Ren-
gökai (1990: 26). 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
Table 8: Working conditions of workers employed beyond retirement age in com-
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Source: Survey of the author; Ösakafu Chüshö Kigyö Römu Kaizen Shudan Ren-
gökai (1990: 37). 
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Furthermore, it is necessary to examine post-retirement age employment, 
which is very important to the Japanese employment system. According 
to our research, 58.7% of the workplaces employ workers after retirement. 
Of these workplaces 62.6% have a yearly contract arrangement system 
with post-retirement workers. Table 8 shows the working conditions of 
those workers. It Covers their Status, job and wage. The percentage of 
workplaces which classify them as part-time and temporary employees 
is 59.2, whereas 74.3% choose not to change their job. Wages are often 
reduced, as shown in Table 8. Thus, it is obvious that a characteristic of 
post-retirement age employment Systems is a general deterioration in 
working conditions. Nevertheless, some workers in SMEs depend on 
post-retirement age employment as they do not get any pensions or re-
tirement allowances. 
On the other hand, as we have already seen, there is still a severe labour 
shortage in Japan. Hence, demand for older workers is on the increase. 
Other reasons for re-employment of pensioners are their work experience, 
maturity, lower wages and social trends. For 50% of the workplaces work-
ing experience and labour shortages were reasons for employing older 
workers. 
According to Table 9 the percentage of workplaces which employ 
female part-time workers is 50.7. However, there are differences de-
pending on the type of industry. The percentage of female part-time 
workers in the construction industry is very low (15.4%) due to the 
great amount of heavy manual work, but very high in the manufactur-
ing industry, where female part-time workers have played a very im-
portant role. On the other hand, the percentage in workplaces with 1-9 
persons is very low (26.2%) as family members are sometimes em-
ployed, and very high (78.9%) in workplaces which employ 100-299 
persons. 
The average age of female part-time workers is 43.0, which means that 
they re-enter the part-time labour market after their children have grown 
up. Average employment length is 3.8 years and average scheduled daily 
working hours are 6:10, leaving female part-time workers time for their 
domestic chores. The average hourly wage is 650 Yen, and the average 
yearly bonus amounts to 76,067 Yen. 39.5% of workplaces grant paid an-
nual leave. There are, however, large differences between workplaces of 
different sizes when it comes to paid annual leave. 
Table 9 also gives an account of future employment plans in regard to 
part-time work. 58.8% of the workplaces are without any expected 
change, whilst 36.1% are planning to increase part-time and decrease full-
time work, which will lead to a drastic increase in the demand for part-
time workers. 
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Despite of the many important publications about female part-time work-
ers in Japan, we believe the results of our research to be interesting as 
they illustrate demands for part-time workers which are due to shortages 
in the labour market or other factors. The number of female part-time 
workers is increasing particularly rapidly. Although their working con-
ditions have been gradually impoving, social insurance benefits and re-
tirement allowances are still inadequate. We therefore think that most 
SMEs should improve welfare provisions along with working conditions. 
In 1989, the central government established new guidelines for part-time 
work in order to overcome these problems. 
As regards the job Situation of the disabled, it is to be noted that in 1987 
a new employment quota of 1.6% was set for disabled workers, meaning 
that enterprises with a staff of 63 persons had to employ above that rate. 
The real conditions of employment are, however, slightly lower due to 
the very negative attitude of some large enterprises. It can be said that 
employment for the disabled is sometimes at a higher level in SMEs. 
Table 10: Employment and working conditions of disabled persons by industry 
and size of workplace (in %) 









































































Machine & metal 5.9 97.8 2.2 12.8 87.2 100.0 (274) 121 1.8 42.2 
Others 10.0 97.8 2.2 20.1 79.9 100.0 (324) 125 1.6 41.7 
Wholesale & retail 2.1 93.8 6.2 43.8 56.2 100.0 ( 80) 52 0.6 11.0 
Services 5.1 95.9 4.1 22.4 77.6 100.0 ( 49) 38 0.8 24.1 
Size of workplace 
1-9 employees 1.3 87.5 12.5 43.8 56.2 100.0 ( 16) 15 0.8 3.8 
10-29 employees 3.9 92.3 7.7 8.8 91.2 100.0 ( 91) 73 1.3 17.9 
30-99 employees 7.0 96.4 3.6 17.2 82.8 100.0 (274) 146 1.3 36.7 
100-299 employees 14.4 97.6 2.4 23.4 76.6 100.0 (453) 151 1.3 74.8 
Total 5.6 96.4 3.6 20.1 79.9 100.0 (834) 385 1.3 27.5 
Source: Survey of the author; Ösakafu Chüshö Kigyo Römu Kaizen Shudan Ren-
gökai (1990: 42). 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
Table 10 deals with employment of the disabled. 5.6% of the workplaces 
employed disabled workers in the last three years. However, the percentage 
ranges from 2.6% to 11.4% according to the type of industry and from 1.3% 
to 14.4% by size of workplace. 96.4% of the workplaces employ disabled 
workers full-time, whilst 3.6% employ them part-time. 20.1% of the work-
places employ the disabled as white-collar workers and 79.9% as blue-collar 
workers. The percentage of disabled among the total of workers is 1.3, and 
the percentage of workplaces employing the disabled is 27.5. 
As we saw, the statutory employment rate is 1.6%. However, the actual 
rate in the present study ranges from 0.8% to 1.3%, depending on the size of 
the workplace. The rate is indeed rather low, but we should bear in mind 
that the regulation Covers only enterprises employing more than 63 per-
sons. This being the case, the rate of 1.3% is not necessarily low, rather, we 
may well conclude that SMEs make great efforts to employ the disabled. 
Employment attitudes towards the disabled have changed and gradu-
ally improved in Japan. For instance, some factories in which the disabled 
are employed, have been founded as Joint ventures by private enterprises 
and local governments. Furthermore, some enterprises have designated 
special staff to improve working conditions for disabled workers. Still, 
employment of the disabled will be an important issue in the 1990s. 
In order to understand the working conditions in SMEs completely, we 
must refer to their employee welfare system since it plays an important 
part in Japanese industrial relations. We looked at three types of welfare 
measures: housing, culture and sporting facilities, and loans. 
Of these, housing is very important for workers because it can be quite 
difficult to find appropriate and inexpensive housing in Japan. Thus, some 
enterprises provide Company housing or bachelor accommodation. In our 
sample, although 21.0% of the workplaces offer Company housing and 
25.1% offer bachelor accomodation, it depends on the size of the work-
place whether such Systems are available. In order for SMEs to attract 
young workers, good Company accommodation is essential. 
As an indicator for culture and sporting facilities, we should investigate 
the percentage of Company trips, which are a kind of Company holiday. A 
remarkable 82.6% of workplaces Sponsor such trips. On Company excur-
sions, taking between one and two days, workers can enjoy relaxed com-
munication and evening parties. Thus, these excursions are very important 
opportunities to intensity communication among workers. Even in work-
places which employ 1-9 persons, the percentage is very high (64.4%). 
The loan system allows workers to borrow money from their work-
places. There are three kinds of loans: housing, personal, and those for 
marriage, birth, death, etc. The percentage of marriage-type loan Systems 
is very high (78.1%). However, the percentage ranges from 57.0% to 96.1%, 
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depending on the size of the workplace. In general, workplaces with many 
workers can provide more comprehensive welfare Systems for their staff. 
Finally we looked into industrial relation problems to be solved in the fu-
ture. The issues most mentioned in our survey were career development 
(59.8%), wage (37.5%) and working hours (36.9%). Thus we can see strong 
concerns over career development in SMEs. Recently technological innova-
tion has progressed rapidly, as has the introduction of office automation Sys-
tems. In SMEs it is very important whether career development Systems 
have been established or not because they have a strong impact on new pro-
duction strategies. It is no exaggeration to say that whether SMEs can grow 
or not decisively depends on career development measures. 
4. CONCLUSION 
We have discussed working conditions in SMEs on the basis of our research 
carried out in Osaka Prefecture. We have looked in particular at workers' 
age, gender structure, employment length, wages, working hours, etc. 
Moreover, we have considered current problems such as employment for 
older workers and female part-timers or disabled workers. Through our 
research we believe to be able to describe some characteristics of working 
conditions, even in the smallest workplaces which are not covered in offi-
cial reports such as the SME White Papers (cf. Chüshö Kigyöchö 1991). 
In our study we became aware of serious problems at a local level. For 
instance, most employment positions in SMEs are occupied by middle-
aged workers. As mentioned above, there are serious supply shortages 
on the Japanese labour market. It is particularly difficult for SMEs to hire 
young workers, because they tend to prefer big companies in order to 
have better working and living conditions. Thus, the average age structure 
in SMEs has been shifting. Some SMEs have, however, begun to employ 
young foreign workers instead of young Japanese workers. 
On the other hand, as far as wages and working hours are concerned, 
SMEs reflect the good economic conditions in Japan. For instance, as the 
result of the spring negotiations most workers have acquired normal wage 
increases. Long working weeks have, however, not been abolished, 
despite demands even in SMEs. But, as we have seen, it is very difficult 
to introduce a 5-day working week. As many SMEs have strong connec-
tions with large enterprises as subcontractors, they are often controlled 
by the client companies in setting working hours and holidays. Although 
it is desirable that SMEs should manage their own production schedule, 
because of their dependence they cannot ignore demands of larger firms. 
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It goes without saying that there are large differences in respect to working 
days based on enterprise size. 
Our research has also examined current problems. For instance, we 
have looked into the real conditions regarding retirement age. The 
national government is promoting an employment policy for older work-
ers, shifting the retirement age from 60 to 65 years. Our research shows, 
however, that one-third of SMEs in Osaka still set their retirement age 
below 60 years. These workplaces will be encouraged to shift their retire-
ment age policy toward 60 years as soon as possible. This is one example 
of the difference between the employment policies of the government and 
working conditions in SMEs. 
We can also see such differences in the case of female part-time workers 
or prospects of employment for the disabled. In particular, there has been 
little detailed research on employment for the disabled in Japan. Another 
lack concerns employment of foreign workers; there has been little re-
search and few positive policy ideas on this subject. Some SMEs are al-
ready employing foreign workers illegally, as a Solution to the severe 
labour shortage. In this case, our research can present some data useful 
to national and prefectural government offices. 
For example, in 1989, the Osaka prefectural office established a new 
labour administration network to deal with these new issues. This net-
work divided Osaka Prefecture into four areas and established four new 
labour administration offices, every one of which can tackle labour prob-
lems in this area, contacting other offices and sharing necessary informa-
tion. This is one example in which local government has executed a re-
gional labour policy. 
Finally it is to be emphasized that our research includes many work-
places which employ less than 30 persons. As it is very difficult to get 
data on such workplaces, our research is important and useful for grasp-
ing the real working conditions in the smallest enterprises. If we try to 
analyze working conditions in SMEs, it is necessary to include data on 
workplaces which employ fewer than 30 persons. 
The smallest enterprises in the broad SME Classification represent the 
worst working conditions in the Japanese economy. This is evident in the 
answers to the questions asked in our research. Thus, we hope that the 
detailed data on working conditions in SMEs presented in our study will 
form a basis for enterprises, unions and central and local government to 
set and develop better labour Standards.5 
5 The author would like to thartk Nishiguchi Yasushige of the Osaka Prefectural 
Labour Office and Gareth Thomas of Osaka City University for their help in the 
preparation of this paper. 
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WOMEN AND JAPANESE SOCIETY TODAY 
POLITICAL M E A S U R E S WITH RESPECT TO M A R G I N A L I Z E D 
L A B O U R F O R C E 
Ösawa Mari 
ABSTRACT 
This paper tries to characterize the condition of women as a marginalized labour 
force in contemporary Japanese society, and to suggest some alternative strategies 
with which to formulate labour Standards. Despite some elaborate studies of 
women's labour, women in general, along with workers in small and medium-
sized companies and non-Japanese workers, have for the most part been excluded 
from the conceptualization of Japanese industrial relations and management. Freed 
from such a bias, it can clearly be seen that the peculiar State of gender division of 
labour, not only in paid work but also in unpaid housework, in which women are 
put in an ever-disadvantaged position, is the very basis of the international com-
petitiveness of Japanese management. The long and underpaid working hours of 
women constitute a much more serious problem than the notorious karöshi (death 
from overwork) of male "corporate warriors". 
CONTENTS 
1. Introduction 
2. Internationalization and the marginal labour force 
3. Women's labour in contemporary Japan 
3.1. Paid work 
3.2. Unpaid work 
4. Alternative strategies towards the formation of labour Standards 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, I hope to, first, characterize and analyze the condition of 
women as a marginalized labour force in contemporary Japanese 
society in the context of internationalization, and second, suggest some 
alternative political measures or strategies with which to formulate 
labour Standards, so that the hardships faced by women in their capac-
ity as a marginalized labour force and the problems connected with 
their working conditions might be overcome. Prior to characterizing the 
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condition of women in the labour force, I would like to provide some 
theoretical background on women's labour in the context of internation-
alization. 
2. INTERNATIONALIZATION A N D THE M A R G I N A L L A B O U R FORCE 
With respect to the problem of internationalization and marginalization, 
the recent works of Morita Kirirö, an international economist, are higly 
relevant. His basic premise is that economists in general, and the study 
of global economy in postwar Japan in particular, have been indifferent 
to the problem of international labour migration (Morita 1987). Reflecting 
the influence of feminists such as Veronica Beechy and Claudia von Werl-
hof, he discusses not only the migration problem but also the multi-
layered hierarchical structure of global labour force appropriation, 
women's labour in "advanced" capitalist countries and migration within 
the "Third World" (Morita and Kimae 1988: 2, 8). He uses the expanded 
concept of an "Industrial Reserve Army" to clarify the theoretical position 
of women and foreign workers, who are commonly referred to as the 
"Marginal Labour Force". 
According to Morita, the concept of an Industrial Reserve Army needs 
to be expanded in three ways. First, we must go beyond the dimension 
of the abstract capitalist mode of production to view the Industrial Reserve 
Army at the level of the "articulation" of the capitalist mode of production 
and social institutions outside this mode (for example, family or small 
farming in the Third World). A second, related point is to make the "capi-
talist world economy" the unit of analysis, thereby freeing analysis from 
the framework of single-country capitalism. Third, labour power must be 
understood in concrete terms, not as abstract wage labour defined as 
"freed in a dual sense". Women and foreigners, who are unable to market 
their labour freely because of politico-legal constraints (for example, mi-
gration control) or socio-institutional constraints (sexist ideology), consti-
tute a category of "unfree wage labour", and as such are the main com-
ponent of the Industrial Reserve Army (Morita and Kimae 1988; Morita 
1990). 
It is through Morita's concept of internationalization that I would like 
to discuss the condition of working women in Japan, although I have 
some reservations about his concept of "unfree wage labour", which I wil l 
elaborate on later. 
Looking at research in the areas of social policy and labour problems, 
I cannot help feeling that women and non-Japanese workers in Japan have 
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been ghetto-ized as "special" or marginal. Although there have been se-
rious and elaborate studies on women's labour as such (Takenaka 1989), 
these studies have not been integrated into the theoretical framework of 
Japanese industrial relations or Japanese management.1 In 1984, Sumiya 
Mikio, then President of the Japanese Institute of Labour, proposed that 
research on "industrial relations be extended to small and medium-sized 
enterprises and women" (Sumiya 1984). Even today, however, studies of 
Japanese industrial relations and Japanese management focus almost en-
tirely on regulär male employees of Japanese nationality who work in 
large companies, and exclude women, even those of Japanese nationality. 
What does this focus of research mean? As a partial explanation, Morita 
points out that Japan was the only "advanced" capitalist country that did 
not introduce foreign labour in large quantities during the period of rapid 
economic growth (Morita 1987: 21). Therefore, the exclusion of foreigners 
in the study of Japanese management might appear justified. However, 
in light of Totsuka Hideo's pioneering work on foreign workers, in which 
he points out that over two million Koreans resided in Japan at the time 
of its defeat in 1945, this exclusion is not justified (Totsuka 1974:123). This 
failure to examine Japan's rule of colonized Korea and its reaction to Japan 
constitutes a serious flaw in social science research on postwar Japan 
(Wada 1980). 
In the case of women, there is even less "rational" explanation for their 
exclusion. Nevertheless, the current model of Japanese management, 
which is based on the exclusion of women as well as workers in small 
and/or medium-sized enterprises, is praised as having elements of "par-
ticipation and egalitarianism", and as "respecting the worker". There is 
even considerable talk about its international tranferability (Totsuka 1990). 
This model is a clear articulation of andro-centrism, in the form of 
methodological imperialism on the micro level and ethno-centrism on the 
macro level. In response to the proposed internationalization of this 
model, I would like to emphasize that we need to look more closely at 
the Situation in Japan first. Inherent in the international competitiveness 
of "Japanese management", which has been touted since the mid-1970s, 
is an extreme bias that ignores the peculiar Status and conditions of 
women's labour. 
I myself had been unconscious of the absence/invisibility of women in studies 
on Japanese industrial relations until it was brought to my attention by a re-
markable, yet unpublished paper by Marga Clegg. 
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3. W O M E N ' S L A B O U R IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 
I would like to summarize some characteristics of Japanese women's labour 
and the part played by women in capital accumulation, paying particular 
attention to how Japan compares with "advanced" countries in the West2. 
3.2. Paid Work 
First, in terms of labour participation, it is noteworthy that only 70% of 
women with occupations are employees (11% are seif-employed, and the 
remaining 18% are family workers). The figure for women in "advanced" 
countries is over 90%, higher than that of men, while that of Japanese men 
is 80%, similar to the figure for other countries. Labour force participation 
by women according to age group follows a bimodal, "M"-shaped curve 
only in Japan, and to a lesser degree in the U.K., while in other industrial-
ized countries the curves are either trimodal (the U.S. and Sweden), or 
unimodal with a peak in the early twenties (West Germany). 
There is also a large wage gap between men and women in Japan. This 
gap has been widening in Japan since the mid-1970s, with women achiev-
ing 56.2% of men's earnings in 1978 but only 49.6% of men's earnings in 
1990 (calculated on the basis of average monthly earnings of both "full-
time" and "part-time" employees in enterprises employing over 30 per-
sons). Other countries, however, have generally experienced a slight re-
duction; certainly no remarkable widening has occurred. Koike Kazuo 
reports that the gap in Japan was already larger than in some European 
countries in the early 1970s (Koike 1991: 142-143), which makes the 
widening in the last 15 years even more alarrning. Even if we only take 
the statistics for full-timers, the gap has remained during this period, with 
women earning 57.1% of men's wages in 1990 (calculated on the basis of 
average monthly earnings in enterprises employing over 10 persons), 
though we should be careful about the differences in official definitions 
and the realities of "part-time" work in various countries. 
It is commonly acknowledged that the most important cause of this 
wage gap is the division of labour between men and women, or gender 
segregation (Shinotsuka 1982: Chapter 8; Koyö Shokugyö Sögö Kenkyü-
sho 1987: 149f.; Walby 1988: 1). A critical characteristic of segregation in 
Japan is suggested by the fact that the so-called WE segregation index 
calculated by the OECD is far lower in Japan than in "advanced" coun-
tries, as shown in Tables 1 and 2. 
2 Statistics on women's labour are from Rödöshö Fujinkyoku (various years), un-
less otherwise noted. 
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Table 1: WE segregation index1 based on occupational data (in %) 
1970 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 
Canada 53.42 49.9 49.5 46.9 46.7 44.6 40.9 
Germany 41.8 44.0 44.1 44.2 
Japan 30.6 28.9 28.4 28.6 28.6 27.5 27.5 
United States 47.5 51.1 50.1 49.4 48.4 47.4 46.5 
1 calculated at the ISCO one-digit level (international Standard Classification of 
occupations, see Table 3). 
According to the OECD (1985: 67-68), the formula of the WE index is: 
X Nfi/Nj N/N x ^ x l 0 0 % and CFR, = ^ . N Nf/N 
It may also be wntten as 2_, ~jy ~ x 100% 
and thus be seen to be the sum of the difference between the female share of 
each employment category and the total share of each category added without 
respect for sign; of which 
Nfi is the number of women in employment category i, 
Ni is the number of persons in employment category i, 
N/ is the number of women in total employment, 
N is the total number of persons in employment, 
it is the number of employment categories. 
2 for 1971. 
Source: OECD (1985: Table H l ) . 
Table 2: Industrial sector data, WE index1 (in %) 
1970 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
Canada 40.32 39.0 39.0 38.9 37.9 37.0 36.4 
Germany 35.2 35.6 35.3 35.0 35.2 35.0 36.3 
Japan 22.3 23.5 23.4 23.1 23.2 22.7 22.0 
United States 39.0 40.8 40.3 40.4 40.6 40.9 41.2 
1 calculated at the one-digit ISIC level (international Standard industrial Classifi-
cation, see Table 4); for calculation method see Table 1. 
2 for 1975. 
Source: O E C D (1985: Table H.3). 
This very low index does not indicate a lesser degree of segregation, nor 
a greater degree of equality between men and women. Composition of 
the index is such that it is equal to the Standard deviation of the coefficients 
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of female representation (CFRs) from unity, weighted by the employment 
size of each major occupational or industrial sector, and standardized to 
lie between 0 and l 3 . Tables 3 and 4 show the results of my own breakdown 
of the indices for several countries for the years 1985 and 1986, according 
to this formula. Figures 1 and 2, based upon Tables 3 and 4, show the 
CFRs of each group vertically and each group's employment share hori-
zontally, so that the areal sum of the striped or dotted segments represents 
the index figures (Ösawa 1992a and 1992b). 


















1 0.47 1.8 1.0 0.64 1.1 0.4 0.81 1.0 0.2 
2 0.34 0.9 0.6 0.18 1.3 1.1 0.35 0.2 0.1 
3 0.73 20.4 5.5 0.78 33.5 7.5 0.98 28.1 0.6 
4 0.44 1.4 0.8 0.33 1.0 0.7 0.35 0.7 0.4 
5 0.20 6.2 5.0 0.24 6.7 5.1 0.37 9.5 6.0 
6 1.08 20.9 1.6 1.50 13.5 6.8 1.25 21.4 5.3 
7 0.67 5.7 1.9 0.56 6.1 2.7 0.36 7.6 4.8 
8 1.27 10.2 2.8 1.36 6.1 2.2 1.14 8.6 1.2 
9 1.37 31.0 11.6 1.28 29.0 8.0 1.25 22.8 5.7 
0 0.20 1.6 
(100.0) 
0.7 1.27 1.6 
(100.0) 
0.4 0.79 0.2 
(100.0) 
0.1 
Nf/N 44.9% 39.0% 36.2% 
WE index 31.5% 34.9% 24.4% 
1 calculated at the one-digit ISIC level. 
International Standard industrial Classification (ISIC) 
Major division 1 - Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 
Major division 2 - Mining and quarrying 
Major division 3 - Manufacturing 
Major division 4 - Electricity, gas and water 
Major division 5 - Construction 
Major division 6 - Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels 
Major division 7 - Transport, storage and communication 
Major division 8 - Financing, insurance, real estate and business Services 
Major division 9 - Community, social and personal Services 
Major division 0 - Activities not adequately defined 
Source: ILO (1987). 
3 For explanation of the index see Table 1. 
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These figures clearly show the differences in the indices among the United 
States, West Germany and Japan. It can be seen from Figure 1 that the 
Japanese CFR in occupational group 3 (clerical and related workers) is at 
the relatively low figure of 1.40, as compared with 1.82 in the States and 
1.57 in West Germany. The CFR in groups 7/8/9 (production and related 
workers, transport equipment Operators and labourers) is at the relatively 
high figure of 0.74, compared with around 0.4 in the others. Figure 2 
indicates that in Japan the CFR in industrial section 3 (manufacturing) is 
close to unity, while in section 9 (community, social and personal Services) 
the employment share Stands at the relatively small figure of 22.8% com-
pared with around 30% in the others, and the CFR is lower. 
Figure 1: Gender segregation by occupation, 1985 
CFR United States CFR West Germany (1984) 
Major groups of occupation« Major groups of occupatioiu 
Japan 
Major groups of occupations 
Source: Ösawa (1992b: Table 3). 
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Along with the industrial restructuring that followed the first "oil shock" 
in 1973, there was a general "feminization" of employment, an increase 
of the proportion of women employees that paralled the relative decline 
of manufacturing industries and the "white-collarization" of the labour 
force. In Japan, however, manufacturing industries like the electrical/elec-
tronics, food and tobacco industries were among the most speedily fem-
inized sectors between 1975 and 1984; since 1985, feminization of employ-
ment has been most prominent in the wholesale and retail trade and res-
taurants where the average wage rate is the lowest among all industries. 
Among the occupational groups, the proportion of women in employees 
among professional and technical workers decreased by 1.8% during the 
period 1975-1990, whereas craftsmen and production process workers 
experienced a 4.6% increase in the proportion of women employees 
(Ösawa 1992a and 1992c). 
Thus, we must conclude that gender segregation in Japan takes a rather 
different form than in the other two countries, and that it cannot be ex-
plained in terms of the distribution of men and women across the major 
industrial sectors or occupational groups. It is instructive to look at differ-
ences in the size of enterprises employing men and women, gender differ-
ences in jobs or grades within the same Company, and sex-specific differ-
ences in employment categories. 
Enterprise size matters, because 55% of women employees are concen-
trated in small enterprises (employing less than 99 persons), as contrasted 
with 45% of men. It is commonly asserted that there is a large wage gap 
related to Company size in Japan, not always acknowledging that the gap 
is larger among women than men, as shown in Table 5. This table is con-
cerned with only full-time employees and their average monthly earnings 
excluding overtime pay, so that the wage gap between men and women 
seems smaller than it really is. Actually, the widening of the wage gap by 
Company size since the mid-1970s has been closely correlated to the 
general widening of the gap between men and women (from 56% to 
49.6%). 
Sex-specific differences in employment categories are also related to 
the wage gap and enterprise size. For example, the percentage of "per-
manent employees" among women has decreased since the mid-1970s, 
while the proportion of official "part-time employees" (working less than 
35 hours per week) among women has steadily increased, reaching 27.9% 
in 1990. In 1987 only 60% of employed women were "regulär employees", 
compared with 83% of employed men, and 70% of "regulär employees" 
were men. As Table 6 shows, the probability of working women becoming 
full-time employees in large-scale enterprises declined during these years, 
unlike in the case of men. In 1990,45% of the women part-timers in Japan 
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Table 5: Average monthly earnings by sex and Company size 
Average monthly earnings 
of workers in companies 
employing 1000 and more 
persons (in 1000 Yen) 
Earnings differentials by Company 
size (1000 and more persons = 100) 
Female earnings as % of 
male earnings by Company 
size 













1975 159.9 90.5 88 82 85 78 59.6 57.2 56.3 
1976 168.5 101.7 87 82 83 78 60.4 57.3 56.8 
1977 185.6 113.3 87 82 85 79 61.0 59.5 59.0 
1978 197.5 120.7 87 82 85 79 61.1 59.3 58.9 
1979 209.6 127.3 87 82 85 79 60.7 59.5 59.2 
1980 223.7 133.9 86 81 86 81 59.9 59.4 59.5 
1981 238.7 143.5 86 81 85 80 60.1 59.7 59.2 
1982 253.6 149.8 84 79 85 80 59.1 59.2 59.8 
1983 262.6 156.7 85 79 84 79 59.7 59.0 59.9 
1984 271.4 161.5 86 79 85 79 59.5 58.8 59.9 
1985 278.8 172.6 85 79 82 77 61.9 59.3 60.2 
1986 289.3 179.3 85 78 81 76 62.0 59.7 60.3 
1987 294.4 185.9 85 78 81 76 63.1 60.2 61.2 
1988 303.1 192.7 85 79 80 75 63.6 59.9 60.5 
1989 318.0 200.0 84 78 80 75 62.9 60.0 60.7 
average monthly earnings excluding over-time pay of full-time employees in 
private sector. 
Source: Rödöshö (various years). 
were concentrated in tiny enterprises with less than 29 employees, and a 
third of the women employees in such enterprises were part-timers. 
The wage gap between women part-timers and regulär women em-
ployees has increased in line with the relative increase in part-timers 
among all employed women since the early 1970s (their relative wage rate 
per hour decreased from 90% to 70% of that of regulär women employees). 
It is worth remembering that these figures still underrepresent the size of 
the real wage gap. For in Japan, besides official part-timers, there are many 
"pseudo" part-timers who work more than 35 hours per week on part-
timers' wage rates but are not included in the statistics for part-timers. 
The first comprehensive survey of part-time workers that includes this 
broad definition of part-time work estimates that there are at least one 
and a half million of these "pseudo" part-timers (Rödöshö 1992). A l -
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Table 6: Numbers of employees by sex, employment categories1 and size of Com-
pany (in 100 persons) 
Companies employing 





































1976 43,044 15,763 823 42,494 19,666 1,502 47,965 26332 2339 7,981 5306 
1979 42,337 15,639 1,393 44,786 20,296 2,618 52,414 27371 4,134 8,727 5345 
1982 45,523 17,116 2,351 47,652 21,536 4,308 51,691 27,038 5,249 9,150 5,997 
1983 44,907 16,822 2,631 48,558 22,916 4,435 53,893 28,296 5,616 9,111 6,019 
1984 45,470 16,946 2,635 51,106 24,389 4,655 53^ 14 27,820 6,086 8321 5,739 
1985 48,051 17,664 2,681 50,957 23,690 4,658 52,623 27,420 6376 8,251 4,735 1381 
1986 47,755 17,392 2,681 49,049 23,437 4,727 52,967 27,246 6,613 8300 4,682 1341 
1987 47,990 17,064 3,011 49,046 23,292 5,346 52351 26,696 6396 7,904 4369 U10 
1988 49,703 18,728 4,006 53,909 25^ 39 6,123 56,936 28320 8,474 9,102 5,057 1,928 
1989 50,975 18,693 3,978 53,264 25,639 6,366 56,078 28,589 8,487 9,098 4,910 1,798 
1 Numbers and wages of male part-time workers have been surveyed only since 
1988 and therefore are not included in this table. 
2 Figures up to 1985 include part-time workers. 
Source: Rödöshö (various years). 
though the definition of part-timer differs from one country to another, 
this wage gap is characteristic of Japan, for the hourly rate of part-timers 
is roughly equal to that of full-timers in some countries like Sweden and 
Australia (OECD 1985: 77). 
Job or grade segregation within the same Company, as Kumazawa 
Makoto emphasized early, has been the very basis upon which the Ja-
panese "merit system" of labour management rests. Women regulär em-
ployees have been confined to simple, subsidiary jobs with low pay and 
small raises, decreasing their incentive to stay with their employers. Thus 
their years of Service are shorter, a fact then used to justify their inferior 
working conditions. It is the pyramidal structure in which women with 
low seniority are concentrated at the bottom that enables men to be pro-
moted efficiently and therefore remain committed to their employers 
(Kumazawa 1984). It is true that women now have slightly better oppor-
tunities for promotion than before, but this effect can be achieved by in-
troducing more and more women as non-regular employees. 
If we broaden our field of vision to include the subcontracting relation-
ship, we can see even more clearly that the gender segregation described 
above provides a foundation for the surprisingly high efficiency of large 
Japanese multinational corporations. It is now widely known that auto-
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mobile and electrical/electronics companies in Japan are organized into 
a huge pyramidal structure with a large multinational corporation on the 
top and thousands of subcontracting companies and self-employed sub-
contractors, as well as innumerable "homeworkers" (mostly married 
women working at home for a low wage) at the bottom (Anasz et al. 1987). 
Most "family workers", who account for 17% of women with occupations, 
are working for extremely low wages in very small companies near the 
bottom of the pyramid. It is revealing that two elaborate field studies on 
ME innovation in the early 1980s conducted by some of the Speakers at 
this Symposium, singled out the subcontracting system and gender segre-
gation as the basis of the international competitiveness of large Japanese 
corporations. 
The first fieldwork study, which was on automobile parts sub-
contracting companies in a region in Nagano Prefecture, was conducted 
by Ikeda Masayoshi and others in 1984. The study concluded that the 
mass appropriation of married women's labour in rural districts "is a 
basis of the superior international competitiveness of Japanese Strategie 
industries" because of the very low wages paid to these women, who are 
at the very bottom of the wage scale (Chüö Daigaku Keizai Kenkyüsho 
1985:221-222). A substantial proportion of the very small companies that 
serve as end subcontractors are also engaged in farming, which puts them 
in the category of "subsistence production", as mentioned by Morita, 
rather than being part of the capitalist mode of production (Morita and 
Kimae 1988:19). 
The second study was a case study on ME innovation at Hitachi by 
Tokunaga Shigeyoshi and others. The findings concluded that the requi-
sites of the Japanese model are subcontracting relationships, temporary 
workers, and the employment of "young women workers as regulär em-
ployees". The latter provides a "labour market buffer" that enables the 
Company to adjust the volume of labour by failing to replace workers as 
they resign. A certain level of employment is thereby secured for regulär 
male employees, and innovation occurs without any stress in labour re-
lations, thus hightening international competitivenes (Tokunaga and 
Sugimoto 1990: 351-352). 
Unskilled repetitive manual work is also a feature of the factory-auto-
mated shop floor, where human beings are used as machines as a con-
sequence of automatization. This kind of work, which is recognized as "un-
bearable" even by the company's labour section, is assigned only to young 
regulär women employees, who thus have no opportunities to develop 
skills or improve their job prospects. This type of work, which is difficult to 
endure and is assigned to women without any special benefits or compen-
satory measures, "has recieved no attention from the union, because the 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
overwhelming majority of these young women stay in the Company for 
only a short time" (Tokunaga and Sugimoto 1990:239-240,349). 
But, of course, a women's working life is by no means finished after a 
short-term job in her youth (remember the M-shaped curve of women's 
labour force participation as a function of age group). Within 10 years 
after she first quits and has borne children, she is typically re-employed 
by a small Company, probably in the Service sector or in wholesale and 
retail stores and restaurants, as a part-time worker, or in manufacturing 
as a blue-collar worker. Because she is unlikely to have a skill, her wage 
is often below the statutory minimum wage. The work is likely to be 
labour-intensive, though simple and repetitive. 
3.2. Unpaid Work 
It has been pointed out that Japanese workers have a very narrow focus 
- that they are too involved in work and the pursuit of short-term effi-
ciency and profitability to have any perspective on the world, the State, 
society at large, or even their own private lives (Baba 1990). The notorious 
karöshi is an extreme result of this narrow focus (National Defence Counsel 
for Victims of Karöshi 1991). But the adjective "male" is needed in front 
of the word "workers" in this context. Women cannot be involved in Com-
pany business so deeply as to lose perspective on "private life", because 
they are not free of housework even if they are managers of large com-
panies (Josei Shokugyö Zaidan 1990). On the contrary, it is because men 
delegate all "family responsibilities" to their wives, including the bürden 
of caring for their husbands' health and domestic needs, that men can 
devote their whole bodies and minds to their work. 
The Service rendered by wives has not been supplanted by the so-called 
"socialization of housework" with the feminization of employment. Rather, 
gender segregation continues in a new form, in which the husband is avail-
able for paid work, the wife for both paid work and housework. Let me refer 
to the Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities 1986 by the Statistics Bureau.4 
In contemporary Japanese society, the working hours of wives with full-
time jobs are the longest of any group if their hours of housework (including 
child care and Shopping) and hours of paid work are added up. The second 
longest hours worked are those of wives with part-time jobs. The working 
hours of husbands (whose sleeping hours incidentally are the longest) come 
next. Working hours of wives without jobs are the shortest, but even their 
sleeping hours are shorter than those of their husbands. In nuclear family 
A convenient abridgement of this survey is found in Rodosho Fujinkyoku 
(1989). 
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households of employees, husbands spend 8 minutes a weekday on house-
work if their wives have jobs, and 7 minutes if they do not. Thus, their life 
style is not affected by their wives' occupational Status. 
This Situation is unusual by international Standards. Figures 3 and 4 
have been constructed from data collected by the Prime Minister's Office 
in 1982. This unique comparative study surveyed the Performance of the 
six major household duties of laundry, house-cleaning, cooking and serv-
ing meals, doing the dishes, Shopping, and child care in these six coun-
tries. The degree to which these tasks feil to wives was highest in Japan, 
followed by West Germany. The differences between Japan and Germany 
were that, first, in Japan the degree of concentration to wives was higher 
in younger age groups while in Germany housework tasks tended to be 
shared by family members in younger age groups, as shown in Figure 4. 
Second, there was no remarkable difference due to the wives' occupational 
Situation in Japan, but in Germany if wives had full-time jobs they tended 
to do less housework (Sörifu 1984). More recently, from their survey in 
the early 1980s focused on Tama New Town in Tokyo, Itö Setsu and others 
found that the hours spent on housework by Japanese husbands were 
shorter and those of wives longer, and therefore the "gender division of 
labour was fixed more rigidly" in Japan than in other countries (Itö and 
Amano 1989: Chapter 8). 
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Last year, the Asahi Kasei Institute for the Study of Dual-Income Families 
published the result of a survey on the life and work of dual-income 
couples in Ibkyö, London and New York. Results showed that husbands 
wake up earlier and go to bed later than wives in both London and New 
York, but in Tokyo the reverse applies. Husbands did 27% of the house-
work in New York and 23% in London, while in Tokyo the figure was 
only 6% (Asahi Kasei Tomo Bataraki Kazoku Kenkyüsho 1990). Given 
these figures, it would be a mystery if Japanese men were not efficient at 
work. 
4. ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR THE FORMATION OF L A B O U R STANDARDS 
The long working hours of the Japanese are a cause of international 
economic friction, and the Japanese government, as well as labour and 
management, agree that they should be shortened. But this raises two 
problems. One is that agreed-upon goals seem impossibly far away. The 
other is that only the hours of paid work of men are being considered. 
The main causes of the first problem are the stubborn unwillingness of 
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companies at a concrete level of negotiation, and the powerlessness of 
trade unions, which are merely in-house organizations for regulär em-
ployees. At the same time, the fact cannot be ignored that 33% of trade 
union members still do not want to decrease their overtime hours, because 
overtime pay is indispensable in meeting the cost of living, as a recent 
survey by the Minstry of Labour showed (Rödöshö 1991). I would not, 
however, recommend wage raises of the traditional type, which have fo-
cused on regulär wage rate of the "Standards", namely male, middle-aged 
employees of the large-scale enterprises. 
The same survey covered "unpaid overtime work" for the first time in 
official statistics, showing that only 68% of overtime hours are "ade-
quately compensated", which means only a 25% premium over regulär 
wage rates. This outrageous and illegal practice should be abolished as 
soon as possible, and the rate of overtime pay should be raised to a sub-
stantial level comparable with international Standards. To decrease the 
wage gap between men and women, particularly by improving the dis-
criminatory conditions faced by so-called part-time workers, is an equally 
urgent necessity. Gender equality in pay might increase the income of 
poorer households by raising the wages of wives. Shorter working hours 
wil l never be realized as long as husbands welcome underpaid (and there-
fore unneccessarily long) overtime work to meet the high costs of living, 
or wives work longer hours at low wages that are not adjusted upward 
periodically. 
The latter measure overlaps with the second problem: the long working 
hours of wives, including housework, which are underpaid or unpaid 
and therefore deprived of worth. We must learn from the German prece-
dent that the 37-hours or 40-hours working week, ranking with the work-
ing time of "pseudo" part-timers in Japan, does not necessarily mean 
gender equality in the division of housework (Erler 1988: 235). But why 
not? Here I would like to return to Morita's concept of "unfree wage 
labour". He says that the secondary position of women in the labour 
market and their unpaid work at home are two sides of the same coin; in 
other words, they are determinants of each other. But his discussion sug-
gests that institutions or ideologies outside the market determine 
women's position at work, and not vice versa (Morita 1990: 70). 
It is worth remembering a critical point made by the French materialist 
feminist Christine Delphy. While consistently emphasizing that house-
work done by women is unpaid and that exploited housework is the 
material base of the oppression of women, she does not overlook the point 
that the systematic discrimination women face in the wage labour market 
pushes them to marry (Delphy 1984: 20). It has also been pointed out by 
Sylvia Walby, based upon her historical studies of gender segregation at 
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work, that women driven to marry on such terms have to take up house-
work as unpaid labour (Walby 1988: 22). Waiting for men to start doing 
housework is surely folly if the gender division of labour in employment 
remains unchanged. 
Another point is that we cannot rely on existing trade unions, which 
over-represent male regulär employees, to pursue gender equality of pay 
or shorter working hours. Furthermore, the Labour Standards Law and 
Equal Employment Opportunity Law, which are actually in force in Japan, 
are plainly ineffective in this regard. They lack the basic principle of "equal 
pay for work of equal value", and fail to proscribe indirect discrimination 
(Takashima 1990; Asakura 1991). How can these laws be reformed along 
such lines without organized labour taking an interest in gender equality? 
Should we expect pressures from, for example, the European Community 
or former French Prime Minister Cresson in this regard, too? 
To turn to the grass-roots level, if part-timers and foreign workers can 
be organized into local general unions, and are successful in raising and 
implementing statutory minimum wages in Cooperation with local wel-
fare rights movements, substantial improvements might be obtained. It 
would be highly benef icial for unions not only to make demands on labour 
administration authorities, but also to offer members opportunities for 
vocational training, especially middle-aged women and foreigners, who 
particularly need it. Mutual self-help activities that include the aged, 
single-parent families, and foreigners would be promising developments. 
If male activists fail to abandon traditional self-serving strategies, women 
may get together and organize themselves. In fact, such grass-roots net-
working by women across the boundaries of traditional socio-labour 
movements has already begun in certain pockets in Japan today. 
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THE CAREERS OF TECHNICAL SPECIALISTS IN JAPAN 
AND IN WESTERN COUNTRIES 
Angelika Ernst 
ABSTRACT 
Research and development (R&D) managers in Europe and the U.S. recently have 
increased their efforts to improve the motivation and productivity especially of 
elderly researchers. One major problem to solve is the partly conflicting ambitions 
of highly qualified R&D personnel who want to be recognized as top specialists 
and, at the same time, aim at being promoted to managerial positions. A n inter-
national comparison of related personnel management concepts in technological 
forerunner countries - including surveys of large electronic companies of the 
U.S.A., Japan and Germany - is presented. The results reveal fundamental differ-
ences between Japan and the other countries. Whereas in Japan it is widely believed 
that scientists over the age of 40 are no longer able to carry out front-line R&D 
tasks, the majority of European and American researchers deny a decline of effi-
ciency above that age. Almost all senior Japanese researchers have managerial Sta-
tus. Nevertheless, they are ambitious to qualify as specialists. A large number of 
Western R&D personnel, on the other hand, never experience promotion to man-
agement positions. Many of them are strongly dissatisfied with their lack of Status 
and rewards. 
CONTENTS 
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4. Discussion of the results 
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1. T H E QUESTION AT ISSUE 1 
The category of the specialist is not clearly defined in discussions. Whereas 
much has been written on the categories 'occupation', 'activity', 'function' 
or 'qualification', a systematic examination of the category 'specialist' is 
lacking. There is also no general agreement on what makes someone a spe-
The findings presented in this paper are based on a survey sponsored by the 
Volkswagen Foundation, Germany. 
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cialist. It is clear that specialists have distinguished themselves in a particu-
lar field. This, however, also applies to experts. What distinguishes a spe-
cialist from an expert? Does a specialist have particularly broad or particu-
larly narrow qualifications? The way the term is used allows us to conclude 
that specialists, in addition to their technical competence, also have a per-
sonal, professional orientation in their field without this involving a fixed 
categorization, as is the case with the labelling of a profession. Specializa-
tion is much more noncommittal than the choice of a profession; it is infor-
mal, individually marked and more freely deterrninable. 
The term 'specialist' is more likely to be used in connection with tech-
nical fields, even though it is just as applicable in any other field of activity. 
At the same time it must be pointed out that especially in descriptions of 
the Japanese labour market, its industrial relations and the organizational 
peculiarities of the Japanese economy, comparatively frequent reference, 
direct or indirect, is made to the specialization of employees or plants. A 
simple explanation for this may be that the profession as an institution 
has not established itself in Japan and that Substitutes for it are needed. 
In the scholarly literature on the Japanese employment system, speciali-
zation was initially looked at more indirectly via its counterpart, the 
general skills of lifelong employees. In the meantime, the perspective has 
shifted, and more thought is being given to the necessity for specialization. 
This was brought about by the lack of highly qualified engineers and 
natural scientists - the specialists par excellence - which is not just a Ja-
panese problem, although it has received particular attention in Japan. 
The more the Japanese model has infiltrated the organizational concept 
of Western industries, the more the position of the specialist and of spe-
cialization has also shifted to the centre of attention. 
In the context of a discussion of labour Standards, the concept of spe-
cialization is indeed more fruitful than alternative concepts such as oc-
cupation or qualification because the concept of specialization encom-
passes technical competence overlapping with the dimensions of one's 
career, position in the firm, deployability in the firm, orientation around 
the internal or external labour market, potential obsolescence and other 
dimensions. The tension produced by the interplay of these factors is most 
clearly expressed in career ruptures, such as a change of employer, work-
ing place, activity, Status or job content. But even without the occurrence 
of such dramatic events, many employees find that with the passing of 
the years they must call their specialization into question. How is an older 
specialist to be assessed? As a failure who did not manage to climb to a 
managerial position or to be recognized as a respected expert? How is an 
older specialist to be placed within an Organization unit with a younger 
boss? How much mileage can be obtained with the acquired specializa-
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tion? Can an older specialist continually adjust to the new findings and 
methods in his field? Is there an age limit for top Performance in a tech-
nical field? If specialization is viewed together with age, there are pri-
marily three problems to be looked at: 
- the career as an alternative to specialization; 
- the motivation of older specialists; 
- employment risks in specialization. 
Since specialization is a multi-dimensional concept, there are no simple an-
swers to these questions. The approach used here is to use an international 
comparison to address this complex area. It could, of course, be objected 
that this approach brings more confusion than clarity since it increases the 
number of variables. But it was precisely an international comparative sur-
vey that pointed our attention to the problem. Also, with the comparison of 
several countries it is relatively easy to identify the set of institutional con-
ditions that mark the way specialists are dealt with. This also makes it clear 
that the assessment of specialists, especially of older persons, is strongly in-
fluenced by country-specific sociocultural factors. The international com-
parative figures quoted in the following are based on surveys of highly 
qualified engineers and natural scientists in research and development de-
partments of major electrical firms in Japan, the U.S. and Western Germany. 
The focus is thus a group of persons who can be assumed to have a com-
paratively strong orientation towards specialization and a potentially high 
assessment of technical competence. Before presenting selected survey re-
sults, we give an outline of the implications of the varying general condi-
tions of the labour market for the position of specialists, in which the focus 
will be placed on a comparison between Japan and Germany. 
2 . T H E STRUCTURE OF THE L A B O U R M A R K E T A N D SPECIALIZATION 
Due to the conceptual proximity between profession and specialization, it is 
useful to place the above questions in the context of segmentation theory. In 
a national economy with a strongly occupationally oriented labour market, 
such as Germany, it is presumable that specialization is assessed and valued 
differently than in Japan, for example - a country with predominantly com-
pany-oriented internal labour markets. The estimation given to a profession 
and its functionality in the labour market in the German case is no doubt 
transferable to specialization, whereas in the Japanese case the concept of 
specialization has a priori no positive connotation. The much cited general 
skills of the elite Japanese employees argues against a strong position for 
specialists in large Japanese enterprises. Instead, one could presuppose a 
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latent conflict between the company's interest and those of the specialists. 
The initial hypothesis would thus be: specialization is to be found to a lesser 
extent in Japan than in Western industrial countries, especially Germany. 
When specialists emerge in Japan, their profile is company-determined and 
not individual. Specialists' career outlook, their recognition as such and 
their employment stability are not as great as in the countries compared. For 
older specialists, insofar as they exist at all in Japan, the general conditions 
and risks are correspondingly less favourable. 
Figures 1-5: Patterns of specialization processes 
To clarify the varying ways specialization is dealt with in different labour 
market Systems, we have constructed a variety of age-oriented processes 
of specialization according to several ideal-type patterns. The main objec-
tive is to contrast the development of specialization in a professionally 
dominated labour market and in a company-dominated labour market. 
In some cases, the component "promotion" will be looked at as an alter-
native to specialization. 
Figure 2 assumes for the same group of people that they were unable 
to continue to use their special qualification due to some dramatic event 
and had to find a new orientation. Examples here would be technological 
changes, dismissals or occupational interruptions for family reasons. 
When they continue their occupation in a changed context, they acquire 
a new specialization. The fanning out of the original line into several 
curves is intented to show that the original can be quite different from 
the new specialization. 
The third pattern depicts a rapid break in specialization due to career 
decisions. This pattern applies, for example, when a team member is pro-
moted to group leader and from this time on can no longer be concerned 
with the individual aspects of a project or business area but must ensure the 
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functioning of the entire working process. With continuing advancement to 
higher levels, it is assumed that the variety of business areas to be super-
vised continues to increase and that the employee's remaining specializa-
tion further declines. Ultimately, a manager emerges who oversees the en-
tire breadth of a ränge of products or topics but who has no actual technical 
competence in a particular area. The objection can, of course, be also raised 
that with the assumption of managerial functions, a specialization in direct-
ing activities is acquired and that there is not necessarily a reduction of the 
degree of specialization but only an exchange of differing specializations. 
This objection is justified to a certain extent but cannot be taken into account 
since we are concerned with demonstrating the reciprocally conditioned 
changes between technical specialization and directing competence. 
The fourth pattern describes the ups and downs of the specialization 
degree of an employee who changes his working field several times for 
training purposes, due to transfers, reorganization or planned rotation 
within the enterprise. It is assumed that these processes are not linked to 
changes in hierarchical position. The horizontal saw-tooth curves shown 
in Figure 4 show the case where the employee changes to a field that has 
no links in content to the previous position so that each time the qualifi-
cation process must start from Scratch. This model is not likely to apply 
to the entire career path but can certainly occur during the initial years 
of employment. Depending on whether and to what extent the areas of 
work are related in terms of content, the curve as a whole will display a 
slope. If an employee rotates between overlapping areas of work, his ex-
perience is rounded off in a rising degree of specialization, and the saw-
tooths must be drawn with rising amplitudes. 
The last pattern shows the more complex and possibly more realistic 
Situation of a company-internal rotation between related technical fields, 
whereby from a certain age onward a change of tasks is linked with pro-
motion. From this point there is a trade-off between specialization and 
promotion. Figure 5 could be seen as a synthesis of the patterns in Figures 
3 and 4. The slope of the declining degree of specialization at mid-career 
primarily depends on two factors: the extent of Substitution for specialized 
labour of managerial tasks and whether the promotion is linked with new 
technical tasks or takes place in the previous area of work. 
The schematic descriptions can only be seen as a rough approximation 
of the variety of conceivable combinations of specialization and advance-
ment. The first two patterns correspond to a career path in an occupation-
ally oriented labour market and the last two to qualifications and career 
in an internal labour market. Figure 3 shows the frequently assumed op-
posing directions of specialization and career. The number of constella-
tions could be enlarged by further differentiating the variables (according 
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to the nature of the technical area, qualification, system of promotion, etc.) 
and making combinations. 
Which parameter can be used to introduce the dimension of age? With 
advancing age, independent of the labour market Systems, we can expect 
changes in a number of variables by which in each case the question is 
raised of what expectations society has of older people and how it reacts 
to age-related behaviour patterns, how the personnel system deals with 
the age factor, and whether older employees are accepted in the socio-
economic context: 
- The attitude of a society vis-ä-vis age in general, whether this is marked 
by respect or distancing, influences the development possibilities of 
older employees. These cultural components have a direct effect on 
employment in terms of concepts of career patterns, age considerations 
in career decisions, or the formation of teams. The possible variations 
are numerous. To point out the two extreme poles, we have, on the one 
hand, the attitude that with increasing age the work content, bürden 
and areas of responsibility of the employee must necessarily change 
and, on the other hand, the assumption that age and employment con-
ditions do not necessarily affect each other. 
- In Company personnel policy the basic attitude towards age is most 
clearly expressed in promotion decisions. If experience and human qu-
alities are highly valued in a firm, seniority will be an important com-
ponent in filling managerial positions. If technical competence and drive 
are important, a comparatively minor role will be assigned to age. 
- The overall labour market Situation and the relation of supply and 
demand in specialist qualifications affect the occupational position of 
older employees. The job security of older employees is more en-
dangered in the case of low overall labour demand; with a high level 
of employment, older employees are also in demand. This group is a 
part of the classical buffer in the labour market. Theoretically, the em-
ployment risk of older specialists is higher than that of broadly qual-
ified older employees because the number of likely jobs is potentially 
smaller than that for generalists. The Situation only takes on a different 
appearance when, deviating from the overall labour market Situation, 
there is a labour shortage in individual skilled areas. 
- Technical progress, or economic development in a field of technology, 
poses as an accute or latent threat to a specialization acquired over the 
years; a specialist who does not keep abreast of his field is in danger 
of losing his footing. Major technological change (e.g., change from 
traditional to EDP printing methods, abandonment of structurally 
weak industries, elimination of socially unacceptable technologies) can 
lead to the total devaluation of the usable qualifications of a previously 
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efficient employee. The danger for the individual depends on how 
broad or narrow his specialization happens to be. 
This rough sketch of the problem constellation describes the arena in 
which firms and individuals must make their decisions regarding the 
labour content and Status of older employees. The way that Japanese firms 
and German and American firms and employees react to this problem 
will be exemplified in the following section with respect to highly qual-
ified industrial researchers. 
3. O L D E R INDUSTRIAL RESEARCHERS IN JAPAN A N D THE O T H E R 
INDUSTRIAL COUNTRIES 
The empirical findings presented here are based on a comparative study 
conducted in Japan, Germany and the U.S. on the career paths of engineers 
and natural scientists in industrial research. The findings are thus appli-
cable only to technically highly qualified employees; generalizations or 
transferring the conclusions to non-technically specialized workers or to 
blue-collar staff are likely to be problematic. The group selected is suitable 
for a discussion of the relation between age and specialization because its 
members are characterized by strong technical and career ambitions and 
because they must deal more intensively than other technically oriented 
employees with technical progress, being responsible for shaping its 
course. The specialization of industrial researchers has a strong dynamic 
component. 
The comparability of country results is ensured by having conducted 
the survey in large electrical firms in the R&D labs specializing in hard-
ware development. In each of the three countries, 260 engineers or natural 
scientists (university graduates) were questioned; a systematic selection 
(alphabetically or numerically) ensured that the hierarchical distribution 
was well represented in each country.2 In Japan the survey approach was 
implemented with no hindrances. In Germany some reservations by in-
dividuals in the survey group impeded a consistent implementation of 
2 In Japan the survey was supported by the Japan Productivity Center. It was 
conducted by a team under the supervision of Prof. Köichirö Imano, Tokyo 
Gakugei University. The U.S. study was commissioned by the Office of Tech-
nology Assessment and conducted by Prof. Philipp Shapira, Georgia Institute 
of Public Policy, Atlanta. The German study was done by the author together 
with Dr. G. Wiesner. The survey took place in Japan in 1988/89 and in Germany 
in 1989/90. For overall results see the publications of the Japan Productivity 
Center (Nihon Seisansei Honbu 1991). 
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the projected survey method. A sufficiently large sample was, however, 
achieved in all countries. 
A differentiation of results according to age was achieved by dividing 
survey participants into a group under 40 and a group over 40 years of 
age. This choice was based on survey results which indicated that by this 
age at the latest a decision must be made for specialization or for career 
orientation. It was precisely these age-specifk survey results that 
prompted the discussion on the varying positions of specialists in the 
three countries. In order to present the differences in the profiles of older 
industrial researchers, the following selected survey results will be ex-
pressed in a three-country comparison. 
1. The first fundamental difference between the lapanese sample, on 
the one hand, and the American and German overall survey results on 
the other, is the differing share of the Upper age group. In the labs sur-
veyed in the Western countries, a good one third of industrial researchers 
were older than 40 (U.S. 35%, Germany 34%); in Japanese R&D depart-
ments the older engineers/natural scientists accounted for, on average, 
only about one fifth (Japan 19%). 
Table 1: Ages of industrial researchers in Japan, the U.S.A. and Germany (in %) 
Age group Japan U.S.A. Germany 
-30 years 31 25 15 
31-35 " 22 22 32 
36-40 " 26 16 19 
41-50 " 19 21 23 
51- - 14 11 








Source: Data collected by Japan Productivity Center, Office of Technology Assess-
ment U.S.A. and ifo Institut for Economic Research (Germany). 
The low proportion of older employees in Japanese firms could be explained 
by the differing overall age structure of the staffs of major Japanese and 
Western industrial firms. The comparatively low retirement age in Japan 
and the tendency of larger Japanese companies to reduce top-heaviness 
in the age structure of the staff speak for this assumption. Nevertheless, 
there are indications that Japanese corporations, in addition, systemati-
cally and successfully work at severing engineers beyond the age of 40 
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from the R&D departments. The fact alone that those over 50 were not at 
all encountered in Japan, but compose 10% of the sample from Germany 
and the U.S., points towards a targeted age-specific personnel policy for 
this age group in Japanese companies. Additional survey findings support 
this assumption. 
2. Perhaps the most important prerequisite for the varying personnel-
policy treatment of older industrial researchers lies in the attitudes of the 
persons affected. For researchers who themselves see an age boundary 
for mastering certain research tasks, it is easier to achieve their removal 
from this area after having reached this age. Conversely, for persons in 
the above-40 group who are confident of their task-performing ability, 
transferral to other areas might be more difficult. The survey thus con-
tained a question on the personal estimation of the top age for perforrning 
demanding R&D work. 
Table 2: Answers of Japanese, American and German industrial researchers to 
the question "Up to what age is an engineer/scientist able to do R&D-work in 
the most advanced fields?" (in %) 
Age limit Japan U.S.A. Germany 
35 years 22 2 1 
40 years 32 3 4 
45 years 26 3 7 
50 years 3 3 8 
over 50 years - 12 8 
no age limit 17 77 72 
Total 
100 100 100 
(N=270) (N=268) (N=258) 
Source: See Table 1. 
The reply to this question points out the striking difference between Japan 
on the one hand, and Germany and the U.S. on the other. Whereas the 
large majority of Western industrial researchers surveyed saw no age limit 
for top industrial research (U.S. 77%; Germany 72%), and in both cases 
only 5% of the sample feit that those over 40 can no longer perform ade-
quately, the opinions in Japan were nearly the opposite. 54% of Japanese 
R&D personnel indicated that engineers/natural scientists beyond 40 can 
no longer do successful research in the newest fields. Only one in six of 
the Japanese agreed with the majority of Western engineers that there is 
no age limit for R&D activity. 
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For the formation of specialists, these estimations are important. The 
model depicted in Figure 1 of an initially rising technical competency 
curve that maintains its high level towards the end is incompatible with 
the basic Japanese attitude toward the technical performance of older 
engineers/natural scientists. According to ways of thinking of American 
and German researchers, such a pattern of "technical continuity" could 
indeed be realized. This differing attitude about the top age for research 
activity can certainly be seen as an explanation of the age distribution 
of R&D personnel in the three countries. Japanese employers and 
possibly the employees themselves evidently do not allow specializa-
tions that would continually develop throughout the course of a career. 
These yet approximate results fit the picture of the general skills of the 
life-long employees of Japanese corporations. Of course, this still says 
nothing about the extent of engineers' specialization up to the point 
where they leave R&D; and, to be sure, leaving R&D need not be coter-
minous with a new technical orientation. In order to identify the fea-
tures of specialization in Japanese firms, additional information is re-
quired. 
3. The available data contain information on how long engineers remain 
in the R&D area of the same firm. A longer period is an indicator for spe-
cialization in a thematically limited R&D activity. This says nothing about 
changes in subjects or technical fields within this working area as a whole. 
But continuous employment alone as a researcher/developer in the same 
firm Stands in Opposition to the generalist model that is based on rotation 
between various areas within the firm. 
Table 3: Tenure of elderly engineers/scientists in R&D-work within their present 
Company in Japan, the U.S.A. and Germany (in%) 
Tenure (years) Japan U.S.A. Germany 
- 5 10 29 18 
6-10 2 17 18 
11-15 21 11 19 
16- 67 42 42 








Engineers/scientists listed in this table are over 40 years old. 
Source: See Table 1. 
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Table 3 liste only those persons over 40. In the Japanese case, a duration of 
16 years or more (due to the absence of the over 50) means that the person 
in question, during the entire period in which he was employed as a fully 
trained engineer, was active in the R&D area. In light of the insufficient uni-
versity engineering education in Japan, an engineer/natural scientist 
begins his career with a Company training phase lasting several years; in 
most cases it is not until their late twenties that they are ready for inde-
pendent work in R&D. In the other two countries, similarly clear divisions 
cannot be made since the groups also include those over 50 and since the age 
for starting one's occupation is less standardized than in Japan. The survey 
showed that two thirds of the older Japanese industrial researchers were ac-
tive in R&D for more than one and a half decades. This provides a strong 
indication for the fact that most Japanese industrial researchers have been 
employed in the same field of activity for the entire productive core period 
of their careers. The share of older engineers/natural scientists, who have 
been less than 10 years in research and thus were certainly in other areas, is 
- at 12% - much lower in Japan than in the two other countries. In the U.S. 
the share of these "mobile" industrial researchers is nearly half (46%); in 
Germany, more than one third (36%). The picture ofthe company-wide, mo-
bile generalist is not supported by these findings for Japanese R&D person-
nel. Instead, the figures indicate that a group of persons has been identified 
that in Japan too is characterized by a strong continuity in task profile and 
that is thus also marked by a clear specialization. 
4. The Interpretation of the results on length of Service in R&D labs can 
be validated by Statements of R&D personnel on the likelihood oftransferral 
within/outside the R&D area. The corresponding question permitted mul-
tiple listings in a selection of eight target areas. In the following table, the 
Statements are grouped together in two blocks, R&D internal and external. 
Table 4: Likelihood of transferral of R&D-employees in Japan, the U.S.A. and 
Germany within and outside R & D departments (answers as % of participants; 
in brackets, persons older than 40 years) 
Probable next kind of job Japan U.S.A. Germany 
R&D department, design 







(N=161) (N=93) (N=100) 
Source: See Table 1. 
A good number of participants failed to answer this question: about 60% 
of the Japanese, one third of the Americans and about 40% of the Germans. 
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It can be assumed that the people who did not answer it do not anticipate 
transferral. In the contrasting group that considers transferral likely, R&D 
internal activity in the broad sense was listed much more frequently in 
all three countries than activity outside of R&D. In both blocks, the num-
bers for Japan are higher than those of Germany or the U.S. Thus, Japanese 
industrial researchers expect to be transferred more often than Germans 
or Americans. But the likelihood that these transfers remain limited to 
within the R&D area are by and large the same in the three countries. The 
reactions of the older survey participants hardly differed from the overall 
survey results. Thus, the findings confirm the conclusion drawn above 
that the technical orientation and thus also the specialization tendencies 
of Japanese industrial researchers do not differ fundamentally from the 
Situation observed in Germany and the U.S. 
5. To check the personal preferences of R&D personnel in relation to 
work content, a question was placed in the survey on desired future activity 
differentiated according to type of activity within the R&D area and the 
firm's organizational units. 
Table 5: Answers of Japanese, American and German industrial researchers to 
the question "What kind of activity do you want to do in the future?" 
(answers in %, in brackets for persons older than 40 years) 
Desired activity Japan U.S.A. Germany 
Specialist work in R&D projects 60(44) 46(48) 30 (26) 
Management tasks in R&D department 26 (33) 36(35) 53 (55) 
Activity in production 3 2 1 
Activity in sales 1 3 3 
Other 8 10 10 
No preference 2 3 4 
100 100 100 
lotai (N=271) (N=267) (N=259) 
Source: See Table 1. 
Japanese engineers/natural scientists indicated more frequently than the 
Americans or Germans that in future they would most like to work as 
specialists in R&D projects. A total of 60% - and even 44% of those over 
40 - listed this preference. Here, the specialization orientation was even 
stronger in Japan than in the other two countries. The wish to assume a 
managerial task in R&D was weaker among the Japanese survey partic-
ipants than among the Germans especially, but also weaker among the 
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American researchers. Astonishing indeed was the opposite distribution 
of Japanese and German preferences. Whereas the Japanese dream of lives 
as specialists, most of the German researchers strive for tasks in research 
management. A n explanation of this finding wil l be provided later in 
connection with the distribution of industrial researchers in hierarchical 
positions. Here it can only be emphasized that the desire of industrial 
researchers to transfer to work in production, sales or other R&D external 
fields is equally low in all three countries. While mention is often made 
of the greater transdepartmental mobility of the Japanese compared to 
Western researchers, the evidence here allows us to conclude that this 
must be a forced mobility. 
6. To verify how serious the Japanese desire for continuing specializa-
tion within their R&D activity in fact is, we can consider the Statements 
of survey participants on the Status of specialist knowledge in their personal 
goals. 
Table 6: Ranking of specialization within the personal ambitions of industrial 
researchers in Japan, the U.S.A. and Germany 
Kind of knowledge Japan U.S.A. Germany 
Knowledge of one's specialist field 1,59 1,92 2,05 
Knowledge in neighbouring fields 1,59 1,86 1,87 
Ranking: 1 = very important, 2 = important, 3 = less important, 4 = unimportant 
Source: See Table 1. 
The number rankings in the above table show that for Japanese industrial 
researchers, the development of special knowledge is even more impor-
tant than it is for the Americans or Germans. Even though the desire for 
activity as a specialized researcher can still be interpreted as a noncom-
mittal utterance, the figures in Table 6 lend support to the assumption 
that in Japan as well, specialization has a high Status. The fact that the 
Japanese rankings are equally high for both answers indicates that the 
Japanese avoid a too-narrow specialization. The difference between the 
Japanese and the American and German rankings can be due to the fact 
that Western researchers generally already have a sounder specialist com-
petency than the Japanese; therefore they tend to find expansion into 
neighbouring fields more important than deepening their knowledge. 
7. As shown in the schematic drawings in Figures 3 and 5, the special-
ization of an employee can stand at odds with his career. For an industrial 
researcher, specialization is an initial career prerequisite; later on, after 
more administrative tasks are assumed, a balance must be found between 
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specialization and the development of managerial competence and over-
all knowledge. The higher the hierarchical position, the more the weight 
shifts to the latter area. No small number of scientists find the necessarily 
associated loss of technical competence unpleasant. Personnel managers 
also refer to the psychological barriers for young researchers and 
developers when first assuming project or group leadership. On the other 
hand, there are wide-spread complaints from Western industrial labs 
about the lack of advancement opportunities. What is the Situation, in 
contrast, with the age distribution of highly qualified Japanese R&D per-
sonnel in managerial positions? 
Table 7: Management position of young and elderly industrial researchers in 
Japan, the U.S.A. and Germany (in %) 
Management position Persons up to 40 i fears Persons older than 40 years 
Japan U.S.A. Germany Japan U.S.A. Germany 
R&D-personnel without 
management tasks 58 77 87 2 44 39 
Section chief 32 16 10 6 36 20 
Department chief or above 7 3 2 92 18 40 
na. 3 4 1 - 1 1 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N=145) (N=128) (N=124) (N=52) (N=97) (N=88) 
Source: See Table 1. 
The results for Japan differ greatly from those for Germany or the U.S. 
Already in the age group up to 40, and even more for older staff, the share 
of Japanese industrial researchers with managerial tasks is much higher 
than in comparable groups in America or Germany. Whereas 32% of the 
younger Japanese have already attained group-leader Status, this applies 
only to one sixth of the Americans and one tenth of the Germans. Already 
7% of the younger Japanese researchers/developers (U.S. 3%; Germany 
2%) were at the "department head" rank or higher. For those over 40 the 
differences were even greater. At this age there are nearly no Japanese 
industrial researchers who do not have managerial Status. Nine out of ten 
over-40 Japanese engineers/natural scientists in R&D have the rank of 
department head or a higher position. 
A direct numerical comparison with the German results is difficult since 
in the selection of the German survey participants the random-sample 
procedure was not always maintained. Managers tend to be under-rep-
resented in the German sample. It is therefore certainly the case that in 
constrast to the Situation in Japan, a large portion of older American and 
German industrial researchers do not attain managerial positions. Based on 
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a rough estimate, nearly one in two researchers/developers in the U.S. 
and Germany spend their entire careers as specialists and experience no 
advancement in the firm. The survey responses on participants' satisfac-
tion or dissatisfaction with their working Situation in R&D refer in Ger-
many and the U.S. primarily to promotion prospects. Complaints about 
the lack of career opportunities and uncertain personnel policies are at 
the top of the list. 
To verify whether managerial Status is actually achieved by the as-
sumption of managerial tasks, a question was included on the position of 
the individual within the R&D project he considered most important. 
Table 8: Position of young and elderly industrial researchers in their project teams 
in Japan, the U.S. A. and Germany (in %) 
Position Persons up to 40 years Persons older than 40 
Japan U.S.A. Germany Japan U.S.A. Germany 
R&D staff 69 49 81 8 33 43 
Deputy project leader 22 13 8 8 13 8 
Project leader or above 9 41 11 83 54 49 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: See Table 1. 
For Japan and Germany, a comparison of Tables 7 and 8 shows largely 
the same distribution pattern. Managerial Status as a rule is also linked 
with project-leadership tasks. Only in the case of younger Japanese re-
searchers/developers does the position of group leader not seem to be 
always synonymous with a directing task. The U.S. values show the 
peculiarity that project leadership can indeed be exercised by re-
searchers/developers without hierarchical Status. 
The conclusion that can be drawn is that it is less the specialization 
than the managerial profile that clearly distinguishes Japanese, American 
and German industrial researchers as well as their basic attitudes toward 
the age-specific Performance capabilities of this group. 
4. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
The empirical results presented are not suited to describe in detail the 
forms and contents of specialization in Japanese and Western enterprises. 
However, they may well be used to discuss the initial hypothesis concern-
ing the weak tendency of Japanese engineers to specialize and modify if 
necessary. The assumption that technically qualified employees in Japan 
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tend to specialize much less than their Western - especially German -
colleagues turns out to be incorrect. Considering the amount of time spent 
on R&D and the ambitions of researchers (even of the elderly) to reach a 
high degree of specialization in order to benefit from the high prestige 
associated with specialized knowledge, one notices that Japanese en-
gineers and scientists aimed at high levels of specialization much more 
than any other of their fellows in other countries. 
The surprisingly high proportion of researchers in managerial positions 
in Japanese companies in comparison to the U.S.A. and to Western Ger-
many may cause some confusion. Given the assumption that any promo-
tion in the hierarchy leads to a Substitution of leadership responsibility 
for scientific knowledge and taking into account an ever-increasing degree 
of Substitution caused by further promotion, those observations made in 
Japan do look rather contradictory. Quite evidently, Japanese researchers 
- even those advanced in years - seem to be able to combine managerial 
tasks with a high degree of specialization in technical matters. These re-
sults may be interpreted in several ways. We shall assess some possible 
approaches which will then lead us to a modified hypothesis on general-
ist-versus-specialist concepts for technically qualified employees in large 
Japanese enterprises. 
First of all, one should see whether Japanese researchers do consider 
specialized knowledge as a part of their personal identity. Although the 
questionnaire made a clear distinction between "field of specialization" 
(senmon bunya) and "technical knowledge" it might be that Japanese re-
searchers do have a different understanding of the wording than their 
German or American colleagues. If one considers the whole ränge of 
possible meanings for the above term, it seems likely that Japanese em-
ployees tend to think of dealing with a technical topic for a limited period 
of time rather than associating it with lifelong focusing on one Single field 
of technology. "Specialization" in this case would mean expertise instead 
of personal orientation towards one special branch of science. A survey 
done by Friedman (1987: 359) showed that Japanese software-engineers 
do not consider themselves specialists, though by Western Standards they 
undoubtedly are. A change in domain should not be as fundamental an 
event for an expert as for a specialist, in the most comprehensive meaning 
of the term. However, one should notice that experts can easily become 
specialists if that kind of development is fostered by the company's per-
sonnel system. 
The results obtained may lead to the conclusion that Japanese compa-
nies aim at fully deploying their employees' technical abilities but at the 
same time try to counter the development of specialists' attitudes. The 
widespread perception among Japanese researchers of an age limit for 
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R&D activities provides clear evidertce for this kind of approach. A l -
though Japanese engineers and scientists are perfectly aware of the fact 
that many physicians, engineers and specialists have been highly success-
ful in their later years in foreign companies and in Japanese research in-
stitutions, the idea of an age limit for R&D activities is fixed in the minds 
of virtually all research staff in large Japanese companies. Even the fact 
that numerous researchers have themselves surpassed the alleged age 
limit does not change this opinion. A person convinced that the quality 
of research work will drop once the age of 40 years is reached will not 
plan for continuous work in this field but will always anticipate a later 
change in working environment. Although the desire for continuous work 
in R&D does exist in Japan, companies seem to suppress these wishes, in 
order to prevent the over-ageing of their R&D-departments and possibly 
also to counter the calcifying of specialists' attitudes. 
The second fundamental obstacle to specialization is the system of 
promoting in large Japanese enterprises. In general, Japanese re-
searchers are promoted at an earlier stage and on many more occasions 
than those in the U.S.A. or in West Germany. Still, foreign researchers 
who have spent some time in Japanese laboratories have reported that 
researchers promoted to the lower ranks of the hierarchy usually had 
a work-pattern very close to those researchers who so far had no 
managerial positions. Dispositive functions are rarely taken on by them; 
they are meant to motivate, educate and assess younger colleagues. 
Such an exposed position does not obstruct a further deployment of 
technical skills; rather, the opposite is true. Often these younger 
managers are referred to as "playing managers." Still, the foregoing 
promotion, which makes a widening of the horizon essential, leaves 
only little time and Space for "nestling" in highly specialized matters. 
Early promotion is a reward for having achieved technical competence 
and is meant to generate ambitions in research as well as in careers. 
"Nerds" wil l not succeed in this setting. 
At the same time one must notice that Japanese reseachers in manage-
rial positions generally bear a smaller work load than their Western col-
leagues. This is true even in the higher ranks. Only 25% of Japanese re-
searchers already promoted to the level of section-chief or further held 
the responsibility for four or more projects, whereas two-thirds (67%) of 
researchers in the U.S.A. and almost three quarters (73%) in Germany 
held such responsibility. Nearly half ofthe Japanese managers (41%) ques-
tioned were responsible for only two projects; in the U.S.A. this was true 
for 24% and in Germany for a mere 16%. The comparatively low variety 
of responsibility in Japan could imply that these promoted researchers 
spend less time on managerial tasks than their colleagues in other coun-
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tries, leaving them with more time for technical work. 3 Thus, the trade-off 
between specialization and hierarchical promotion seems to be less in-
tense in Japan than in the other countries analyzed. Whereas in Germany 
promotion of researchers is identical with a gradual withdrawal from 
dealing with research problems and an eventual change in the re-
searcher's field of work, this turn-around tends to be less pronounced 
with Japanese executives. Classifying the above results in a rough way, 
Western researchers either reach very high levels of specialized knowl-
edge or are promoted, which results in a gradual loss of their technical 
orientation. Such a clearcut distinction cannot be observed in Japan, where 
up to a certain level R&D staff are promoted without neglecting their 
scientific tasks. 
In the framework of these observations, what are the consequences for 
elderly, technically skilled employees? Irrespective of specific circum-
stances which differ from one country to another, older employees always 
have more problems adjusting to new working environments than 
younger ones. Adapting themselves to changes in technology, to reorgani-
zation, to economic slumps, to structural alterations, to new management 
styles or to a change in Status usually affects older persons more than 
younger ones. This makes the topic of specialization one to be considered 
in the context of labour Standards. The above comparison raises the ques-
tion of whether a high degree of specialization, a managerial position or 
a combination of the two does provide the background best suited for 
older employees in adapting to new circumstances. Assuming that a high 
number of options does increase an employee's facility to adapt to a differ-
ing Situation, those which are exclusively research-oriented as well as 
those who do accomplish managerial tasks are placed at a disadvantage 
against those working within a wider frame of possible functions. In the 
light of this Observation, one could conclude that elderly Japanese re-
searchers have much less difficulty in adapting to new requirements than 
many American and the great majority of German R&D staff. The data 
available are not yet sufficient for this topic to be covered even in a su-
perficial manner. This new hypothesis wil l be our concluding Statement, 
and we hope that it wil l lead to further studying. 
3 A comparative study on careers in British and Japanese enterprises gives evi-
dence for the fact that "...the meaning of a 'career path' differed between the 
two countries...career moves [in Japan] .. .did not necessarily involve changes 
of function." Besides, that it became clear that the Japanese managers were more 
specialized than the British. Their experience was limited to a smaller number 
of management functions. See Storey et al. (1991). 
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THE FORMATION OF RENGÖ AND STRAGEGIES OF 
THE JAPANESE LABOUR MOVEMENT FOR THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF LABOUR STANDARDS 
Takagi Ikurö 
ABSTRACT 
Rengö (Japan Trade Unions Confederation, JTUC), founded in 1989, has become 
the most important centre of trade unions in Japan, at least from the quantative 
point of view. In this paper the historical background finally leading to the foun-
dation of Rengö and the structure and character of enterprise unions which still 
constitute the basis of the Japanese trade unionism are examined. Then Rengö's 
strategies toward the development of labour Standards, in particular toward that 
of working hours reduction are discussed. Although Rengö states "we will realize 
a relaxed way of life based on due regard for humanity" including shorter working 
hours, it does not have sufficient power to directly achieve its aims as the basic 
structure of Japan's peculiar industrial relations remained unchanged. As a result, 
Rengö relies upon the enactment or administrative guidance instead of collective 
bargaining and national 'consensus' instead of industrial disputes. It is concluded 
that Japanese unions have not yet gained enough power to establish better labour 
Standards. 
CONTENTS 
1. The formation of Rengö and three major streams 
2. Ideology, functions and unionization 
3. Strategies for the development of a labour Standard: the reduction of working 
hours 
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Appendix: Names of labour unions, national centres and federations 
1. T H E FORMATION OF RENGÖ A N D THREE M A J O R STREAMS 
In December 1989, Rengö (Japanese Trade Unions Confederation, JTUC) 1 
was founded. On the same day, Söhyö (General Council of Trade Unions 
of Japan), which had been the largest national centre of trade unions in 
In this paper abbreviations for the Japanese names of the unions are used. An 
appendix gives the complete names and their English translations. 
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Japan, dissolved itself. Dömei (Japanese Confederation of Labour), the 
right-wing rival national centre, and Chüritsu Rören (Federation of Inde-
pendent Unions) also dissolved themselves. The formation of Rengö 
marked a new epoch in the history of the Japanese trade union movement. 
Rengö does not organize all of the unions in Japan. There are two other 
national organizations, one of which, Zenrören, calls itself the "genuine" 
national centre2. Moreover, many independent enterprise-based unions -
in fact, in-house unions - as well as independent small Community unions 
still exist. 
Table 1: Number of unions and members by affiliation 
Affiliation Number of unions 
Number of union 
members 
Share of union 
members 
Rengö 13,230 7,613,517 62.1 
Zenrören 2,154 835,005 6.8 








15,904 2,603,063 21.2 
Total 33,270 12,264,509 100.0 
Data based on the Labour Union Basic Survey 1990 (Rödökumiai kiso chösa 1990) 
Source: Rödö Daijin Kanbö Chösabu (1991: 89). 
Nevertheless Rengö has become, in fact, the only national centre of trade 
unions in Japan, at least from the quantitative point of view. Table 1 shows 
that the share of Rengö in the total membership of trade unions is about 
60%. When Söhyö, which then called itself the "mother body" for trade 
union unification began its activities in 1950, its share was about 56% but 
that soon began to decline, and from the mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s 
it stayed at about 35%. During the same period, the share of the inde-
pendent unions was also about 35%, but the share of the rival unions 
against Rengö is a lot smaller. 
From the historical point of view, three large streams of the conven-
tional trade union movement have run together into Rengö: the main 
2 The other centre is Zenrökyö (National Trade Union Council). 
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stream of Söhyö (the minority group of Söhyö mainly led by the Com-
munists has not joined Rengö, and formed the Zenrören), Dömei, and the 
enterprise unionism of big businesses in the private industries, which is 
represented, for example, by Kinzoku Rökyö (IMF-JC, International 
Metalworkers' Federation - Japan Council). 
The majority of Söhyö membership belonged to the unions organizing 
the workers of such public-sector enterprises as Japan National Railways 
(now privatized JR companies), National Telegraph and Telephone Cor-
poration (NTT, also privatized), the operational sector of the Ministry of 
Posts and Telecommunications and the local governments. In general, 
these unions were militant and had close relations with the Japan Socialist 
Party, the largest Opposition party in the Diet. Until the mid-1980s their 
formal policies, or ideologically expressed Statements, had been to some 
extent influenced by class-struggle doctrine or Marxism. Many of the Sö-
hyö-affiliated unions in the private industries, which concentrated on or-
ganizing workers in medium- and small-sized enterprises, were also of 
militant persuasion. 
Schematically speaking, Dömei, the previously second large national 
centre of trade unions, organized the workers of conventional private 
industries such as textiles, marine industries and metal-working. Some-
times, especially in the case of some industrial disputes, Dömei or the 
industrial federations belonging to Dömei organized the other unions, 
forming so-called second unions in enterprises where Söhyö-affiliated un-
ions already existed. Ideologically Dömei expressed a clear anti-com-
munism and politically supported the Democratic Socialist Party. The 
Dömei philosophy was based on the idea of Cooperation in production, con-
frontation over the distribution of profit. In general, Dömei was a right-wing 
rival of Söhyö. 
When IMF-JC was formed in 1964, it described itself as only a "win-
dow" to the International Metalworkers' Federation and stated that it 
would not establish domestic policies and not demand special Status as 
an internal labour Organization, because each of the IMF-JC-affiliated un-
ions had been under a different national centre; i.e. Tekkö Rören (Japanese 
Federation of Iron & Steel Workers' Unions) under Söhyö, Jidösha Sören 
(Federation of Japan Automobile Workers' Unions) under Dömei and 
Denki Rören (Japanese Federation of Electric Machine Workers' Unions) 
under Chüritsu Rören. Soon, however, it became one of the main streams 
which represented the trade unions in Japan domestically, because it 
formed a link between the unions belonging to key industries such as 
steel and iron, automobiles and electric appliance manufacturing. In these 
same industries, the so-called Japanese type of management or Japanese-
type labour management system has developed. Most of the workers or-
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ganized in the IMF-JC-affiliated unions have been in Service at such big 
companies as Shin Nittetsu, Toyota and Matsushita. Of course, other in-
dustrial sectors, even more than IMF-JC have been characterized by many 
enterprise unions, but IMF-JC has been a typical example of the power of 
big-business unionism. With few exceptions, the unions affiliated with 
IMF-JC have maintained cooperative relations with managements. 
Some people argue that Dömei and IMF-JC belong to the same stream 
- namely to the right wing of the movement. Certainly, both of them have 
maintained friendly relations or partnership-relations with managements, 
and in the political and ideological sphere both of them have an anti-Com-
munist attitude. 
There have been, however, some important differences between them. 
The main stream of Dömei attached importance to the social and political 
dimension of working conditions and job security. For example, the Japan 
Federation of Textile Workers' Unions (Zensen Dömei), one of the major 
Dömei-affiliated industrial federations, has been one of the most strongly 
centralized of all Japanese unions and has tried, to some extent success-
fully to set a unified Standard for such working conditions as wage levels 
or working hours. Zensen Dömei also put pressure on the government to 
establish an improved unemployment insurance system and to develop 
job opportunities in each region. Politically Zensen Dömei has strongly 
supported the Democratic Social Party and supplied many candidates for 
Parliament and local assemblies. Many of the high-ranking officers of Zen-
sen Dömei were professionals who had applied for posts in the union itself. 
In contrast to Zensen Dömei, the Confederation of Japan Automobile 
Workers' Unions (Jidösha Sören), one of the major IMF-JC-affiliated in-
dustrial federations, has had a decentralized structure and function. Wage 
levels, including fringe benefits as retirement allowances, and working 
time Systems differ among the various companies concerned. Collective 
bargaining concerning these items has been carried out between the man-
agement and the union of each Company. Each enterprise-based union 
has tried to secure the so-called "lifelong employment system" in its af-
filiated enterprise, or at least within the group of companies headed by 
the enterprise. Also some of the Jidösha Sören-affiliated unions have sup-
ported the Democratic Socialist Party and supplied it with candidates for 
Parliament. But many of the members or candidates of the local assemblies 
who come from unions have been independent of any party or political 
section. Sometimes they have acted in the regions not as the repre-
sentatives of some party but as representatives of the companies. The 
high-ranking officers of Jidösha Rören (one of the members of Jidösha 
Sören) are ordinarily recruited from the leaders of the affiliated enterprise 
unions, and their salaries - at least a part of the amounts - are paid by 
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the original unions. They will return to jobs in the original enterprise-
based union, or even to managerial posts in some cases, after a few years 
of their term. In short, compared to Zensen Dömei, Jidösha Sören is a kind 
of Joint committee of the enterprise-based unions in the automobile in-
dustry - a committee in which each enterprise-based union maintains its 
sovereignty. 
The structures and functions of the IMF-JC-affiliated federations are 
not necessarily the same as those of Jidösha Sören. For example, the Ja-
panese Federation of Iron & Steel Workers' Unions (Tekkö Rören) has 
maintained stricter industrial Standards for working conditions, mcluding 
annual wage increases, working time Systems and the retirement age, at 
least in the five major iron and steel companies. But the main feature of 
Jidösha Sören - that union activities are fundamentally based in each en-
terprise - may be seen in almost all unions belonging to IMF-JC or in the 
other unions affiliated with big enterprises. Thus we can distinguish the 
stream of large-enterprise unionism (e.g. Jidösha Rören) from the stream 
of Dömei (e.g. Zensen Dömei). Moreover, we wil l be able to get a view of 
the future Rengö by making such a distinction. 
2. IDEOLOGY, FUNCTIONS A N D UNIONIZATION 
Why and how were these three streams of Japanese trade unions unified 
in Rengö? A long story characterized by some dramatic process may be 
necessary to concretely answer this question. But, to jump straight to the 
conclusion, three main factors had an effect on the process of the formation 
of Rengö. These factors are to some extent illustrated by a report entitled 
The Direction of Rengö which consists of three sections: Platform, Basic Ob-
jectives, and Task and Mission.3 
The first factor is connected to the ideological phase. The Platform states: 
"We will continue the tradition of the free and democratic union move-
ment." The term "free and democratic union movement", which was 
quoted form the original Statement of the International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), has been a symbol of the right-wing trade 
unions in Japan, especially Dömei. It was an important concession of the 
main stream of Söhyö to accept the use of this term. More clearly speaking, 
the main stream of Söhyö abandoned its class-struggle-oriented policy 
line in the course of the unification process. The transformation of the 
3 The Japanese Version of this report can be found in the proposals for the 2. 
general meeting of Rengö (Nihon Rödökumiai Sörengökai 1991a). 
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policy line was seemingly related to the New Declaration (Shinsengen) the 
Socialist Party of Japan adopted in 1986, which also abandoned the old 
quasi-Marxian policy. 
Söhyö's concessions were motivated by the fact that by the mid-1980s 
the unions in the public sector had become weak. Since the late 1940s the 
government continued to deny the right to strike for all the unions in the 
public sector and restricted the right to bargain collectively. For example, 
in the previous Japan National Railways (JNR), collective bargaining be-
tween the management and the related unions (the largest one was the 
National Railway Workers' Union, Kokurö) could not negotiate wage in-
creases for employees. The total payroll cost of JNR was set by the govern-
ment within the framework of the national budget, and the average wage 
level was also controlled by the budget. Ordinarily, wage increases for 
JNR employees were determined through arbitration by the Public Cor-
poration and National Enterprise Labour Relations Commission, which 
in tum was guided from behind the scenes by the Ministry of Finance 
and/or the Minstry of Labour. This process contributed to the Situation 
in which the unions in the public sector attached more importance to 
political confrontation with the government than to the gradual improve-
ment of working conditions through labour-management relations. 
The unions in the public sector continued to press for the recovery of 
the right to strike, and in 1975 they called a "general strike" in pursuit of 
this aim; the strike was carried out for a week but had no effect. After 
failure of the strike some of the unions involved, for example, the National 
Telecommunication Workers' Union (Zendentsu), adopted a more flexible 
policy in which they attached more importance to autonomy within the 
framework of the labour-management relations. (Zendentsu was to play 
the role of a bridge between the unions in the public sector and those in 
the private sector on the way to the formation of Rengö.) The other unions, 
however, for example Kokurö, continued to work politically against the 
government. 
In the early 1980s the government, influenced by neo-conservatism 
adopted a programme of privatizing public corporations such as JNR and 
NTT. The aims of the privatization of the JNR were obvious: first, to 
decrease the financial bürden of the government and second, to weaken 
the power and influence of the unions, especially Kokurö. Originally all 
of the trade unions in the public sector strongly opposed privatization, 
although many unions in the private sector, especially the ones belonging 
to Dömei and IMF-IC, sympathized with privatization. Eventually, how-
ever, Zendentsu changed its attitude and finally accepted privatization of 
the NTT in order to secure the jobs of its members and to avoid the division 
of the corporation. 
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On the other hand, Kokurö continued to oppose the government. When 
the government enforced privatization with the division of JNR into six 
private regional railway companies in 1987, the managements of the new 
companies substantially reduced the total number of their employees and 
selectively dismissed the members of Kokurö. Under these circumstances, 
many Kokurö members left the union, and membership in Kokurö, which 
had been the most militant and ideologically representative of the left 
wing of Söhyö, very quickly decreased from about 250,000 to about 30,000. 
Thus, through the process of privatization, the group of unions maintain-
ing the tough left-wing line was decisively weakened, and as a result 
Söhyö was able to change its policy or ideological line. 
The second factor is concerned with the function of the trade unions. 
The Task and Mission section within The Direction of Rengö states: 
We wil l vigorously push forward with our demands for policy and 
institutional changes with a view to elevating the living Standards 
of workers as a whole while stepping up our 'power and policies' 
parallel to activities at the work force, industrial and Community 
levels. 
Here the term "policy" refers to the economic and/or social policies 
planned and operated by the government. Thus the sentence shows that 
Rengö has a strong desire to influence the policies of the government. 
Needless to say, the fates of workers are largely dominated by the 
various policies or institutions concerned with, for example, economic 
growth, social security, education, housing, urban planning, environment, 
and the tax system. But, schematically speaking, the unions in the private 
sector, especially in the big companies, tried to resolve these issues within 
each Company in a conventional way. In addition to wages or salaries, the 
level of which is determined by each Company, policies concerning the 
lifelong employment system of job security, lump-sum retirement Settle-
ments, and Company housing are set within each Company. The first test 
of the unions' resolve to reform the social policy of the government was 
a one-day united strike organized by Söhyö in 1973, demanding the im-
provement of the workers' pension system. Not many unions, however, 
participated in this strike. In those days many unions, especially those in 
the private sector, did not consider that the reform of institutions or poli-
cies at the State level was an urgent problem. 
The economic Situation after the first oil shock in 1973, and even more 
after the second oil shock in 1978, changed this attitude of the unions. The 
deterioration of the economic Situation made it difficult for each Company 
to observe the lifelong employment System completely. Managements 
began to pare their numbers of employees through various methods. Thus 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
the unions in the private sector began cailing for improvements in, for ex-
ample, the unemployment insurance system, which was redefined as em-
ployment insurance in 1975. Moreover, unions came to realize that a sui-
table level of economic growth at the national level was essential in order to 
preserve the lifelong employment system within each individual Company. 
A n industrial federation belonging to the IMF-JC stated even in the late 
1970s that wages should change in accordance with the economic Situation. 
Since the mid-1980s, under the pressure of the recession that resulted from 
the exchange-rate appreciation of the Yen, the unions commonly demanded 
that the government adopt an economic policy that would expand domestic 
demands through increasing wages and social benefits. In short, even large-
company unionism, which mainly had functioned within each individual 
enterprise's framework, has been compelled to expand its activities to the 
social dimension in order to cope with the needs of its members. Thus, large-
company unionism has also changed its policy line, although in a different 
sense from the left-wing unions. 
Logically speaking, in order to influence government policy-making, 
the formation of a united and strong national centre of unions is essential. 
Thus from the functional point of view the formation of Rengö can be 
seen as a logical conclusion. 
It is important to note in relation to this phase a possible change in the 
relationship between the unions and the political parties. The Basic Objec-
tives of Rengö states: 
We wil l bolster our ,power and politics' and cooperate with political 
parties which share our objectives, policies and demands, in an effort 
to attain füll employment, stabilize commodity prices and improve 
the general Standard of living, thereby realizing a welfare society 
brimming with vitality. 
This sentence shows that Rengö did not intend to maintain an exclusive 
ideological relationship with one or another political party. In contrast to 
the programmes of Söhyö and Dömei, the terms "Socialism" or 
"Democratic Socialism" are not used in The Direction of Rengö. At the same 
time, however, it is essential for Rengö to establish some form of Coopera-
tion with the political parties in order to promote its "policies and insti-
tutions" for workers. At present Rengö leaves the decision to each fed-
eration about whether or not to support a political party and which party 
to support, so the old relation of Söhyö with the Socialist Party and Dömei 
with the Democratic Socialist Party has barely changed. But, as The Basic 
Objectives of Rengö suggests, the relation may change fundamentally 
within a few years. 
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Table 2: Unionization rate 







Calculation based on the number of members of enterprise unions (tan'i rödö kumi-
aiin) as recorded in the Labour Union Basic Survey (Rödökumiai kiso chösa) and the 
number of employees as recorded in the Monthly Labour Survey (Maitsuki kinrö 
tökei chösa). 
Source: Rödö Daijin Kanbö Seisaku Chösabu (1991b: 187). 
The third factor is related to the Stagnation of unionization. The Task and 
Mission section of The Direction of Rengö states that one of the federation 
is "to put a brake on the downward trend in the unionization rate of 
unorganized labour and boost the rate." This sentence reflects the atmos-
phere of crisis on the trade union scene. In fact, as Table 2 shows, the rate 
of participation in the union-affiliates has continued to decrease since the 
mid-1970s. Although Rengö's share among the unionized is largest in the 
history of the Japanese trade union movement, its share of all the em-
ployed is only about 15%. It is also logical to conclude that unification of 
the existing unions may be the best way to increase their power. 
3. STRATEGIES FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A L A B O U R STANDARD: 
THE REDUCTION OF W O R K I N G H O U R S 
As mentioned above, the strategies of Rengö are expressed by such terms 
as "free and democratic trade union movement", "power and policies", 
and "unionization". At the same time, as Rengö is a national centre of the 
unions, it stresses the improvement of working conditions. The second of 
the Basic Objectives of Rengö is "achieving a relaxed way of life based on 
due regard for humanity, by maintaining better working conditions, in-
cluding higher wages, shorter working hours and better working environ-
ments". Here I would like to discuss how these objectives, especially the 
one concerning shorter working hours, will be pursued by the unions. 
There are two reasons why I take up especially the matter of working 
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hours. First, moderate wage increases have been built into the national 
economy in Japan, so they are not necessarily an issue of vital importance 
between labour and management. Second, we will be able to see the 
process and the problems involved in the formation of a labour Standard 
more clearly in the case of shorter working hours than in the case of wage 
increases. 
It is a well-known fact that in general working hours in Japan generally 
are much longer than those in other developed countries. In response to 
criticism from abroad, working hours reduction has become a national 
topic of discussion. In fact, a 1987 amendment to the Labour Standards 
Law reduced legal maximum working hours from 48 hours a week to 46 
in 1988 and again to 44 in 1991. This amendment was expected to intro-
duce a new stage in the working time Situation in Japan. And in fact, as 
Table 3 shows, average working hours decreased slightly from 1988 to 
1990, mainly as a result of the amendment. In particular, the number of 
workers with a two-day weekend has increased rather rapidly since 1988. 
But the amount of reduction has not yet reached the level at which the 
structure of the working time system has been qualitatively changed. The 
Ministry of Labour and Rengö had planned to shorten annual total work-
ing hours (including overtime) to about 1800 hours by 1992 or 1993. At 
present, however, the realization of this goal is regarded as very difficult. 
There are many obstacles standing in the way of the reduction of working 
hours. For example, managers in general are opposed to the shortening 
of working hours, although nowadays they have been compelled to re-
duce hours to some extent because of the difficulty in attracting workers. 
Thus a big question is how the unions deal with these obstacles. 








Annual working hours including overtime in undertakings with 30 and more em-
ployees. 
Source: Rödö Daijin Kanbö Seisaku Chösabu (1991b: 80). 
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The following policy Statements, from Rengö documents4, show the fed-
eration's attitute toward reduction of working hours, and also shows to 
some extent its attitude toward the development of a labour Standard in 
general: 
1. Reduction of working hours is the "course for Japan to follow". 
2. Opposition to management's argument of "control of total per-
sonnel costs". 
3. Revision of the Labour Standard Law. 
4. Legislative action to promote the introduction of shorter working 
hours for smaller enterprises. 
5. Reduction of working hours for public Service employees. 
6. A five-day week for schools. 
We can see in these documents some features of the union strategies re-
lated to the reduction of working hours. 
First, the goals to be pursued by the Rengö-affiliated industrial federa-
tions are not concretely stated, although as a general goal the document 
states: "Realization of a 40-hour workweek and attainment of 1,800 an-
nual working hours is a matter of course for Japan as a developed 
economy." This lack of clear goals is due to the idea that Rengö and its 
affiliated industrial federations should have different functions: the fed-
erations have autonomy or "self-determination" in such matters as wage 
increases and shorter working hours, while Rengö should concentrate its 
energy on "policies and institutions". The role of Rengö in the wage 
struggle is limited to "adjustments", including the establishment of a 
general approach to demands and information exchange activities. 
This philosophy means that Rengö does not necessarily have an effect 
on the structure of industrial relations at the industry or firm level. Rengö 
may set guidelines for unions' demands regarding wages and working 
hours, but the federation does not yet have the power to establish Stand-
ards for working conditions, nor do the industrial federations with a few, 
but important, exceptions. In general, collective bargaining is still decen-
tralized, and working conditions are determined at the level of each en-
terprise or firm, without clear social Standards. 
Second, the document gives some key concepts involved in negotiating 
for shorter working hours. It states that management should voluntarily 
suggest systematic Steps for introducing shorter working hours in accord-
ance with a "national consensus", and that "Rengö will maintain its firm 
stance until working hours in Japan reach international levels". For Rengö 
These documents are published in Nihon Rödokumiai Sörengökai (1991b). 
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a "national consensus" and "international levels" (or the "fair inter-
national labour Standards") are the key words. 
This means that Rengö intends to promote shorter working hours in 
response to pressure from public opinion at home and abroad rather than 
using its own power. Rengö does not plan to call a unified strike to realize 
reduced working hours. 
Third, Rengö attaches importance to the legislative and other activities 
of the government. The document states the following: 
The management side has remained negative throughout toward 
the revision of the Labour Standards Law. This attitude is based on 
arguments that decisions on working conditions should be left to 
labour-management negotations and that law and administration 
should be kept to the minimum necessary. At present, however, most 
employees of medium and small enterprises have had their wages 
kept at the iruriimum levels prescribed in the Labour Standards Law. 
Therefore raising the labour Standards is extremely important. 
Again, working conditions in Japan are at low levels in the light of 
international fair labor Standards, making the revision of the Labour 
Standards Law imperative. 
Improvement of the Labour Standards Law as well as the reduction of 
working hours in the public sector and the introduction of the five-day 
week in the school system may be expected to have an effect on the re-
duction of working hours in the medium- and small-enterprise sector. In 
fact, however, the unionized sector, including some of the unions of large 
enterprises, tends to rely on legislative and/or administrative methods. 
In short, as the policy of Rengö for the reduction of working hours 
shows, when Rengö (or the unions in Japan in general) works to develop 
labour Standards, it relies upon the "international level" as a goal, on the 
"consensus" or public opinion for power, and on legislative and/or ad-
ministrative methods as instruments. Of course, for Strategie development 
it is vitally important for the Rengö-affiliated industrial federations to 
strengthen their functions. In fact, in some industries, including, metal 
working and food, a new style of industrial federation is developing. But 
in general the weakness of the industrial federations has not yet been 
overcome. Under these conditions, Rengö's strategies for the development 
of a labour Standard wil l continue to rely on "international level" and 
"consensus". 
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APPENDIX 
Names of Labour Unions, National Centres and Federations 
Abbreviated name Complete name English translation 
Chüritsu Rören Cüritsu Rödökumiai 
Renraku Kaigi 
Federation of Independant 
Unions of Japan 
Denki Rören Zennihon Denki Kiki 
Rödökumiai Rengökai 
Japanese Federation of 
Electrical Machine Workers' 
Unions 
Dömei Zennihon Rödö 
Södömei 
Japanese Confederation of 
Labor 
Jidösha Rören Nihon Jidösha Sangyö 
Rödökumiai Rengökai 
Federation of Japan 
Automobile Workers' Unions 
Jidösha Sören Nihon Jidösha Sangyö 
Rödökumiai Sörengökai 
Confederation of Japan 
Automobile Workers' Unions 
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Abbreviated name Complete name English translation 
Kinzoku Rökyö Zennihon Kinzoku 
Sangyö Rödökumiai 
Kyögikai 
Japan Council of Metalworkers' 
Unions or: International 
Metalworkers' Federation -
Japan Council (IMF-JC) 
Kokurö Kokutetsu Rödökumiai National Railways Workers' 
Union 
Kokusai Jiyü Rören Kokusai Jiyü Rören International Confederation of 
Free Trade Unions 
Rengö Nihon Rödökumiai 
Sörengökai 
Japanese Trade Union 
Confederation (JTUC) 
Söhyö Nihon Rödökumiai 
Söhyö Gikai 
General Council of Trade 
Unions of Japan 
Tekkö Rören Nihon Tekkö Sangyö 
Rödökumiai Rengökai 
Japanese Federation of Iron 
and Steel Workers' Unions 




Zenrökyö Zenkoku Rödökumiai 
Renraku Kyögikai 
National Trade Union Council 
Zenrören Zenkoku Rödökumiai 
Sörengö 
National Confederation of 
Trade Unions 
Zensen Dömei Zensen Dömei Japanese Federation of Textile 
Workers' Unions 
1 The English names of the trade unions mentioned often differ. Several transla-
tions are in use. In order to identify the unions clearly, the complete and the 
abbreviated Japanese names are included in this list. Complete names and Eng-
lish translations have been drawn from the quoted sources. 
Sources: Japan Labor Bulletin (May 1, 1991: 11-20), Orientaru Ekonomisuto Hen-
shübu (1985: Appendix 27-31). 
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THE JAPANESE PRODUCTION MODE AS MODEL FOR 
THE 21ST CENTURY? 
Helmut Demes 
ABSTRACT 
After a brief summary of some of the results of the other articles in this reader the 
question is raised whether or not the lean production mode will be the dominant 
mode of production worldwide in the 21st Century, as is predicted by the MIT 
Research Team. With reference to the articles in this publication and certain 
developments and discussions in Japan, some trends indicating a "Europeaniza-
tion" of Japanese practices of organizing labour and production are elaborated. In 
spite of the growing fear of a "Japanization" of Western industrial relations through 
the introduction of Japanese production Systems, in some aspects there might ac-
tually be a "Europeanization" of Japanese practices. International pressure, en-
vironmental problems and the growing scarcity of labour as well as social changes 
are contributing to (future) changes in the Japanese production mode. 
CONTENTS 
1. New impacts on industrial relations in Western countries: Towards Japaniza-
tion? 
2. Lean production in Japan: Some neglected features 
2.1. The discretionary power over the work force 
2.2. Dualistic economic structures 
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2.3.2. Work content and working teams 
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4. Surnming up: Towards Europeanization? 
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Taking into account recent discussions of lean production, with reference 
to the contributions included in this volume1 and some recent develop-
ments in Japan, this paper examines whether the authors of the book on 
lean production (Womack et al. 1990) are justified in their assumption that 
a production system of that kind can be a model for the 21st Century. The 
paper is divided into three parts. The first one is an account of new in-
fluences on industrial relations, mainly in Western countries; the second 
deals with some factors of industrial relations in Japan which are closely 
linked to lean production, as well as structural particularities of the Ja-
panese economy and society. The third part is a discussion of problems 
caused by lean production in Japan, which, the author contends, wil l lead 
to changes and "Europeanize" Japanese production concepts. 
1. N E W IMPACTS O N INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS IN WESTERN COUNTRIES: 
TOWARDS JAPANIZATION? 
New rationalization and production concepts, partly inspired by Systems 
developed in Japan, are becoming increasingly populär in Western coun-
tries. At the same time a rediscovery of human resources is taking place, 
since rationalization reserves are mainly to be found in the Organization 
of the whole value-adding process and of work itself. Automation based 
merely on technology seems to have reached its limit. 
In contrast to the very optimistic picture painted by the MIT group (cf. 
Womack et al. 1990: lOOff.), not all employees and companies are winners 
in this rationalization process, which encompasses the whole value-
adding chain. Altmann, Sauer and Doleschal confirm this in their con-
tributions. Among the employees a polarization becomes obvious. A 
group of core employees, the "problem solvers" within the context of new 
production concepts, becomes increasingly significant as other lowly 
qualified employees lose importance and are marginalized (cf. Sauer). 
The reorganization of the supply system creates a new power constel-
lation between the companies, on the one hand strengthening the market 
position and the potential of those suppliers of important components, 
and on the other hand leading to a loss in entrepreneurial sovereignty of 
the suppliers of parts who are linked to just-in-time Systems. A hierarchy 
emerges, with the market mechanism regulating the transactions partly 
replaced by power relations. 
A more comprehensive summary of the proceedings can be obtained by reading 
the abstracts to each article. 
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Naturally, this strongly affects industrial relations. For example, one 
part of the dual system of interest representation in the Federal Republic 
of Germany (F.R.G.), i.e., the workers Councils, is deprived of some of its 
influence. In dependent enterprises on the supplier chain, the workers 
Council does not have a counterpart to bargain with, as the management 
itself in these enterprises has lost its entrepreneurial sovereignty. Many 
issues which should legally be dealt with between works Councils and 
management are de facto decided by dominant buyers. Both trade union 
and legal counterstrategies to this Situation are still in their early stages. 
Internationalization, too, has several far-reaching consequences for in-
dustrial relations. Supra-national economic integration undermines parts 
of the national Systems of labour relations. Supra-national regulations of 
labour Standards have only been developed to a certain extent, as Bosch 
shows by analyzing the case of the European Community. High labour 
Standards in the more developed countries face the pressure of competi-
tion from other countries as protecting borders are abolished. Minimum 
Standards have to be agreed upon. These should be set below those levels 
achieved in the most developed countries in order not to hinder the 
development chances of the industrially less developed countries, but 
above those in the least developed countries to prevent undercutting com-
petition. Such a far-reaching Social Charter has yet to be formulated on a 
Europe-wide level. But a few enterprises have already concluded agree-
ments with their employees to form supra-national bodies for workers' 
interest representation (cf. Altmann, Bosch, Jürgens). 
In his contribution on the role of the International Labour Office (ILO) 
in the creation of internationally obligatory working Standards, Sen-
genberger points to the fact that these do not - as is sometimes proclaimed 
by economists - necessarily represent a competititve disadvantage, but 
on the contrary can be a productivity advantage by, for example, con-
tributing to social peace and by their cost, which also provide an incentive 
for companies to rationalize. In addition, the setting of minimum Stand-
ards could also be coupled with international trade, and non-compliance 
could, perhaps in the framework of GATT, be sanctioned. Thus undercut-
ting competition could be prevented. 
Another form of internationalization is the expansion of enterprises 
abroad. Japanese foreign direct investment has particularly increased in 
the last two decades. These foreign subsidiaries of Japanese companies 
are often viewed as experimental ground for the transferability of new, 
Japan-oriented production concepts, an aspect which was central to some 
of the contributions. 
Industrial relations and work Organization concepts are not as easily 
transferable as production concepts. In their empirical analyses 
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Kumazawa and Deutschmann reach the conclusion that in the Federal 
Republic of Germany and in England prevailing practices of industrial 
relations, as well as legal and economic structures, impede transfer, and 
that the discretionary power of the enterprise over the labour force is 
limited. This also means that the deployment of labour cannot be man-
aged as flexibly as in Japan. This also applies to other countries, as Jürgens 
proves with his example of Japanese car manufacturers in the U.S. and 
as Nomura shows on the basis of his study on the electronics industry in 
various countries in Asia and Europe. Central features of personnel man-
agement, such as the seniority system and enterprise-level union Organi-
zation, seem to be difficult to introduce in these countries. Different struc-
tures of the labour market, which are not as segmented, greatly hinder 
the development of internal labour markets, which are characteristic in 
Japan for core employees and closely connected to personnel Systems 
based on seniority and company-centred interest representation Systems. 
However, in the area of the transfer of the Organization of work, Japanese 
companies are successful to some extent, as Berggren and Björkman impres-
sively show in their paper on Japanese auto transplants in the U.S., but the 
transfer is not achieved without negative effects on the quality of working 
life. Further reference will be made to this in a later section. 
In the Organization of supply Systems there also seem to be limits to 
the transfer of lapanese practices. In his paper, Sei elaborates on the fact 
that the market is still stronger as a mechanism of price determination in 
Western countries and that the striving for entrepreneurial independence 
leads to other forms of Cooperation between buyers and suppliers. Some 
observations in Sei's paper regarding Europe may already have been over-
taken by reality. Doleschal and Sauer point out that some large German 
purchasers of parts and components are making considerable efforts not 
to become technologically dependent on their suppliers or to reduce the 
existing dependency. They might then be in a position to bring about 
control and price determination mechanisms beyond those of the market, 
similar to those in Japan. 
Sei's paper is also interesting in regard to another aspect of Cooperation 
between suppliers and buyers in Japan - a mechanism which greatly en-
courages innovation. Suppliers can only make a profit in the medium 
term if they are successful in reaching a higher value-added, for example 
by the modification of components and other innovations. 
The precondition for the process of price determination analyzed by 
Sei is a network-like system between the various departments of suppliers 
and buyers, which is also described by Ikeda in his contribution. Smooth 
coordination between them is secured by the flexible deployment of the 
work force. Technicians and engineers often gain work experience in 
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different departments - for example, in product and production tech-
nology development as well as in procurement - which facilitates 
Cooperation between the individual departments. In Japan, even exchange 
of personnel between companies can be observed. One aspect of this flex-
ible deployment of the work force is covered in the paper by Ernst, which 
examines the careers of technical specialists in development departments 
in Japan, the U.S. and Germany. In Japan the assignments of specialists 
to the development departments are much shorter; while in both the other 
countries specialists usually stay in one department for most of their 
careers, Japanese engineers are rather quickly transferred to other depart-
ments. These varying career paths may be one of the problems in the 
transfer of Japanese supplier Systems to other countries. 
Nevertheless, even in Japan the supplier system is undergoing some 
changes, which are more closely analyzed by Ikeda. He points out that in 
some cases the buyers will no longer have insight into the whole develop-
ment process of parts and components. Thus, this process becomes a 
"black box" for the buyers. Such knowledge is, however, a precondition 
of the effective functioning of cost-based price determination. In these 
cases it wil l be interesting to see the resiuting new mechanism of coordi-
nation between supplier and buyer. 
Hiramoto regards the differing labour market structures - that is the 
non-existence of a low wage rate in the supplier industry - as a reason 
why a transfer of some production processes to suppliers in Japanese 
companies abroad is not profitable. Make-or-buy decisions (or, in other 
words, the degree of "leanness") continue to be determined by a much 
wider package of reasons, which include national particularities such as 
social and economic structures. 
Jürgens concludes in his paper that there is no uniform internationaliza-
tion strategy of companies. Analyzing the strategy of a German car maker 
compared to that of Japanese auto companies, Jürgens points out that the 
latter try to transfer production Systems to other countries (cf. also Berggren 
and Björkman). The German Company, however, aims at putting pressure 
on its domestic undertakings by the testing of new Japan-oriented produc-
tion concepts abroad. It tries to tranfer these concepts to its plants at home 
by mounting pressure via international inter-plant competition within the 
Company. Therefore its strategy is directed from the periphery to the centre, 
whereas the Japanese companies aim from the centre at the periphery. 
Summing up the developments in Western countries, it seems that the 
new production concepts are quite similar to those in Japan. Rationalization 
strategies covering the whole value-adding chain bring about a sirniliar di-
vision of labour between companies. Industrial relations, however, do not 
converge to this extent, as different labour market structures, social tradi-
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tions and institutions are an obstacle. The convergence of rationalization 
strategies does not, therefore, lead automatically to the same structures in 
industrial relations, as Altmann points out in his introductory article. 
2. L E A N PRODUCTION I N JAPAN: SOME NEGLECTED FEATURES 
Western discussion of new production concepts is currently dominated 
by one particular study. In 1990, under the title The Machine That Changed 
the World, Womack et al. published a book which received much attention 
in Western countries. The authors describe a production system based 
mainly on concepts developed at Toyota, in which goods of the highest 
quality can be produced flexibly and very efficiently, using a minimum 
amount of capital and other production factors. A n important, if not the 
most important, element of lean production is a dynamic team of workers, 
which contributes to continuous improvement (kaizen) and the elimina-
tion of any slack. It is therefore rather surprising that in this study little 
attention is paid to these particular teams, their functions and working 
conditions. Only once, while contrasting lean production with "neocraft-
manship" concepts in Sweden, Womack et al. point out that lean produc-
tion causes stress for the employees, as all slack is eliminated. At the same 
time, however, they note that lean production gives the employees an 
intellectual challenge by promoting improvement activities such as kaizen. 
In this sense it offers advantages over the Taylorist production Organiza-
tion and "neocraftmanship" in Sweden (Womack et al. 1990: lOOff.). How-
ever, the authors neither make reference to the problems of employees 
which arise from this production concept nor attempt to figure out how 
employees are kept made working hard in such a production system. 
Thus, in the following, with reference to this book's papers and the 
author's own current research work, the attempt wil l be made to explain 
some aspects of lean production in Japan and its effects on employees. 
In Japan the book of Womack et al. was given a cool reception. Very 
soon after the publication of the English original, a Japanese translation 
was issued in 19902. But in general this book generated less interest here 
than in Western countries. This is also obvious in the bibliographies of 
the authors represented in this book. In the first three parts, of the six 
contributions by Japanese authors only one cites this study, while it is 
mentioned in five of the six contributions by Western authors. 
2 According to the publisher (Keizaikai) 20,000 copies of this book were sold 
which is a moderate edition for a successful economic book in Japan. The trans-
lation is entitled Rtn seisan höshiki ga sekai no jidösha sangyö o kö kaeru. 
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Lean production was developed in Japan under certain socio-economic 
conditions. The most significant conditions include the lack of capital and 
currency restrictions which existed in the early postwar decades, the 
specific structure of enterprise groups (keiretsu), which partly arose from 
the conglomerates (zaibatsu) of the prewar era and which are closely linked 
with the continuing problem of dual economic structure, the lack of skilled 
employees and the notoriously bad quality of Japanese industrial pro-
ducts. In addition, the downfall of the trade union movement following 
hard struggles in the 1950s and early 60s, which all ended with in the 
unions' defeat, most certainly contributed to the smooth introduction of 
these new production concepts. The management had a free hand. The 
trade unions had scarcely any alternative to cooperate as a "junior part-
ner". In the 1970s, in the first great postwar recession in the wake of the 
Nixon shock and the oil crisis, many aspects of lean production, under 
the heading of "slim-down management" (genryö keiei), gained increasing 
popularity even beyond individual enterprise groups (cf. Hiramoto 1984). 
Since the 1980s this new style of management has been discussed abroad 
as "Japanese management" or "Toyotism" (e.g. Dohse et al. 1984), but, of 
course, with slightly different emphasis. 
Considering the long history of lean production, it is not surprising that 
in Japan the book of Womack et al. was not considered new and revolution-
ary. The history of its develpment already demonstrates some typical struc-
tures of Japan, which do not exist in this form in other countries. 
2.1. The Discretionary Power over the Work Force 
In lean production, there is a continual attempt to eliminate any form of 
slack. Buffers such as stock-keeping and relief work forces are reduced. 
Employees, who are organized in teams, are permanently under stress. 
Due to the lack of buffers, production frictions can only be resolved by 
increasing the work load of employees. In order to be able to do this, 
companies must have discretionary power over the work force. In Japan 
several strategies were developed for this purpose. 
a) The size of the work force can be increased in the short or medium 
term by the use of temporary and unstable forms of employment such 
as borrowing employees from dependent companies or employing 
part-timers. These unstable forms of employment are still the most 
dominant on the Japanese market (cf. Tokunaga and Tokunaga 1984; 
for groups of female employees see Ösawa in this volume). 
b) Short-term bottlenecks can be resolved internally by the transfer of per-
sonnel from other sections (öen). Due to the specific skill-formation Sys-
tem in Japan, based on on-the-job training in specific skills to perform 
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Single jobs and not on the training of general skills to enable an employee 
to perform on a wider ränge of jobs (cf. Demes 1992), the strategy of in-
ternal short-term transfers or employment of temporary staff is limited, 
c) As the first two measures are not sufficient to cover the need for em-
ployees either quantitatively nor qualitatively, companies in this pro-
duction system have to rely on the extensive use of available core work-
ers in order to be able to fulfill production plans. Thus, overtime is a 
necessary element of lean production. 
According to an opinion poll by the Ministry of Labour, the most impor-
tant reasons for overtime are the lack of an adequate work force reserve 
and the Organization of the supplier chain, not a long-term shortage of 
labour.3 Another survey of the Confederation of Japan Automobile Work-
ers' Unions points in the same direction. More than 80% of all production 
workers agreed that too few workers were in their Workshops to handle 
the workload (Jidösha Sören 1990: 32). The auto industry with its well-
developed lean production system was at the top of all industries with 
almost 400 (paid) overtime hours per year per blue-collar employee in 
1990 (Rödöshö 1991: 40). 
Another hint that long overtime hours are linked to the lean production 
system is the problems reported in Japanese companies abroad (Berggren 
and Björkmen, Deutschmann). Due to restrictions these employers cannot 
enact overtime as freely as in Japan. The lean production concept is 
functioning in Japan on the condition that there is a strong discretionary 
power over the work force. Overtime can largely be assigned without 
limits and at very short notice. 
How far the discretionary force of companies over the work force ex-
tends can be illustrated with a few recent examples: 
- According to a recent survey, in only 4% of all transfers within the 
Company involving a change of location was the agreement sought of 
those concerned. In the remaining cases the social Situation of the em-
ployee often is partly taken into account or his opinion is asked, but 
the final decision still lies with the Company (Japan Times, Sept. 9,1992). 
3 Employees were asked why they thought overtime was not reduced (Rödöshö 
1991: 42; three of 10 items could be selected). The main reasons were: 
1. The work cannot be done within the contractual working hours (49.8%). 
2. The work bürden varies greatly (27.2%). 
3. Services for customers and (sub)contractors (26.1%). 
4. There is no time leeway in contractors' Orders (21.6%). 
Only in the fifth position was a labour shortage mentioned, and the resulting 
difficulty of recruiting (13.5%). 
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- It was only when the regional Labour Standard Bureau forbade the 
practice that it came to light that Toyota had forced its employees to 
take their annual holidays when production had to be limited due to 
a fall in demand. Employees working on alternate shifts were obliged 
to take a day's holiday every Saturday as on these days the night-shift 
was cancelled (Japan Times, July 29, 1992). 
- After over 20 years of litigation, the Hitachi Company recently won a 
case in the High Court of Justice in which it had fired an employee 
who refused to do overtime assigned at short notice, as he had a private 
engagement. The agreements negotiated between the Company trade 
union and management were so inexplicit - a very common practice 
in Japan - that the Company could always demand overtime at short 
notice as it required (Sugeno 1992). 
The outcome for employees of such long and strenuous working hours are 
described very well by the answers to another item of the survey by the 
Confederation of Japan Automobile Workers' Unions quoted above. Only 
4.7% of all male respondents did not answer to be "often exhausted"; 23.5% 
said that they recover by the following day, but more than 70% stated that 
they are permanently exhausted or that they had not overcome their ex-
haustion by the next working day (Jidösha Sören 1990: 33ff.). 
2.2. Dualistic Economic Structures 
A characteristic of new production concepts such as lean production is, as 
mentioned above, that efforts at rationalization are aimed at covering the 
whole value-adding chain beyond individual companies. Although some 
suppliers of components have gained some independence, as Sei and Ikeda 
outline in their papers, the dual economic structure and the dependence of 
subcontractors is still strong (for an overview cf. Hemmert 1992). 
Tamai's contribution to this book, about labour relations in small en-
terprises in Osaka, gives evidence of this. Most of the small and medium-
sized companies in Japan are still suppliers to larger companies. The 
downward shift in costs as well as in demand for flexibility implied in 
such a production concept is much more obvious in Japan than in other 
countries. This is only possible because up to now, within the system of 
industrial relations in Japan, labour Standards which are valid for all com-
panies have been developed only to a certain extent.4 Due to the organi-
The legally defined Standards are generally not very high in Japan. There are 
often exceptions for small companies, such as in the area of social security bene-
fits. Moreover, the State does not always enforce even these basic Standards in 
small companies. 
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zation of employees on the Company level - in small and medium-sized 
companies there are seldom trade unions at all - the Standards set by 
negotiation vary greatly and in small and medium-sized enterprises 
wages, hinge benefits, employment security and other working condi-
tions are basically much worse than in larger companies. 
2.3. Intra-plant Rationalization Strategies 
2.3.1. Technological Rationalization Strategies 
The authors of the MIT study emphasize that lean production is not based 
on advanced automation of production processes. There are several in-
dications that, concealed behind the various intra-plant rationalization 
concepts in Western and Japanese companies, there are basically different 
strategies of technological rationalization. The first results of a study of 
work Organization in the assembly of videotape recorders (VTR), which 
the author carried out with two Japanese colleagues, illuminate this 
point.5 In the Japanese companies that were investigated, the technologi-
cal layouts of the assembly lines were different. Huge efforts had been 
made to produce large quantities of VTRs by closely linking all production 
Steps and individual workplaces and avoiding any buffers between them. 
The lines were significantly longer, and individual jobs on the line had to 
be performed at very short cycle times. Maintaining flexibility in produc-
tion volume as well as meeting production targets even in case of prob-
lems could generally only be achieved by the flexible use of the work force 
under rigid conditions. Production technology itself did not contribute to 
flexibility. 
A Company in Germany, also Japanese-owned but whose production 
technology is dominated by local staff, developed to a much greater extent 
a flexible production technology for the production of a largely identical 
product: 
- buffers were created between workplaces, 
- parallel workplaces with the same job content were introduced, 
- some production Steps were decoupled by introducing sub-assembly 
lines, and 
- considerable efforts were made to easily adjust the lines to different 
manning levels when required. 
This flexibility has several advantages. On the one hand, it creates leeway 
for the Company with regard to product mix and production volume. On 
5 The complete case studies by Nakamura Keisuke, Nagano Hitoshi and the 
author will be published by the German Institute for Japanese Studies in 1993. 
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the other hand, disposable time is created for the staff, and differing 
speeds of work as well as requirements for flexible working time and 
hours can be better dealt with. 
In the Japanese context such an Organization of production contains a 
considerable amount of muda (waste). The elimination of any slack in the 
Japanese factories necessarily leads to strict Organization of work, with 
the hidden problems described by Berggren and Björkman connected with 
the military-like discipline which is necessary to keep the production 
process running smoothly. 
2.3.2. Work Content and Working Teams 
It is remarkable that in Japanese companies the cycle times in production 
are short compared to those in many European countries. The frequently 
described multi-skilledness, as Kumazawa also notes in his contribution, 
is often reduced to line-ups of simple, fool-proof jobs. The Organization 
of direct production thus frequently has a super-Tayloristic character. The 
above-mentioned study on video-recorder production shows that in the 
companies in Japan most of the simple assembly work was performed by 
temporary staff, while more complicated work such as adjustment and 
control, and all indirect work, was done by permanent employees. Per-
manent staff carried out only simple tasks at the beginning of their careers, 
or rather took over these jobs temporarily as flexibility reserves according 
to need. Overtime was required from them. Only very few employees 
performed this very monotonous and restrictively organized work long-
term. 
This form of intra-plant division of labour is closely linked with the 
multi-layered labour market described by Tokunaga (in this book and 
1984). The volatile lower segments of the labour market allow the Com-
pany to hire (and fire) unskilled workers at short notice and to adjust the 
labour force to production requirements. Core employees likely submit 
themselves to this regime in return for being offered career perspectives. 
In the case of video-recorder production, after a while core workers would 
be transferred to indirect production (maintenance, repair, quality control) 
and/or to the first-level supervisory positions. Only their work content 
widens as their careers progress. They are the centre of the dynamic teams 
in lean production. 
The term "team" or "work group" in Japan has a different meaning 
than in Western countries. The competence of the group lies in the im-
provement of the process and the setting of new Standards according to 
given rules. They are under the strict supervision of group leaders, who 
are not elected by the members but selected for promotion by manage-
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ment. The more democratic forms of work Organization, discussed in 
Western countries under the catch-label of the semi-autonomous groups, 
have a different character (Jürgens 1992). In Japan participation within 
this hierarchical structure seems not to be as well developed as is often 
assumed. According to a survey by the Japan Productivity Center, among 
30,000 trade union members who were asked about their job satisfaction, 
the complaint "the opinion of employees is not sought to a great enough 
extent" ranked very high among items expressing dissatisfaction.6 
These few examples show that the impact of lean production in Japan 
is coupled with disadvantages for the employees. Lean production is 
embedded in a particular structure and based on the discretionary power 
of the management over employees. The following section discusses 
whether this concept can really be the production concept for the 21 st 
Century. Some "Symptoms of changes", as Tokunaga labels them in his 
contribution, can be identified. 
3. PROBLEMS RELATED TO L E A N PRODUCTION I N JAPAN A N D RESPONSES BY 
THE GOVERNMENT A N D ENTERPRISES 
In the course of Japanese history profound changes in society have often 
been brought about by external pressure (gaiatsu). Today this pressure is 
again increasing. Japan's growing surplus in foreign trade and her domi-
nance world-wide in some industries is a source of conflict with other 
countries. In particular the U.S.A., but also the countries of the European 
Community, not only are increasingly pressing for better access to the Ja-
panese market and the protection of industries endangered by Japanese ex-
ports - or rather by products produced by Japanese companies abroad - , 
they also are calling for the the structural adaptation of the Japanese 
economy itself. The best-known example of this is the Structural Impedi-
ments Initiative (Sil). The growing fear of being excluded from the large, 
newly emerging integrated economic zones in North and Central America 
and Europe seems to be leading to a turnabout in some areas of politics in 
Japan. In the summer of 1992 a new economic plan with the title The 5-year 
Economic Plan: Sharing a Better Quality of Life Around the Globe7 was publish-
6 Those questioned could rate a total of 25 items covering employment and work-
ing conditions. A dissatisfaction index ranged between -3 (dissatisfied) and +3 
(satisfied). With a score of -0.68, the above item ranked third (Nihon Seisansei 
Honbu 1990: 45). 
7 This English version of the lapanese title is from an unpublished translation by 
the Economic Planning Agency. It seems to have been translated with foreign 
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ed by the government. The plan aims at an increase of employees' share in 
the national wealth and at the improvement of living conditions. In con-
junction with this, it is recommended that working hours be reduced to 
1800 hours annually within a couple of years. As such a policy goal had 
been announced even earlier - the Ministry of Labour proclaimed this goal 
of 1800 working hours per year as long ago as 1988 - it could be regarded 
as mere propaganda. However, from the measures which have already be 
partially carried out, it can be concluded that in the long term working 
hours will be reduced signif icantly. In addition to a further reduction in the 
statutory Standard working hours and an increase in the minimum over-
time remuneration8, both regulated in the Labour Standards Law, the Min-
istry of Labour is pushing for new shift models, which do not favour over-
time9, and for other organizational means in order to reduce overtime in-
cluding the so-called "säbisu-zangyö" - the non-paid overtime. Within the 
framework of administrative guidance, advisors of the regional Labour 
Standard Bureaus are to visit all companies. As a supporting measure in 
society in general, the government also plans to gradually introduce the 
5-day week at schools, in order to make it possible for parents to have more 
contact with their children; this wil l also create pressure by the increased 
need for time to look after them (Keizai Kikakuchö 1992:9). Thus it is to be 
expected that in the long term companies wil l have to accept shorter work-
ing hours. 
It is also significant that there has been an increased change in aware-
ness of the population due to the public campaign for a rise in the 
Standard of living and an extension of free time. A n abundance of opin-
ion polls show that free time in relation to work is being awarded 
increasing priority. In 1991, in a representative poll, the Prime Minister's 
Office found that over 60% of the total population and over 70% of 
20-to-34-year-olds would like a reduction in working hours. In 1986 
the rate was still below 50% (Sörifu 1987: 7 and 1992: 6). Needs also 
changed accordingly. Since the mid-1980s, the desire for consumption 
has been waning while the desire for free time is increasing (Sörifu 
readers in mind. The lapanese (Seikatsu taikoku 5 nenkan kikaku - chikyü 
shakai no kyöson o mezashite) is closer to the following translation: Achieving 
the Status of a Quality-of-Life Major Power: Towards Coexistence with the Global 
Society. 
8 As regulated in the Labour Standards Law (Art. 37), overtime payments are still 
low and fixed at 125% the hourly wage. Even in reality enterprises seldom pay 
higher rates (Rödöshö 1991: 52). 
9 Between the end of the day shift and the beginning of night shift are usually 
several hours which are frequently used for overtime. The Ministry is urgening 
companies to revise the scheduling of shifts. 
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1990: 46). This also effects working life. In an opinion poll by the Ja-
panese Federation of Electrical Machine Workers' Unions, over 70% of 
those questioned gave family life and free time precedence over work. 
As in the other polls there was also a strong age correlation. The 
younger the employees, the more preference they give to family life 
and free time over work (Denki Rören Seisaku Chösabu 1990: 24f.). 
Thus it is likely that in the long term companies wil l no longer have 
employees at their disposal to such a strong extent, because the acqui-
escence of the work force is diminishing. 
With regard to environmental policies, there also seems to be a change 
in course. Although, even by international Standards, Japan has carried 
out a very successful environmental policy, particularly in the 1970s after 
the great environmental scandals, new pressure is mounting due to the 
increasing vehicular traffic and quantities of waste which are almost too 
great to cope with. 
By international Standards, the traffic infrastructure in Japan is very 
poorly developed. Due to high costs and shortage of Space in the distribu-
tion system and the well-developed just-in-time (JIT) delivery system, the 
volume of traffic in 1989 had risen considerably compared to 1975, while 
the average load quantity per lorry dropped (Un'yüshö Kabutsu Ryütsü-
kyoku 1991: 27, 61). According to a forecast of the Ministry of Transport, 
up until the turn of the Century there will be a further increase of over 
20% in the total volume of delivery transport. Neither the infrastructure 
nor the labour market can cope with such an increase. The Ministry of 
Transport is now encouraging new logistical concepts, which rely on a 
better use of capacity of lorries and switch to more environmentally 
friendly means of transport such as ship and rail. Corresponding changes 
in the present JIT system are indispensable, i.e., there will be larger stock-
piles and less frequent delivery-cycles. 
The transport problem is aggravated by the employment Situation: A l -
though the working population will increase slightly until the year 2000, 
the number of young workers this sector heavily relies on, is already fal-
ling. If working hours in the transport business could be reduced to the 
proposed 1800 hours per year by the year 2000 (present working hours 
including overtime are on average more than 2800 hours10), a further 
800,000 employees would be necessary, representing an increase of more 
than two-thirds (Un'yüshö Kabutsu Ryütsükyoku 1991: 4). This would 
mean that almost every twelfth employee in Japan would be a transport 
1 0 Studies in this industry based on smaller samples revealed even longer working 
hours, more than 3000 hours per year (Zennihon Torakku Kyökai 1990: 216). 
Tokunaga/Altmann/Demes (1992): New Impacts on Industrial Relations. 
URN: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-100333 
worker. Thus the lean production system would be faced with an even 
more inflated Service sector.11 
Another environmental problem is the amount of waste also caused 
by the product cycles, which are growing shorter and shorter not only in 
the car industry but also in many other industries. In many cases these 
products feature no remarkable innovation, but merely further marginal 
developments and design changes. In some sectors of the electronics in-
dustry, the cycle of new products Coming onto the market has fallen to 
three months (Japan Times, April 9,1992). This trend toward a "wasteful" 
society has now come under criticism. The Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI), for example, has suggested that the product cycle 
should not reduced any more and that it should even be extended in some 
cases (Nikkei Weekly, Feb. 29, 1992). Even here there is a close link to 
working conditions. Frequent changes of products led to working hours 
much longer than average, particularly in product development and other 
indirect departments of companies. The demand for a lengthening of pro-
duct cycles has received support not only from the MITI, but also from 
the trade unions and the Ministry of Labour.1 2 
What is new in these developments is that a change in the strategies 
for the setting of working Standards is becoming apparent. In the past, 
government policies were more strongly aligned to the formation of 
minimum Standards, and differences in opinons between ministries 
blocked improvement initiatives. Moreover, even existing Standards 
have not been enforced in all cases. Government policies today seem 
more to be characterized by the active setting of higher Standards. The 
interests of the different ministries and also of the trade union move-
ment seem to converge. Although the umbrella Organization of the trade 
unions (Rengö) is still weak, as Takagi notes in his paper, with political 
support, its influence could be extended and thereby contribute to an 
improvement in working Standards on the national level. This would 
have a great impact on the dual economic structure and lead to changes 
in subcontracting Systems. 
Even with these new developments on the part of the companies, how-
ever, very different positions are still represented. A n example of this is 
the debate between the vice-president of the Keidanren (Federation of 
Economic Organizations), Morita Akio of Sony, and the president of the 
1 1 A n overview discussion of the future of JIT in Japan is given by Kameyama 
(1991). 
1 2 For example, Rödöshö Shokugyö Anteikyoku (1991: 107) and the discussions 
at the Confederation of Japan Automobile Workers' Unions' Conference on Feb. 
2,1992. 
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Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employers' Associations), Nagano Takeshi 
of Mitsubishi Materials. While Morita, shortly before the annual wage 
negotiations in 1992, maintained that employees should receive a larger 
share of the national wealth and therefore called for wage increases, a 
shortening of working hours and other measures, Nagano argued that 
wealth should be increased by further growth and not by a redistribution 
of present wealth, when Japanese employees are already earning the 
highest incomes worldwide 1 3. Regardless of the controversy, which is 
being closely followed in public, many companies are already reacting to 
the pressure of the labour market as well as the beginning changes in 
policy and are modifying their management and production Systems. 
Although the present economic crisis is having a dampening effect on 
the demand for labour, demographic patterns are clearly showing that 
after a slight increase in the 1990s, a rapid decrease in the labour force is 
to be expected. In addition, the age structure of the labour force is already 
shifting. The number of older employees as a proportion of the labour 
force is rapidly expanding. Companies are in a fierce competition for 
young employees and try to attract them by offering better working con-
ditions. This seems to apply even more to the pioneers of lean production 
in Japan. Despite offering high wages to its employees and being economi-
cally the most successful Company in Japan, Toyota is not highly regarded 
as an employer. Among university graduates in technical subjects, for 
example, it ranges only on the 27th position on the list of most populär 
employers, behind such economically less successful companies such as 
Nissan (17th place) and Honda (7th place) (Ekonomisuto 1992). Honda 
is, perhaps not incidentally the car manufacturer with the shortest work-
ing hours in Japan. 
Some car manufacturers have already drawn their conclusions and are 
trying to create better working conditions in their new factories in order 
to attract employees. Similarities can be drawn with European rationali-
zation strategies. In the modemized or newly built factories of some car 
manufacturers (Mazda in Höfu, Nissan and Toyota on Kyüshü, and in 
Tahara on Honshü) great emphasis is put on the improvement of working 
conditions and working environment.14 They all have a high degree of 
automation of the assembly lines, whereby physically exhausting work 
1 3 For this controversy, cf. the comments of Moriguchi (1992) with reference to the 
consequences for international trade and competition and Miyazaki (1992) from 
the perspective of consumers. A summary of the discussion between Morita and 
Nagano was published in Asahi Shinbun (March 10,1992). 
1 4 The following information has been drawn from newspaper reports (Nikkei 
Weekly, July 7,1992; Japan Times, July 20,1992, and Feb. 4,1992). 
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has also been automated. Chassis of cars are placed on pallet Systems, 
which makes it possible to split up assembly lines and to create sub-as-
sembly lines with differing cycle times. Ergonomic aspects have been 
taken into consideration for the first t ime 1 ; individual pallets can be 
stopped and chassis positions be changed, which ameliorates strenuous 
working postures considerably. Working conditions are further improved 
by noise reduction and longer cycle times. More buffers and storage units 
have been introduced, and the whole factory floor has been enlarged. 
In addition, the shift system is to be changed. Instead of leaving a few 
spare hours between shifts as a buffer, which would usually be used for 
overtime, the shifts wil l in future follow on from each other, which auto-
matically leads to a reduction in overtime. The working environment is 
likewise being improved, with canteens, Sport facilities, etc. According to 
newspaper reports, Toyota and Nissan have invested 50-100% more in 
their new production sites than in the "normal" factories. 
In many respects the new Japanese companies seem to be planned to 
run counter to the concept of lean prodcuction. Many of the above-men-
tioned aspects were already being discussed in Europe several years ago, 
and were taken into consideration by many companies when "humani-
zation of work" was put on the agenda. Nomura (1992) reports that even 
more drastic changes are being discussed at one of the major car manu-
facturers. For example, the concept of reducing muda (waste) by all means 
is to be revised, and a distinction between necessary and unnecessary 
muda is envisioned. This would take some pressure off the employees and 
give them more disposable time. Taking all these changes ahead into con-
sideration, the Japanese production system seems to be on the verge of 
change. 
4. S U M M I N G UP: TOWARDS EUROPEANIZATION? 
Rationalization strategies in Japan and other countries are converging to 
some extent while industrial relations remain divergent. Analyzing some 
recent trends in Japan, signs for change appear to indicate trends toward 
(northern) European concepts of intra-plant rationalization strategy. 
However, it is still uncertain whether this tendency wil l increase and a 
profound transformation wil l occur, whether the almost unlimited discre-
With regard to the ergonomic layout of workplaces, most Japanese car factories 
are under-developed compared to those in other countries. Overhead work, 
work while the production lines are moving, and other forms of work under 
bad conditions are common. 
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tionary power of companies over their employees will finally diminish, 
and whether Japan will really develop from a major industrial power to 
a major power in terms of quality of life. The recent economic crisis wil l 
at least delay this development. However, lean production Japanese style 
will probably take on a different character, as its acceptance among em-
ployees is falling. If, in addition, the strategies of unions and the govern-
ment which aim at the improvement of labour Standards at national level 
are successful, then it can be expected that the dualism in working con-
ditions between large and small companies will dissolve to some extend, 
with profound consequences for the division of labour between compa-
nies. It is thus questionable whether lean production, in the form in which 
it exists in Japan at present, can really be a model for the 21 st Century. 
Japan seems to be bidding it farewell. 
Even if the discussion about new impacts on industrial relations is of 
great importance, in our strong fixation with the large industrialized na-
tions we should not forget that the majority of the world's people are still 
fighting for material existence and the granting of basic human rights. It 
is through the contributions by Tokunaga and Sengenberger in this 
volume that we are reminded of this. 
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